ACL-CPL 00051 Official History of the Indian 1939-45 Post-war occupatioon forces

OFFICIAL HISTORY OF THE INDIAN ARMED 'FORCES
IN THE SECOND WORLD WAR
` 1939-45

POST-WAR OCCUPATION FORCES :
Japan & South-East Asia

General Editor
BIsHESHWAR PRASAD, D.LITT.

COMBINED INTER-SERVICES HISTORICAL SECTION
INDIA & PAKISTAN
1958

Distributors: |
ORIENT LONGMANS

©

PRINTED IN INDIA BY THE JOB PRESS PRIVATE LIMITED, KANPUR, U. P

POST-WAR OCCUPATION FORCES:
JAPAN AND SOUTH-EAST ASIA

RAJENDRA f SINCH
RIGADIER

Edited by
BISHESHWAR PRASAD, D.LITT.

TO ALL WHO SERVED

ERRATA

In Plate II, facing page 27, for “ Indian Contingest-arrives at

Kure” read “ Brindiv arrives at Kure.”

In Plate V, facing page 66, add “ Іп the centre is Field Marshal
Auchinleck.”

In Appendix ‘J’, facing page 310, for “ PART ‘A ’—USSR
Arms Basis " read “ PART * A? User Arms Basis.”

ADVISORY COMMITTEE
CHAIRMAN

Secretary, Ministry of Defence, India

MEMBERS

Dr. Tara CHAND

Dr. S. N. Sen

Pror. K. A. NILAKANTA SASTRI
Pror. MOHAMMAD HABIB

Dr. R. C. MAJUMDAR

GENERAL K. S. THIMAYYA
LIEUT.-GENERAL Sir DupLEeEY RUSSELL
LIEUT.-GENERAL S. P. P. THORAT

MILITARY ADVISER TO THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR PAKISTAN
IN INDIA

SECRETARY

DR. BISHESHWAR PRASAD

vii

CAMPAIGNS IN THE EASTERN THEATRE

CAMPAIGNS IN SouTH-Easr Asia 1941-42
RETREAT FROM Burma 1941-42

ARAKAN OPERATIONS 1942-45

Reconguest or Burma 1942-45, Two VOLUMES

Post-War OCCUPATION Forces: JAPAN AND SOUTH-EAST
ASIA

vii

PREFACE

i have great pleasure in presenting another volume of the
Official History of the Indian Armed Forces in World War п,
"which has been prepared by the Combined Inter-Services Historical
Section which was set up by the Government of India when that
war ended and, after the Partition of India in 1947, was reconsti-

tuted as a joint venture of the two countries—India and
Pakistan.

This Section planned the Official History of the Indian
Armed Forces in the Second World War to appear in about
twenty volumes, besides the seven volumes relating to the medical
aspects of war. These twenty volumes were divided into three
series, viz. campaigns in the eastern theatre, campaigns in the
western theatre and general war administration and organisation.

Three volumes in the series relating to the campaigns in the
eastern theatre have already been published. Unlike those volumes,
the present one describes the responsibility shouldered by the Indian
forces in the military administration of the territories occupied
by the Allied Powers after the cessation of the war in Japan and
South-east Asia. In Japan the Indian Contingent formed part of
the British Commonwealth Occupation Force which was organised
by the countries of the British Commonwealth to co-operate with
the United States forces under the Supreme Commander Allied
Powers, General MacArthur, while in South-east Asia the Indian
forces worked under the control of Lord Mountbatten, the Supreme
Allied Gommander in this area. In both the zones the Indian
Contingent had onerous duties to perform; and with the transfer
of power in India in 1947 these troops were withdrawn.

This volume was written by one of the Editors in the
Combined Inter-Services Historical Section, Lieut.-Colonel (now
Brigadier) Rajendra Singh who had formed part of the Indian
Contingent in Japan and thus had an intimate knowledge of the
events narrated here. To him I acknowledge my indebtedness.
The story is, however, based on the official records which were
made freely available to the Combined Inter-Services Historical
Section. For the statement of facts and the views expressed here
I accept full responsibility.

The volume has been seen in the typescript by Shri H. M. Patel,
.1.С.8., then Secretary, Ministry of Defence, New Delhi; General
S. M. Shrinagesh; Shri B. B. Ghosh, Joint Secretary, Ministry of
Defence, New Delhi; Lieut.-General H. C. H. Robertson, GBE,
DSO, Commander-in-Chief, Headquarters British Commonwealth
Force, Japan; Major-General W. J. Cawthorn; Gavin Long Esq.,
General Editor, Australian Official History of War; Brigadier.
H. B. Latham, Cabinet Historical Section; and Major-General
Orlando Ward, Chief Historical Division, Washington, to whom
my thanks are due. I am indebted to General K. S. Thimayya,
DSO, Dr. R. C. Majumdar, and Professor K. A. Nilakanta Sastri
who read the volume as members of the Advisory Committee and
offered their valuable comments. I am also grateful to Mr. P. N.
Khera for seeing the book through the press, and Mr. T. D. Sharma
for preparing the maps and charts.

In conclusion I acknowledge the encouragement and support
which I have received from the Ministries of Defence, of India

and Pakistan.

New Delhi, BisHESHWAR PRASAD.
October 1958.

CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION

JAPAN
CHAPTER
I. Pre-surrender Period
II. Supreme Command Allied Powers
III. The Allied Control of Japan

IV. The British Commonwealth iod коса
Occupation of Japan

V. Joint Chiefs of Staff Australia
VI. British Commonwealth Occupation Force
VII. Concentration and Move of Brinjap to Japan ..
VIII. British and Indian Troops in Japan ..
IX. Responsibilities of Brindiv in Japan
X. Navy, Air and Divisional Troops
XI. Withdrawal of the Indian Contingent from Japan

SOUTH-EAST ASIA

XII. The Overall Plan i -
XIII. Recovery of Allied Prisoners of War and Internees

XIV. Restoration of Law and Order in French Indo-
China and Thailand after the Defeat of Japan ..

XV. Restoration of Taw and Order in the Netherlands
І East Indies . s

XVI. The Disarming, Concentration and Repatriation
of the Japanese Prisoners of War in South-East
Asia

APPENDICES

INDEX

Page

MAPS AND CHARTS

Facing

Page
Japan and Korea 1
Zones of Occupation Japan and Korea - 10
Diagram showing relationship of JCOSA and
Australian defence machinery for consideration of
BCOF matters 36
Diagram showing channels of communication
authorised for BCOF 55
Diagram showing channels of communication
authorised for officers nominated as representatives
of National Contingent 95
Southern Japan dispositions of British Common-
wealth Occupation Force as in June 1946 100
Southern Japan dispositions of British Common-
wealth Occupation Force as on Ist March 1947 .. 105
Part map of Japan (Southern Honshu and ME
showing roads with capacities BCOF area 109
South-East Asia - Я sä 169
French Indo-China s ae Page 198
Netherlands East Indies .. T Facing Page 221

ILLUSTRATIONS

Major-General D. T. Cowan, Commander Pom

Indian Contingent arrives at Kure

March through Kure ..

RIAF in Japan

RIN in Kure

268 (Ind) Brigade and Battalion Commanders

4Squadron ТАЕ ..

Major-General Cowan with 3 V. Cs. of Brinjap, Jemadar
Gaje Ghale, Naik Agansing Rai and Namdeo Jadhao

268 Brigade Group Staff

Brigadier (later General) K. S. Thimayya, ‘Commander
268 Indian Brigade

Brigadier (later General) S. M. Shrinagesh, ‘Commander
268 Indian Brigade

Scenes of Earthquake, December 1946

Resettlement Training

Japan meets India

Indian Troops in Etajima

Admiral the Lord Louis Mountbatten, Supreme Allied
Commander SEA, reading a message from His Majesty
the King after the surrender of Japan...

Lieut.-General Sir Philip Christison, Allied Force Com-
mander in Netherlands East Indies

Lieut.-General E. C. Mansergh, Allied Force Commander
in Netherlands East Indies

Lady Mountbatten, Chief Superintendent, Nursing Divi-
sion, St. John Ambulance, eee to some im a did

of war

Lady Mountbatten talking to a ‘patient in a hospital i in
Saigon

Major-General G. C. Evans, Commander 7 Indian
Division

Major-General O de ж, Lovett, Commander 7 Indian
Division

Major-General D. D. Gracey, ‘Commander 20 Indian
Division

Major-General D. C. Hawthorn, Commander 23 Indian
Division

Major-General Cawthorn, representative of C-in-C India
on Joint Chiefs of Staff, Australia

Major-General H. N. Chambers, Commander 26 Indian
Division

Resettlement Training of Repatriates is ға

xiii

BRICOSAT
Brindiv
Brinjap

BT

CIEME
CRE

DADPR
DIC
Div Tps

ABBREVIATIONS

Assistant Adjutant.

Allied Control Council.

Australian Commonwealth Navy Board.
Allied Commander South-East Asia.
Aide-de-Camp.

Allied Forces Headquarters.

Allied Land Command Netherlands East Indies.
Allied Land Forces French Indo-China.
Allied Land Forces Netherlands East-Indies.
Allied Land Forces South-East Asia.

Allied Land Forces Siam.

Allied Military Government.

Allied Military Government Region.

Allied Military Government Occupied Territory
Australian Military Force.

Army Post Office.

Allied Prisoners of War and Internees.
Australian.

British Armed Forces Special Vouchers.
British Commonwealth.

Air Command of BCOF.

British Commonwealth Occupation Force.
Brigade Group.

Brigade Education Officer.

British Overseas Airlines Corporation.
British Other Ranks.

British Commonwealth Sub-Area Tokyo.
British Indian Division.

British Indian Troops in Japan.

British Troops.

Commander, Indian Electrical and Mechanical
Engineers.
Commander Royal Engineers.

Deputy Assistant Director Public Relations.
Colonial Infantry Division.
Divisional Troops.

XV

KNIP
KT

Madras SM.

Director Medical Services.
Director Public Relations.

Electrical and Mechanical Engineers.
Entertainments National Service Association.

First Aid Nursing Yeomanry.

Far Eastern Allied Commission.
Field and Fortress.

Field Controller Military Accounts.
Frontier Force.

French Indo-China.

General Headquarters.

Hikari Kikan ( Japanese Intelligence Organisa-
tion).

His Majesty's Indian Ship.

His Majesty's Ship.

His Majesty's Troopship.

Headquarters.

Indian Artillery.

Indian Air Formation Signals.

Indian Army Medical Corps.

Corps of Indian Engineers.

Corps of Indian Electrical and Mechanical
Engineers.

Independent Mixed Brigade.

Indian National Army.

Indian.

Infantry.

Indian Salvage and Local Disposal.

Joint Chiefs Planning Staff.
joint Chiefs of Staff Australia.
Japanese Fifth Columnists (also for INA).

Komite Nasional Indonesia Poesat.
Kempei Tai (Japanese Intelligence Organisa-
tion).

Madras Sappers and Miners.

xvi

Netherlands East Indies.

Netherlands Indies Civil Affairs Organisation.
New Zealand.

New Zealand Military Force.

Other Ranks.
Office of Strategic Services.

Prisoners of War.

Pacific Air Command, United States Army.
Public Relations.

Public Relations Officers.

Quartermaster General.
Queen Victoria's Own.

Royal Artillery.

Royal Australian Air Force.

Royal Air Force.

Repatriation (or Recovery) of Allied Prisoners
of War and Internees.

Royal Australian Navy.

Royal Army Service Corps.

Regiment.

Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers.

Royal Gurkha Rifles.

Royal Indian Artillery.

Royal Indian Air Force.

Royal Indian Army Service Corps.

Colonial Infantry Regiment.

Royal Indian Engineers,

Royal Navy.

Royai New Zealand Air Force.

Supreme Allied Commander South-East Asia.

Special Army Service.

Supreme Command Allied Powers.

South-East Asia Command.

Staff Officer.

Sailors, Soldiers and Airmen Families Associa-
tion.

Sailors, Soldiers and Airmen Home Association.

Squadron.

South Wales Borderers.

South-West Pacific Area.

СА

TKR

UK
UKINDEL
USSR

vc
VCOs
VIPs
Vj

WAS
WAS(B)
WIS
WVC(I)
WVC(UK)

People’s Protection Army (Tentara Keamanon
Rakyat later changed to TKI.)

United Kingdom.
United Kingdom/Indian Element.
Union of Socialist Soviet Republics.

Victoria Cross.

Viceroy’s Commissioned Officers.
Very Important Persons.

Victory over Japan.

Women’s Auxiliary Service.

Women’s Auxiliary Service (British).

Weekly Intelligence Summary.

Women’s Voluntary Corps (India). |
Women's Voluntary Corps (United Kingdom).

INTRODUCTION

Japan entered the war with the stunning blow of Pearl
' Harbour. Similarly, the United States closed the scene by atomic
explosions of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. But neither the opening
of the armageddon nor its conclusion was as sudden as it appears
to be. The beginning of Japanese aggression in China and the
interest evinced by the United States in limiting the sphere of
Japanese economic expansionism had made inevitable a conflict
between the two great naval Pacific Powers. The war in Europe
and the easy victories of Nazi Germany in its earlier phases brought
the clash nearer, for the militarists of Japan could have no better
opportunity of ensuring their naval security in the Pacific and
bringing under their control the economic resources of the South-
west Pacific than when the United States and Great Britain were
involved in a war in Europe and their more numerous and stronger
fleets were dispersed over the distant seas. British diplomatic
activity had been directed in Tokyo from the very commence-
ment of the war, if not before that, towards keeping thc
kingdom of the Mikados away from the global conflict; and
appreciations did not fail to take cognizance of the hostile attitude
of the castern imperialist. But actual hostilities took long to
begin. The occupation of Indo-China by the Japanese forces in
collusion with the Vichy Government of France evoked counter-
vailing measures by the United States and her Allies. These
reacted further on the bellicosity of the Japanese militarists, and,
when diplomacy failed to close the widening gap, Japanese navy
enacted the Pearl Harbour to cripple the United States Navy
and thereby gained a respite for her plans of closing the Pacific
from the south-west. Her immediate successes were spectacular
and for the moment she had swept the Pacific waves of Anglo-
American ships of war, had annexed its land fringes on the southern
and western sides and brought within her grips the vast economic
resources and the fields of oil and mineral supplies of Burma,
Malaya and the Netherlands East Indies.

This concurrence of Japanese victories with the successes of
her Axis partners in Europe created a complex problem for the
Allies whose war potential, though mighty, could not cope with
the situation. But soon the war machinery in the United States
and the British Empire was geared to the needs, and their giant
productive capacity was harnessed to turn out a stream of men

хіх

and armaments, battle-ships and planes, to stem back the tide of
Axis aggression. By the end of 1943 the ultimate defeat of Japan
had become a certainty, though it took more than twelve months
to drive her armed forces back from the vast periphery which
encroached on the preserves of western imperialisms. The two-
pronged attack, landward from India, and seaward in the Pacific
islands by the United States navy, was slowly but steadily battering
its way to the core of the Japanese Empire. The frustration of
Japanese invasion of Imphal in the spring of 1944 by the Indian
forces and the capture of Okinawa and Iwo Jima by the American
marines, paved the way for the ultimate surrender of Emperor
Hirohito and his cabinet.

Japan's economy was not up to the strain of a long and
exhausting war. The mainland did neither produce enough food
for the growing population nor had a sufficiency in mineral resources
to feed the war industries. ОН and steel were both in short supply.
As long therefore as Manchuria and the vast region of ‘ Eastern
Asia Co-prosperity Sphere" could be maintained in direct contact
with the homeland and their products exploited, the Japanese
offensive could proceed unabated. But the moment the United
States had pierced the line of island defence in the Pacifie, the
communications with Indo-China, Malaya and Netherlands were
intercepted and the Japanese mainland faced a continuous barrage
of air bombing. Industry was crippled, food resources were
depleted and the timber and paper cities of Japan were burnt to
ashes. Нег “ productive machinery was approaching paralysis
as a result of a shortage or complete lack of almost everything. Air
raids and blockade had compressed steel fingers around the
economic throat of the nation °.” The production of planes had
fallen from the peak figure of 2,857 during the month of June 1944
to only about 1,000 in July 1945. Her naval fleet had been practi-
cally wiped out in the battles of the Philippine Sea and Leyte Gulf
and by air attacks in the Inland Sea. The food situation was
growing critical and malnutrition was sapping the “© nation's war
potential" and affecting human efficiency. Black-marketing was
prevalent and embraced not only the supply of food but of clothing,
shoes and other necessaries oflife. Allied air attacks had disrupted
the country's transport system. Shortage of fuel was causing a
feeling of dismay at the prospect of a cold winter. To add to the
grimness of this story may be calculated the loss in personnel and
property by the ever-recurring air raids which had destroyed or
badly damaged about 100 cities and had accounted at a minimum

! Masuo Kato: The Lost War, p. 13.

хх

for a loss of 280,000 men in killed and 4,20,000 in injured. No less
than 95,00,000 persons had been rendered homeless losing practi-
cally all they possessed. The consciousness of inevitable defeat
was there but the spirit of the people had been kept up by the
propaganda that they would go down fighting a glorious war to
the last man. Preparations were on foot in 1945 for the defence of
the homeland and farmers were busy on the vulnerable coast-line
putting up walls and preparing an “iron ring ”.

This propaganda front, however, was hollow from within.
The Suzuki Cabinet from the day of its installation in office had
been looking for a way out of the war. Their determination was
reinforced by the Russian notification in April 1945 to terminate
the neutrality agreement which had “‘ lost its significance ". The
German defeat in Europe made Japan apprehensive of Soviet entry
into the war in the east. And, in the words of Kato, “‘ Japan's
number-one diplomatic job from that moment on was to find some
new basis for an understanding with Russia that would prevent her
from joining the Allies in the Pacific war ".^ Not only were talks
begun with Russia for a new agreement, but even the proposal
was made for the Soviet to “ act as a mediator in bringing the
war with the Allies to a close". Even a peace feeler was trans-
mitted to America by the Japanese representative in Switzerland.
Soon after, the Potsdam Declaration of the three supreme Allied
heads issued on 26 July 1945 paved the way for the acceptance of
defeat and the surrender of Japan. The Declaration was considered
but not rejected, though a section in the Government desired to
interpose certain conditions affecting the occupation and trial of
war criminals. But the suspense did not last long when the
United States used the atom bombto breakit and Russia chose to
declare war against Japan on August 8, to shatter the will of the
people. The war party had not lost its enthusiasm completely
and in the army there was still a group which was prepared even
for a coup de main to prevent the pacifist Suzuki from accepting the
demand for surrender. But all opposition was drowned by the
Emperor’s determination to end the war when he spoke to his
people on the radio for the first time on 15 August. Japan had
lost the war and was prepared for peace, but a negotiated peace
with all its preliminaries of truce and armistice did not square with
the objcets of the United States, and the new weapon of destruction
was employed, not to secure the end of war but the unconditional
surrender of the Japanese people and the occupation of their land
by the Allied forces. The purpose was not peace alone, but the

2 Ibid p. 231.

moulding of Japanese will and psychology for all times and training
that people in the ways of democracy. Surrender was thus to be
followed by a period of occupation and military government by
the Allies.

After the first World War also certain territories of the
defeated Powers had been occupied by the British, French or
American forces and a form of military administration had been
established. But early in World War II except for the opening
of the School of Military Government by the United States in
Charlottesville, Virginia, in May 1942, for the training of officers
for civil affairs and liaison, no preparations appear to have been
made by any of the Allied Powers for the disposal of Axis posses-
sions during the “ post-hostilities period ". Nor had any concrete
peace aims been declared beyond the general principles contained
in the Atlantic Charter. However, in January 1943 after his
mecting at Casablanca with Prime Minister Churchill, President
Roosevelt ‘‘ announced unconditional surrender as the only terms
on which the United States would deal with the Axis Powers °°.3
This principle was applied first in the case of Italy which surren-
dered on 3 September 1943. The document signed by General
Eisenhower, which offered military armistice, specified the right
of the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Forces firstly to '* establish
Allied Military Government over such parts of Italian territory as
he may deem necessary in the military interests of the Allied
Nations", and secondly ‘‘to impose measures of disarmament,
demobilization and demilitarization’’. By another document
signed on 29 September 1943 the conditions of such military
control were fully defined. But apart from defascization which
involved the surrender of Mussolini and his Fascist collaborators,
Italy did not experience the full weight of military occupation. It
was so because of the formation of Government by Badoglio and
the administration of Italy as a co-operator in the war against
Germany. Owing to the existence of an established government
there and its recognition by the Allied Powers, military government
was enforced only in such areas as were required for the purpose
of prosecuting war against Germany. Nevertheless, the Moscow
Declarations of 1 November 1943 enunciated the object of Allied
policy towards Italy, which it was announced, “ must be based
upon the fundamental principle that Fascism and all its evil in-
fluences and emanations shall be utterly destroyed and that the
Italian people shall be given every opportunity to establish govern-
mental and other institutions based upon democratic principles ”.

5 Hajo Holborn: American Military Government, p. 16.

E

An Advisory Council of the representatives of the Governments of
the United Kingdom, Russia, United States, French Committee
of National Liberation and Greece and Yugoslavia was also set
up to deal with all day to day questions, other than military opera-
tions, and co-ordinate Allied policy in regard to Italy. Italian
example could not, however, be effective in the case of other Axis
partners who were dealt with not as co-operators but as enemies
whose unconditional surrender and complete transformation from
totalitarianism was desired. But the object of occupation remained
the same everywhere, and the measures outlined at Moscow were
followed in their essentials in Japan or Germany.

Germany's turn came next. As early as 1 November 1944,
Moscow Declarations took cognizance of German atrocities and
threatened punishment of war criminals. But it was at the Crimea
Conference in February 1945, that the post-hostilities policy towards
Germany was determined. On her unconditional surrender and
cessation of armed resistance, Germany was to be occupied by the
forces of the three Powers and France, cach occupying a separate
zone. Co-ordination was to be secured by a central control com-
mission consisting of the Supreme Commanders of the three Powers
with its headquarters in Berlin. The purpose of such military
occupation was “‘ to destroy German militarism and Nazism and
to ensure that Germany will never again be able to disturb the
peace of the world ". To secure this object it was declared: ** We
are determined to disarm and disband all German armed forces;
break up for all time the German General Staff that has repeatedly
contrived the resurgence of German militarism; remove or destroy
all German military equipment; eliminate or control all German
industry that could be used for military production; bring all
war criminals to just and swift punishment and exact reparation
in kind for the destruction wrought by the Germans; wipe out the
Nazi Party, Nazi laws, organizations and institutions, remove all
Nazi and militarist influences from public office and from the
cultural and economic life of the German people; and take in
harmony such other measures in Germany as may be necessary to
the future peace and safety of the world. It is not our purpose
to destroy the people of Germany, but only when Nazism and
militarism have been extirpated will there be hope for a decent
life for Germans, and a place for them іп the comity of nations "'.*
The occupation thus would not be for any momentary object
such as exacting an armistice but was for a permanent purpose
of ensuring peace in the world for all times by preventing “ Germany

4 Ibid, Appendix VI, pp 154-5.

from ever again becoming a threat to the peace of the world ”,5
It was also made clear that Germany would be occupied “аз a
defeated enemy nation ” and not “ for the purpose of liberation ".
An essential aspect of the occupation was to effect “ the decentral-
lization of the political and administrative structure and the
development of local responsibility **.

Before we proceed to the analysis of the principles and
measures for the occupation of Japan, it may be useful to examine
the method of Allied military government in Germany. With
the surrender on 8 May, Germany had no central government
or authority “ capable of accepting responsibility for the main-
tenance of order, the administration of the countryandcompliance
with the requirements of the victorious Powers". Hence the
Allied Supreme Commands assumed ** supreme authority ° which
encompassed every aspect of civil or military government. Holborn
has rightly interpreted the declaration to imply determining the
law for the Germans without recognizing any internal political
authority. The authority thus assumed was a “common res-
ponsibility " to be exercised in concert by the four Powers. The
Allied Control Council was established as an instrument to achieve
this object. Demilitarization of the country and exaction of the
reparations were its main functions. But in the matter of occupa-
tion the principle of separatism or individuality had full sway.
The country was divided into four zones, each under the military
occupation of one of these four Powers. "Though initially zones
were created merely for convenience of Allied administration yet
gradually these introduced virtually a “ political partition of
Germany ", and the Control Council lapsed into a mere formal
gathering of the representatives of the Powers to determine general
policies which did not always govern practice. No central govern-
ment was created in Germany and the lack of cohesion among the
occupying Powers led to the development of diverse policies and
methods for the ''democratisation of Germany". Economic
and other controls enunciated at the Potsdam Conference could
not be given effect to uniformly, and the political system which had
evolved as a result of occupation had contributed to decentraliza-
tion and dualism. Occupation has also led to friction between
the western and eastern occupation authorities and has been one
of the most potent post-war international irritants.

5 Directive to C-in-C United States Forces, Holborn, p. 159.

$ Ibid p. 158.

? Holborn, Appendix X, The Declaration of Berlin 5 June 1945, p 173.
8 Holborn, p. 33. !

XXIV

Principles on which occupation was to be carried out were
defined by the three national leaders, Churchill Stalin, and
Truman, at the Potsdam Conference in August 1945. These
provided for the complete elimination of all weapons of war and
the means of their production, the abolition of the National
Socialist Party and a “ complete purge ” of all its members, con-
vincing the German people of their total defeat and guilt for war,
and finally for measures to train the Germans in the “ democratic
and peaceful ways of life". "These objects were sought to be
achieved by the repeal of all Nazi legislation discriminating between
races and people, by the trial and punishment of all war criminals,
by inculcating democratic ideas and establishing an impartial
judiciary and creating local government institutions. The Allied
Control Council was definitely desired to take effective measures
for the gradual democratisation of Germany for which local self-
government and other democratic techniques were to be employed.
Re-establishment of the elective principle, initially in the sphere
of local government, and the restoration of frecdom of speech and
vote were to be used as methods for this consummation. The
whole idea was to build up the edifice of democratic government
from the bottom and inthe absence of a central indigenous
authority, the training in self-government of the German people
was to begin in the sphere of local government only.

The Allied Control Council also created a number of adminis-
trative departments, manned by Germans, to assist it in general
supervision. These related to finance, transport, communications,
foreign trade and industry and provided a substitute for a central
administration. The Council was also entrusted with certain
economic responsibilities, which related to the reconstruction of
German economic life on an agricultural basis. All industry
connected with war was forbidden, and all “unneeded productive
capacity ", measured in terms of the lower standard of living of the
German people, was to be removed and utilised for the payment
of reparations. The denudation of German industrial potential
and the agrarianisation of her whole economy were believed to
be the best correctives against future militarism of the people.
However, there was no intention to efface German nationality or
to condemn the people to political helotage, for, at Potsdam,
solicitude was expressed for treating them ''fairly and without
discrimination" and for handing over the entire administrative
machinery to them gradually. Rapidly changing conditions made
complete adherence to those policies and programmes impracti-
cable; nevertheless, these provided a model for occupation policy
in Japan.

Before Japan had surrendered, as has been mentioned earlier,
the heads of the three Allied states, the United States, Great Britain
and the Republic of China, had outlined at Potsdam on 26 July
1945 the terms on which Japan could expect the cessation of war,
These called for the complete elimination, for all times, of “‘ the
authority and influence of those who have deceived and misled the
people of Japan into embarking on world conquest ". This was
believed to be essential for establishing in the world “‘ a new order
of peace, security and justice " which would be incompatible with
“irresponsible militarism ". No mention was made in it of the
Emperor specifically, but his advisers and all leaders of the army,
navy and war governments were to be ousted from all positions of
power and influence. Next was announced the desire to occupy
** points.in Japanese territory " until such time as the new order
was established and convincing proof was available that the “© war-
making power ’’ of Japan had been destroyed. These were the
** basic objectives " of occupation. The Potsdam Declaration also
limited Japanese territory to the four islands of the mainland.
No other limitations were imposed. It was further declared that
the Japanese forces after being disarmed would be returned to
their homes and opportunity would be afforded to them “ to lead
peaceful and productive lives". Beyond the punishment of war
criminals, there was no retribution or intention to enslave the
Japanese people or to destroy their nationality. The Japanese
Government was exhorted to ‘‘ remove all obstacles to the revival
and strengthening of democratic tendencies among the Japanese
people " and to establish *' freedom of speech, of religion, and of
thought, as well as respect for the fundamental human rights ”.
Only such industries as had war significance and would enable
Japan to rearm were to be forbidden, but other industries “ as will
sustain her economy and permit the exaction of just reparations in
kind " were to be maintained and access to raw materials was to be
permitted. The duration of the occupation was also defined in
a clause which laid down that ** the occupying forces of the Allied
shall be withdrawn from Japan as soon as these objectives have been
accomplished and there has been established in accordance with
the freely expressed will of the Japansese people a peacefully
inclined and responsible government". This Declaration, mild
yet firm, was accepted by the Japanese Government and the
instrument of surrender was signed on 2 September 1945.

The United States having the sole control of war in the
Pacific, Japan, unlike Germany, was initially occupied by the
United States forces only and was saved from partition which is
incidental to zonal occupation by diverse Powers. The United

XXVI

States Government was also keen to retain unity of control in

Japan and not share power or responsibility with other members
of the United Nations. Thus, while the form of United Nations
authority was kept up by instituting advisory organisations, supreme
control vested in the United States Government and was exercised
without restraint or interference by its representative, General
MacArthur, who was designated the Supreme Commander for the
Allied Powers. That Government had also defined its occupation
policy in a Directive issued by the President to the Supreme Com-
mander Allied Powers on 6 September 1945, when the instrument
of surrender was signed. "Though the occupation was considered
to have the “ character of an operation on behalf of the principal
Allied Powers acting in the interests of the United Nations at war
with Тарап” and the forces of those powers were invited to parti-
cipate in the occupation, all such forces were to be under the
command of the “ Supreme Commander designated by the United
States". It was also clearly mentioned that while every effort
would be made to formulate policies by common consultation and

* the constitution of appropriate advisory bodies", in the event

of difference of opinion, ''the policies of the United States will

govern"'. These limitations on Allied control were imposed to

achieve a unity of command and to prevent the repetition of divided

authority as in Germany and Austria.

In the Directive of 6 September 1945, the United States
had defined ultimate objectives of occupation, the mode and
extent of Allied authority and the political and economic pro-
gramme of occupation. "This Directive together with the principles
enunciated at Potsdam became the basis of Allied occupation
policy in Japan. The ultimate United States objectives were laid
down as:

**a. To insure that Japan will not again become a menace
to the United States or to the peace and security of the
world. - '

“b. To bring about the eventual establishment of a peaceful
and responsible government which will respect the rights
of other states and will support the objectives of the
United States as reflected in the ideals and principles of the
Charter of the United Nations. The United States
desires that this government should conform as closely
as may be to the principles of democratic self-government
but it is not the responsibility of the Allied Powers to
impose upon Japan any form of government not suppor-
ted by the freely expressed will of the people ”.

xxvii

The above objectives were to be achieved by limiting the
sovereignty of Japan to the mainislands, completely disarming and
demilitarising the country, encouraging the Japanese people *' to
develop a desire for individual liberties and respect for fundamental
human rights", particularly freedom of speech, thought and
religion, and affording them an opportunity to develop their
economy for the peaceful needs of the community. Disarmament
and demilitarisation were the primary tasks of military occupation
and were to be carried out promptly and with determination.
Japan was not allowed to have any army, navy, air force, secret
police organisation or civil aviation. All ground, naval and air
forces were to be disbanded and the General Headquarters and the
General Staff were to be dissolved. Ali naval and military material
as well as installations were to be handed over to the Supreme
Commander. High officials of the General Headquarters and
General Staff, high naval and military officials, and leaders of
ultra-nationalist and militarist organisations were to be taken
into custody and all such institutions were to be dissolved and
prohibited. Constructively, freedom of worship and formation
of political parties were to be encouraged. The Japanese people
were also to be afforded an opprotunity “ to become familiar with
the history, institutions, culture and the accomplishments of the
United States and other democracies’’. For this purpose associa-
tion of Japanese people with the personnel of the occupation forces
was to be provided. Judicial, legal and police systems were also
to be reformed and all discriminatory laws were to be abrogated.
In the economic field, the whole industrial basis of “ Japanese
military strength" was to “ be destroyed and not permitted to
revive". But organisations of labour, industry or agriculture with
a democratic basis were to be encouraged. All economic activity
with a bias towards *'the peaceful disposition of the Japanese
people " was to be supported and reconstructed. Japan was also
expected to provide goods and services for the needs of the occupy-
ing forces but to the extent that her people would not be exposed
to starvation, disease or acute physical distress. The Japanese
authorities were themselves made responsible for establishing and
administering controls over their economic activities. In the
Directive provision was made for reparations, monetary and banking
policies, and international trade etc. Control was to be main-
tained over exports and imports, and their administration was to
be subject to the approval and supervision of the Supreme
Commander.

An important departure from German occupation was in
respect of the continuance of the Japanese central authority.

ase

xxvii

The Supreme Commander was required to “ exercise his authority
through Japanese governmental machinery and agencies, in-
cluding the Emperor, to the extent that this satisfactorily байл
United States objectives". Hence the Japanese Government was
permitted under the instructions of the Supreme Commander
* to exercise the normal powers of government in matters of
domestic administration". In other words, “the authority of
the Emperor and the Japanese Government” was subject to
control by the Supreme Commander who alone possessed “ all
powers necessary to effectuate the surrender terms and to carry
out the policies established for the conduct of the occupation and
the control of Japan ". The policy was to use the existing form
of government in Japan, though not to support it. Consequently,
the continuity of government could be possible there and no
lacunae did arise as in Germany. This made easy the administra-
tion of military occupation and secured the United States objectives
more expeditiously.

It has been mentioned earlier that the military occupation
of Japan had the character of an Allied operation and that the
armed forces of the other Allied states were also invited to join
in its enforcement. Of course co-operation was to be in a subordi-
nate capacity for all control and command vested in the American
Supreme Commander who would execute the directives issued to
him by the American Joint Chiefs of Staff. However, advisory
bodies were to be formed for establishing policies. The American
Government was keen to have such co-operation and established a
Far Eastern Advisory Commission with the function of making
“ recommendations to the participating governments" on some
matters without having any controling powers. According to
Holborn, “‘ the Far Eastern Advisory Commission, as proposed оп
August 21, 1945, was a rather weak instrument for reaching such
political agreements, the more so since its establishment would not
provide any clear system of regular information to its members
by the United States Government. The proposed Far Eastern
Advisory Commission would have contributed merely a forum for
the exchange of views ".? This system had the merit of preserving
“ unity of command over the actual operations of American military
government in Japan". And the American view was that nothing
should be done which would in any manner weaken the authority
of General MacArthur who had been accepted by the other Allied
Powers as Supreme Commander. Any tampering of his actions
by an Allied Control Council or any hindrance to the United

9 Holborn, p. 95.

States, Government in giving him “ adequate policy guidance ”,
would, according to Holborn, have opened the gates “to the
same elements of political disunity and ensuing stagnation that had
marred the occupations of Germany and Austria".'?^ The United
States did not desire any serious limitation in her powers to control
the military occupation of Japan, for in the Pacific and in so
important a base as Japan, the United States did not want any
powerful partners. Hence, the machinery for Allied participation
had to be weak, ineffective and limited in the extent and scope
of its controlling authority. But such a machinery could not be
acceptable to the other Allied Powers. The Far Eastern Advisory
Commission could not suit their conception of inter-Allied co-opera-
tion. Britain and China had misgivings about it, and Soviet
Russia declined to join it in September 1945. Invitations
were then issued to Australia, Canada, France, India, the Nether-
lands, New Zealand and the Philippines to join. The first-meeting
of the enlarged Far Eastern Advisory Commission was held in
Washington on 30 October 1945, and the members were taken to
Japan in December to review the conditions there. But even
before they had reached Japan, the Moscow Conference had decided
on replacing the Commission by the Far Eastern Commission.

The new Far Eastern Commission was a “ body of higher
political standing than its predecessor "." It was to be composed
of one representative each of the participating governments, viz.
the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics, the United Kingdom,
the United States, China, France, the Netherlands, Canada,
Australia, New Zealand, India and the Philippines: Its functions
were defined to be:

1. “То formulate the policies, principles, and standards in
conformity with which the fulfilment by Japan of its
obligations under the Terms of Surrender may be
accomplished.

2. “То review, on the request of any member; any directive
issued to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers
or any action taken by theSupreme Commander involving
policy decisions within the jurisdiction of the Commission °°.

The Commission had no power to make “ recommendations
with regard to the conduct of military operations" or territorial
adjustments and was bound to “ respect existing control machinery
in Japan". The policy decisions of the Commission were to be

тө Ibid p. 95.
и Thid p. 96.

interpreted by the United States Government in the form of
directives issued to the Supreme Commander who was bound to
implement them. But such directives could be reviewed by the
Gommission. Thus theoretically the Commission was vested with
the “ ultimate power for the determination of general policy”,
but in actual practice the policies adopted by the Commission were
formulated into directives for the Supreme Commander Allied
Power (SCAP) by the State, War and Navy Department Co-ordi-
nating Committee of the United States Government which also
served the Joint Chiefs of Staff in formulating their policies
into directives for the Supreme Commander. The result was that
while the Allied Powers had “а part in mapping out plans for
occupied Japan, the fact that they were channeled through wholly
American agencies subjected the outcome to dominant American

33 із

ideas "'.

The Supreme Commander was initially without any check
on his authority, but the Moscow Conference instituted an Allied
Council for Japan in Tokyo under the Chairmanship of thc
Supreme Commander or his Deputy.“ for the purpose of consulting
with and advising the Supreme Commander in regard to the
implementation of the Terms of Surrender, the occupation and
control of Japan, and of directives supplementary thereto; and
for the purpose of exercising the control authority herein granted ”.
The Council was to be composed of the Supreme Commander who
was its Chairman and the United States member, a member each
for USSR and China, and one member representing jointly the
United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand and India. This
Council was to meet once every two weeks. All orders for the
implementation of the Terms of Surrender were issued by the
Supreme Commander, who was the ‘sole executive authority’,
but he was required to “ consult and advise with the Council in
advance of the issuance of orders on matters of substance, the,
exigencies of the situation permitting ". But in respect of funda-
mental changes in the structure of Japanese constitution or change
` in the Japanese government as a whole, any disagreement with
the members of the Council would involve suspension of orders
and reference to the Far Eastern Commission. But this did not
affect changes of individual Ministers or filling of vacancies in the
Cabinet there. However, General MacArthur is reported to have
“ strictly construed this grant of power to the Allied Council and

ээ 19

refused to be controlled by it".

12 Floyd A. Cave: Origins and Consequences of World War II, p. 565.
13 Ibid.

хххі

Within this framework of Allied supervision and American
execution of occupation policies, the British Commonwealth Occu-
pation Force was invited to participate in the military occupation
of Japan. Among the four Powers constituting the Allied Council,
the USSR and China had no share in the actual occupation and
their forces did not come into Japan. Initially, the United States
had the control of the whole mainland of Japan and with her
forces initiated the new regime of military government. But soon
after the British Commenwealth agreed to participate by sending
the Occupation Force, which had to work under the supreme
command of General MacArthur and had limited functions and
restricted authority within the areas allotted to it. The British
Commonwealth Occupation Force had no responsibility for policy
formulation but had merely to execute the directives issued to it by
the Supreme Commander for Allied Powers. The chain of com-
mand was linked to the United States chain of command
though in its internal affairs of administration and discipline,
each one of the component elements was autonomous. Their
subordination to Supreme Commander for Allied Powers extended
to the enforcement of occupation policies and execution of SCAP
directives or in matters which brought the Force into contact with
the Japanese people or their Government.

The British. Commonwealth Occupation Force was itself
an integrated force composed of the elements of the Armed Forces
of Australia, India, New Zealand and the United Kingdom.
Apparently the intention was to demonstrate the solidarity of the
British Commonwealth, on which basis Great Britian sought the co-
operation of other members of the Commonwealth in participating
in the occupation of Japan. Australia also was eager to supervise
the changeover of Japan from totalitarianism to democracy in view
of her vital Pacific interests. India was not a free agent then
and responded to the call of the United Kingdom. Thus a force
was raised and sent to Japan early in 1946 under the command of
an Australian Gommander-in-Chief and to this force was allotted
a part of the Japanse territory for military occupation and govern-
ment under the control, supervision and authority of the Supreme
Commander for the Allied Powers in Japan. A joint organisation
known as Joint Ghiefs of Staff Australia (JOOSA) was set up in
Australia for the discussion and determination of common matters
and that represented the defence authorities of the various compo-
nent states. But the COSA had to function in most cases through
the Australian Defence Department, which caused friction
and occasional protests by the representatives of the other
Commonwealth countries. In Japan, however, the integration of

XXXII

forces had a smooth working and the BCOF could function effec-
tively within its limited sphere.

The main function of the occupation forces was to destroy
Japan's capacity to. make war and for that purpose a dual
programme of disarmament and democratisation had been outlined.
Rapid progress had been made in realising the first objective, which
was facilitated and greatly expedited by the continuance of the
Japanese Government and the prestige which attached to the
Emperor. ''Under orders of the Supreme Commander, the
Japanese Government dissolved the Imperial General Headquarters
and disarmed and demobilized the armed forces located in Japan ”.
Armies outside Japan were disarmed by the local Allied commanders
and sent back to Japan. The demobilized soldiers soon settled
into peaceful avocations. The war material was also quickly
destroyed, for the Japanse made no effort to hide it. "Thus the
task of demilitarising Japan was completed within a few months
and when the British. Commonwealth Occupation Force and
particularly the Indian Contingent assumed their duties, little
was left to be done to accomplish this objective.

The process of democratisation however was a long one
though in this field also success was both rapid and appreciable.
The task of eliminating persons guilty of.war crimes was not
difficult. The Government organised a purge and carried out
orders of SCAP most zealously. All persons suspected of pro-Fascist
leanings were removed from office, all anti-democratic organisa-
tions were abolished and the secret police was demobilised. But the
positive advance towards a democratic psychology and constitu-
tional and social set-up was necessarily a long process. But even
in this direction some progress had been made early. Immediately
after occupation, the Supreme Commander issued a directive
ordering the release of all political prisoners and the removal of
limitations on political and civil liberties. АП aid was stopped to
the cult of Shintoism. Freedom of association was allowed and
political parties and labour unions were encouraged to reorganise.
A new constitution was also drafted and on the Diet approving it,
was brought into effect on 3 May 1947. Elections were held and
the new democratic government modelled on European parlia-
mentary and Amcrican systems began functioning. - All this came
about by the efforts of the Japanse people and their Government,
who rendered co-operation in altering the outlook of the country.
The occupation forces had also contributed towards such con-
summation by their example. But burden was not heavy and
mostly their job was limited to rendering aid in times of natural

...

XXXI

calamities or in relieving economic distress resulting. from the
breakdown of the machinery of production.

The Indian Contingent of the British Commonwealth Occupa-
tion Force, was sent to Japan early in 1946 and was withdrawn con-
sequent on the change of Government in India in 1947. Originally
it had the character of a British officered force with a secondary
role. But when in 1946 there was popularisation of the Govern-
ment of India and with the withdrawal of the British Contingent,
the Indian force had its own officers; and General H. C. H.
Robertson, the Gommander-in-Chief of British Commonwealth
Occupation Force, gave it the recognition of an autonomous unit
with an independent charge. The occupational task of the force
did not involve any warlike operations. Mostly it was engaged
on internal security duties, had to deal with the smugglers,
black-marketeers and other anti-social elements. It played its part
in relieving distress arising from natural calamities. Yet it would
not be incorrect to add that having no control over policy
decisions, and having no major responsibilities, it acted merely
as a component unit of a large British Commonwealth force
which had been sent to Japan largely for reasons of prestige.
The narrative in the following pages, therefore, is only a record
‘of the organisation of the force, its move to Japan, the functions
it performed and the manner in which it disposed itself in a
foreign land under Allied military occupation. The machinery
of inter-governmental relationship, the links between SCAP,
JCOSA and the component contingents and the mutual contact
between the national contingents and the BCOF command have
been discussed to focus attention on the main aspects of an inter-
state organisation for military co-operation.

Bisheshwar Prasad

SCALE OF MILES
50 100

INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARY. — .— -—
ВАШМУАҮӨ...........-..------

CHAPTER I

Pre-Surrender Period

WAR WITH jAPAN

On 7 December 1941, the Imperial Japanese Headquarters
in Tokyo announced that Japan had entered into a state of war
with Great Britain and the United States of America. Many
hours before this announcement, and while peace parleys were
still going on in Washington between the American and Japanese
representatives, Japanese carrier-borne planes had made heavy
attacks on Pearl Harbour, the main American base in the Pacific
Ocean. 'The war in thc Pacific had already started when the
Government of India declared war on Japan on 8 December 1941.

The same day Japanese forces landed in Thailand (Siam)
and north-east Malaya. The battle-trained Japanese crack troops
who had prepared long for this war, with the elements of initiative
and surprise in their favour, began to spread like wild-fire into
French Indo-China, Siam and Malaya, while with their naval
superiority, the other prong struck the oil-bearing Dutch islands
of Sumatra and Java and started heading towards New Guinea.
The two prongs were directed against India and Australia, the
two main bases from where offensive action to stem and turn this
tide could be mounted against Japan.

Many set-backs were in store for the Allies. On 25 December
1941, the British outpost of Hong Kong, where Indian troops
along with British and Canadian units had fought gallantly against
immensely superior Japanese forces, surrendered. The menace to
Singapore began to grow. Strong dissatisfaction with the conduct
of the Malayan Campaign, where considerable Australian forces
were fighting alongside Indian and British troops, began to be
voiced in the Australian press. On 3 January 1942, to meet this
persistent demand and to organise the whole area stretching from
Malaya, through Dutch East Indies, to New Guinea and Australia,
into a combat zone, General Sir A. P. Wavell was appointed
Supreme Commander in the South-West Pacific area, while General
Chiang Kai-shek became the Commander of the Allied forces in
the Indo-China and Thailand region.

Meanwhile twenty-six Allied nations including India ex-
pressed their determination to prosecute a relentless war against
Japan by signing the Atlantic Charter on 1 January 1942 and made
a joint declaration that:

2 POST-WAR OCCUPATION FORCES: JAPAN—1945-47

“ (a) Each Government pledges itself to employ its full
resources, military or economic, against the Tripartite
Pact and its adherents, with which such a Government
is at war.

(b) Each Government pledges itself to co-operate with the
governments signatory hereto,and not to make a separate
armistice or peace with the enemies’’,

The war in the Pacific moved with great rapidity involving
serious threats to Malaya, Borneo, Dutch East Indies and the
Philippines. January 1942 saw the siege of Singapore, the main
bastion of Allied defence in the South-West Pacific.

The Japanese had acquired air and naval supremacy in the
South-West Pacific and thus menaced the security of vast terri-
tories held by many nations, British, Dutch, French, Portuguese,
Australian and American. То co-ordinate properly the war effort
of those regions and direct the operations from a centrally
located headquarters was impracticable for General Wavell.
Hence an organisation known as the Combined Chiefs of Staff
Committee was formed in Washington for the purpose of ensuring
effective unified command in the South-West Pacific and co-ordina-
ting war effort in all the theatres. Thus alone could the Australian
demand for a voice in the control of war be met, which had been
voiced at the time.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff Committee was set up in
Washington and was to consist of the representatives of the
. British Chiefs of Staff and the United States Chiefs of Staff.

This body had to co-ordinate and correlate the policy in all the
theatres of war where British and/or United States forces were
operating. In case of a difference of opinion between the service
representatives the dispute had to be referred to the heads of the
two states, Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill.

The United States Chiefs of Staff was made responsible for
the eastern approaches to Australia and New Zealand, which
was designated “ ANZAC Area". The northern area which
centred around Singapore was made a British responsibility under
the designation of “ ABDA Атса”. The China theatre under
Marshall Chiang Kai-shek, though not directly controlled by
the Combined Chiefs of Staff, was closely linked to it by high-
powered services liaison staffs at Chungking, Washington and
London.

. The war in the South-West Pacific took an adverse turn for
the Allies. Following on the surrender of Singapore on 15 February
1942, the Japanese landed in Java and Sumatra, thus cutting off
the link between Indiaand Australia,and invaded Burma,involving

PRE-SURRENDER PERIOD 3

a threat to the defences of India. The fall of Rangoon and the
easy entry of the Japanese navy into the Indian Ocean made them
masters of south-east Asia. Moreover, India was threatened on her
eastern frontier. If the surging tide of Japanese advance was to
be checked, India and Australia, the two bases, must be defended
at all cost and their industrial resources developed to gain material
superiority over the Japanese. For this purpose it was necessary
to bring about closer co-operation between the Governments and
their fighting services.

Sir Stafford Cripps, the Chancellorof Exchequer, Government
of the United Kingdom, arrived in India in March 1942 to en-
deavour to settle the political issue in India and obtain maximum
Indian effort for war against Japan. General Douglas MacArthur,
“the hero of Bataan ”, arrived in Australia by air on 17 March
1942, to become the Supreme Commander of all the United
Nations forces in the South-West Pacific region, at the request of the
Australian Government. The Australian Prime Minister, Mr. John
Gurtin, announced on 12 March 1942 that the conduct of opera-
tions in the ANZAC Area would be vested in the Supreme Com-
mander, South-West Pacific Area (SWPA). Australia had
imposed two major conditions for this organisation, viz.:—

(a) that the machinery set up should not be complicated,

(b) that at the final stage of any decision Australia should’

have a direct and equal voice.

The Australian Chiefs of Staff were directly linked to South-
West Pacific Area and Australia had an accredited representative
with General MacArthur to influence policy at all stages. A
close link-up was created between the Australian and South-West
Pacific Area Service Headquarters.

To obtain a voice for the component units at the govern-
mental level in influencing policy regarding the South-West Pacific,
a Pacific War Council was established whose first meeting was
held in Washington on 1 April 1942. India was a member of
this Council and was greatly interested in its deliberations. The
importance of Australia and India in the war was emphasised by
Mr. Curtin who said: “ Australia and India must be held as the
pillars of the Allied position in Asia and the Pacific for the final
defeat of Japan "'.'

The war was coming nearer to these two pillars. In the
north General Alexander's forces, after a fighting retreat in Burma
against overwhelming odds, had reached '*the eastern gates of
India”. But this supreme effort of the out-numbered, worn-out

1 John. Gurtin's speech in Canberra.

4 POST-WAR OCCUPATION FORCES: JAPAN— 1945-47

Indian and British troops had given India time, five precious
months, to prepare her defences.

Further advance of the two Japanese prongs was held up—
that towards India in the jungle-clad, mosquito-infested hills of
eastern India; that towards Australia in the knife-edged mountain
peaks of the Owen-Stanley Range in New Guinea, In both bases
vast forces and resources were being assembled and organised,
not only to check the Japanese advance, but to put it back into
reverse gear.

REORGANISATION OF ABDA AREA

On 19 June 1943, General Sir Claude Auchinleck took over
as Commander-in-Chief, India, from Lord Wavell, who became
Viceroy of India. On his appointment Lord Wavell said: ** India
is a vital supply base for the United Nations in the east, and the
more fully and rapidly India can develop and extend the war
effort she is already making, the sooner will this shadow of war pass
from her, and the earlier can she achieve her aim of full self-
government ”,%

To conduct operations against Japan a separate South-East
Asia Command (SEAC) was also set up. Admiral Lord Louis
Mountbatten was appointed the Supreme Commander of this area
which consisted of the former territories of ABDA Area less India,
which came under the Commander-in-Chief, India. South-East
Asia Command came directly under the British Chiefs of Staff and
was organised on the same basis as the Allied Forces Headquarters
(AFHQ) for General Eisenhower’s campaign in North Africa.
All the Allied forces in this theatre were placed under Lord Louis
Mountbatten’s command. The policy in the two Pacific theatres,
South-East Asia Command and South-West Pacific Area, was
co-ordinated through the Combined Chiefs of Staff in Washington.
With the creation of these two new commands and the appointment
of a distinguished sailor and soldier respectively at the head of
ae the war in the Pacific took a definite turn for the

etter.

PROSECUTION OF WAR IN THE EAST
General MacArthur’s Headquarters announced that combined
and co-ordinated operations had begun in New Guinea, while

South-East Asia Command forces had declared a halt to the

2 Lord Wavell’s speech to the Pilgrim's Society in London.

PRE-SURRENDER PERIOD 5

westward threat of the Japanese in Imphal-Kohima area. For thc
next two years, a relentless war was carried on in Burma and thc
islands of South-West Pacific in which America, United Kingdom,
Australia, India and New Zealand paid tremendous price for
victory. The story of the campaigns in Burma, Gaudalcanal,
Chindwin, Mandalay, Arakan and Leyte has been written in
other histories.

Throughout 1944-45, the Indian Navy, Army and Air Force
played a major part in holding the invading hordes against severc
odds, and ultimately turned the tables on the Japanese in early
1945. After many gallant deeds which added fresh laurels to their
martial glory, the Indian forces swept the Japanese off their feet
and drove them down the Irrawaddy and Chindwin rivers to
Rangoon with the speed of those mighty torrents.

The war in Europe came to an end at 0245 hours on 7 May
1945 with the unconditional surrender of Germany to the Allies.
Italy had fallen before and there remained only one and the last
partner of the Tripartite Pact—Japan. It was obvious that the
mighty effort of all the Allies would be turned against their
remaining foc.

Despite the Allied warning and the Potsdam Declaraüon,
Japan showed no sign of giving up the fight. Still the Japanese
fought on, attacking time and again with blind persistence and
destroying everything in their path or getting destroyed themselves.
While the Allied land forces were destroying the Japanese Imperial
Army in their ‘‘ fox holes”, the American Super-Fortresses were
raining havoc on the Japanese mainland by persistent and heavy
bombing. Allimportant towns were razed to the ground, one after
the other, by high explosive and incendiary bombs. The Fourteenth
Army, three-fourths of which were Indian troops, had chased the
Japanese from one end of Burma to the other.

The Atom Bomb

The American forces captured Okinawa and were preparing
to assault the Japanese mainland. It was anticipated that the
Japanese would put up a stout resistance in defence of their homeland
and that the Allies would have to pay a heavy price for conquering
every inch of the Japanese mainland. But, late in the evening of
6 August 1945, President Truman announced: “ Sixteen hours
ago, an American aeroplane dropped an atomic bomb on Hiroshima.
The use of an atomic bomb for the first time in the history of
warfare was a consequence of epoch-making discovery ”. |

Hiroshima, the target, was a great port and army base with
a population of about 340,000. It covered an area of 7:5 square

6 POST-WAR OCCUPATION FORCES: JAPAN—1945-47

miles, 41 square miles of which was completely obliterated with
heavy additional damage outside the area. More than 70,000
people were killed. A wave of consternation submerged the
Government and people of Japan.

The second atomic bomb was dropped at noon of 9 August
1945 on the great port of Nagasaki, a city of 250,000 people. One-
third of Nagasaki was wiped out. The fear of the annihilation of
Japan gripped the Government who now saw the writing on the
wall.

THE JAPANESE SURRENDER

On 8 August 1945, the Soviet Foreign Minister, Mr. Molotov,
handed a note to the Japanese Ambassador that Russia would be
at war with Japan as from 9 August 1945. Within thirty-six hours
of Russia's entry into the Far Eastern war, and after the complete
destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki by atomic bombs, the
Japanese offered to surrender according to the termsof the Potsdam
Declaration. On 14 August 1945, the Japanese Cabinet accepted
the Allied terms and the war against Japan came to an end.
General MacArthur was appointed the Supreme Commander
Allied Powers (SGAP) to accept the Japanese surrender.

CHAPTER II

Supreme. Command Allied Powers

THE ARTICLE OF SURRENDER

On 2 September 1945, on board the U.S.S. Missouri, in
Tokyo Bay, the Japanese envoys signed the unconditional surrender.
The terms of the surrender were as follows:—

“ (1) We, acting by command of and on behalf of the Emperor,
the Japanese Government, and the Japanese Imperial
General Headquarters, hereby accept the provisions in
the declaration issued by the Heads of the Governments
of the United States, China and Great Britain on 26
July at Potsdam, and subsequently adhered to by the
Soviet Union.

(ii) We hereby proclaim the unconditional surrender to the
Allied Powers of Japanese Imperial General Head-
quarters and of all Japanese armed forces and all armed
forces under Japanese control wherever situated.

(iii) We hereby command all Japanese forces wherever
situated, and Japanese people, to cease hostilities forth-
with, to preserve and save from damage all ships, air-
craft, and military and civil property, and to comply
with all requirements which may be imposed by the
Allied Supreme Commander or by agencies of the
Japanese Government at his direction.

(iv) We hereby command Japanese Imperial General Head-
quarters to issue at once orders to commanders of all
Japanese Forces and all forces under Japanese control
wherever situated to surrender unconditionally them-
selves and all forces under their control.

(v) We hereby command all civil, military and naval officials
to obey and enforce all proclamations, orders and
directives deemed by the Allied Supreme Commander
to be proper to effectuate this surrender and issued by
him or under his authority, and direct all such officials
to remain at their posts and continue to perform their
non-combatant duties unless specifically relieved by him
or under his authority.

(vi) We hereby undertake for the Japanese Government and
their successors to carry out the provisions of the Potsdam
Declaration in good faith and to issue whatever command

8 POST-WAR OGGUPATION FORCES: JAPAN—1945-47

and take whatever action may be required by the Allied
Supreme Commander or by any other designated
representative of the Allied Powers for the purpose of
giving effect to the Declaration.

(vii) We hereby command the Japanese Imperial Govern-
ment and Japanese Imperial General Headquarters at
once to liberate all Allied prisoners of war and civilian
internees now under Japanese control, and provide for
their protection, care, maintenance and immediate
transportation to places as directed.

(viii) The authority of the Emperor and the Japanese Govern-
ment to rule the state shall be subject to the Allied
Supreme Command, who will take such steps as he deems
proper to effectuate these terms of surrender **.

On behalf of the Allies the following affixed their signatures
to it: General MacArthur (as Supreme Commander), Fleet- Admiral
Chester Nimitz (for the United States), General Hsu Yung-Chang
(for China), Admiral Sir Bruce Fraser (for Great Britain), Lieute-
nant-General Kuzma Nikoyayevitch Dervyanko (for the Soviet
Union), General Sir Thomas Blamey (for Australia), Colonel
L. Moore Cosgrave (for Canada), General Phillip Leclerc (for
France), Admiral Conrad Helfrich (for Netherlands) and Air
Vice-Marshal Isitt (for New Zealand). There was no Indian
delegate present at the ceremony.

The Imperial Script

At 1030 hours on that date, World War II came to an end
and Emperor Hirohito issued an Imperial Script calling on all
Japanese forces to lay down their arms forthwith and “ faithfully
to carry out all provisions of the instrument of surrender ". 'The
surrender and subsequent occupation werc made easy by this
proclamation, which the Japanese considered it their sacred duty
to obey. There were no incidents with the Japanese military or
civil population.

Japanese Surrender in South-East Asia Command

_ While the main surrender took place on board the U.S.S.
Missouri, other Japanese formations surrendered in various theatres.
In Singapore, the Supreme Allied Commander, Admiral Lord
Louis Mountbatten, accepted the surrender on 12 September 1945
of all Japanese forces in South-East Asia. Count Terauchi the
Japanese overall commander in South-East Asia, could not attend
as he was suffering from a paralytic stroke but sent his sword to be
surrendered by General Itagaki, Commander of the Imperial

SUPREME COMMAND ALLIED POWERS 9

Japanese Seventh Army Area, who signed the surrender on his
behalf. Representatives’ of the Armed Forces of Great Britain,
United States, India, Australia, China, France and Holland were
present, Brigadier (now General) K. S. Thimayya, D.S.O., affixed
his signature on behalf of India.

Thus ended the Japanese threat, which in 1942 had reached
the gates of India. To stem and turn back this tide thousands of
Indians had laid down their lives and India had to make heavy
sacrifices of material and money for the common cause. In the
words of President Truman, “ It was a long road to Tokyo and а
bloody one, °? and India having paid dearly in blood and sweat
became a partner in the occupation of Japan.

American Troops Land in Japan

It was agreed with the Japanese surrender envoys, who had
arrived in Manila on 19 August 1945 that the American occupation
troops would begin to land on the Japanese soil on 28 August.
On that date a few thousand American troops went ashore and
occupied strategic places on the four Japanese Islands of Honshu,
Shikoku, Kyushu and Hokkaido. On the same day General
MacArthur issued a directive:

(a) authorising his Army Commanders to requisition any-

thing they needed in Japan; and

(b) calling for the immediate demobilization and disarma-

ment of the Japanese forces.

On 8 September 1945, General MacArthur at the head of
his troops made his formal entry in Tokyo. In a statement from
Supreme Gommand Allied Powers Headquarters it was announced,
* that Japan would be occupied by 500,000 American troops,
that every opportunity would be given to the Japanese to carry
out their instructions without compulsion, that the civilian popula-
tion would be allowed freedom from all unwarranted interference
with their personal liberty and that the Japanese economy would
be controlled to the extent necessary to achieve the United Nations
objectives ”?.

As a United Nations Organisation had already come into
being it was expected that Japan would be occupied by an Allied
Force, composed of contingents of various countries. But General
MacArthur, perhaps being influenced by the none too pleasant
experience of the joint control of Germany, placed the military
control of Japan solely under the United States Eighth Army
Commander, General Eichelberger.

While Americans were landing in Japan, the Soviet troops
of the 2nd Far Eastern Front occupied the whole of Japanese

10 POST-WAR OCCUPATION FORCES: JAPAN—1945-47

Sakhalin Peninsula, the northern halfof which already belonged to
Russia. In Korea and Manchuria there was a race to occupy the
largest area of foreign territory formerly held by Japan. In Korea,
however, the line of division between the Russian and American |

troops was agreed to as the 38th parallel.’

JAPAN’S MAIN TERRITORY

` Japan's main territory consists of four main islands: Hokkaido
in the north, separated from Sakhalin by a 40-mile narrow channel;
the biggest of the four islands, Honshu; the island of Shikoku; and
the southern-most island of Kyushu. A backbone of volcanic
mountains runs through the four islands, with the sacred mountain
Fuji in Honshu dominating them all. The hills are steep and
wooded and in some places snow-covered. At most places they
end up precipitously at the seashore. Thus most of Japan is
mountainous with narrow coastal plains skirting the hiiis, and
fast flowing streams and steep ravines intersecting them. There
are four large level areas in Japan, Tokyo, Nagoya, Sendai and
Osaka, all in Honshu, where live most of Japan’s teeming millions
with their factories and dwellings.

The communications of Japan consisted of railways, roads
and a highly developed ferry system which connected the four
islands. Its wireless, telephone and other communication systems
were all placed under the complete supervision and control of the
Supreme Commander Allied Powers. With her exits completely
sealed off by the Allied naval forces, her system of inland communi-
cations under Allied control, and the seizure of her mercantile
marine, Japan was completely isolated from the outside world.

THE OBJECTS OF OCCUPATION

Japan was an occupied territory and the objects and aims of
occupation were laid down in a Directive issued by President
Truman to General MacArthur. It laid down:

(a) that the authority of the Japanese Emperor and Govern-

ment would remain subordinate to General MacArthur;

(b) that the control of Japan would be exercised through

the Japanese Government as long as it remained
satisfactory;

(c) that the Potsdam Declaration would be the basis of the

United States policy for treatment of Japan.

TThe division of boundaries in Japan and Korea is shown on chart opposite,

ZONES OF OCCUPATION JAPAN AND KOREA

SCALE

MILES 50 o Бо 100 160 Фо 250 $00 350 400 MILES

YETURUFU
j
|
| UNASHIRI
i COsHIKOTAN
|
i

N

|

CHIN NAM PO A
SS,

LLL.

сне-ми.го O SEOUL mmm

YELLOW EE

SEA

LEGEND

RUSSIAN OCCUPAT/ION..........

000603 I BRITISH OCCUPATION...
Я ROY SHIKOKU |
хед AMERICAN OCCUPATION...
rudi r A ВС О F BOUNDARIES... m mm е

N TUS SUNT UR

SUPREME COMMAND ALLIED POWERS 11
А In conformity with these principles General MacArthur
issued many directives to the Japanese Imperial Government and
created a complex machinery to conduct his policies, as far as
possible, through the Imperial Japanese Government, and failing

that, directly through the occupation channels illustrated on the
chart opposite.

SUPREME COMMAND ALLIED POWERS MACHINERY

Unlike Germany, where normal Government had ceased to
exist, in Japan the Government of the Emperor was maintained in
power and governed the country, though Supreme Commander
Allied Powers’ Headquarters supervised the governmental acts
and controlled various aspects of administration by directives
issued to the Japanese Government. This continuance of the
emblem of the Emperor, without effective political power but
invested with all the forms of a constitutional machinery, made the
task of military occupation easy. All directives to the Japanese
people were issued through the Emperor’s Government and
were obeyed by them owing to their instinctive obedience to the
Emperor. That insured people’s co-operation rather than their
resistance. At the same time it facilitated the conduct of business
for General MacArthur, the overall political and military authority,
who had to deal only with two channels, for political matters with
the Japanese Government and for. military control through the
United States Eighth Army.

Supreme Commander Allied Powers was invested with the
powers to supervise and direct the Japanese Government. All
legislation by the Diet required his approval to be effective.
Supreme Commander Allied Powers could also secure necessary
legislation through the Diet which could be dissolved by him
and fresh elections ordered. The Supreme Commander Allied
Powers also controlled the formation of ministries and allocation of
portfolios. It was also found necessary to retain the administrative
machinery of the old Japanese regime, purged of the “ suspects E
or “ war criminals". But in fact the real controlling authority in
their respective regions was retained by the operational commanders,
the Commander United States Eighth Army, Commander-in-Chief
British Commonwealth Occupation Force, and the commanders
of the United States Corps and Divisions who were responsible for
policing the Japanese people to see that the operation directives
were not violated by them. In addition, throughout the Japanese
islands, personnel of the Allied Military Government were stationed
at important centres to help the local prefectural authorities with

12 POST-WAR OCCUPATION FORCES: JAPAN —1945-47

advice and to guide them in democratic methods. One of the
main functions of this Allied Military Government came to be to
supervise the issue and distribution ofthe food and medical supplies
which were made available by the United States Government
throughout the whole of Japan.

SCAP (Tokyo)
(General MacArthur)
| S ее чч
|
Imperial Japanese U.S. 8 Army (Yokohama)
Government (Tokyo) (General Eichelberger)
imas] Hirohito)
ho sl р ІН
Prefectural Regional 1 Corps U.S. Army IX Corps U.S. Army
Governments Branches of
Ministries

|
Allied Military AMGR Formation
Govt. Region Commanders

!
Allied Military
Government Teams

Occupation
ls d

|

Japanese People

LEGEND

Under Command.

Contact.

The Allied Military Government was organised into regions
and operated through teams, which were largely manned by
American personnel. But in the British Commonwealth Occupa-
tion Force area, commonwealth co-operation was not unwelcome
and the British Commonwealth Occupation Force supplied a
number of teams in its regions, whose work evoked admiration from
the American authorities. It was, however, not possible for the
British Gommonwealth to render effective co-operation in the Allied
Military Government owing to the inability to share in the costly
liability involved in providing food and medical supplies for a
population of between eleven and fourteen million Japanese people
who inhabited the area controlled by the British Commonwealth

SUPREME COMMAND ALLIED POWERS 13

Occupation Force. Nevertheless, through its personnel in the Allied
Military Government teams, British Commonwealth Occupation
Force could have all the contact it needed with the Japanesc
people without any cost to itself or to the participating Govern-
ments. The Allied Military Government teams in their prefectures
maintained an intimate control over the people and effectively
participated in all forms of Japanese social, political and economic
activity. These teams were not directly under the authority of
the United States Eighth Army, but were dependent on it for the
supply of food, stores etc. and for telegraphic and postal communica-
tions. It may also be emphasised that these teams did not in any
manner override the controlling authority of the Commander-in-
Chief British Commonwealth Occupation Force in his area of
responsibility.

The Military Objects of Occupation

President Truman’s Directive of 6 September 1945, laid
down the objectives of occupation as:

(4) the complete disarmament and demilitarisation of Japan;
(ii) the eradication of military education;

(iii) the dissolution of the large industrial and banking

concerns;

(iv) the encouragement of democratic organisation;

(v) freedom of worship (military organisation not to be allow-
ed to hide behind the cloak of religion—Shintoism) ;

(vi) the ensuring of payment of reparations (provided this did

not interfere with the country’s peace-time economy);
and

(vii) enabling the Japanese to conduct their economic life

within stated safeguards and under the approval of the
Supreme Commander.

The attainment of the above objects required the destruction
of Japanese militarism in all its stages; the location and subsequent
destruction of all military stores and equipment, the liquidation of
all Japanese war organisations; the demobilisation of all armed
forces; and the suppression of all subversive activities in any form.
To carry out these tasks the American forces were initially located
at all important centres. At the same time the Japanese military
authorities being well aware of their altered position carried out
the Supreme Commander Allied Powers directives with great
promptitude and exactitude. By 30 September 1945, only 28 days
after the surrender, 81 per cent of the Japanese ‘troops in Japan
had been demobilised and it was estimated that full demobilisation
would be completed by 15 October 1945.

14 POST-WAR OCCUPATION FORCES: JAPAN—1945-47

The biggest problem was, however, the repatriation of the
Japanese forces in the far-flung theaters of war. Arrangements
were therefore made for their quick repatriation and demobilisa-
tion. Similarly the huge stocks of military stores had to be traced,
catalogued and destroyed. The Japanese military authorities being
well aware of the impossibility of armed resistance gave themselves
up. The Japanese war machinery was thus liquidated overnight
and all military officers who were not wanted for war-crimes retired
to their country homes to till their scanty farms. The Japanese
masses, accustomed to strict discipline and proverbial obedience of
orders, also adopted a non-militant attitude. Japan changed
overnight.

The military object having been attained in such a short
time and without any resistance whatsoever, General MacArthur
declared on 26 September 1945, ‘‘ that within six months 200,000
troops would be sufficient for the occupation of Japan and Korea’’—-
a reduction of 300,000 troops.

Henceforth the political object, the democratisation of Japan,
became more important and, in consonance with world opinion
and public pressure from America, Supreme Commander Allied
Powers machinery was put in top-gear to achieve this end.

ALLIED TROOPS FOR JAPAN

Meanwhile some of the Allied Powers were also showing
keenness to participate in the occupation in accordance with
President Truman’s Directive, which had laid down that “Һе
occupation shall have the character of an operation on behalf of
the principal Allied Powers, that the participation of the forces of
other nations that had taken a leading part in the defeat of Japan
would be welcomed and expected ", and thereby to change the
United States control into Allied control.

Such a demand was made particularly by Australia,
presumably on behalf of the British Commonwealth, and by virtue
of her being a principal Pacific Power which had borne a major
share of the struggle against Japan, as measured by the casualties
suffered (some 50,000) and the cost incurred [Z (Australia)
2,111,000,000|2 On 17 August 1945, Mr. Chifley, the Australian
Prime Minister, informed the United Kingdom Government of

?Killed in action against the Japanese. 10627
Died of wounds in action. 1196
Died of wounds on sickness while P of W. 5597

Died of injuries or sickness in о ti
Wounded in action. QUORUM 1081

Prisoners of War repatriated. 14519.

SUPREME COMMAND ALLIED POWERS 15

the wish of Australia “ to furnish a composite force to participate
in the occupation of Japan under an Australian Commander subject
only to General MacArthur's consent". Thereupon it was
ultimately decided to send a Commonwealth Force consisting of
British, Australian, Indian and New Zealand troops to Japan under
an Australian Gommander, and under the overall control of a
Joint Chiefs of Staff in Australia composed of the representatives
of the participating states.

Negotiations to this effect were opened with the United States
State Department in Washington by Dr. Evatt, Australian Minister
of External Affairs, and in Tokyo with General MacArthur by
Lieutenant-General Northcott of the Australian Army, on behalf
of the Commonwealth.

NEGOTIATIONS WITH SUPREME COMMANDER ALLIED POWERS

Their concurrence took long to come. Negotiations dragged
on for many months. The chief point at issue was whether the
British Commonwealth forces should have an independent zone for
their occupation? The State Department was not prepared to
accept this, because of its opposition to the allocation of national
zones in Japan similar to those in Germany.* It was felt that this
would create a bad precedent which could be taken advantage of
by Russia and China also. Hence in the principles adopted for
the participation of the British Commonwealth forces in the
occupation of Japan, it was specifically laid down that the army
portion of British Commonwealth Occupation Force would be
placed under the command of the United States Eighth Army while
the Air Force and the Navy could work under the United States
Air Force and United States Navy respectively.

MacArthur —JNorthcott. Agreement
The proposals of the United States Government as to the
general principles and the tentative arrangements made in Tokyo,
following discussions between General MacArthur and Lieutenant-
General Northcott, were embodied in a ‘Memorandum for Record’
(also known as ‘ MacArthur—Northcott Agreement’) which were
accepted by the British Commonwealth Governments concerned

in the following form:—

“The British Commonwealth Governments welcome the
agreement reached between General MacArthurand Lieutenant-
General Northcott as a logical outcome of the general principles

3Document dated 20 December 1945. o i
4Britel/36 of 26 December 1945 to Troopers and Armindia.

16 POST-WAR OCCUPATION FORCES: JAPAN— 1945-47

set out by United States Government and propose that this
agreement be accepted and placed on record as the agreed
basis on which the British Commonwealth Force will proceed
to, and participate in the occupation of, Japan, subject to
further consideration of such matters as detailed financial
arrangements, supply of stores, internal organisation of British
Commonwealth Occupation Force ”.

The main points of MacArthur-Northcott agreement

were:?

(a) The British Commonwealth Occupation Force will
constitute a component of occupation forces in Japan
under the supreme command of theSupreme Commander
for the Allied Powers. It will be charged with the
normal military duties of a force of its size and composi-
tion, including military control of Hiroshima Prefecture
etc. These areas do not constitute a National Zone.
Relationship of British Commonwealth Occupation
Force with the Japanese and routine security functions
will be prescribed by the Commanding General, United
States Eighth Army.

(b) Supreme Commander Allied Powers will assign ground
forces of British Commonwealth Occupation Force to the
operational control of the Gommanding General, United
States Eighth Army and the Air component of British
Gommonwealth Occupation Force to United States
Fifth Air Force. General Officer Commanding, British
Commonwealth Occupation Force will be responsible
for the maintenance and administration of British
Commonwealth Occupation Force as a whole.

(c) General Officer Commanding, British Commonwealth
Occupation Force will have the right of direct access to
the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers on
matters of major policy affecting the operational
capabilities of the Force. :

(d) For matters of Governmental concern affecting the
policy and operations of British Commonwealth Occupa-
tion Force, the channel of communication lies from the
Australian Government as representative of the British
Commonwealth of Nations through the United States
Government and Joint Chiefs of Staff to Supreme
Commander Allied Powers.

~ 5 Memorandum for Record, General i
for the Allied Powers, dated 18 Dec. 45, in AUS жана они

.

SUPREME COMMAND ALLIED POWERS 17

s see. STATES GOVERNMENT
Е t

жаа

Joint Chiefs of Staff 1 United Kingdom

pepe E Г
Supreme Commander Australian..... : See Ж Government of
Allied Powers Government——— ——- India
X Y і 5 : і
British Commonwealth Occupation Force i — Government of
СТРА New Zealand

ee i aa
LEGEND

Government Channel.

асады тын vlt eran Service Channel.

(e) British Commonwealth Occupation Force may be
withdrawn wholly or in part upon agreement between
the Governments of United States and Australia or upon
six months notice by either party.

(f) Reductions will be made in British Commonwealth
Occupation Force from time to time in conformity with
progressive reductions in the United States Occupation
Forces in Japan.

(g) The Australian Service Mission in Tokyo will be dis-
banded and its functions taken over by an Advance
Echelon, Headquarters British Commonwealth Occupa-
tion Force.

(h) Improvements made to Japanese facilities with United
States materials will be accepted by British Common-
wealth Occupation Force on dollar reimbursement basis,
when such facilities are needed and desired by the
British Commonwealth Force.

This agreement defined the functions of the British Common-
wealth Occupation Force and determined its relationship with
Supreme Commander Allied Powers and the United States Eighth
Army. The force was placed under the supreme command of
Supreme Commander Allied Powers, but its relationship with the
Japanese and the routine security functions concomitant on the
military control of the Hiroshima Prefecture allotted to it, were to
be determined by the Commander of the United States Eighth

18 POST-WAR OCCUPATION FORCES: JAPAN— 1945-47

Army. It was made perfectly clear that the areas under direct
occupation of the British Commonwealth Occupation Force would
** not constitute a National Zone ". This specifically differentiated
the role of the component units in Japan from that of AMGOT
in Italy and Germany and ensured centralised control under the
Supreme Commander Allied Powers. The anxicty for unity of
control is clearly emphasised in clause (b) which provided for
operational control of the ground and air forces respectively by the
commanding generals of the United States Eighth Army and
Fifth Air Force. But such control did not comprehend the
** maintenance and administration of the British Commonwealth
Occupation Force for which its independence was clearly
expressed”. The British Commonwealth Occupation Force had
to make its own provisioning, and any materials obtained from
the United States had to be paid for in dollars unless required for
operational purposes. Clause (h) further laid down that all
Japanese facilities improved by the United States forces with
their materials, when utilised by the British Commonwealth
Occupation Force would have to be paid for in dollars. This
condition might have affected the choice of Hiroshima Prefecture as
the area of occupation of the British Commonwealth Occupation
Force owing to the limited nature of such improvements there; for
elsewhere the Americans had, owing to their prior occupation, made
considerable improvements in the matter of accommodation etc.

The other clauses of this agreement prescribed the channels
of communication between the Supreme Commander Allied Powers
and British Commonwealth Occupation Force both for operational
and political purposes; while in the first case the General Officer
Commanding British Commonwealth Occupation Force had the
right of direct access to the Supreme Commander Allied Powers,
in the latter category the approach was through the Australian
Government, United States Government and the Joint Chiefs
of Staff. There was provision for the withdrawal of the British
Commonwealth Occupation Force also, which was either by
agreement with the United States Government or upon six months’
notice.

SELECTION OF AN AREA FOR BRITISH COMMONWEALTH OCCUPATION
FORCE

In selecting the area for BCOF the following basic factors
had to be taken into consideration:

(a) the area must have prestige value;

SUPREME COMMAND ALLIED POWERS 19

(b) it must have an important port of entry under the

(e)

(f)
(g)

exclusive control of British Commonwealth Occupation
Force;

it must have facilities for recreation;

it must have sufficient accommodation for Headquarters
and troops;

it must be proportionate in relation to the Force and its
possible operational role;

it must be available immediately;

it should, as far as possible, be climatically suitable.

There were four important areas in Japan, important from
the point of social, industrial and political development. All of them
were located in the main Japanese island of Honshu. They were:

(a)

(b)

(c)

Tokyo Area— This was the capital area, the seat of Im-
perial Japanese Government and of Supreme Command-
er Allied Powers. The port of Yokohama, only 8 miles
away, was occupied by the United States Eighth Army
Headquarters. This area of major importance and
great prestige value for the Japanese was not offered to
British Commonwealth Occupation Force as it was
fully occupied by very large United States forces, and
British Commonwealth Occupation Force would not
have been fitted in as an independent entity with all the
facilities mentioned above.

Nagoya Area—This was an industrially developed area
south of Tokyo, and was earmarked for the Chinese,
who never came. This area was not offered to British
Commonwealth Occupation Force because Supreme
Commander Allied Powers might have desired to locate
the Chinese forces between two American formations in
the north and south.®

Kobe-Osaka Area—This was the second largest and highly
developed area with the former Japanese capital of
Kyoto located in its centre. In pre-war days this area
was of great commercial value and the harbour of Kobe
handled the largest amount of shipping in Japan. Kobe
had thus great prestige value particularly because
Japanese sacred cities and the centres of civilisation of
Kyoto and Nara were located there. It was also highly
industrialised and socially developed and had an im-
portant port. It had modern beautiful hotels, all
important places of sight-seeing and the best
opera, Takarazuka. It had at the same time sufficient

6 PACCOS 38 dated 11 September 1946.

20 POST-WAR OCCUPATION FORCES: JAPAN— 1945-47

accommodation both forthe Headquarters and thetroops.
But as Kobe was designated “ the first major port of
the American forces in Japan through which far more
supplies passed than through any other port, and which
was also the base for their forces in Korea, it was unlikely
that this area could be offered to British Commonwealth
Occupation Force. "Therefore the Supreme Commander
Allied Powers declared that it could not be made
immediately available to British Commonwealth Occupa-
tion Force. It was stated that the port had to be cleared
of mines and United States stores had to be shifted to
other areas, which required at least a period óf eight
months to execute. This naturally could not suit the
British Commonwealth Occupation Force which had
already been marking time for a long period and was
gctting restive to take up its role. Moreover, the occupa-
tion of the area would have involved payment in
dollars of a colossal amount, the cost for developments
made by the United States forces. The density of its
population which was considered to be a potential danger
owing to its highly industrialised character inclining to-
wards communism, was also a factor against the selection
of Kobe-Osaka area as General Northcott's forces were
not adequate to control this area? in the event of any
trouble,

(d) Hiroshima—Kure Area—It bordered the narrow Japanese
inland sea with Honshu on the north and Shikoku to the
south. It had an important port of Kure, the great
Japanese naval dockyards. With the atom bombing of
Hiroshima this area had become notorious though it
had no great prestige value in the eyes of the Japanese.
It was industrially and socially backward ; and as a large
number of military installations were located there it had
been badly bombed. Except for the sacred Miyajima
(Paradise Island) it offered no recreational facilities.
Accommodation was limited except at Etajima which
was the former Japanese naval academy and only a few
minutes sea journey from Kure harbour. This area was
immediately available for British Commonwealth
Occupation Force and could be easily taken over as it
was sparsely occupied by United States forces.

Out of the two areas available, Kobe-Osaka area was not

offered by Supreme Commander Allied Powers, but even if it had

7PACCOS No. 11 dated 20 March 1946.
8 Ibid.

SUPREME COMMAND ALLIED POWERS 21

been offered it is problematical if General Northcott would have
selected it for the reasons mentioned above, viz. the time-lag, cost
involved in taking over American facilities and the inadequacy of
British Commonwealth Occupation Force to control it in the event
oftrouble. Asit turned out later, however, the time lag was of no
importance, for British Commonwealth Occupation Force could
not arrive before February 1946; and the cost consideration could
have been obviated by taking over alternative accommodation and
developing it from Japanese resources. Finally, there was luckily
no trouble in the area. But these could not have been visualised
in advance and that too only four months after the surrender.
General Northcott who did not have a previous opportunity to
reconnoitre thoroughly any of these areas? accepted the only
alternative—Hiroshima, which he considered аз * satisfactory from
climatic and other aspects of British Commonwealth Occupation
Force. This area may be extended if necessary ".'^ Nevertheless,
some dissatisfaction was felt owing to the limited nature of amenities
and facilities for recreation and shopping. Climatic and expansion
aspects could not override this consideration for it was believed
that climatic disparity could not be great between it and the
area on the south coast of Honshu and that the direction of expan-
sion had not been indicated.»

No provision was made initially for stationing British
Commonwealth Occupation Force troops in Tokyo and the Cabinet
Office in London cabled to Joint Chiefs of Staff Australia on 21
December 1945, that ‘‘ the MacArthur-Northcott agreement does
not even mention a Detachment of the Force being stationed in
Tokyo Prefecture, which we consider desirable ".'*.

The Supreme Commander Allied Powers readily agreed to the
location, in rotation, of one battalion in Tokyo to carry out guard
duties under the control of United States 2nd Cavalry Division
stationed there. Later a British Commonwealth Sub-area
(BRICOSAT) was formed in Tokyo which played an important
part in raising Commonwealth prestige and in the maintenance of
British Commonwealth civil agencies in Tokyo.

FINAL ACCEPTANCE OF BRITISH COMMONWEALTH OCCUPATION FORCE

After his agreement with General MacArthur, Lt.-General
Northcott returned to Australia to report to the Joint Chiefs of

9 BRITEL Signal No. 62 dated 8 January 1946. 22.

19 BRITEL/36 of 26 December 1945 to Troopers and Armindia.. Н

IrSignal dated 21 December 1945 from Cabinet Offices to Joint Chiefs of Staff
Australia.

22 POST-WAR OCCUPATION FORCES: JAPAN— 1945-47

Staff in Australia. On 24 December 1945, he gave a resume of
his discussions with General MacArthur. The main points
stressed were:—'? .

(a) whole-hearted welcome and co-operation of MacArthur

and his staff; =

(b) affirmation by MacArthur that British Commonwealth

Occupation Force was urgently needed and that, far from
opposing it, he had always pressed for its early arrival.

Even after the agreement and final acceptance of all terms
laid down by the Supreme Commander Allied Powers, the formal
agreement from the United States Government was notimmediately
forthcoming. The New Zealand Government was getting tired of
this delay and the Prime Minister of New Zealand cabled to
Mr. Chifley, Prime Minister of Australia:

* We have considered the terms of agreement between
General MacArthur and Northcott and are quite prepared to
participate on that basis. We would be less than frank, how-
ever, if we did not say that in view of the time which has
elapsed since the first tentative announcement was made
regarding the provision of this Force and the way in which
negotiations have dragged, that enthusiasm for it had flagged
very considerably in New Zealand. "There is a general feeling
that this Force is not needed and it appears questionable
whether, in the circumstances, it is likely to yield any
increase in British Commonwealth prestige. We are, however,
willing to go оп”.

The Australian Government, as representing the British
Commonwealth Governments concerned, pressed for the United
States Government's agreement so that a movement programme
could be drawn up and submitted to General MacArthur for
approval. 'The time schedule of arrival of British Commonwealth
Occupation Force depended on the capacity of Kure harbour, the
only port in the area. The detailed reconnaissance of this arca
was to be carried out by the Advance Echelonof General Northcott's
Headquarters in Tokyo and a Port Party to be despatched from the
East Indies Fleet. No person could be moved to Japan without
Supreme Commander Allied Powers clearance, and Supreme
Commander Allied Powers was not willing to give this clearance
till United States Government approval was received to the entry
of British Gommonwealth Occupation Force in Japan.? This
greatly handicapped the Advance Headquarters in carrying out the
detailed reconnaissance and making out plans of allocation.

1? BRITEL/36 dated 26 December 1945.
13 Signal dated 15 December 1945 from Tokyo to Australia.

SUPREME COMMAND ALLIED POWERS 23

On 31 January 1946, the United States Government gave
their final approval and a combined communique was issued from
al Allied capitals. The following communique was issued by
General MacArthur:'*

“ The present Occupation Forces іп Japan extend the
heartiest possible welcome to the British Commonwealth Forces
who are about to share with them the arduous and difficult
duties which are involved. Their presence will materially
broaden the base along international lines of a burden which
up to this time has of necessity been carried to a large extent
unilaterally by the United States Forces and cannot fail to be
beneficial in effect. It will enable a diminution in our own
strength and will thereby bring welcome relief to many indivi-
duals. The Australian contingent served under my personal
command with brilliant honour during the long and arduous
campaigns on the road back and I take a special personal pride
in again being associated with it. The reception of the entire
force will be of the warmest ”.

In addition, the United States Government State Department
issued the following communique:'?

** When the exact composition and time of arrival of the
British Commonwealth Force are known to General MacArthur
he will determine the number and schedule of withdrawal of
American troops from his command.

The participation of British Commonwealth Forces in the
occupation of Japan is in line with the policy made public by
the President on 22 September which stated that the participa-
tion of the Forces of other Nations that have taken a leading
part in the war against Japan will be welcome and expected.

In accordance with this declaration invitations were
extended also to the Governments of China and Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics to send troops to participate in the occupa-
tion. The Chinese Government has informed this Government
that while it is willing to provide a contingent of troops it is
notin a position to do so at the present time. The Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics has not accepted the invitation to
participate ”.

Thus ended the period of protracted negotiations. It appears
that the United Kingdom was initially not keen to participate in
the occupation of Japan but was persuaded to do so by the persis-
tence of Australia. The attitude of the New Zealand Government

14 Signal 1 dated 30 January 1946, from Washington to Australia. .
15 Sienal 2 dated 30. [cm 1946 from the Australian Legation Washington to
Australia.

24 POST-WAR OCCUPATION FORCES: JAPAN—1945-47

was lukewarm; they were merely going as part of a common show
and to further Commonwealth co-operation. The Government of
‘India, it is stated, on being asked by His Majesty's Government
in the United Kingdom to provide a British-Indian Division at
His Majesty's Government's expense, decided to participate on
their own account in the occupation and meet the charges for the
Indian element."
On arrival in Japan British Commonwealth Occupation
Force became an instrument in the Allied control of Japan.

16 General Cawthorn's note:
“India was asked initially to provide a Britisb-Indian Division on behalf

of His Majesty’s Government in UK who would meet all charges. The
Government of India on their own initiative decided that in preference to
this they would participate in the occupation and provide and pay for part
of the forces.” G

CHAPTER III

The Allied Control of J apan
JAPAN AS AN AMERICAN BASE

The political and military objectives for the occupation of
Japan were clearly laid down in President Truman's Directive to
General MacArthur of 6 September 1945. The main purpose of
occupation was to so completely demilitarise Japan as to make
her powerless for aggression both politically and economically.
However, the uneventful occupation and co-operation given to the
Supreme Commander Allied Powers by the Japanese Government
and people and the changing world situation soon after the end of
war, operated to soften the rigours of occupation policy. It is not
unnatural to suppose, at the same time, that American policy in
this respect might have been affected by the growing tension
between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and United States
of America in the matter of Germany and Korea. Japan's
strategic position in the Far East and the anti-communist
tendencies of her people could be reckoned upon as assets in any
future Russo-American conflict in the Pacific. Moreover, Japan.
could not be left wholly unprotected at the mercy of her powerful
neighbours. These factors may have influenced the Supreme Com-
mander Allied Powers in following a policy which prima facie might
not have squared with the declared object of occupation. Its
directions and actions might have been directed by these considera-
tions particularly in so far as they were guided towards making
Japan economically self-sufficient and politically democratic.

Japan's anti-communism and her potentialities led America
to develop such political and economic institutions there as might
contribute to ensure Japanese loyalty to the cause of democracy.
This was facilitated by the co-operation extended by the Japanese
who saw in the American control of all their activities, economic
and political, an opportunity of re-establishing Japan and of
emerging as a great power. To achieve this object, then a mere
dream, the Japanese gave all-out help to the Supreme Commander
Allied Powers authorities, geared up their production with American
assistance and indocrinated the Japanese masses with anti-
communism.

This spirit of total support to America convinced the Supreme
Gommander Allied Powers of the good intentions of the Japanese
Government and its people. General MacArthur must also have

26 POST-WAR OCCUPATION FORCES: JAPAN—1945-47

begun to feel that it might after all not be necessary to occupy
Japan for such a long period as had been planned before and
declared, “ the occupation will last for five years and if necessary
for a longer period ”’. А

The chief object of such occupation, then, was to maintain
administrative and political stability which was achieved by vesting
more power to the Japanese authorities and retaining the emblem
ofthe Emperor. It was also essential to produce an anti-communist
psychology Бу popularising democratic institutions. It is not
unlikely that the idea of making Japan a defensive base against
communism might have been entertained by some American
authorities which could be easily effected by keeping United States
land, naval and air forces there and maintaining them by develop-
ing the industries of Japan. The eventual stoppage by the Supreme
Commander Allied Powers of the removal of Japanese capital
industries and their rehabilitation by the Economic Section of the
Supreme Command Allied Powers lent support to this view.

It was, however, unlikely that these objectives could be
pursued unilaterally by United States of America without opposi-
tion from some of the Allied Powers. Hence the appearance of
Allied control was maintained for which an Allied Control Council
had been established.

(United States of America, Great Britain, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, India,
China, Philippines, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Holland and France)

Far Eastern Gommission,

Washington
À al .
Allied Council, T'okyo (United Supreme Command Allied
States of America, British Powers
Commonwealth, China, Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics) |
ы |
Imperial japanese Eighth United States
Government, Tokyo Army Yokohama

ALLIED CONTROL COUNCIL (АСС)

, The Allied Control Council in Tokyo was intended to be an
advisory body for Supreme Commander Allied Powers, and the
United States Department of State made it quite clear that
** United States of America will not allow any interference with the
control of Japan by the Army of General MacArthur ”

1 Signal dated 27 August 1946.

Pare I

Brinjap

er

. Cowan, Command:

T

General D.

fajor-

М

Prate П

Indian Contingent arrives at Kure

March through Kure

THE ALLIED CONTROL OF JAPAN 27

The Allied Control Council had one representative each from
United States of America, British Commonwealth, Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics and China, with an American as its President.
This body was an agent of the Far Eastern Commission in W ashing-
ton and was vested with no executive powers to influence or direct
policy. It could only discuss and raise issues with the Far Eastern
Commission and advise Supreme Commander Allied Powers who
was free to accept or reject the advice without giving reasons.

THE ALLIED GOVERNMENTS

The British Commonwealth seat on the Allied Control
Council was filed by an Australian, Mr. MacMahon Ball.
Dr. L. G. Jain, an Indian economist, was appointed Economic
Adviser to the Gommonwealth Representative.

The differences of opinion amongst the Allies regarding
Japan were voiced in this Council and General Derevyanko, the
Russian representative, was thc most vehement exponent of views
in opposition to those of the United States of America, The Russian
attitude to Supreme Commander Allied Powers policy was diametri-
cally opposed to the Americans. The main Russian criticism of
Supreme Commander Allied Powers policy centred on the American
attitude towards the Japanese Government. These criticisms.
were naturally resented by the American representatives who were
fully convinced of the genuineness of Japanese co-operation.
Mr. Acheson said, ‘‘ that the Japanese authorities never seemed to
get creditin the Council for the good work they did. If the Council
was to have influence with the Japanese it should be just and fair
minded ”.

In order to gain Japanese confidence it was essential for
America to support the Japanese Government. On 18 October
1946, Mr. Acheson remarked ‘ That the time had come when
Japanese aims had become virtually identical with Allied aims."
This remark was strongly criticised by Russia who saw in it the
growing menace of Japan, and by Mr. MacMahon Ball, who said,
“І would like to say that I would not, without the most careful
further consideration, be able to identify myself with you in the
expression of cordiality and confidence towards the present Japanese
Government."5 Australia was against the resurgence of Japan as a
power in the Pacific. But General MacArthur was of the opinion
that the Japanese had shed their Imperial coat and that thc April
1946 elections were very fair and devoid of any corruption and

2 Signal dated 28 October 1946.
3 Ibid.

28 POST-WAR OCCUPATION FORGES: JAPAN— 1945-47

pressure from the Allied Occupation Forces and showed the
democratic conversion of Japan.

LIAISON MISSIONS IN JAPAN

In order to obtain more influence with Supreme Commander
Allied Powers, the United Kingdom strengthened its Liaison
Mission and appointed Mr. Gascoigne, with the rank of an
Ambassador. General Gairdner also remained as the Personal
Representative of the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom.

THE ALLIED kN anda
FAR EASTERN ALLIED COMMISSION, WASHINGTON

(F.E.A.C.)
| |
Allied Council Tokyo
(U.S.A., British Commonwealth, Supreme Command Allied Powers
China, U.S.S.R.) Tokyo (S.C.A.P.)
І і
Imperial Japanese Eighth U.S. Army Yokohama
Government, Tokyo |
| | |
Allied 1 Corps IX Corps вбол.
Military U.S. Army U.S. Army Н

Government

ААА АА АРАДА АДАТ АЛАТА ыы мөө;

АШеа Military Formation

| Govt. Region Commanders
Prefectural Regional |
Governments Branches of E

: Ministers г alli et IR аралды саласы

i 1 R H

i i E Occupation Units

i Allied Millitary

i Govt. Teams

| |

Japanese Ен
LEGEND

———————— Command.

s usu, Liaison.

THE ALLIED CONTROL OF JAPAN 29

With the formation of an Interim Government in India in
September 1946, Dr. L. C. Jain was promoted as the Head of the
Indian Liaison Mission in Tokyo. He still retained his post as the
Economic Adviser and in this dual role he was both equal and
subordinate to Mr. MacMahon Ball at one and the same time. In
any case the Indian Liaison Mission did not have much influence
with Supreme Commander Allied Powers and it could not further
India's interest without proper reorganisation.*

Despite these various agencies Supreme Commander Allied
Powers remained the sole arbiter of Japanese destiny. Although
British Commonwealth Governments had sent their troops to Japan
they could not either effectively interfere or influence Supreme
Commander Allied Powers policy. In order to ensure continuity
of occupation and military government, the Supreme Commander
Allied Powers had laid down the condition of six months’ notice
before any Allied Government could withdraw its contingent
from Japan and then only with the Supreme Commander's
concurrence, and military government was made a sole American
responsibility. In February 1947 the United Kingdom withdrew
its main force and only left a token force in Japan to satisfy the
Australian susceptibilities. India on attaining her independence
also withdrew her forces while New Zealand first reduced its
contingent and later withdrew it completely. Only Australian
forces stayed on though their numbers were considerably reduced.

To evaluate the achievements of the British Commonwealth
Occupation Force in relation to the Supreme Commander Allied
Powers, we will have to examine the objects of British Common-
wealth policy in Japan for which that Force was sent there.

*Signal No. 1826 dated 14 August 1946. File No. 6325/1-11/505.

CHAPTER IV

The British Commonwealth Policy
Regarding Occupation of Japan

In order to assess the objects for which the British Common-
wealth of Nations took part in the occupation of Japan, 1t may be
necessary here to examine the economic, political and military
advantages which were supposed to accrue from the despatch of
British Commonwealth Occupation Force to Japan and which
might have influenced the decision.

Strategic Considerations '

The Pacific had, after World War II, loomed large in the
diplomatic arena as a region of immense strategic potentialities,
Japan as its centre naturally attracted close attention of the Powers
wanting to play a rolein the Far East. The British Commonwealth
could not therefore neglect the developments there. For Australia
and New Zealand particularly, and Canada, India and the United
Kingdom generally, the future of Japan and the situation in the
Pacific were of intimate concern. The events of World War II
were still fresh in memory and Australia could not afford to take
any risks with her own security. That may account for her keen-
ness to locate forces in Japan which now became an outpost of her
defence. She may also have been influenced by the growing
menace of the spreading communism in China and South-East
Asia, which she viewed as a potential danger to her security, her
position as a world power and her whole tradition of friendly
relations with the United States. Australia's keenness for an effec-
tive position in the Pacific and the sense of obligation for the
assistance derived from the United States may also have prompted
her to take an active share іп the occupation of Japan. The
interests of the other members of the Commonwealth did not
materially differ from those of Australia. It was therefore considered
necessary to have the Commonwealth forces in Japan so as to be
able to influence the future course of treaty and to control her
economic resources and war potential.

Political Considerations?

In addition to these strategic considerations there
were important political considerations also which prompted

* Memorandum on the usefulness of British Comm і
1 2 onwealth О tion Force
by Australian Defence Committee (Extended) and Joint Chiefs of Staff Australia.

2 Australian Defence Committ te i i i
| Memorandum on the advantages of BOOR. танады quA DE

POLICY REGARDING OCCUPATION OF JAPAN 31

participation in the occupation of Japan. It was believed that
British Commonwealth Occupation Force in Japan would

(a) increase British prestige in the eyes of the Japanese
people as among the victors of the last war, also as a
power to be reckoned with in future;

(b) raise in the eyes of the Allies and other countries,
specially those interested in the Pacific, the prestige of
the British Commonwealth of Nations and its potentia-
lities as a world power;

(c) demonstrate to the world that Australia had attained
political maturity and was prepared to play her part
in the councils of the world;

(d) ensure for Australia the position of a principal in the
peace settlement;

(e) strengthen the position of the Commonwealth representa-
tives on the Far Eastern Commission and on the Allied
Control Gouncil for Japan.

The main political factor was that of prestige. It was felt
that the presence of British Commonwealth Occupation Force
in Japan would increase British Commonwealth prestige in the
eyes of the Japanese people and would impress on their
mind the fact that they were defeated not by the United States
alone but by a combination of the British and American forces.
The presence of Indian troops did largely contribute to raise the
prestige of India which was naturally enhanced after the declara-
tion of Independence and the establishment of the National
Government at home. An element in prestige is the behaviour of
diplomatic representatives. In the beginning, though the Indian
diplomatic representative could not make much impression owing
to lack of contacts, poor accommodation and lack of transport,
particularly as compared with the resources of other missions, yet
ultimately Dr. L. G. Jain and Shri B. Rama Rao did not fail to
lay the foundation of India's prestige in Japan.

Economic Considerations А
One of the objects of occupation would be the economic
exploitation of Japan. Though not mentioned in the directive to
the Commander-in-Chief British Commonwealth Occupation
Force yet it may have been one of the primary reasons which
induced the British Commonwealth to participate in the occupa-
tion. These economic motives, while not being direct, included
the development of contacts with the influential sections of the
Japanese people, securing of suitable ports of entry for commerce,
sharing in the shipping tonnage of Japanese overseas trade, which

32 POST-WAR OCCUPATION FORCES: JAPAN—1945-47

was to be carried in Allied shipping owing to the ban on Japanese
mercantile marine, and developing future trade with the British
Commonwealth. |

India had no conception of these economic advantages and
having neither the means nor the freedom to exploit them, her
contingent was unable to enhance India's economic interests in
Japan. The same was not the case with the other participating
members of the Commonwealth who had their own shipping and
had surpluses of food and raw material to carry on a favourable
barter trade with Japan.

Military Objects

The military objects assigned to British. Commonwealth
Occupation Force were more or less the same as outlined by the
President of the United States for Supreme Commander Allied
Powers. They were:

(a) to assist in demilitarisation and disposal of Japanese war

installations and armaments,

(b) to safeguard the Allied installations and equipment,

(c) to give military protection to British Commonwealth
civil missions engaged in selecting goods and equipment
for reparations,

(d) to maintain internal security in Japan, and

(e) to provide military backing to the United States
military government in British Commonwealth Occupa-
tion Force area.

The necessity to employ troops to give protection to the
Allied nationals, agencies or installations fortunately never arose
except in very minor cases. At the same time, the Japanese main-
tained perfect internal peace. Tabulation of military stores and
their destruction became a matter of routine which was carried
out without any interference or hindrance. "Thus, in the event, it
never became necessary for British Commonwealth Occupation
Force to carry out practically most of the military tasks, which it
was originally expected it might be called upon to perform.

Commonwealth Co-operation Considerations 3

An important consideration which governed the mounting
of British Commonwealth Occupation Force was to develop a
system of Commonwealth co-operation, need for which was felt
during World War II. British Commonwealth Occupation Force
was as such an experiment to determine the basis of integration of
British Commonwealth forces. It was intended to:

3 Australian Defence Committee (Extended) and Joi i i
t Ch t trali
Memorandum on Lessons of British cba ie meis ыы таш

POLICY REGARDING OCCUPATION OF JAPAN 33

(a) foster maximum integration of services and personnel,

(b) foster integration between personnel and the services of
the various contingents,

(c) provide data for the administration of a similar combined
force overseas in war, and

(d) provide data for the control machinery of a similar
combined force.

But unfortunately these results could not be achieved, for,
firstly, the principle of such integration had not been defined
initially, and secondly lack of mutuality and national differences
did not afford sufficient scope for its experimentation. Integration
was started sometime in the middle of 1946 but by the end of the
year the British Brigade was under orders of withdrawal causing a
major reorganisation in the British/Indian element, and before
this could be stabilised, the Indian Contingent was itself withdrawn.
Even in this limited time British Commonwealth Occupation Force
was able to indicate the lines on which an experiment could be
conducted in the future. It indicated the trends on which the
future Commonwealth defence policy might be developed.

When British Commonwealth Occupation Force was mounted
it was decided to apportion the responsibility for its control to a
body known as the Joint Chiefs of Staff Australia (JCOSA) and
the Australian Government machinery was made the agent to
execute its policy.

The experience of British Commonwealth Occupation Force
in Japan and its controlling agency in Australia, must provide
useful lessons for the control and administration of such a force, on
behalf of the countries contributing it, irrespective of its location
and role. The points of general application to be examined are :—*

(a) The Controlling Body: the machinery necessary to control
such a combined force, the inter-Governmental difficul-
ties, relationship of this body to the respective national
Governments and their agents, and the staff and organi-
sation for such a body.

(b) TheCombined Force: the principles governing the composi-
tion, organisation and administration of such a force,
inter-Dominion and inter-service integration, outline
plan, defence arrangements and control.

(c) The Executive Agency: to determine the division of respon-
sibility between the controlling body and executive
agency, channels of communication between various
governments taking part in the combined force. To

4Australian Defence Committee (Extended) and Joint Chiefs of Staff Australia
Memorandum on Lessons of British Commonwealth Occupation Force.

34 POST-WAR OCCUPATION FORGES: JAPAN— 1945-47

determine the basis and staff for liaison between the
controlling body and agents. — —

The controlling body and British Commonwealth Occupation
Force were a combined organisation while the executive organisa-
tion was solely Australian. To view the achievements of Joint
Ghiefs of Staff Australia and British Commonwealth Occupation
Force in their correct perspective it is essential to remember the
various handicaps under which these organisations had to work.
Joint Chiefs of Staff Australia was never treated as a pet child and
British Commonwealth Occupation Force had no powers to formu-
late policy. The Supreme Commander Allied Powers alone had
the complete control of the Allied Military Government.

CHAPTER V

Joint Chiefs of Staff Australia

The setting up of Joint Chiefs of Staff Australia and the
formation of British Commonwealth Occupation Force was an
experiment in British Commonwealth co-operation. The Govern-
ments of four countries—the United Kingdom, Australia, India
and New Zealand-—and the national service headquarters in each
country were equally concerned in framing the policy for British
Commonwealth Occupation Force and sharing the responsibility
for providing man-power and meeting the cost of the force.

Joint Chiefs of Staff Australia was set up in Australia on
behalf of the British Commonwealth Governments concerned, and
was vested with the right to control and administer the British
Commonwealth Occupation Force, subject to:—

(a) the supreme control of the British Commonwealth
Governments concerned;

(b) the responsibility of the British Commonwealth Govern-
ments concerned for the interior economy and adminis-
tration of their own contingents;

(c) the conformity with the procedure laid down by the
British Commonwealth Governments concerned for the
authorisation of commitments relating to the maintenance
of their own contingents, or accepted in respect of British
Commonwealth Occupation Force as a whole;

(d) the reservations regarding operational control; and

(e) the reservations regarding financial control.

Joint Chiefs of Staff Australia consisted of the Australian
Chiefs of Staff and representatives of the Chiefs of Staff in the
United Kingdom and New Zealand and of the Commander-in-
Chief of the three Indian Services. It was supposed to foster
within its own organisation and within British Commonwealth
Occupation Force the policy of maximum jntegration on an inter-
service and inter-Dominion basis.

The directive issued to Joint Chiefs of Staff Australia on
behalf of, and with the approval of, His Majesty’s Governments
concerned laid down that Joint Chiefs of Staff Australia had to
look to the Australian Government’s machinery for:—

(a) obtaining inter-governmental guidance on matters of
political significance ;

1 Australian Minister of Defence Memorandum of 1946.

36 POST-WAR OCCUPATION FORCES: JAPAN— 1945-47

(b) executive action to implement Joint Chiefs of Staff
Australia policy and decisions; and | |

(c) administrative machinery required for Joint Chiefs of
Staff Australia and British Commonwealth Occupation
Force matters.* .
Joint Chiefs of Staff Australia was made responsible for
drawing up plans for the participation of British Commonwealth
Occupation Force in the occupation of Japan and to ensure that
Qommander-in-Chief, British Commonwealth Occupation Force,
was provided with all facilities to enable him
(a) to represent worthily the British Commonwealth in the
occupation of Japan; Е

(b) to maintain and to enhance British Commonwealth
prestige and influence in the eyes of the Japanese and of
our Allies; and

(c) to illustrate to, and to impress upon, the Japanese people

as far as may be possible the democratic way and purpose
in life.

As the executive responsibility to implement Joint Chiefs
of Staff Australia policy was vested in Australian Service machinery,
it was agreed that overseas members (representatives of countries
other than Australia) of Joint Chiefs of Staff Australia would sit
as members of the Australian Defence Committee (Extended)
when matters concerning overseas contingents of British Common-
wealth Occupation Force or concerning the force as a whole were
under consideration. The relationship between Joint Chiefs of
Staff Australia, British Commonwealth Occupation Force and
Australian Defence Ministry, is shown in the diagram opposite.

For all matters upon which Joint Chiefs of Staff Australia
was not authorised to pronounce without consultation on a govern-
mental level, it had to refer to the national governments concerned.
Matters having political significance were to be submitted through
the Secretary, Australian Department of Defence, to the Australian
Minister of Defence and of service significance to the respective
Chiefs of Staff. ы

_ The complicated machinery which was created to integrate
national interests of the countries taking part in British Common-
wealth Occupation Force would not work smoothly. There was
constant friction between the Australian Defence Department and
the overseas members of Joint Chiefs of Staff Australia.

The overseas members of Joint Chiefs of Staff Australia re-
presented their respective Clhiefs of Staff or Gommander-in-Chief,
India, and their task was:

2 Joint Chiefs of Staff Australia No. 276, minute No. 255/1946.

DIAGRAM SHOWING RELATIONSHIP OF JCOSA
AND AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE MACHINERY
EOR CONSIDERATION OF BCOF MATTERS

UNITED KINGDOM/INDIA МЕМ ZEALAND AUSTRALIA LEGEND

MATTERS CONCERNING BCOF REQUIRING OPERATIONAL AND/OR FUNCTIONAL
„a INTER" BOVERNMENTAL CONSULTATION. AUST PM CHANNELS OF RESPONSIBILITY..

MIN FOR DEF ORGANISATION OF THE AUST HIGHER
GOV'T LEVEL ч DEFENCE MACHINERY FOR &,COF MATTERS =e ~ —

OVERSEAS REPS IN AUST COMMITTEE
PERMANENT HEAD
DEPT OF DEFENCE FOR BCOF MATTERS....... A
!

| RENT Lo dido.
co 16 --
jOEFENCE COMMIT TEE! | DEFENCE о

4COSA ii ` (EKTENDEO) | COMMITTEE NOTES
CHIEFS OF usd. ADMINISTRATIVE | THE CINC,BCOF, 15 RESPONSIBLE
SYAFF LEVEL - { MACHINERY FOR THE COMMAND AND ADMINISTRATION
1 DEPT ОҒ DEFENCE) OF BCOF TO HM GOVTS IN UK, INDIA

NEW ZEALAND AND AUSTRALIA
THROUGH JCOSA.

bor, NE aoe
о

(8) UCOSA DEALS DIRECT WITH TRE
CMIEFS OF STAFF IN UK AND NZ,
CIN C. INDIA, SOUTH-EAST ASIA
COMMAND, AND GIN C, BRITISN PACI
FLEET, ОҢ SERVICE MATTERS
JOINT | CONCERNING BCOF.

DIRECTORS

OF PLANS

AND MAIN DIRECTOR OF JOINT
COMMITTEE PLANNING
LEVEL

17] PLANNING

I( (© THE DIRECTORS OF JOINT PLANNING

! (ucosa) (осоа) ARE AUTHORISED TO
COMMUNICATE ON A PLANNING LEVEL
WITH HEADQUARTERS BCOF AND WITH
THE JOINT PLANNING STAFFS AND
THE PRINCIPAL ADMINISTRATIVE
OFFICES, COMMIT TEES IN THE VARIOUS
COUNTRIES REPRESENTED ONUCOSA.

IN AUSTRALIA

PLANNING

мыт

PLANNING UK/IND
АМО SUBCOMMITTEE| STAFF FOR JOINT
LEVEL PLANNING

SECRETARIAT | қо SECRETARIAT

OVERSEAS REPS

AUSTRALIAN SECHETARIATS

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF AUSTRALIA 37

(a) to represent the views of their respective Chiefs of Staff
or Gommander-in-Chief in India with special reference
to the control and administration of British Common-
wealth Occupation Force;

(b) to maintain touch with the various branches of the
Australian service departments, and provide overseas
representatives in those departments so as to assist in
dealing with British Commonwealth Occupation Force
matters; and

(c) to ensure that representatives were provided to sit on the
various committees that met under the direction of the
Australian Defence Committee or Joint Chiefs of Staff
Australia whenever these committees were dealing with
British Commonwealth Occupation Force matters of
common interest.

The position of Joint Chiefs of Staff Australia vis-a-vis

Australian service machinery is illustrated below:

Joint Chiefs of Staff Australia

Australian Chiefs of Staff as
agents of Joint Chiefs of
Staff Australia

i
ACNB HQ AMF RAAF СНО,

LEGEND

—Joint policy of control and joint policy of administration.

Executive Instructions based on this policy issued by the Service Head-
quarters.

Thus all policy decisions of Joint Chiefs of Staff Australia
were passed to the Australian Chief of Staff, who as agents of Joint
Chiefs of Staff Australia then issued appropriate instructions to the
Australian Commonwealth Navy Board, Headquarters Australian
Military Forces or Royal Australian Air Force Headquarters, as
the case might be. These Headquarters were then responsible for
issuing executive instructions implementing Joint Chiefs of Staff
Australia policy. It was a circuitous channel and was often liable
to considerable delays and misunderstandings.

38 POST-WAR OCCUPATION FORCES: jAPAN— 1945-47

The Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff Australia, (Chief of
Staff, Australian Army) clearly defined the functions ofits members
vis-a-vis the Australian Service Headquarters. He wrote in his
memorandum of 24 July 1946, “It has become apparent that
friction has arisen between various authorities concerned with
British Commonwealth Occupation Force in carrying out their
respective functions. This friction is entirely due to a lack of
clearness in the definition of where the duties of one authority begin
and of the other end....... It has therefore become necessary to
clarify the relationship of the overseas members of Joint Chiefs
of Staff Australia and their staff to the Australian Service Head-
quarters". ^ According to him the functions of the overseas
members were:

(i) to assist in the framing of joint policy for Joint Chiefs
of Staff Australia and maintaining touch with the
branches of Australian Headquarters;

(i) to assist Australian Headquarters in planning by
providing a portion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Australia
Planning Staff and its secretariat;

(iii) to provide advice to the Australian Headquarters when

requested by that Headquarters to do so; and

(iv) to keep their own authorities adequately informed.

He made it absolutely clear, ** that overseas members of Joint
Chiefs of Staff Australia had no responsibility for the detailed work
connected with the issue of the executive instructions required to
implement Joint Chiefs of Staff Australia policy and the members
of Joint Chiefs of Staff Australia Planning Staff only have access
to the branch of the Australian Headquarters concerned, and then
only for planning purposes and NOT to query how the branch is
carrying out its duties in connection with the implementation of
Joint Chiefs of Staff Australia policy ”.

He further wrote:

“ Australian Service Headquarters are embarrassed Бу
frequent enquiries and suggestions received concerning ways and
means ofimplementing Joint Chiefs of Staff Australia policy
T members of Joint Chiefs of Staff Australia and their staff
who devote the greatest part of their time solely to Joint Chiefs of
Staff Australia and British Commonwealth Occupation Force will
think of various ways of framing executive instructions............
However, the Australian Staffs are more fully acquainted with all
the factors involved. In any case, in Australia the responsibility
for the execution of Joint Chiefs of Staff Australia policy has

3 Memorandum of Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Australia dated 24 July 1946.

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF AUSTRALIA 39

been placed upon the Australian Service Headquarters who can
carry out this task. Having been given a job to do they should
be left alone to do the job "4

Moreover, he made comprehensive recommendations to
determine the relationship between Joint Chiefs of Staff Australia
and Australian Chiefs of Staff in order to remove occasions of
conflict. These were that

“ (а) the Australian Chiefs of Staff arrange to have made to
Joint Chiefs of Staff Australia such general statements as
the Australian Chief of Staff considers necessary to the
execution of this responsibility for British Common-
wealth Occupation Force;

(b) Joint Chiefs of Staff Australia invite the Australian
Chief of Naval, General and Air Force Staff to provide
replies to such questions as Joint Chiefs of Staff Australia
considers necessary;

(c) in regard to matters which are, or are likely to be, the
subject of Planning Staff action, the overseas members
make their enquiries from Australian Headquarters
through the Australian members of Joint Chiefs of Staff
Australia;

(d) where possible, all overseas offices be integrated with
each branch of Australian Headquarters; А

(e) information from а Branch may be provided опіу wi
the authority of a Senior Australian Staff Officer of that
branch;

(f) copies of correspondence concerning executive action
by Australian Headquarters on Joint Chiefs of Staff
Australia policy should NOT be passed to Overseas
members. Only when necessary for planning, they will
be provided to the Planning Staff by Australian Service
Headquarters ”. :

Strong exception to these proposals was taken by the overseas
members, and one of them wrote:

‘The overseas representatives, as part of Joint Chiefs of
Staff Australia are charged with the administration and control
of British Commonwealth Occupation Force. In the present cir-
cumstances they can only discharge their responsibility by keeping
a close eye on the agent and the result of hislabours. Ifthe agent
was perfect, many questions could be left entirely to him after
policy had been decided. But he is not perfect and that is one
reason why, in my opinion, we cannot accept the proposal that

4 Memorandum of Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Australia, 24 July 1946.
5 Note of 2 August 1946.

40 POST-WAR OCCUPATION FORCES: JAPAN— 1945-47

the overseas representatives should sit in a darkened room and
view British Commonwealth Occupation Force by such shafts of
light as the Service Headquarters may choose to turn on from
time to time. The other reason is that we cannot exercise
control, or shape a policy, unless we are fully informed about what
is happening, net only in Australia in meeting the instructions
given by Joint Chiefs of Staff Australia, but also in British
Commonwealth Occupation Force as the result of the execution or
attempted execution of Joint Chiefs of Staff Australia policy.

We cannot blindly accept an agent’s views on these
subjects—and thus make the agent judge, jury and advocate of his
own саве--а we are virtually asked to do ”.

This statement was representative of the views of the overseas
members who greatly resented any assumption of overriding
authority by the Australian Defence Department. Their apprehen-
sion was that Australia was appropriating the position of a
* dominant partner, who would hear the views of the interested
parties but who might, in his capacity as the executive agent for the
Region, ignore them when it came to saying what was to be done ”,
Their feeling was that “‘ equal responsibility for the framing of
policy was denied " to them. They suspected Australia of a desire
for unilateral control which they regarded as destructive of the very
basis of Joint Chiefs of Staff Australia which was organised on a
combined basis. There was protest against Australian action in
taking up certain matters at Governmental level without going
through Joint Chiefs of Staff Australia. On 3 May 1946, India's
representative on it protested that ‘‘ the Australian Government
had shown lack of courtesy to him by short circuiting Joint Chiefs
of Staff Australia, by referring to India the matter regarding supply
of meat on hoof, without referring the matter to him first "5 They
did not fully agree with the enunciation of the functions of the
overseas members of Joint Chiefs of Staff Australia by the Chair-
man, and considered that his interpretation would reduce that
authority into a mere advisory body, which has to beg for informa-
tion from Australian service machinery bothin respect of the framing
of policy and its implementation. It would appear that overseas
members desired to have close and intimate association with the
Australian service agencies and some sort of a supervisory authority
in matters pertaining to British Commonwealth Occupation Force.
That this role was incompatible with the independence of a self-
governing nation did not occur to them. Australian defence
services however could not tolerate interference with their freedom

6 Agenda 95/1946. Supplement No. 1 of discussion on 31 May 1946.

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF AUSTRALIA 41

of action and viewed with disfavour all attempts by the overseas
members to encroach on their discretion. The whole episode
was an unfortunate one and was born of misunderstandings arising
from the undefined nature of the respective roles of the two
authorities, Joint Chiefs of Staff Australia and the Australian
Defence Department; ultimately this omission was rectified by the
issue of detailed instructions for the guidance both of the overseas
members and the Australian services concerned. ‘This was
formally issued as a directive by the Australian Government on
behalf of the Commonwealth Governments in December 1946.
But in the interval the indefiniteness of the position had led to
misunderstandings and frictions which adversely affected the work
of Joint Chiefs of Staff Australia. It is no wonder that this experi-
ence influenced the Prime Minister of Australia to make the state-
ment on 1 December 1946 “ that he did not consider Joint Chiefs
of Staff Australia to be a suitable model on which to base future
Imperial defence developments". Nevertheless Joint Chiefs of
Staff Australia continued to fulfill its responsibilities and brought
out many lessons which are contained in its Plan issued on 15 May
1946.

On Joint Chiefs of Staff Australia, India wasrepresented by an
‘Indian element under Major-General Cawthorn, who was designa-
ted as the representative of the Commander-in-Chief of India.
This section joined the United Kingdom element to form a com-
bined organisation briefly known as UKINDEL (United Kingdom/
Indian/Element). Its functions were to look after the interests of
the United Kingdom and India and to this extent it succeeded
admirably. It assisted to a large extent in the work of planning
and organisation by Joint Chiefs of Staff Australia for British
Commonwealth Occupation Force.

With the withdrawal of the British Brigade from Japan in
January 1947 and Indian troops in October 1947 the Joint Chiefs
of Staff Australia organisation was dissolved and the Australian
Defence Department took over the responsibility of British Common-
wealth Occupation Force, which had by now become almost an
Australian /New Zealand Group.

In order to sum up the functions and achievements of Joint
Chiefs of Staff Australia itis desirable to point out the lessons learnt
during its tenure, September 1945 to December 1947. "These
lessons are in respect of the controlling body (Joint Chiefs of Staff
Australia) and the executive agents (Australian Defence Machinery)
and their relationship :®

7 Indei/71 dated 17-6-1947.
8 Ibid,

42

POST-WAR OCCUPATION FORCES: JAPAN— 1945-47

The Controlling Body
(a) Need to issue in advance an agreed inter-governmental

(b)

(c)

(d)

(e)

definition of the aims and objects of the force and of
broad principles on which it is organised, controlled
and administered.

Need for a controlling body to be nominated and ad-
ministratively established before detailed planning for
the raising and despatch of the force is started.

Need for an agreed directive to all the members at the
outset, even though this has to be modified in the light
of actual working.

Need for a considerable degree of decentralisation of
power to the controlling body by the National Service
Headquarters whom the members individually represent,
particularly in such matters as alterations to War Estab-
lishments and integration of services, within the man-
power ceilings laid down by the respective Governments.
Need for early decision by the Governments concerned
on the manpower ceilings for their contribution to the
force.

Need for early decision on broad outline of financial
arrangements likely to affect organisation and adminis-
tration both within and without the force.

Need for early preparation of an outline plan of organisa-
tion for command and administration of the force and
its despatch to concentration areas.

Need for the staff of the controlling body to be properly
organised at the outset to allow of Naval, General, and
Air Staff aspects to be given early and adequate weight
so that administrative planning can be based on well
thought out, clearly defined and co-ordinated “ general
Staff" policy.

Need for a Public Relations Organisation, together with
amenities and other matters which must essentially be
co-ordinated on a force as opposed to a component basis,
to be considered from the outset.

The Executive Agents

(a)

Need for early definition of responsibility and allocation
of subjects.

(b) Need for clearly defined machinery and procedure from

the outset to facilitate adequate consultation with over-
Seas representatives and to ensure that they are kept
adequately informed.

Prate III

RIN in Kure

268 :Ind Brigade and Battalion Commanders

4 Squadron RIAF

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF AUSTRALIA 43

(c) Need for early decision as to the extent to which existing
staffs of the national headquarters made executively
responsible for the force should be augmented to cope
with the extra work, so as to avoid necessity for setting
up special machinery.

CHAPTER VI

British Commonwealth Occupation

Force

THE COMMUNIQUE

On 2 February 1946, after agreement with the Governments
concerned, the following communique was issued simultaneously
in the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand and India:—

“f
*

Ás a result of discussion between the members of the
British Commonwealth, and reference on their behalf
to the Government of United States by the Australian

Government, it has been agreed that a Joint British

Commonwealth Force should participate in the occupa-

tion of Japan. Arrangements are now well advanced

for the Force to proceed on the following basis:

The Force is drawn from the United Kingdom, Australia,

New Zealand and India. The Commander-in-Chief of

the Force is Lieutenant-General J. Northcott, C. B.,

M.V.O., of the Australian Military Forces. His Head-

quarters is fully integrated with representatives drawn

from each Service and from each Commonwealth country
contributing to the force. Air Commodore F. M. Bladin,

C.B.E., of the Royal Australian Air Force has been ар-

pointed Chief of Staff to Licutenant-General Northcott.

The Force comprises:—

(a) Force and Base troops drawn from each of the
contributing countries.

(b) A land component organised as a Corps of one
British-Indian Division and two independent brigade
groups, one each from Australia and New Zealand.

(c) Anair component comprising Squadronsdrawn from
the Royal Air Force, the Royal Australian Air
Force, the Royal New Zealand Air Force and the
Royal Indian Air Force.

Units of the British Pacific Fleet are also stationed in

Japanese waters.

The British-Indian Division is commanded by Major-

General D. T. Cowan, C.B.E., D.S.O., M.C., Indian

Army, and includes 5 Brigade of the 2nd Division and

268 Indian Infantry Brigade.

The Australian Infantry Brigade Group includes 34

Australian Infantry Brigade commanded by Brigadier

BRITISH COMMONWEALTH OCCUPATION FORCE 45

Nimmo. The Commander of the New Zealand Brigade,
which is coming from Italy, is Brigadier К. L. Stewart,
C.B.E., D.S.O.

The British Commonwealth Force (BCOF) will form
part of the occupation forces in Japan under the supreme
command of General Douglas MacArthur, Supreme
Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP). He has
assigned the land component to the genera) operational
control of the Commanding General, 8th United States
Army, who is in military control of the whole area of
Japan. The air component has been assigned to the
general operational control of the Commanding General,
Pacific Air Command, United States Army (PACUSA).
Lieutenant-General Northcott, as Gommander-in- Chief,
British Commonwealth Occupation Force, is entirely
responsible for the maintenance and administration of the
British Commonwealth Force as a whole. He has
direct access to General MacArthur on matters of major
policy affecting the operational capabilities of the Force.
On policy and administrative matters affecting the
Force, the Commander-in-Chief is responsible to the
British Commonwealth Governments concerned through
a British Commonwealth organisation set up in
Melbourne and known as the “ Joint Chiefs of Staff in
Australia ’’.

Their instructions to the Commander-in-Chief, British
Commonwealth Occupation Force, will be issued by the
Australian Chiefs of Staff. The Joint Chiefs of Staff in
Australia (JCOSA) comprise the Australian Chiefs of
Staff and representatives of the Chiefs of Staff in the
United Kingdom and New Zealand, and of the Comman-
der-in-Chiefin India. This organisation is fully associa-
ted with the Australian joint service machinery. The
Commander-in-Chief, British Commonwealth Occupa-
tion Force, has the right of direct communication with
the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Australia on administrative
matters affecting the Force. On matters of Govern-
mental concern affecting the policy and operations of
British Commonwealth Occupation Force he wiil
communicate through Joint Chiefs of Staff in Australia
to the Australian Government who act as the representa-
tive of the other Commonwealth Governments concerned.
The area allotted to British Commonwealth Occupation
Force is the Hiroshima Prefecture, including the

10.

11.

12.

POST-WAR OCCUPATION FORCES: JAPAN—1945-47

cities of Kure and Fukuyama. British Commonwealth
Occupation Force will be responsible for the demilitarisa-
tion and disposal of Japanese installations and armaments
and for exercising military control of the area but not
for its military government which remains the respon-
sibility of the United States agencies. The British
Commonwealth Occupation Force area will not constitute
a national zone. The British Commonwealth Occupation
Force may be called upon to conduct military operations
outside its normally allocated area. When air support
for the land component of British Commonwealth
Occupation Force is required, this will primarily be
provided by the British Commonwealth Occupation
Force air component. Kure will be the base port for
the British Commonwealth Occupation Force who will
be responsible for the working of the entire port, the Kure
naval yard remaining under United States naval control.
Provision is being made for the British Commonwealth
Occupation Force to be represented in Tokyo Prefecture
by a detachment which will probably be of battalion
strength. This detachment will be drawn in turn from
each national component in the Force.
The British Commonwealth Force may be withdrawn
wholly or in part by agreement between the United
States Government and the Commonwealth Govern-
ments concerned, or upon six months’ notice by either
party. It has also been agreed that progressive reduc-
tions in the strength of the Force will be made from
time to time in conformity with progressive reductions
which may be made in the strength of the United States
Occupation Forces in Japan.
The Australian Services Mission hitherto located in
Tokyo has been transformed into an advanced echelon
of Headquarters British Commonwealth Occupation
Force with the addition of officers from other Common-
wealth components, For the present it remains in the
Tokyo area to facilitate liaison with General MacArthur’s
Headquarters.
Details of the move to Japan of the various components
of British Commonwealth Occupation Force cannot
yet be announced but detailed planning is now in
progress on the following basis: —
(a) Naval Port Parties for the working of Kure port to
arrive in the first week of F ebruary.

13,

BRITISH COMMONWEALTH OCCUPATION FORCE 47

(b) Leading elements of the Australian component to
arrive in the third week of February.

(c) Leading elements of the British-Indian Division to
arrive about Ist March.

(d) Leading elements of the New Zealand Brigade,
which is moving from Italy, to arrive about 23rd
March.

The organisation of British Commonwealth Occupation

Force and the arrangements for its control through Joint

Chiefs of Staff in Australia which are outlined above

constitute a further development in the closer integra-

tion of British Commonwealth co-operation. They ensure
that each of the Governments concerned has a full and
effective voice in this joint undertaking "'.

The course of events leading to the publication of the above
communique has already been traced in earlier chapters and it is
not necessary to reiterate the causes of delay which occurred.
Authority having been obtained from the United States it was now
expected that there would be no further delay in the move of the
force, which had been marking time for a considerable period.
This, of course, depended on the formulation of policy and plans
by Joint Chiefs of Staff in Australia and the issue of orders for the
mounting of the force, which in its turn depended on the following

factors:
(a)
(b)
(c)

(d)

reception facilities in the area allotted,

information about capacity of Kure Port tohandle British
Commonwealth Occupation Force shipping,

the availability of shipping to carry troops from various
theatres, and

the availability of troops for the move.

INFORMATION ABOUT HIROSHIMA AREA

The initial reconnaissance of the Hiroshima area, allotted to
British Commonwealth Occupation Force, provided the following
information :'

** About one-third of the area is broken land, the uplands

with heights ranging from 800 to 2,000 feet have thin, sandy
rocky soil with thin forest cover, while the lowlands consist
of coastal strips with narrow valleys. Within the few miles
of the coast-line, the altitude sometimes exceeds 2,000 feet,
although the average altitude along the south coast is usually

1 Joint Chiefs of Staff in Australia Plan 141/13A G(ops).

48 POST-WAR OCCUPATION FORCES: JAPAN— 1945-47

less than 1,500 feet. Movement across country is difficult
due to steep gradients, swift unbridged streams, the narrow
valleys, and the density of the jungles with which the entire
mountainous section is covered. The area is hot, humid, with
rainy summers and relatively mild winters with the mean
temperature in coldest month above freezing point. Despite
the southernly location snowfalls are frequent, but they only
last for a short time. The prefecture is located in the
typhoon area and the south-eastern portion is subject to the
greatest damage. Sufficient accommodation for personnel,
equipment, ammunition and supplies is available in the
prefecture to mect British Commonwealth Occupation Force’s
requirements. Cool rooms, freezing rooms, ice-making plant
and ice-storage rooms are available. Roads are adequate,
but their condition is only fair.

There is no shortage of manual labour in the area though
skilled labour is in short supply. No difficulty is anticipated
in obtaining sufficient labour for unloading ships and other
work concerned with setting up of British Commonwealth
Occupation Force ”.

On the above information, it was planned that the whole of
British Commonwealth Occupation Force could be dispersed in
.Hiroshima Prefecture with sufficient amount of covered space for
men and material. But contrary to expectations the inadequacy
of accommodation and facilities for 37,000 troops was revealed
soon after the arrival of the first contingent. This necessitated
taking over a few more prefectures. The Australians being first to
arrive, occupied Hiroshima Prefecture; here, however, accommoda-
tion did not seem to correspond with their wishes. The Sun
(Melbourne) in its issue of 28 March 1946, reported: “ Nobody
here (Tokyo) denies that the Australians in 34 Brigade at Kaitaichi
are at present in the worst barracks area for occupation troops
in the whole of British Commonwealth Zone. The British and
New Zealand forces now arriving in Japan more than a month
behind the Australians are being favoured with better billets and
more pleasant surroundings ”’.
| This was associated with the nationality of the Commander-
in-Chief of the Force and was thus commented upon by the Sun:
"Itwas explained to-day that the Australians were penalised because
the Commander-in-Chief of the British Forces, General Northcott,
1$ an Australian, and it may have been misunderstood if the
Diggers (Australians) had been given the pick of the places ”’.?

® The Sun, Melbourne, 28 March 1946.

BRITISH COMMONWEALTH OCCUPATION FORCE 49

The facts, however, were that after the arrival of the Austra-
lian Brigade it was felt necessary to occupy additional prefectures
of Yamaguchi, Shimane, Tottori and the island of Shikoku. It
was decided to allot the last three to the British-Indian Division
which was the largest formation, and the prefecture of Yamaguchi
to the New Zealanders who were coming last. It was not deemed
necessary to move the Australians from Hiroshima Prefecture
to the new areas because accommodation in all areas was more or
less of the same type, which on the whole was not of high quality
until new barracks were constructed.

CAPACITY OF SEA AND AIR PORTS OF ENTRY

** Kure which was selected as the port of entry for the force
was the site of the largest naval base in Japan and is located in a
small valley bounded on three sides by high hills and,on the fourth,
by the harbour. To the west and south, the harbour is protected
by two groups of rugged, granite islands. The port had ample
anchorage, but only a limited number of berths, three alongside
berths being available for Liberty-type cargo ships and two addi-
tional anchor berths being available for discharge of mechanical
transport and stores. Sufficient Japanese tugs and lighters were
available to discharge simultaneously two ships from the anchorage.
Mobile and floating cranes were available. The tide range was
eleven feet ’’.3

'The air-port of entry was Iwakuni in the Yamaguchi Prefec-
ture. This air-field, during the war, was a fairly large Japanese
naval and army training and operational air-field. It was the
nearest air-field from Hong Kong which could accept heavy planes.
It had one concrete strip (4-inch depth) 3,900 feet long. Taxi
tracks and dispersal areas were inadequate. An aeroplane slip-
way was available nearby. There were good hangars and domestic
accommodation was available, although it needed considerable
rehabilitation. The air-ficld was also served by a railway
siding.*

Kure Port and Iwakuni air-port had sufficient capacity to
handle all British Commonwealth Occupation Force’s sea and air
traffic. The difficulty anticipated was in reception and dispersal,
and maintenance of troops because no initial stocks were available
to tide over the transit period and accommodation could not be
improved until the troops were actually in occupation.

8 Joint Chiefs of Staffin Australia Plan 141/13 AG (Ops).
4 Ibid.

50 POST-WAR OCCUPATION FORCES: JAPAN—1945-47
THE AVAILABILITY OF SHIPPING

The shipping programme had to be chalked out after consul-
tation with the various authorities responsible as shipping was in
short supply, and was heavily booked. But when the final sanction
of United States of America for the mounting of British Common-
wealth Occupation Force was not available, Joint Chiefs of Staff
in Australia was naturally worried. On 18 January 1946, the
Australian Government informed their legation in Washington
that “ embarrassment was arising from the delay of the reply from
the United States Government because shipping had already been
ordered by the several contingents of British. Commonwealth
Occupation Force and some loading instructions had been issued":
But still from the United States confirmation was not forthcoming.
The Australian Government further pressed for the grant of clear-
ance for the Naval Port Party so as to avoid inconvenience on the
date of arrival of the rest of the force. After great pressure from
General Northcott's Headquarters in Tokyo, Supreme Commander
for the Allied Powers clearance for the Naval Port Party was granted
on 21 January 1946, with the proviso that it would arrive on or
after 1 February 1946, and without prejudice to the United States
final agreement regarding the basis of participation. The Naval
Port Party had, therefore, a very limited time to carry out recon-
naissance and prepare detailed shipping time-table before the
arrival of the force which was scheduled to begin by the middle of
that month.

The responsibility of mounting the force was:

(a) United Kingdom/Indian Army component—General

Headquarters India in consultation with Headquarters
Allied Land Forces South-East Asia.
(b) Royal Air Force/Royal Indian Air Force component—
(i) Units in Malaya—Headquarters Air Command
South-East Asia.
(ii) Units in India—Headquarters British Air Force
South-East Asia,

(c) Australian Military Force component—AHQ Melbourne

in conjunction with HQ Morotai Force.
(d) Royal Australian Air Force component—AHQ
Melbourne іп conjunction with HQ Morotai
Force.

(e) New Zealand Army component—HQ Central
Mediterranean Force,

BRITISH COMMONWEALTH OCCUPATION FORCE 51

(f) Royal New Zealand Force component—Air Depart-
ment, Wellington. .

(g) Naval Port Party—C-in-C East Indies.
THE AVAILABILITY OF TROOPS

The British-Indian troops had been marking time at Nasik
in India, the Australians at Morotai in South-West Pacific and the
New Zealand Brigade in Italy since 15 August 1945. It was only
on 9 January 1946 that the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington
signalled their approval for a Naval Port Party to arrive in Kure
for the purpose of making arrangements in advance for British
Commonwealth Force. General Northcott, who was on a visit
to India, was so informed. On 12 February 1946 Supreme
Commander for the Allied Powers issued Operation Instruction
No. 3, giving a practical shape to the MacArthur-Northcott Agree-
ment. On receipt of these instructions Joint Chiefs of Staff in
Australia issued a directive to C-in-C, British Commonwealth
Occupation Force, for the mounting of the force.

DIRECTIVE TO COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF BRITISH COMMONWEALTH
OCCUPATION FORCE®

The Directive to the Commander-in-Chief, inter alia laid

down the following responsibilities ;

* (a) to represent the Armed Forces of the British Common-
wealth Governments in the Allied occupation of Japan,
and to ensure that that role was carried out in such a way
as worthily to represent the British Commonwealth
Governments concerned and so as to enhance British
Commonwealth prestige and influence in the eyes of
the Japanese and our Allies and of the World. The
force has to exemplify and impress upon the Japanese
people the British Commonwealth way and purpose in
life.

(b) to follow the principle of maximum integration of
services and personnel of national components in British
Commonwealth Occupation Force Headquarters and in
the Force and Base organisations "'.

The process by which British prestige had to be impressed on

the Japanese and the Allies has already been discussed and the

5 Occupation Instruction No. 3 dated 12 February 1946, at Appendix ‘B’
6 Directive to Commander-in-Chief, British Commonwealth Occupation Force
No. JCPS 45/19 dated 18 February 1946 at Appendix “С”

52 POST-WAR OCCUPATION FORCES: JAPAN—1945-47

part played by Indian troops to raise the prestige of India will
be explained in greater detail in the following chapters. In brief,
the Force played a very great part in bringing home to the Japanese
the power, prestige and position of the British Commonwealth of
Nations in world politics.

The other objective, thatof integration, wasdifficult to achieve;
firstly, because no basis was laid down in advance on which such
integration was to be carried out and, secondly, there were many
differences which could not be removed by the touch of the magic
wand, but could only be smoothed by experience and time,
Integration is only possible if the fundamental principle of equality
in all aspects is firmly adhered to. But this could not be applied
to British Commonwealth Occupation Force to a very great degree,
because there were not only differences of pay, service, and
allowances but also of religion, culture and tradition, which could
not be easily reconciled by executive action.

Integration was to be applied mainly in Headquarters British
Commonwcalth Occupation Force, Britcom Base and in adminis-
trative units under these formations. In Headquarters British
Commonwealth Occupation Force the senior staff positions were
reserved for the officers of the Australian Military Forces (AMF).
This was done because they were conversant with the Australian
service machinery at home, which was the source of supply for
British Commonwealth Occupation Force. In the earlier stages
the various vacancies below them were not allotted on a nation-
ality basis but had to be filled up haphazardly. The ideal might
have been to have well balanced teams, consisting of officers
of different nationalities, but this was made more difficult by the
fact that, where the vacancy was allotted by nationality, it was not
filled by that nation due either to lack of qualified persons or shor-
tage of manpower. India perhaps, due to her own fault, was the
greatest sufferer in this respect. While it provided the greatest
number of integrated units and a force as large as Australia's,
its representation in British Commonwealth Occupation Force was
negligible. Till December 1946, there were hardly six Indian
officers in junior appointments in a Headquarters consisting of more
than two hundred officers. It can mainly be explained by the
fact that British officers were borne on Indian Army strength, and
Indian officers were required in India for nationalisation of the
forces then taking place. When the replacement of a proportion
of British officers by Indians in the Integrated Headquarters was
urged on General Headquarters India by Joint Chiefs of Staff in
Australia, it was pointed out: “© It is essential in the interests of the
Indian Contingent of British Commonwealth Occupation Force

BRITISH COMMONWEALTH OCCUPATION FORCE 53

that there should be adequate Indian Army representation in
integrated Headquarters and integrated units. British officers are
still an integral part of the Indian Army and if they are excluded
from the manpower ceiling of Indian component, it is inevitable
that Indian Army representation in integrated Headquarters. will
suffer, firstly, because responsibility for allocating British officers
of Indian Army to appointments in British Commonwealth Occupa-
tion Force will really rest with the War Office who will consciously
or unconsciously tend to give preference to British Service officers,
secondly, because the bulk of the senior staff and integrated
command appointments outside Brindiv are held by Dominion
officers who equally consciously or unconsciously prefer to have
British rather than Indian officers appointed to more senior posts
under them as they are used to dealing with the former and latter
are strange to them "." Could this attitude be conducive to inte-
gration? It is only fair to add however that Commander-in-Chief
India expressed his inability to find more Indian officers for British
Commonwealth Occupation Force in response to these urgings.

Integration in Britcom Base on the other hand was achieved
to a greater degree and produced some good results. But all
formations were always trying to have more British personnel in
place of Indian. A particular case was the demand by British
Commonwealth Occupation Force for additional United Kingdom
Provost units. There was already a preponderance of British
Provost sections over the Indians, though the Indians were far
greater in number. “The preponderance of British Military
Police indicated that Indian Military Police could not be used
independently and that British Military Police were required to
deal with both Indian and British troops.?

Nevertheless, there were not many occasions for friction.
Deputy Chief of the General Staff, India, who visited Japan in
1947 remarked: “ The Force comes from the three different Services
of four separate countries, which made friction unavoidable,
especially in the early days. The miracle is that there has been so
little ”,9

To obviate misunderstandings, India proposed the integra-
tion of Indian administrative units for functional control only and
opposed carrying this policy of integration below sub-units;
“Indian Other Ranks in an integrated unit should be so organised
that they work under their own officers and non-commissioned
officers as complete sub-units ”, and would remain under command

7 Indel/200 of 2 December 1946, А .
B Indclj49/ 11 {1 notes of visit of Chief of General Staff (India) to Delhi 4-7 October 1946,

9 No, 2504/B/DCGS (B) Tour notes of DOGS (B) India 5February te 1 March 1947.

54 POST-WAR OCCUPATION FORCES: japan—1945-47

of the Commander, Brindiv, for domestic, administrative and
welfare purposes.'? .

The Commander-in-Chief in India stressed ‘very strongly,
* the necessity for avoiding ‘ incidents ° arising out of disregard
for the religious and class susceptibilities of Indian personnel. He
was anxious that any impression of discrimination in the treatment
of, or outlook towards, Indian personnel, should be avoided and
that it should be apparent that Indian formations and units were
treated on the same basis as those of other components "'.**

With the political changes in India, the policy of integration
in British Commonwealth Occupation Force received a further
set-back. All the Indian units and services were to be nationalised,
which should not have affected integration in British Commonwealth
Occupation Force if the Indian element had been an independent
entity like other components from the very start." Now the mixed
British/Indian Units had to be broken up so that Indian units
could become independent of British control. "This ''created a
paradox for British Commonwealth Occupation Force, for while
advocating integration in general on one hand, on the other it
was destroying what had already been built up. It is suggested
that British and Indian mixed units in British. Commonwealth
Occupation Force be allowed to remain as before and that the
Indian component be nationalised like contingents of other
nations. "'? The suggestion was accepted with the proviso that
Indian personnel would serve under their own and not under
British Warrant Officers and Non-Commissioned Officers.

It may be to a certain extent due to the fact that India’s
acquiescence in integration was only given in part or that integra-
tion in British Commonwealth Occupation Force was not fully
achieved. A further reason undoubtedly was that different
national elements did not really have time to know each other
sufficiently to form a “ palatable’? mixture at an early enough
stage.

As has already been pointed out, given more time and means,
and good faith and understanding on all sides from the outset,
integration should have succeeded admirably as was proved in
many units where integration was applied. It would be wrong
to say that it succeeded in every case because there were a few
mixed units which were unhappy, the causes being mostly national
jealousies and lack of human understanding. It was once again

10 Brite! 540 of 7 March 1946.
1! Notes on General Cawthorn's visit to India dated 4 February 1946.

12 Notes on the Liaison visit of Colonel Roberts, D i
13 Personal signal from General Cawthorn to PAO 29 ла

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BRITISH COMMONWEALTH OCCUPATION FORCE 55

proved that to understand and work together it is necessary to lay
down rules of precedence and command, and define responsibilities
and channels of communication from the very beginning. "Where
this was omitted or not insisted upon by higher formations, the
different elements instead of coalescing began to disintegrate.

THE CHANNELS OF COMMUNICATION

In order to carry out his various responsibilities the Com-
mander-in-Chief, British Commonwealth Occupation Force, had
to deal with many authorities on different levels. The channels
through which British Commonwealth Occupation Force communi-
cations had to pass are illustrated on the chart opposite. "These
were'* :—

(a) On matters requiring ministerial or Governmental advice but not of a
command or administrative nature :
Commander-in-Chief British Common-
wcalth Occupation Force ... Secretary of Defence
Department, Australia.

(b) On matters of joint policy:
Commander-in-Chief British Common-
wealth Occupation Force ... Australian Chicfs of
Staff to JCOSA.

(c) On matters of command and administrative responsibility :
Commander-in-Chicf, British Common-
wealth Occupation Force .. Joint Chiefs of Staff
Australia—Govern-
ments concerned.

(d) For all executive action by Australian Service machinery :
Commander-in-Chief British Common-
wealth Occupation Force .. Australian Services—
Chiefs of Staff Australia

(e) On all matters of domestic administration from the aspect of the
personnel of any particular national contingent :
Headquarters British Commonwealth
Occupation Force — ... ... National Service
Headquarters.

14 Joint Chiefs of Staff in Australia Plan 114/13 AG(Ops),

56 POST-WAR OCCUPATION FORCES: JAPAN— 1945-47

The above summary covers the arrangements in respect of
both land and air forces.

The channels of command and for orders from British
Commonwealth Occupation Force to various components were
according to the established rules of procedure but the nominated
national representative had the right of direct communication with
his national Service Headquarters on any matters of national
importance but had to submit two copies of such communication
to Headquarters British Commonwealth Occupation Force. It
was very rarely that this prerogative was used and never in fact
had it to be invoked to protect any contingent or component
against a policy or decision of Headquarters British Commonwealth
Occupation Force.

The organisation of British Commonwealth Occupation
Force was:

HQ BCOF
| | | | | |
Shore Based но Aust Inf NZ Inf HQ BCAIR НО BC BASE
Naval Brindiv Bde Gp Bde Gp
Personnal
Force and
Base Units
drawn from all
Contingents
| | | |.
| Station HQ. RAAF Wing HQ,
| | Div Tps | |
UK Inf Ind Inf Two RAF Sqns Three RAAF
Bde Gp Bde Gp One RIAF Sqn Sqns

Station HQ.

One RNZAF Sqn
One Comm Sqn
One Sqn RAF Regt

It was presumed that all contingents of British Common-
wealth Occupation Force would be self-contained and would also
provide, separately, additional troops for Headquarters British
Commonwealth Occupation Force and Base Installations, but the
orders ofbattlefor the various national contingents neither specified
the numbers to be detailed nor gave the breakdown of units
earmarked for Integrated Headquarters. In consequence the
transfer of units by Headquarters British Commonwealth Occupa-
ton Force, from national contingents to Integrated Formations
created a good deal of misunderstanding. 4

BRITISH COMMONWEALTH OCCUPATION FORCE | 57

COMPARATIVE STRENGTHS BY SERVICES AND NATIONALITIES"?

, ,, The comparative strength for various nationalities was
initially :
Country Total | Percentage
Е
Great Britain ... 9,954 | 28:1
India .. те. & 9,611 |, 2741
—— M —À — M —— M — MM —À———M —À— ——ÀÀ 2. i
Australia à 11,466 | 32:3
a жекен 1
New Zealand кеі 4,425 | 12:5
A a ec ef EN
Total British Commonwealth Occupation |
.Еогсе gis НАР ... | 35,456 100

The breakdown of strengths between integrated units and
national contingents was approximately as shown on the next page.

BRITISH COMMONWEALTH OCCUPATION FORCE ORDER OF BATTLE

From the outset it was clear that Australia and New Zealand
could not provide their share of Base and technical troops, hence
larger demands were placed on India and the percentage of Indian
troops increased with each shipment.’® India accepted this addi-
tional commitment under the belief that this would provide an
opportunity to gain experience. For financial and administrative
reasons it was essential that Indian units be kept on the Brindiv
Order of Battle. British Commonwealth Occupation Force allot-
ted certain Indian units to the Force and Base Order of Battle, and
in case of Base placed such units under the command of the
Base Commander in accordance with “ normal procedure".
Commander-in-Chief British Commonwealth Occupation Force
stated that * experience has shown that any departure from the
established principles of command, general and local administration,
leads only to difficulties and inefficiency. Such command has been
limited to the extent that domestic personnel administration and
welfare of the troops remains the responsibility of the nominated

national representative "'.'?

16 URINDEL 115/2 dated 28 Feb 1946.

SURI ate ebruary P

17 е жее, British Commonwealth Occupation Force GSOS 0-421 SD
dated 19 October 1946.

POST-WAR OCCUPATION FORCES: JAPAN—1945-47

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BRITISH COMMONWEALTH OCCUPATION FORCE 59

_ This transfer was in respect of the United Kingdom and
Indian elements only as New Zealand was unable to provide any
Force or Base troops. After discussion with Joint Chiefs of Staff
in Australia and in order to avoid confusion Indian units were
retained on the Brindiv Order of Battle, while on the British
Commonwealth Occupation Force Order of Battle, for domestic
use only, they were shown with the formation under which they
werc serving. It was also agreed that, whenever the nominated
representative or component commander wished to take action in
respect of any aspect of domestic administration and welfare of units
not under his direct command, he would initiate such action
through the commander under whom the unit was then actually
serving.'?

The following Indian administrative units were transferred
to the general administration of British Commonwealth Occupa-
tion Force to fuse with the administrative services of British
Commonwealth Occupation Force, so as to effect greatest economy
in operations?

Serial Designation

626 489 Indian Supply Platoon.

627 591 Indian Supply Platoon.

628 8 Indian Field Bakery Section.

629 69 Indian Field Bakery Section (BT).

630 67 Indian Field Butchery Section (BT).

631 38 Indian Rear Holding Supply Depot.

632 59 Indian Supply Company Headquarters.

633 756 Indian Supply Section.

634 858 Indian Petroleum Platoon.

634a 861 Indian Petroleum Platoon.

634b 92 Indian Field Bakery Section.

635 92 Indian General Hospital (Combined) (250 Bed).
636 80 British General Hospital (200 Bed).

638 51 Indian Sub Depot Medical Stores.

640 25 Indian Field Laboratory.

644 25 Indian Ophthalmic Unit.

645 5 Sub Spec Centre.

648 Detachment 221 Advance Ordnance Depot.

649 One Ammunition Platoon (ex 64 Ordnance Field Depot.)
650 Half 223 Vehicle Park.

18 1/7AJ1 dated 18 November 1946.
19 кы iturus (India) No. 7240/01/A/SD 5 dated 25 January 1946.

60 POST-WAR OCCUPATION FORCES: JAPAN—1945-47

Serial Designation

673 Detachment ISLD.

676 1548 Indian Pioneer Company.

696 Detachment Graves Registration and Enquiry Unit.

717 Press Detachment.

719A 9 Recovery of Allied Prisoners of war and Civilian
Internees Searcher Team.

665 Headquarters Movement and Transportation.

ADMINISTRATION OF BRITISH COMMONWEALTH OCCUPATION FORCE

The administration and maintenance of British Common-
wealth Occupation Force was difficult because all supplies, stores,
vehicles and equipment were imported. The Force came from
three different services of four separate countries. The various
administrative problems of particular interest to the Indian Con-
tingent will be dealt with in the following chapters, but those
problems were faced and solved very bravely and expeditiously and
* great credit is due to the Commanders, their staffs and the Units
for what they have achieved in so short a timc ’’.?°

Maintenance of discipline and morale was the most important
administrative problem. ‘The discipline of British Commonwealth
Occupation Force troops, on the whole, remained very good. It is
not necessary to compare one contingent with the other but the
discipline of the Indian Contingent was of a high order of which
they could be well proud.

FRATERNISATION

The most controversial subject in British Commonwealth
Occupation Force was fraternisation on which policy was clearly
laid down in a Personal Instruction issued by Lieut.-General
J. Northcott, Commander-in-Chief, British Commonwealth Occupa-
tion Force, with the approval of Joint Chiefs of Staff in Australia
and after reference to the Commonwealth Governments. This
stated:

“1. Fraternisation is one of the most difficult problems with
which we shall be faced. I consider that it is quite
impracticable to issue stringent orders defining what is
to be done in an infinite variety of possible contingencies.
My policy regarding fraternisation can best be stated

2° General Scott's Tour Notes No. 2504/B/DCGS(B) dated 8 March 1947.

BRITISH COMMONWEALTH OCCUPATION FORCE 61

in the following terms. Every member of British Com-
monwealth Occupation Force must bear in mind that
he is present in Japan in a dual capacity. He is not only
a sailor, a soldier or an airman. He is also a representa-
tive of the British Commonwealth of Nations and all
that it stands for in the world.

In dealing with the Japanese he is dealing with a
conquered enemy who has by making war against us,
carried deep suffering and loss in many thousands of
homes throughout the British Empire. Your relation
with this defeated enemy must be guided largely by your
own individual good judgement and your sense of disci-
pline. You must be formal and correct, you must not
enter their homes or take part in their family life. Your
unofficial dealings with the Japanese must be kept to
the minimum. You must obey strictly all instructions
regarding establishment or areas which are placed out
of bounds to personnel forming part of the British
Commonwealth Occupation Force. Above all you
must remember that dual capacity in which you came
to Japan and, beyond that the fact that the eyes
of the Japanese and our Allies and indeed of the world
will be watching you. Much depends on your conduct
and on your bearing. Be sure that they remain
normal and that they are in keeping with the dignity and
courtesy which are part of our common heritage and
tradition.

2. No games will be scheduled between any organisation of
British Commonwealth Occupation Force and any teams
composed altogether or in part of Japanese nationals.

3. No military personnel will engage іп any athletic contests
with Japanese nationals.

4. Japanese should be encouraged to conduct their own
athletic and recreational programmes.

5. Itis the policy of the Occupation Force to make provi-
sion for all its requirements of food and not to acquire
any food whatsoever from local sources. Local procure-
ment of food depletes the food resources available to the
inhabitants of Japan. Members of British Common-
wealth Occupation Force will not purchase or otherwise
obtain, receive, possess or consume any foodstuffs of any

35 2t

description from local sources ".

21 Joint Chiefs of Staff in Australia Plan Minute No. 102.

62 POST-WAR OCQUPATION FORCES: JAPAN— 1945-47

These comprehensive instructions issued with the approval of
the participating Governments were intended to limit contacts
between the Japanese and the members of the component units
of British Commonwealth Occupation Force. It was not possible
to rigidly define the conditions of such contact, but the general
principle that the members of the Occupation Force should not
commit acts which could react on the prestige or honour of the
participating nations was fully emphasised. The troops were
admonished to keep their conduct and bearing normal and act with
dignity and courtesy in their dealings with the Japanese people.
It was at the same time essential to impose restrictions on the
procurement offood stuffs from the local sources so as not to interfere
with the local economy which was then in the grips of a crisis.
On the other hand, black-marketing was rife in the country and
many Japanese were prepared to utilise prospects of fraternisation
with the troops for obtaining supplies of food, clothing, cigarettes,
soap etc. from the occupation forces. It is unfortunate that many
members of these forces could be made unwitting agents of un-
crupulous black-marketeers. This situation had led therefore to
occasional rigorous application of these instructions regarding
fraternisation which might have been resented by some members
of the occupation forces. But such limitations on the conduct of
the individuals were essential, though these should not have been
allowed to deteriorate into racial or national arrogance. It was
also essential to limit fraternisation between the Japanese women
and the members of the Occupation Force, owing to its social
reactions in the parent countries. One means by which such
liaison could be minimised was to permit the move of service
families to Japan, which was done by British Commonwealth
Occupation Force. At the same time better recreational and
amenity services for the troops were organised.

DEPENDENT FAMILIES IN BRITISH COMMONWEALTH OCCUPATION
FORCE

In October 1946 it was decided to allow service families in
Japan depending on the availability of accommodation. The
first families to arrive in British Commonwealth Occupation Force
were of Brindiv, who had been able to procure and develop the
facilities a little earlier than other formations. In Headquarters
British Commonwealth Occupation Force, Britcom Base and the
Australian Brigade areas, construction of new accommodation
was taken in hand, New Zealand did not permit the move of
families to Japan. As the British Brigade was withdrawn in early

BRITISH COMMONWEALTH OCCUPATION FORCE 63

1947 and there were rumours of the withdrawal of the Indian
Contingent, the move of Brindiv families was stopped in May 1947,
The maintenance of families in Japan was not an easy task
it involved procurement and distribution of supplies, household
necessities and other arrangements concerned with families.

AMENITIES AND WELFARE

For the troops in general the arrangements for amenities and
welfare were organised on a centralised basis.

Headquarters British Commonwealth Occupation Force
was to co-ordinate and control all amenity units, canteens and clubs
to provide the maximum benefit to the general welfare of the whole
Force. The Australian Army Canteen Service, through Commander-
in-Chief, British Gommonwealth Occupation Force, was made
responsible for thc supply of canteen stores for British Common-
wealth Occupation Force and for establishing and directing British
Commonwealth Occupation Force Canteen Service, which was
to operate in Japan throughout British Commonwealth Occupation
Force as a financially independent organisation.

The Canteen Service provided clubs for officers and men,
ran various gift shops and gift trains and was responsible for welfare
in general. The shops were well stocked with Australian materials
and the Japanese souvenirs were sold at reasonable prices. The
opening of these shops was an important occasion at all centres.

The amenities services ran a circuit of cinemas where Indian
pictures were screened for the benefit of Indian troops. Occasional
concert parties from Australia, United Kingdom and India toured
the various formations.

Many hotels in different sight-seeing places were taken over
from the Japanese, rehabilitated and organised as Leave Centres.
The most popular were those in Kobe and Tokyo area. For the
Indian Contingent, British Commonwealth Occupation Force
organised a separate hotel at Uijji, about ten miles from Kobe. This
became very popular. Indians were also allowed to visit Tokyo
on leave during the tour of duty of Indian battalion there.

Trips to various beauty-spots and inland cruises were also
organised by the Amenities Service. In the latter half of 1947
the welfare and amenities were of a very high standard and com-
pared well with those of the Americans. The only drawback was
the scarcity of imported goods, which were in abundance in
American Post Exchanges but could not be bought by British

64 POST-WAR OCCUPATION FORCES: JAPAN— 1945-47

Commonwealth Occupation Force personnel due to currency
restrictions.

MAINTENANCE OF BRITISH COMMONWEALTH OCCUPATION FORCE”?

The maintenance of British Commonwealth Occupation
Force was to be carried out from Australian or New Zealand
sources through Australian channels so as to ensure economy of
personnel and shipping and to produce the most effective method of
administration. 'The above policy was implemented in three
phases:

(a) Phase I—The ''Initial Phase", during which each
component was maintained from the supplies and
stores which accompanied it to Japan.

(b) Phase II—The “ Interim Phase "', during which Australia
had to assume added responsibilities for other
contingents, beginning on 1 August 1946 and
continuing until 31 December 1946.

(c) Phase III—The ''Long-term Phase", beginning on
1 January 1947 which was based on the full
implementation of maintenance policy by
Australia.

Army Headquarters Melbourne was made responsible for
providing all services, supplies and stores for the maintenance of the
whole Force. It had also to supply all medical and dental stores
and had also to arrange to ship fresh supplies for all components
of the Force.

SUPPLIES

The most difficult problem was the supply of fresh vegetables,
which were neither available nor could be produced in Japan.
These supplies had to come from Australia and the course from the
market to the consumer was set with many difficulties ;?3 such as:

(a) the quantity and quality of vegetables available at

Sydney at the time of loading,

(b) transportation from market to army stores at White Bay,

(c) refrigeration temperatures on reefers,

(d) reefer storage facilities at Kure,

(e) internal distribution to scattered units of British Common-

wealth Occupation Force,

(f) preservation in outstations.

22 Joint Chiefs of Staff in Australia Plan, paras 129-140.
23 Australian Military Forces Q1/2308 dated 1 October 1946.

BRITISH COMMONWEALTH OCCUPATION FORCE 65

It will be pertinent to mention here that there is summer in
Australia when it is winter in Japan and vice versa; hence the
vegetables which could be made available during summer in Japan
were those which grew in winter in Australia. 'The problem of
transport was further complicated by the fact that all shipping
from Australia had to cross the equator and pass for some days
through very hot areas. That made shipment of vegetables in
deck cargo impossible, and required refrigeration facilities which
were not easily available. Nevertheless, these difficulties were
overcome by persistent effort and, by Dccember 1946, the follow-

ing scales of fresh supplies were available to all British Common-
wealth Occupation Force troops :—

Meat T€ IM ... 6 days weekly
Butter T vee .. 6 days weekly
Eggs — ibn: ... 3 days weekly
Fresh Fruit e "us ... 4 days weekly
Potatoes rem = ... 5 days weekly
Onions 5 days weekly

Other vegetables (including swedes,
cabbages, cauliflowers, carrots, pumpkin,
beetroot etc.) ... e" ... 95 days weekly

ORDNANCE

The supply of ordnance stores until 1 January 1947, was
arranged by providing automatic maintenance packs for each
component from its own sources. After 31 December 1946, Army
Headquarters Melbourne had to arrange for the supply of all
ordnance stores required by all component units.

The British Commonwealth Occupation Force Ordnance
Service was responsible for providing common user items of
ammunition. The plan was:

(a) units to hold one first-line refill,

(b) formation to hold one first-line refill,

(c) the Base Ammunition Depot to hold 30 days supply of

ammunition at contact rate,

All units had to maintain field system of accounting for
ordnance stores and all ordnance establishments were to use the
AMF accounting system.

ACCOMMODATION, ENGINEER WORES AND STORES

An initial supply of engineer works stores, furniture and
essential accommodation stores was to accompany all components.

66 POST-WAR OCCUPATION FORCES: JAPAN—1945-47

But after 31 December 1946 Army Headquarters Melbourne was
made responsible for the supply of all such stores, required by
British Commonwealth Occupation Force. As regards accommo-
dation, Supreme Commander Allied Powers had issued general
instructions relating both to the rehabilitation of existing buildings
and the construction of new ones. A lavish scale of furniture was
also sanctioned for the messes. But gradually, in view of its effect
on Japanese economy, the provisions regarding requisition and
procurement of houses, facilities and stores had to be tightened up
by Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. Yet British
Commonwealth Occupation Force had full power and authority
to handle all its own affairs. It was responsible for procuring
construction material and furniture from the Japanese sources,
which it provided to its component units on a generous scale. "The
scale of accommodation and furnishing provided by British
Commonwealth Occupation Force compared well with the
American standards.

MOVEMENT AND TRANSPORTATION

Army Headquarters Melbourne, in close consultation with
Headquarters British Commonwealth Occupation Force, was
responsible for the general control of merchant shipping into Kure.
All arrangements for movement by rail and by sea from and within
Japan were made by British Commonwealth Occupation Force
Movement Control Group, an integrated body. All air movement
was made by the Air Booking Centre, Iwakuni, subject to the
priorities allotted by Air Priorities Board, Headquarters British
Commonwealth Occupation Force. Scheduled air transport
services to Japan for British Commonwealth Occupation Force
were provided by Royal Air Force from Hong Kong. Non-schedule
services within Japan were carried out by the BCAIR. Communica-
tion Squadron.

The Transportation Service, under Headquarters British
Commonwealth Occupation Force, was responsible for the opera-
tion and maintenance of the port of Kure. As local skilled labour
was available for port maintenance, only supervision was required.

Railways in Japan were operated and maintained by the
Japanese Government Railways under the United States supervi-
sion. In British Commonwealth Occupation Force area Movement
Control Organisation of British Commonwealth Occupation Force

2. responsible for all moves of men, stores and vchicles by
rail.

IM џемог) үеләчәсу-лоГерү

Pirate VI

Group Staff

268 Brigade

BRITISH COMMONWEALTH OCCUPATION FORCE 67
POSTAL АВВАМСЕМЕМТ57%

Postal Set-up: Army Postal Units were provided by ай contin-
gents and components for service with their units and for main-
taining communication with the home countries. Indian Army
Postal Units were responsible for serving Indian and British army
units and for providing postal services for Royal Air Force/Royal
Indian Air Force units.

An integrated Base Post Office was established at Kure.
A detachment of Brindiv Postal Unit formed the Indian Section of
the integrated Base Post Office. Forward Post Offices were
established at all stations.

Mail Routes in British Commonwealth Occupation Force: The lay-
out of the Force over an extensive area required long lines of
communication. There was a network of railway lines in the area,
but even so some places on the north coast of Honshu and the south
coast of Shikoku were more than 24 hours journey from the Base.
The Postal Services were further handicapped by the lack of
alternative roads and the ban on travel by civilian trains. The
main routes were as follows:—

(1) Tokyo—Iwakuni Main Line: Two express Allied trains
were run on this line, and postal couriers were permitted
the use of separate accommodation in the mail van in
one of the trains called, “ Allied Limited ". Couriers
were provided by the Australian Advance Post Office.

(ii) Okayama—-Shikoku: Daily courier services was run by
train from Okayama to Uno connecting with railway
ferry between Uno and Takamatsu across the Inland
Sea. The couriers were provided by Royal Indian
Army Services Corps units. From Takamatsu railhead
the Brigade arranged to collect and distribute the mail
bags to Tokushima, Takuma, Matsuyama, Gomen and
Kochi. All these places were connected by fast railway
service to Takamatsu.

(11) Okayama—Matsue: There was а daily service which was
run from Okayama to the north coast by couriers provi-
ded by 268 Indian Infantry Brigade. From Matsue
the mail bags were conveyed to the Field Post Offices at
Hamada and Tottori by unit representatives.

(iv) Okayama—Kure: In addition to the despatches made on
the “Allied Limited” military special, secondary
despatches were made daily by Japanese civilian trains

24Report by Major D.S. Virk DDPS (Brindiv).

68 POST-WAR OCCUPATION FORCES: JAPAN— 1945-47

to connect with outgoing and incoming air mails. This
was the only route on which couriers were provided by
the Indian Advance Post Office.

(v) Kure—Iwakuni: After trying the rail and road services
for a few months a special launch was procured to bring
in air mails direct from Iwakuni to Kure, saving many
hours in transit and assuring mail connections from Kure
onwards.

Postal facilities: 'The following postal facilities were available
at the Indian Forward Post Office:

(1) Sale of postal stamps and stationery (Indian postage
stamps ).

(ii) Delivery and acceptance for despatch of first class and
second class mails including parcels through the post
orderlies.

(iii) Registration of letters and parcels.

(iv) Issue of Indian Money Orders.

(v) Sale and encashment of British Postal Orders.

(vi) Acceptance of Indian Saving Bank Deposits.

(vii) Facilities for the receipt and despatch of private telegrams.

Air Mail: Initially, air mail was routed from India via.
Australia, but the United Kingdom insisted on sending their
despatches via. Hong Kong because anair-link had been established
between Hong Kong and Japan from the beginning of April 1946.
The same route was adopted by India. The receipts and despatches
on this route were extremely irregular and transit time varied from
10 days to 20 days. High level representations were made but
there was no improvement till BOAC commercial service was
established towards the end of 1946 and even then receipts from the
United Kingdom were only once a week while those from India
were as irregular as before. The root cause of the trouble was the
adverse flying weather on the Calcutta—Rangoon—Saigon—Hong
Kong route. Royal Air Force machines had frequent breakdowns
and responsibility for the carriage of mail was shared by at least
three separate squadrons.
. Telegrams: In August 1946 a limited direct cable service was
introduced between Osaka and London and this was later expanded
to normal cable service. The financial aspect of the new service
was very favourable because telegrams could be sent at almost
one-third of the normal world rate.

Money Orders and Postal Orders
Restrictions were placed from the beginning on the booking
of Money Orders and sale of British Postal Orders. No Money

BRITISH COMMONWEALTH OCCUPATION FORCE 69

Order could be booked or Postal Order purchased unless the
Commanding Officer of the unit certified that the money was
drawn by the purchaser from his entitlement. Maximum monthly
limits of remittances were also fixed for all ranks,

Postal Concessions : The normal war-time concessions of postage
and customs duty were sanctioned. As silk was sold at all gift
shops the Government of India was requested to increase the annual
limit of duty-free silk from 4 yards to 6 yards and this was approved.
Free airmail postage was replaced by concessional rate of postage
in May 1947 as for members of the other forces overseas.

Lessons: The experience of postal services in British Common-
wealth Occupation Force brought out the following lessons:

(а) an unambiguous, catching and indicative address should

be adopted and promulgated well in advance,

(b) the civil post offices in India should be given adequate
instructions for the routing of the mail of the Force to the
proper offices of exchange,

(c) adequate postal units should be allotted to the Force from
the very beginning,

(d) the postal units should not be dependent on India for
day to day supply of postage stamps etc. and for
rendering of accounts,

(e) firm air and surface routes should be selected for despatch
of mails before the Force leaves India, and regularity and
speed should be the objective,

(f) postal representatives should be detailed at all important
points where mails have to be transferred en route from
one air service/ship to another,

(g) postage stamps should be overprinted * APO" to elmi-
nate hoarding for use and sale,

(h) the controlling postal officers should be permitted to
fix the postage and telegram rates to suit local conditions,

(i) the controlling postal officers should have direct liaison
with the other postal administrations represented on the
spot.

CURRENCY ARRANGEMENTS IN BRITISH COMMONWEALTH OCCUPATION
FORCE

In the beginning the Japanese Yen was made legal tender in
British Commonwealth Occupation Force, whose Yen requirements
were met by Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers from
Japanese sources. It is not known on what basis this money was
obtained and how it was to be adjusted but it became apparent

70 POST-WAR OCCUPATION FORCES: JAPAN—1945-47

very soon that more and more Japanese Yen were being deposited
with Paymaster British Gommonwealth Occupation Force than
were actually issued to the troops. This was bound to happen
when there was nothing to distinguish between Yen obtained from
legal sources such as pay and allowances and those obtained from
illegal sources, such as black-market and sale of War Department
property."

In order to stop conversion of illegal Yen into world currencies,
restrictions were imposed and conversion was allowed only for one
half of the amount issued during the previous month. "The with-
drawals through Paymaster were very insignificant and this check
forced the black-marketeers to buy postage stamps so that at one
time no postage stamps were available in British Commonwealth
Occupation Force post offices. This rash was stopped by rationing
stamps and, as soon as arrangements could be made, by overprinting
them for sale to British Gommonwealth Occupation Force
personnel in Japan.

It was anticipated that the high percentage of Yen obtained
by illegal sources, and converted by British Commonwealth
Occupation Force agencies in Japan into world currencies by Chief
Paymaster British Commonwealth Occupation Force would be lost
to the pool account of the Force. It was threfore decided to
introduce cash vouchers for all transactions in British Common-
wealth Occupation Force agencies."

Satisfactory vouchers could not be produced locally in
Japan and it was not possible to use vouchers used by Ámerican
troops because that would have meant reimbursement to the United
States Treasury of an equivalent amount of dollars. Hence these
vouchers had to be obtained from outside, and as Australia could
not produce them within six months it was agreed to introduce
the British Armed Forces Special Vouchers (BAFSV) which were
being used by British Occupation Force in Germany.*?

British Commonwealth Occupation Force required British
Armed Forces Special Vouchers to the value of 880,625 pounds
sterling and the United Kingdom Government wanted the
Australian Treasury to reimburse the face value ofthe cash vouchers
in full. To this the Australian Government rightly demurred and
wrote that the Australian Government as agent for the British
Occupation Commonwealth Force had assumed primary respon-
sibility for supply and maintenance which required great financial

25 Brindel 1412 of 23 December 1946.
86 Ibid.

Бар” Defence Melbourne Joint Chiefs of Stafin Australia 305 баќеа 20 December

BRITISH COMMONWEALTH OCCUPATION FORCE | 71

accommodation and should not be called upon to reimburse
the full value of vouchers to the extent of 900,000 pounds
sterling.

Ultimately in view of the mounting loss to all countries due
to illegal Yen transactions it was agreed that:

(a) Australia would treat British Armed Forces Special
Vouchers received from His Majesty's Government as
public moneys which would be subject to conditions
prescribed under Australian Audit Act and Treasury
Regulations.

(b) On termination of use, Vouchers would be returned to
His Majesty's Government and any losses charged to
Pool Account and reimbursed to His Majesty's Govern-
ment.

(c) Vouchers would retain their British Sterling rating, and
articles and services for which they are used would be
priced accordingly.??

From 6 May 1947, British Armed Forces Vouchers denomina-
ted in sterling became the only legal tender within British Common-
wealth Occupation Force for all British Commonwealth Occupation
Force service personnel, non-British Commonwealth Occupation
Force service personnel and British Commonwealth Occupation
Force accredited civilians, for the issue of pay and allowances and
for payment of:

(i) purchases in all Force establishments including post
offices, canteens, gift shops, officers’ shops, institutes,
hotels, clubs, cafeterias, messes etc;

(ii) mess bills ;

(11) services, stores and supplies provided on pre-payment or
repayment,

British Armed Forces Vouchers could be exchanged for
Japanese Yen currency through Paymasters, Field Cashiers, and
Account Officers at the rate of 200 yen to £1 sterling, but Yen
currency could not in any circumstances be reconverted to British
Armed Forces Vouchers,

FINANCIAL ARRANGEMENTS OF BRITISH COMMONWEALTH OCCUPATION
FORCE

The final financial arrangements for British Commonwealth
‘Occupation Force were not approved till December 1947, by which

28 Joint Chiefs Staff in Australia 305 of December 1946.

72 POST-WAR OCCUPATION FORCES: JAPAN—1945-47

time the British, Indian and New Zealand contingents had com-
pletely or partly left Japan for their home countries. The finalisa-
tion of financial arrangements between four Governments for
apportioning costs of British Commonwealth Occupation Force was
however bound to take time as lengthy inter-Governmental nego-
tiations were involved, In the interim, Australia made all the
joint payments and each country kept an account of its own
payments, The main problem was the basis on which charges
had to be apportioned between the various countries,

General Cawthorn on his return from India in February
1946 informed Joint Chiefs of Staff in Australia that India had
agreed to meet the cost of the Indian component on the following
basis :?9

(a) Pay of all personnel to be borne by the Indian
Government.

(b) АП other charges to be debited to the Japanese Govern-
ment,

(c) One-fourth of the overall cost of British Commonwealth
Occupation Force to be charged to India, as the strength
of the Indian component was approximately in that
ratio,

(d) No dollar payments to be made to the United States
authorities for any material or services provided by or
through United States authorities, which the latter ob-
tained from Japanese sources, e.g., Japanese Yen ob-
tained from Supreme Commander Allied Powers for
use in British Commonwealth Occupation Force.

These financial intricacies had not been thought out before
and Joint Chiefs of Staff in Australia Planning Staff expressed their
inability to advise, '*being unaware, of the political and politico-
legal aspects of cost of British Commonwealth Occupation Force
being borne by the Japanese.??"

The United Kingdom Government desired to recover from the
Japanese Government the cost of stores and supplies for the main-
tenance of the Force as a first charge against the proceeds from
Japanese exports. It also intended that stores obtained locally
should be paid for, either by the Japanese or by the payment of
Yen received from the Japanese free of charge.

There were many other difficulties in levying this charge on
the Japanese Government and this could only be settled on an

29 General Cawthorn's notes on his visit to India i '46.
39 JCPS 45/17 of 14 February 1946. NE

BRITISH COMMONWEALTH OCCUPATION FORCE 73

inter-Governmental level. It also depended on the policy of
Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers and the capacity of
Japan to pay. It was intertwined with the complex problem of
“ Reparations”, which was never thrashed out. As this affair
could only be settled after a Japanese Peace Treaty had been
signed, it was essential to make some financial arrangements
between the four countries taking part in British Commonwealth
Occupation Force.

The arrangements for computing, and the policy for allo-
cating overall cost of British Commonwealth Occupation Force
among the various countries concerned was based on a “ per
capita ’’ basis:

(a) each country to be responsible for meeting all charges

for pay of the personnel of its components,

(b) one of the Governments concerned (Australia) to assume
primary responsibility for financing and computing all
other expenditure incurred for British Commonwealth
Occupation Force,

(c) all participating countries to reimburse the Pool Account
according to the ratio fixed for them,

(d) any recoveries from the Japanese to be allocated between
the four Governments proportionately to the strength
of their component with the Force,

(e) the cost of all stores and supplies sent to Japan for the
maintenance of British Commonwealth Occupation
Force, and the cost of transport thereof, to be borne by
the Pool Account,

(f) the cost of any major requirement of a unit to be borne
direct by the Government concerned.?'

India's share in the Pool Account** was provisionally and
initially fixed at 32 per cent but this did not take into consideration
the following facts:

(i) India provided the largest amount of initial equipment
and stores, which were taken over by British Common-
wealth Occupation Force.

(ii) India provided more ancillary personnel to make up
for deficiencies in other national components. (United
Kingdom paid for the troops provided by India to make
up United Kingdom's deficiencics).

(iii) India provided direct certain items peculiar to Indian
troops.

зі JCPS 46B/22 dated 1 August 1947.
3° DCGS/G/100. Remarks by General Cawthorn.

74 POST-WAR OCCUPATION FORCES: JAPAN—1945-47

In view of the above India's proportionate share was reduced
to 27-4 per cent.?? T

The long term maintenance for British Commonwealth
Occupation Force was based on the following :?*

(i) Base Depots to be integrated.

(ii) No actual costing of the maintenance of each component
to be carried out in Japan. :

(11) The financial adjustment regarding the cost of main-
tenance of British Commonwealth Occupation Force
between various Governments to be on a proportionate
basis (the integrated nature of the force made actual
costing out of question).

(iv) Australia to be responsible for the maintenance of
British Gommonwealth Occupation Force of all stores
and supplies.

(v) All demands from British Commonwealth Occupation
Force to be placed on Australia,

(vi) Demands to be forwarded by Headquarters, British
Commonwealth Occupation Force as one co-ordinated
demand for the whole of the Force and not separately
for each contingent.

(vii) Australia to meet, as far as possible, demands from her
own sources and the balance of demands to be laid off
on other countries according to pre-arranged schedules.

(viii) All stores to be demanded on a co-ordinated basis for the
whole of British Commonwealth Occupation Force and
no separate account to be kept for different con-
tingents.

In the beginning it may not have been possible to appreciate
what might be the outcome of these arrangements at the final
disbandment of the Force. If no credit was to be given for the
** initial issues" the country which had contributed most to the
integrated installations was bound to lose. Each country was
responsible for the initial cost of the units it supplied and those
should therefore have been returned in the same state as they were
mounted irrespective of the source of supply of the replacements?*.
The position, however, remained indeterminate and was fruitful
of controversy.

These disputes could have been avoided if the financial
implications had been thrashed out earlier and Financial Advisers
from each participating country were appointed with Joint Chiefs

33 Britel No. 88 dated 25 January 1946.
34 DCGS/G[100. Note by General Cawthorn.
35 Indel/183 dated 22 October 1947.

BRITISH COMMONWEALTH OCCUPATION FORCE 75

of Staffin Australia and British Commonwealth Occupation Force
India had a Financial Adviser with British Commonwealth
Occupation Force for a period of a few months but on the insistence
of India®® this post was declared redundant and Mr. Zahir Ahmad
was returned to India.

THE LESSONS FROM BRITISH COMMONWEALTH OCCUPATION FORCE

The mounting, build-up, administration and maintenance
of British Commonwealth Occupation Force was an important
experiment which brought out many useful lessons and revealed
the need for :—

(a) early receipt by the Commander-in-Chief of Outline
Plan of force to cover broad principles of organisation
and administration, including degree of inter-service and
international integration, financial arrangements and
control,

(b) early receipt of directives by the Commander-in-Chief
and the component commanders,

(c) assembly of headquarters staff in time to permit of
detailed planning before despatch of the force/
components,

(d) decentralisation of powers to the Commander-in-Chief -
to adjust establishment etc. within the force to meet
local conditions subject to an agreed degree of control
by the controlling body,

(e) standardisation of relations between the Commander-
in-Chief and all components and contingents to enable
the Commander-in-Chief to exercise effective control
on a uniform basis throughout the force,

(f) early provision of entertainment allowances on a force
basis,

(g) revision of nomenclature of staffs and appointments to
meet the case of a force integrated from both the service
and international aspects,

(h) avoidance of undue adherence to the national nomen-
clature etc., in respect of administration so as to foster
the idea of a British Commonwealth Force and prevent
from the outset any feeling that one component predomi-
nates or that others are dependent on its “ bounty ”.
This particularly applies to supply, ordnance and canteen
units,

36 DCGS/G/100.

76 POST-WAR OCCUPATION FORCES: JAPAN— 1945-47

(i) adherence to the Chief of Staff organisation and avoi-
dance of duality of responsibility between the Principle
Administrative Officer and the Chief of Staff,

Q) headquarters of the force to be organised and to function
as an inter-service headquarters and not primarily as an
Army Headquarters.

CHAPTER VII

Concentration and move of Brinjap
to Japan

Chief of Staff Telegram Cossea 314 of August 13, 1945
gave the following estimate of the occupational forces for Japan
to be provided by India Command:—

(a) One Indian Brigade Group.

(b) One British Brigade Group.

(c) Divisional Troops. |

It was decided that this force should be known аз Brinjap
and the following principles were laid down for the selection of the
units! ;— І

(а) as many classes and arms as possible to be represented,

(b) units with maximum war experience (for political and
sentimental reasons contingent to be drawn from regi-
ments known to have done especially well against the
Japanese in Burma)’,

(c) subject to the above, units to be rcadily available in
India,

(d) limitation of movement, so as to avoid uneconomical
use of the limited shipping resources,

(e) no interference with the forces in Zipper, which had
already been mounted,

(f) before dispatch, the force to be brought on standard
establishment and equipped to a high standard,

(g) proper organisation of administrative units, as adminis-
trative problems for this force in Japan were expected
to be considerable,

(h) concentration of the force in one place in India prior to
its mounting.

This force was to be formed from the selected units of 36th
(Indian) Infantry Division and 2nd (British) Infantry Division, The
British Brigade from 2nd (British) Infantry Division was to consist
of English, Welsh and Scottish battalions, It was further decided
to form a Headquarters similar to a normal Division Headquarters
but containing certain additional personnel, usually found at a
Corps Headquarters, such as Education, Welfare etc, These
additional troops were provided to make Brinjap a completely
independent and self sufficient unit,

1File No. 7240/01/SD3.
?Telegram 73913/SD5 dated 17 August "45.

78 POST-WAR OCCUPATION FORCES: JAPAN—1945-47

It was also agreed to provide an initial maintenance lift for
all stores and supplies for 90 days with the exception of cigarettes
and tobacco and tinned and dehydrated equivalent of fresh meat,
fruits and vegetables, and tinned butter, which were to be for 45
days only? .

The second maintenance lift was to include Royal Air Force
stores, all petrol, oil, lubricants and mechanical transport spirit for
90 days as for the first lift, and ammunition at contact rates for
15 days, For reasons of prestige, and the fact that this force had
to serve in the closest contact with Americans, it was decided that
the unit messes should be equipped to a high scale with crockery
and other peace-time ancillaries, for which loans were provided
on the following basis* :—

(a) Officer? Messes Scale per
officer
Headquarters Force, Force Signals and all units
raised especially for this force нее .. Rs, 300/-
All other units including British units, and
regular and non-regular units | ... .. Rs, 200/-

(b) Sergeants’ Messes
Headquarters Force, Force Signals and all units
raised especially for this force rs .. Rs, 150/-
All other British regular and non-regular units Rs, 150/-
A special clothing scale for officers was sanctioned and the
following items on loan were issued to all the officers proceeding
to Japan:

No,
Battle dress serge 2
Caps G.S, serge 1
Greatcoat dismounted ; 1
Shirts Angola drab with collars “2
Camp Comforter 1
Gloves knitted 1
Jerkin leather 1
Blankets 3

Major-General D. T. Cowan, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O., M.C.,
well known іп military circles as ** Punch ” Cowan, was selected
to command this force General Cowan had commanded the

3Britel 141 of 14 February '46, Britel 517
File No. 7240/01/SDS. ^" adi

5Signal No. 73913/SD5 dated 17 August 45 from Auchinleck to Slim.

CONCENTRATION AND MOVE OF BRINJAP TO JAPAN 79

17th Indian Division which captured Meiktila, a major victory,
and changed the tide of events in the Burma campaign. This
division had fought against the Japanese longer than any formation —
from February 1942 until June 1945, In that period the division
had won seven Victoria Crosses and more than 600 other decora-
tions, The achievements of this division were a fair sample of the
whole range of Indian effort on land in the war against Japan,

Major-General Cowan who commanded this famous forma-
tion was the right person to command Brinjap and to show to the
Japanese people the victors of war and builders of peace. Не said
on assuming command :—

“Тат proud to be leading to Japan, men and women of

British and Indian armies who through so many years of

endurance and hard fighting have so well earned the right

to be there after the common victory.

These men and their predecessors, whose effort and
achievement they represent saved India and reconquered
Burma, Many of them were on the edge of still greater
enterprise when the enemy capitulated.

I hope our time of duty in Japan will help to consolidate
and enlarge the fellowship and unity of effort which were
forged with our friends and allies in Маг”.

The personnel of Division Headquarters began to assemble
in Delhi from 10 September 1945, and moved to Nasik after a
fortnight to join the force which they had to command,

Brinjap, as this force was then called, had begun to assemble
in August 1945, but the Headquarters was not in position till the
end of September, The concentration of the force which, in normal
course, should be organised by its own Headquarters was carried
out haphazardly without any proper planning before the Head-
quarters was ever formed, This handicap was also evident in a
marked degree in the mounting of British Commonwealth Occupa-
tion Force. The Joint Chiefs of Staff Australia Plan, which was to
be the working plan for this force, was not, as has been mentioned
before, in print till after six months of the concentration of the force
in Japan, However, Headquarters Brinjap by dint of labour
soon organised the force into a well equipped and trained force
` before it left India for duty overseas.

SELECTION OF UNITS
The selection of units was an important task because all units

had done very well, After careful consideration, the following
units were selected :—

80 POST-WAR OCCUPATION FORCES: JAPAN— 1945-47

(a) Indian Brigade

Headquarters 268 Indian Infantry Brigade which had

fought in Burma during 1944-45 was selected as the Brigade

Headquarters to command the three battalions, which had

been specially selected to represent the Indian Army,

These were:—

(i) 5th Battalion 1st Punjab Regiment from 26th Indian
Division. This unit had fought in Arakan and taken
part in the capture of Rangoon.

(ii) Ist Battalion, the Mahratta Light Infantry, which,
although it had not taken part in the Burma
Campaign, had been in the Western Desert and
Italy, where it had won two Victoria Crosses.

(iii) 2nd Battalion, 5th Royal Gurkhas which had
fought throughout the greater part of the Burma
campaign and which headed the list of honours and
awards for the infantry in the Indian Army, the famous
“ Triple ҮС” Battalion.

(b) British Brigade (5 Infantry Brigade)
2nd Battalion Dorsetshire Regiment
Ist Battalion the Queen's Own Cameron Highlanders
2nd Battalion the Royal Welch Fusiliers,

The 7th Light Cavalry was selected to represent the Indian
Armoured Corps, for its excellent work during the Burma campaign,
where it had won more awards than any other Indian cavalry
regiment, For its role in Japan it was changed to an armoured car
regiment and issued with Daimler armoured cars.

The artillery was represented by 30 Field Battery, RA,
from 2nd Infantry Division, with whom it had served in France
and Burma. 16 Indian Field Battery, IA, which had served
in Burma was to represent the Indian Artillery, which was granted
the title of Royal in December 1945,

The Engineer Units were 5 Field Company and 21 Field
Park Company. 429 Ficld Company (Queen Victoria’s Own
Sappers and Miners) represented the famous Corps of Sappers
and Miners,

CONCENTRATION AT NASIK

These famous units of the Indian Army began to assemble
at Mashrul Camp near Nasik from the middle of July 1945. They
came from far off corners of the world, the Punjabis from Burma,
the Mahrattas from Italy, and the Engineers from Jamshedpur. The

CONCENTRATION AND MOVE OF BRINJAP TO JAPAN 81

deserted camp once again came back to life. Its distance from
any large town and lack of facilities made it difficult for the troops
to find sufficient amenities and relaxation, which were so necessary
for a force of this kind. The reason for the selection of this site
might have been its vicinity to the port of embarkation. But this
absence of amenities fully prepared the troops for lack of them in
Japan where initially no ready made facilities could be available.

268 Indian Infantry Brigade: 268 Brigade as an indepen-
dent brigade had done excellent work in the Burma Campaign. It
had to represent in Japan the might and valour of the Indian Army.
India had made a very great contribution in stopping and later
defeating the Fascist aggression on all fronts. She had raised
the greatest volunteer fighting force of all time—more than 2,000,000
men. More than two-thirds of the Allied Land Forces in South-
East Asia were Indian Army men and among them were the
original battalions of 268 Indian Infantry Brigade. It was now
to be commanded by Brigadier (later General) K. S. Thimayya
D.S.O., who had won great honour and renown in the fighting
against Japan. Brigadier Thimayya was most suited by his perso-
nality, charm of manners and unassailable reputation, to impress
on the Japanese the calibre of Indian commanders. He had been
present at the ceremony of Japanese surrender in Singapore and
had signed on behalf of India.

The staff was a mixed one which was selected from many
Indian units but had few Indians in it. For an Indian brigade,
commanded by an Indian, it was expected that the majority of the
staff must be Indian, as this would have impressed the Japanese a
great deal more and saved the constant American comment
** peculiar Indian contingent commanded by British officers”’®

Indian Camp at Mashrul : The Brigade staff soon after arrival
at Nasik got down to the task of organisation, reception and
accommodation of Indian units coming to join them in the
Mashrul Camp. à

The camp was a beehive of activity, everyone preparing
furiously for the impending move to Japan. They did not know
that they would have to wait many long months before they could
actually move to the country of “ cherry blossoms ° about which
they had heard so much from officers who came to lecture about
Japan. In the tented camps the various units vied with each other
in the reputation they had gained in the last war. The Punjabis
were proud because the Commander-in-Chief of India was their
Colonel-in-Chief and considered themselves as his “ blue-eyed
boys". In 1941 this unit was in garrison duty at Mandalay and

6 Interview by Lt-Col. J. С. Singh, ADC to General Robertson.

82 POST-WAR OCCUPATION FORCES: JAPAN—1945-47

had withdrawn to India with General Alexander’s Army. It had
very nearly completed a circle via. Arakan, Ramree and Rangoon.

The Маһгайаѕ with their gaudy red-green hackles,
talked proudly of their achievements in the Western Desert and
Italy. They did not like the huts and tents of Mashrul after the
villas of Italy. The Italian Campaign had made them tough.
They had taken part in smashing the Gustav and the Hitler
lines and had seen action in South Florence. They had advanced
to Pisa and helped to cross the Senio and Santerno rivers. They
had won many decorations including two VCs. Having taken
part in the defeat of one enemy they were now going to occupy
the land of the other, defeated by their brothers-in-arms.

The Gurkhas from Nepal had already won great renown for
valour by winning three VCs in the grim battles of Kohima.
Two VCs were won at Mortar Bluff in the Imphal area, on
successive days in June 1944. In five months of bloody fighting
this unit had 820 battle casualties. They had also the proud
privilege of having been commanded by General “Punch” Gowan,
who was now their Force Commander.

There were many other Indian units about whom we will
hear a great deal later. There was the 7th Light Cavalry which
was an Indian unit, though being Divisional Troops, was not with
268 Indian Infantry Brigade.

429 Indian Field Company IE arrived at Mashrul Camp from
Tatanagar on 16 September 1945 and got down to making roads
and culverts in the Camp. It was happy to be back again within
the fold of 268 Brigade, having fought along with it in Burma.

Force 152 я
Force 152, which was being raised at Mashrul Camp was
christened British and Indian Troops Japan (Brinjap) with
effect from 1 November 1945 when General Cowan, the General
Officer Commanding, inspected all the troops on the inauguration
day. It was the intention of the Commander-in-Chief, India,
that this force proceeding to Japan should be well equipped, clothed
and provided with all articles of amenities, welfare and training.
The long stay at Nasik was therefore devoted to fitting all personnel
properly with summer and winter clothings. The veterans were
put through many ceremonials and trained to carry out Internal
Security tasks.

The fame of Brinjap had spread far and wide in India and
many officers came to inspect this force. On 27 November 1945
the force marched past Lieut.-General R. M. Lockhart C.B.,
C.I.E., M.C., General Officer Commanding, Southern Command.

CONCENTRATION AND MOVE OF BRINJAP TO JAPAN 83

7th Light Cavalry took part partly in armoured cars and partly
in soft vehicles. In the evening the massed pipes and bugles of
the force played Retreat at 57 Indian General Hospital (C).
Bands of 5/1 Punjab Regiment, 2/5 RGR (FF) and 2 Camerons
took part. The General Officer Commanding-in-Chief congratula-
ting the forces said: І congratulate all ranks on their soldierly
bearing, turn-out and steadiness on parade. I consider that the
standard reached in a ceremonial parade in so short a period of
training, reflects great credit on all concerned. I appreciate that
the standard reached so far is the result of the hard work, which
has been so enthusiastically put in by all ranks of the Force. The
Retreat sounded by the massed Bands was most impressive. The
obviously happy Force spirit made the visit most enjoyable one.
Best of luck in Тарап”.

The date of departure from India was still not certain.
Negotiations were going on in Washington and Tokyo. The
earlier indications were that the force would be embarking before
the end of the year, but as no definite decision was forthcoming the
move was postponed for early next year. This period of enforced
delay was utilised in arranging inter-unit and inter-brigade exer-
cises, sports tournaments and recreation camps near Lake Beale.
Welfare parties were also organised to visit Bombay and to go
out shooting in the neighbouring jungle. During December 1945,
7th Light Cavalry was busy equipping itself with Dodges, and
British units were making arrangements for the celebration of
Christmas and New Year's Day in Nasik. Most of the units were
able to send leave parties to Bombay and had holidays for X° mas
and New Year's Day.

Commander-in-Chief's Visit
For the first fortnight of the new year, 1946, all units of the
force were busily preparing for the Commander-in-Chief's visit.
General Sir Claude Auchinleck inspected 268 Indian Infantry Bri-
gade on parade, with 7th Light Cavalry, 16 Indian Field Battery
RIA, 429 Indian Fiekd Company (QVO) Madras S & M, Indian
Light Field Ambulance, IAMC, and 111 Indian Infantry Workshop
Company (IEME). After inspection he presented 48 medals and
orders to officers and men of the brigade, and presented a Union
Jack to the Brigade Commander. Addressing the parade he said :—
“I ат very glad that you are going to Japan to represent
the Indian Army there.
The Indian Army did much to bring about the defeat
of the Japanese and all the world knows how well it fought in
Assam and Burma. -

84 POST-WAR OCCUPATION FORCES: JAPAN—-1945-47

The Indian Army also helped greatly in the defeat of
Germany by its bravery and skill in the hard fighting in
Africa, Germany and Syria.

Amongst you, are units and officers and men who have
fought in all these countries and have made the name of
the Indian Army famous.

All parts of the Indian Army are represented here to-day—
Cavalry, Artillery, Engineers, Signals, Infantry, ТАМС,
IEME and all had their share in securing Victory.

In Japan you will meet soldiers not only from Britain,
but also from Australia and New Zealand and other
countries.

I know that you will show them by your conduct, bearing
and efficiency that the Indian Army is second to none in peace
as well as in war. The honour of the Army is in your
hands.

Your Commander is the first Indian Officer to command
a brigade in war and I have much pleasure in presenting
this flag to him and I know that you will guard it well.

I wish you good luck and a safe and pleasant journey.

I wish I were going with you ”.

The Brigade then marched past to the tune of the pipes and
drums of the 5th Battalion 1st Punjab Regiment and 2nd Battalion
5th Royal Gurkha Rifles (Frontier Force).

The Commander-in-Chief met the three heroes of the force,
the three VCs: Jemadar Gaje Ghale of 2/5 Gurkhas, Sepoy Nam
Deo Jadhao of 1/5 Mahratta LI, and Naik Agansing Rai 2/5
Gurkhas, who were going to Japan to show to the Japanese the type
of brave sons of India who had gained the highest awards fighting
against them.

Another Postponement

The departure of the force was again postponed, and the
camp rumours were that it would be moving out in March. This
was confirmed when leave details were sent out and leave was to
close on 15 March. These postponements were having an adverse
effect on the morale of the troops and General Cawthorn
apprised the Joint Chiefs of Staff Australia of the position. “ The
advantages of an early arrival are considerable. Political and
public enthusiasm are already waning and further delays may
cause complete disinterest. This tendency was reflected as far
back as 19 November 1945 when British troops of Brindiv
began cancelling deferments of release. The divisional comman-
der considered an early firm date of sailing, and implicit adherence

FLATE VII

Brigadier (later General) K. S. Thimayya, Commander 268 Indian Brigade

Prare VIII

Brigadier (later General; $. M. Shrinagesh, Commander 268 Indian Brigade

CONCENTRATION AND MOVE OF BRINJAP TO JAPAN 85
to it, very important to maintaining morale.
bered that all British troops hate India,’ and th
close to the Transit Depot at Deolali where they see large numbers
of men leaving for United. Kingdom on release and repatriation.
_ “А factor exists which cannot yet be quoted officially but
which may cause difficulties if further delays occur, i.e., internal
disorders in India may arise in March. These would probably
be directed against the railways and ports ”.®
Against this desire to secure the early arrival of Brinjap
in Japan was the fact that no Indian Advance Party had gone there
and it was not definite that adequate advance base facilities were
available at Kure port for a sound peace-time scale of administration.

It was suggested by the United Kingdom/India Element of

Joint Chiefs of Staff Australia that, ** this administration could
best be secured by the setting up of a self-contained Brit/Ind/
Anzac/Advance Base prior to the introduction of the main body
of Brinjap ".? The latter was self-contained as far as the
divisional rear boundary, and could be sailed as such without any
delay. Some of the units required in rear of this boundary, how-
ever, were still to be raised, as also personnel, whose details were
unknown, belonging to various integrated headquarters in the Base.

General Cowan, Commander Prinjap, signalled: “ІҒ it

was desired to sail Brinjap without Brinjap element in Base
a very firm undertaking would be required that satisfactory alterna-
tive administrative arrangements were guaranteed. "This was not
possible to assess until the British Commonwealth Occupation
Force administrative reconnaissance report was received. It was
recognised that the period of maximum stress in the Base will be
during the arrival period, when short cuts and expedients are
unsound. Reliance upon such means, or upon United States aid,
would subject United Kingdom/India force to the risk of:—

(a) failure to provide the high peace-time standard which
United Kingdom/Indian troops have been led to expect
and to which they are entitled,

(b) in the worst but foreseeable cases, possible complete
administrative breakdown particularly in the more com-
plex problem of Indian troops maintenance”.

This sound advice was not heeded and the move of Brinjap

Advance Party was further dealyed. The matter was again raised
with Joint Chiefs of Staff Australia but decision was postponed

It must be remem-
€y arc located very

7DCGS/G/100 dated 8-4-49. General Cawthorn explains that ‘British troops
hated service in India and not India itself".

ВІСО PS/48/A/3 dated 4 January 46.

SJCPS 48/A/43 dated 4 January 46.

19 bid.

86 POST-WAR OCCUPATION FORCES: JAPAN—1945-47

till after the return of General Northcott, Commander-in-
Chief, British Commonwealth Occupation Force, who had come
to India to inspect Brinjap, accompanied by Major-General
W. J. Cawthorn, C.B., C.I.E., C.B.E., India's representative on
Joint Chiefs of Staff Australia.

On 18 January 1946, Lieut.-General J. Northcott, C.B.,
M.V.O., Gommander-in-Chief, British Commonwealth Occupation
Force visited the force. He inspected 268 Brigade Group, took the
salute at a march past and conferred with selected officers and
VCOs. He said: “ Our job in Japan is to play our part in winning
the peace which is just as important as the task we had in winning
the war. We are not going there as Indians, Britons, Australians
and New Zealanders in separate units, but for the first time we
form a completely integrated British Commonwealth Force. The
success of our job will depend a great deal on the behaviour,
discipline, military efficiency of every individual in the force as
part of the Commonwealth team.

* Very soon the Australians from Australia, the New
Zealanders from Italy, yourselves from India, and air force
squadrons from many parts of the world will begin moving
to Japan to carry out the important task іп front ofus. We
have to take over the occupation of a large area in southern
Japan called the Hiroshima Prefecture. It is an area stiff
with armaments, coastal defences, ammunition works, naval
workshops and so on. The whole areais to be demilitarised
and we have to do it. We have to supervise the Japanese
who will do the labour and to see they do not put any thing
over us. It is a man-size job and it will take us some time
to complete it. Another most important task which is the
object of this force is to occupy this country and to show the
Japanese what it means to enjoy the personal freedom we
know but of which they have not the slightest understanding.

** For the first time in their lives they have been freed from
the tyranny of their own authorities, the police and gestapo
organisations, and the only reason they are now free from this
fear is because of the presence of Allied occupation forces.
As representatives of the British Empire your behaviour,
discipline, military efficiency and the whole manner in which
you comport yourselves both on parade and off duty will be
a great example to this cowed and defeated nation ”.

The General was entertained by officers of the force, and the
Kumaon Brass Band in full ceremonial dress made its first official

appearance. This band thereafter was alwaysin great demand at
all social functions. i

CONCENTRATION AND MOVE OF BRINJAP TO JAPAN 87

On his visit to General Headquarters (India), New Delhi,
General Northcott asked for an Indian Officer to be appointed
as his ADC to keep him acquainted about Indian Army matters
and customs.

THE MOVE

When planning the move it was appreciated that it would
be essential to have sufficient elements of administrative units
functioning on the ground when the main party arrived, as this
was not a purely tactical move. It was considered necessary to
send an Advance Party to Japan as early as possible. This question
was referred to Joint Chiefs of Staff Australia. On 28 December
1945, Joint Chiefs of Staff Australia signalled “‘ that the subject of
Brinjap Staff Advance Party was discussed with General
Northcott and A. V. M. Boucher and conclusion was reached that
except for those RAF officers no party should be sent forward but
held in India when a final stage is reached in discussions now taking
place in Washington ’’.

General Northcott assured General Headquarters India
that the Advance Party would be called forward in ample time and
proceed direct to Japan. In the meantime the Australian Liaison
Mission which had been in Japan for some weeks, and had become
the advanced element of British Commonwealth Occupation
Force Headquarters was to carry out reconnaissances of the area
allotted to British Commonwealth Occupation Force and communi-
cate to Brinjap their future locations.

The appreciation of the time factor for mounting Indian
contingent was submitted to Supreme Allied Commander South-
East Asia, who was responsible for the provision of shipping for this
move, on 30 November 1945. This clearly stated that 4 personnel
ships, 11 fitted M. T. ships and 4 store ships were required. Taking
D-Day as the day of sailing ex-Bombay, where the contingent was
concentrated, the time-table was:—

Day Event

D-30 Orders to mount contingent received.
D-26 Shipping selected.

D-8 Shipping arrives Bombay.

D-7 Loading commences Bombay.

D-Day Contingent sails.

A clear 30 days warning was required to mount the contin-
gent from the date the order‘ to ро” was received by Armindia.

88 POST-WAR OCCUPATION FORCES: JAPAN—— 1945-47

The planned build-up of United Kingdom/Indian Contingent
in Japan was as follows:—

Number |

NAME
d.
5 i Formation, Units of Per- , ETA Kure
ER sonnel
11 Мама Ран Рану m ..| 400 | 1-11 Feb 1946
2 | Air Advance Party ... 20 | 6-12 Feb 1946
3 | Advance Sea Party Brindiv— |
RAF/RIAF ..1 2,055 | 1 Mar 1946
4 | First Echelon Brindiv—RAF/
| RIAF .. | 2,048 116-23 Mar 1946
5 | RAF/RIAF (Malaya) ..| 1,025 |116 Mar 1946
6 | RAF/RIAF (Air Parties) m" 400 121 Mar 1946
7 | RAF/RIAF (Carrier Party) ! |
| Second Echelon... қай 126 15-18 Apr 1946
8 | Brindiv—-RAF/RIAF ... | 8,909 |15 Apr to 3 May
| 1946
ы и

RAF/RIAF (Burma, Malaya) | 1,380 | 15 Арг 1946

Schedule оў Movement
Air Advance Party: A party of 10 officers and 7 BORs, selected

representatives of staff and services, left India by air on 16 February
1946 and arrived at Kure on 19 February 1946.

Sea Advance Party

When planning this move, it was appreciated that it would
be essential to have a sufficient element of administrative units
functioning on the ground to receive and maintain the main body
of the division on arrival. Hence an advance party of 1600
personnel was despatched from India on 8 February 1946 and
arrived in Kure on 1 March 1946. To make this party self-
contained in itself it was allotted a lift of 100 vehicles and 850 tons
of balanced stores.

Main Body
The main body was divided into two echelons, roughly
corresponding to the two infantry brigades each, plus a proportion
of divisional troops.
(a) First Sea Echelon: Division Headquarters
Divisional Troops (less 7 Cavalry),

CONCENTRATION AND MOVE OF BRINJAP TO JAPAN 89

169 General Transport Company,
5 Infantry Brigade.
Shipping allocated: НТ Dunera
HT Orduna
HT Arundel Castle,

(b) Period 17 March—5 April 1946

First Flight: Balance Divisional Troops and
Advance Party 268 Indian Infantry
Brigade.
Shipping allocated: HT Rajula.
Second Flight: 268 Indian Infantry Brigade.

Shipping allocated: HT Orduna.

Final embarkation of 6,761 personnel of first sea echelon was
completed on 17 March 1946 and final debarkation in Kure by
5 April 1946, 112 personnel of the second echelon were embarked
by 29 April 1946 and arrived in Kure on 19 May 1946 completing
the move of the whole division.

Vehicles|Stores[G1098— 1st Sea Echelon

8 Mechanical Transport/Stores Vessels were allotted to lift
the vehicles of this echelon together with Unit G1098 and half
of the first 90 days maintenance stores tonnage.

Total vehicles shipped - yis 824
Total stores shipped wis ... 12,248 tons
Total G1098 shipped А .. 1,288 tons

2nd Vehicle/Store Sea Echelon

7 Mechanical Transport/Stores vessels were allotted to this
echelon to lift the balance of vehicles and balance of Unit G1098
and first lift of 90 days maintenance stores.

Total vehicles shipped ila T 859
Total stores shipped vie .. $6,895 tons
Total G1098 shipped e те 218 tons

Personnel on Mechanical Transport[Stores Vessels

Ali vessels with the exception of five were fitted to carry
personnel. This helped out the personnel lift considerably as
a total of 1417 personnel were carried over the two echelons.

First 90 Days Maintenance Tonnage |
Shipment of this tonnage balanced over the first and second

echelons was completed on 21 April 1946.

90 POST-WAR OCCUPATION FORCES: JAPAN—1945-47
MOVE FROM NASIK TO BOMBAY

The move by rail from Nasik to Bombay once again
demonstrated that units as a whole did not appreciate the necessity
for Unit Standing Orders to cover moves by rail, road and sea.
The fact that the successful move of a unit depended entirely
on the preparedness of the unit to move was brought home to
most of the units.

Nasik being only 100 miles from Bombay, and connected by
main road, proved to be an excellent concentration area. No
duplication of lines of communication resulted in continual hold-
ups in the passing of order and in case of necessity War 'Transport
link could be used for effective link-up.

Movement of troops overseas calls for accurate and complete
documentation and where the implications were not appreciated
in advance, considerable difficulty was felt in embarkation. In
this connection it was found imperative not only to insist on correct
documentation but orders were issued for officers of units to
accompany their men on board and into troops’ decks. ‘This also
helped in the correct stowing of kit and economy in space.

Travel in troops transport is never luxurious and there were
general complaints about the cramped space. But as the troops
were keen to get to Japan and as light entertainment was avail-
able on board the ships the complaints gradually disappeared,
troops making the best of the available facilities.

The setting up of Divisional Control Headquarters at the port
of embarkation was considered essential. Though this duplicated
the control with the Movement Control authorities, yet it proved
very effective in the accurate allocation of personnel to the
ships and in the continuity in calling forward troops from the
concentration area in Nasik to the port of embarkation at
Bombay.

The vehicles and personnel had to be split up in many
groups, but asthe vehicles and stores had preceded the personnel
ships it was expected that the units on arrival in Japan would be
self-sufficient and mobile.

On the departure of Brinjap from Bombay the following
message was received from General Officer Gommander-in-Chief
Southern Command, India:—

“АП in Southcom join me in wishing you and those
under your command the very best of Good Luck and success
on the great and important task that lies before you. Weshall
watch your activities with pride and confidence ?.

CONCENTRATION AND MOVE OF BRINJAP TO JAPAN 91
ARRIVAL IN SINGAPORE

The ships carrying Brinjap arrived in Singapore on 16
March 1946, and in the early morning of 17 March the main party
of Brinjap paraded through the streets of Singapore. Admiral
Lord Louis Mountbatten, Supreme Allied Commander, South-
East Asia, took the salute as a column of representatives of
Brinjap troops marched past the historical municipal building
where Lord Louis Mountbatten had accepted the Japanese surrender
of Singapore оп 19 Spetember 1945. Lord Mountbatten inspected
the contingents of Queen Alexandra's Imperial Military Nursing
Service, Field Army Nursing Yeomanry, Women's Auxiliary
Service (B), Women Volunteer Services (United Kingdom), Young
Women's Christian Association, Entertainments National Service
Association, formed up on the steps of the municipal building.

H.M.T. Dunera carrying Headquarters 268 Indian Infantry
Brigade and 5/1 Punjab arrived at Singapore on 7 April 1946. АП
ranks were greatly disappointed at not being allowed ashore
although the ship remained in stream for more than two days.

ARRIVAL IN HONG KONG

Major-General Frank Festing, C.B.E., D.S.O., General
Officer Commanding Allied Land Forces Hong Kong, came on
board the ship Dunera to welcome Brinjap on 22 March,
1946. On 23 March, the crowded streets at Kowloon, on the
mainland across Hong Kong, welcomed the first contingent of
Brinjap troops going to Japan. Major-General Festing took the
salute as the representatives of all the units marched past the
building of the Peninsula Hotel.

DEBARKATION IN KURE

The port of debarkation was Kure, the old Japanese Naval
Dockyard, one of the biggest in the world, now a mass of twisted
steel. Three alongside berths were available for the discharge of
vehicles and stores, while personnel could be disembarked along-
side pontoons or in the stream on to Landing Ship Tanks depending
on the size of the vessel.

Personnel : Disembarkation of personnel was effected smoothly
throughout, and rapid clearance to unit areas was facilitated
through the excellent arrangements made by the advance
parties to receive and accommodate units.

92 POST-WAR OCCUPATION FORCES: JAPAN— 1945-47

Vechicles: Majority of vehicles on arrival were runners
and facilitated easy discharge. There had been extensive
pilferage en route from the vehicles in ships which were not
fitted to carry escorts. Strict precautions and quick clearance
were required to prevent pilfering in Kure.

Stores: Discharge of stores was at first handicapped because
the Port Organisation was not efficiently gearedup to handle
the tonnage. This was soon remedied by the assistance of
Brinjap troops.

It was found that the port working facilities, including
Movement and Transportation and Base Units, should be
well established and geared up to receive a force of any
considerable size before such a force is mounted for ultimate
disembarkation at the port.

The following units co-operated in the disembarkation of the
Division, which was effected during the period 1 March to 19 May
1946.

British Combined Movement Control Group.

241 Indian Docks Operating Company.

Australian Docks Operating Unit.

One British Combined Base General Transport Company.
The above units had only arrived in Kure in the last week of

February, and their settling-in period coincided with the arrival of
the New Zealand and Australian contingents. None-the-less, their
rapid discharge of stores and vehicles and embarkation of personnel
was a creditable performance in view of the limited port facilities
and unpreparedness of the port to receive so large a force, whilst
catering also for the Australian and New Zealand contingents.

The first Indian element arrived in Kure on 28 March while
the main body in H. T. Dunera arrived on 18 May 1946. At the
docks, 5/1 Punjab escort to Colours was inspected by Commander-
in-Chief, British Commonwealth Occupation Force, Lieut.-
General J. B. Northcott, C.B., M.V.O. The troops then
disembarked and marched past Generals Northcott and Cowan
on their way to the railway station.

The Indian troops for the first time had a good look at the
Japanese mainland which they were going to occupy and saw the
havoc that had been caused by American bombings. Everywhere
large Japanese warships were lying aground in various positions
of abandonment while all naval structures on the island along the
narrow Japanese Inland Sea were no more than a mass of twisted
steel. Brigadier Thimayya had a good look at this desolate scene
and as he stepped ashore said: “ We are sorry to have left India
at this stage of political changes but there is a job to be done here

CONCENTRATION AND MOVE OF BRINJAP TO JAPAN 93

and the Indian Army has definitely earned a share in the honour
of the occupation of Japan. We are looking forward to happy
associations with Empire and other Allied troops”.

MOVE OF NO. 4 SQUADRON RIAF

On 2 April 1946, after six months of standing by, nineteen
Spitfire Mk. XIV aircraft were airborne from Yallahanka for
Cochin, where they were embarked on an aircraft carrier which
took the air party of No. 4 Squadron to Japan for occupation duties,

After landing at Cochin the engines were inhibited to prevent
corrosive action at sea, and then wheeled down to the quay. By
the morning of the 7th all aircraft were loaded and lashed on the
carrier deck. The carrier steamed out of the harbour at 1400
hours on 8 April 1946, and after a voyage of 15 days anchored at
Iwakuni, on the 23rd in the morning. According to the original
plan the aircraft were supposed to be flown off the carrier and landed
at the airfield, but due to bad weather and some technical
complications no aircraft was allowed to take off from the carrier.
This caused great disappointment to the pilots who had received
concentrated training on deck take-offs. By the 24th all the
aircraft were off-loaded and transported to the wharf by means of
barges, from where they were pushed down to the airfield.

The squadron was originally based at British Commonwealth
Air Station, Iwakuni, for one week, from where it was moved to
British Commonwealth Air Station Miho and formed a group with
two other Royal Air Force Spitfire Squadrons."

Report by Squadron Leader Barker RIAF.

CHAPTER VIII

British and Indian Troops in Japan

THE CHANGE OF DESIGNATION

Brinjap arrived in Japan as a self-contained formation
fully organised to carry out any role allotted to it in an indepen-
dent capacity. However, as a part of the British Commonwealth
Occupation Force, an integrated force, under the command of
General Northcott, it had no independent role allotted to it. Soon,
on the recommendation of Joint Chiefs of Staff Australia, the
designation of United Kingdom/Indian Contingent, Вгіпјар,
was changed to Brindiv. In its new role Brindiv was placed
under the direct overall command of the Commander-in-Chief
British Commonwealth Occupation Force. The national contin-
gents were autonomous in their domestic affairs and responsible for
their own Governments, though for international contingent pur-
poses and overall supervisory control they were underthe command
of the Commander-in-Chief, British Commonwealth Occupation
Force. There was some misunderstanding initially about this
change in designation, but in the end it was admitted by all, even
General Cowan, that Joint Chiefs of Staff, Australia policy was
sound and in the best interests of the Indian Contingent.'

DIRECTIONS TO CONTINGENT COMMANDERS

It was necessary to define the relationship between National
Contingent/British Commonwealth Occupation Force/National
Headquarters, hence a directive was issued to General Cowan as
Commander of the British/Indian National Contingent which
inter alia laid down that:?

“(а) National Contingent Commander was responsible to
Commander-in-Chief, British Commonwealth Occupa-
tion Force, for the command, employment, administra-
tion and training of the Indian clement of the British-
Indian Division and such formations and units as might
be allotted to it from time to time.

(b) National Contingent Commander was made responsible

to the Commander-in-Chief, British Commonwealth
Occupation Force, and to General Headquarters, India,

* DCGS/G/100. General Robertson had been responsible for this organisation.

2 Directive to the Nominated Representati i i /
«diete Mad. oon presentative of India contingent Indel/50/4 of

DIAGRAM SHOWING CHANNELS OF COMMUNICATION AUTHORISED FOR OFFICERS
NOMINATED AS REPRESENTATIVES OF NATIONAL CONTINGENT S

т ua 74

HM GOVERNMENT HM GOVERNMENT HM GOVERNMEN T HM GOVERNMENT Май р-у
IN THE IN IN IN THORISED CHANNEL OF
UNITED KINGDOM AUSTRALIA NEW ZEALAND INDIA COMMUNICATION.

CHANNEL FOR COPIES OF
COMMUNICATIONS. ы.

CHIEFS OF STAFF See ee MCE: or CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMANDER IN CHIEF

UNITED KINGDOM AUSTRALIA NEW ZEALAND IN INDIA

REPRESENTATIVES REPRESENTATIVE
оғ UK COS “СОЗА OF CIN C INDIA
ON uCOSA ON JC OSA

NOTE
IN ALL CASES THE OFFICER
NOMINATED AS THE REPRESENTATIVE
OF А NATIONAL CONTINGENT WILL

FORWARO IMMEDIATELY To THE
COMMANDER IN СМЕЕ SCOF
TWO COPIES OF THE COMMUNICATIUN
DESPATCHED TO HIS NATIONAL

AUTHORITIES.

OFFICER NOMINATED
AS REPRESENTATIVE

NEW ZEALAND
CONTINGENT

NEW ZEALAND INDIAN
AIR ARMY
OMPONENT OMPONENT

OFFICER NOMINATED
AS REPRESENTATIVE
INDIAN CONTINGENT!

OFFICER NOMINTATED
AS REPRESENTATIVE

OF FICER NOMINATED
AS REPRESENTATIVE
Ur CONTINGENT

AUSTRALIAN
CONTINGENT

AUSTRALIAN
AIR ARMY
COMPONENT

AUSTRALIAN INEW ZEALAND INDIAN
AIR ARMY AIR
COMPONENT COMPONENT COMPONENT

D BASE PERSONNEL OF VARIOUS
Не” NATIONALITIES

BRITISH AND INDIAN TROOPS IN JAPAN 95

for matters of domestic administration including disci-
plinary action in respect of all the personnel of the
Indian Army wherever serving in British Commonwealth
Occupation Force and to ensure that the arrangements
for their welfare were satisfactory.

(c) National Contingent Commander was to communicate
direct with General Headquarters, India, but to provide
the Commander-in-Chicf, British Commonwealth Occu-
pation Force, with two copies of any such communica-
tions "". ғ

The channels of communication authorised for Contingent

Commanders and nominated representatives are given in the
diagram opposite.

Domestic Subjects: The following subjects were classified under

“ routine domestic personnel administration and were the
responsibility of the National Contingent Commander:
(1) Reinforcements, replacements.

(ii) Re-engagements in Japan.

(iii) Leave, including compassionate leave outside Japan.

(іу) Discharges, including discharges for compassionate
reasons.

(v) Return to countries of origin of undesirable, unsuitable,
and medically unfit personnel.

(vi) Conditions of Service (except policy concerning service

in Japan).
(vii) Education, repatriation, rehabilitation and post-war
reconstruction.

(viii) Promotion, reduction etc.
(ix) Honours and awards of medals and stars other than for
service in Japan.
(x) Promotion and posting of officers up to the rank of
Colonel.
(xi) Confidential and special reports on officers below the
rank of Lieut.-Colonel.
(xii) Officers’ records.
(xii) Records, including the reporting of casualties.
(xiv) National elections and referendums.
(xv) Philanthropic bodies.
(xvi) National patriotic funds.

NOMINATED REPRESENTATIVE

Major General D. T. Cowan, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O., M.C. was
appointed the Commander of the Army Component of the Indian

96 POST-WAR OCCUPATION FORCES: JAPAN—1945-47

Contingent and also its nominated representative. Squadron
Leader J. G. Chandra was the Commander of the Air Force
component of the Indian Contingent of British. Commonwealth
Occupation Force. As the national representative General Cowan
was made responsible for 3

(a) all personnel of all services in the Indian Contingent
and for bringing to the notice of the Government of
India any matter which affected either the general well-
being of the personnel in the contingent or the interests
of the Government;

(b) ensuring in conjunction with Commander-in-Chief,
British Commonwealth Occupation Force that Indian
personnel were not employed on any task or in such
manner as to conflict with religion or caste susceptibilities,

TASKS FOR THE INDIAN CONTINGENT

The National Contingent Commander was to ensure that those
under his command, at all times:— '
** (a) represent India worthily in the occupation of Japan,
(b) maintain and enhance British Commonwealth prestige
and influence in the eyes of the Japanese and/or our
Allies; and
(c) illustrate to, and impress оп, the Japanese people as far as
may be possible, the democratic way and purpose in Ше’.
In the fulfilment of these objects, General Cowan had a very
difficult task. Any degree of propaganda and advertisement could
not change the political position of India vis-a-vis the United
Kingdom. India was not politically independent and the fact that
Indian troops had defeated the Japanese in the far flung battle-
fields was a matter of the past. The actual position at the moment
was depicted by Indian troops mostly commanded by British
officers. In the beginning the Indian contingent could not ade-
quately demonstrate to the Japanese people, who, not very long ago,
were one of the big powers of the world, the democratic way and
purpose of life, which their countrymen themselves were fighting
for. It could only show, what it was, a sound, efficient and disci-
plined military force. The turn-out, efficiency, sense of duty and
discipline of the Indian troops was the one redeeming feature of the
whole situation. By their treatment of the Japanese, their all-
round behaviour and conduct, the Indian troops created a good
impression among the Allies and the Japanese.

d Inde som of 15 October, 46 at Appendix “Е”

BRITISH AND INDIAN TROOPS IN JAPAN 97

After the dissolution of Brindiv and the formation of an
Indian Brigade Group, with complete nationalisation of the officer
cadre and the attainment of independence on 15 August 1947
the position of Indians in the eyes of the Allies and the Japanese was
greatly enhanced. On the foundation of sincere freindship which

was bulit up gradually, rose the edifice of Indian prestige, sound
and shining.

THE MEANS TO INCREASE INDIAN PRESTIGE

The tasks laid down above for the Indian Contingent were
to be achieved by:—

** (1) efficiency and smartness of turn-out and the standard of

equipment and drill of troops;
(ii) preservation of the dignity of all ranks on or off duty;

(ii) the influence and conduct of British system of obtaining

and administering justice; and

(iv) the contact of service personnel with the Japanese to

influence their opinion in favour of India ”.

The efficiency and smartness of the Indian troops was second
to none in Japan and contributed equally with others to the
reputation of British Commonwealth Occupation Force. On the
many occasions of the change of guard at the Imperial Plaza,
Tokyo, their turn-out and drill movements exacted admiration from
numerous Allied and Japanese spectators. The preservation of
dignity of all ranks on or off duty was not only a matter for the
individual but mostly depended on the attitude of the senior
members of the Force.

Indians were appointed by General Robertson to the Provost
Courts and conducted their business with decorum and disposed
of cases on merits, and no national prejudice or war venom was
ever allowed to affect the course of justice. Generally the behaviour
of the Indian troops towards the Japanese also showed no feelings
of revenge and few cases of misbehaviour were reported. There
were, however, not many occasions for contact with the people of
Japan. Yet, despite these handicaps, many Indians came in con-
tact with the Japanese and thoroughly impressed on them the
Indian way of life, their austere simplicity and genuine sincerity.
On the other hand, the Japanese also made a lasting impression
on the Indian mind by their customs and mode of life, which in
many instances were admired by the Indian soldiers. Their high
standard of education and wide literacy existing even in the
remotest villages, the number of schools and the large attendance
there did not fail to affect the soldier, who could contrast the

98 POST-WAR OCCUPATION FORCES: JAPAN— 1945-47

conditions in his homeland. They also marked the advance in
technical sciences and cognate fields. Another aspect of Japanese
life which appealed to the Indian soldiers was the discipline of the
masses there and many felt that for progress in their own country
inculcation of discipline was essential.

The Indian troops who used to do the journeys by rail or
road were impressed by the fact that no space was wasted in Japan.
A law forbids the peasant to cultivate more than one-third space
on any hillside. "The virgin forest at the top and in the re-entrants
stops erosion which is bound to occur where gradients arc so steep
and rainfall so heavy. The cultivated space is terraced in small
fields according to the contours. This zig-zag pattern is a pleasing
sight in the Japanese landscape, for it is covered with various
plantations of different hues. All the space, along the roads,
along the railway lines, almost anywhere where there is soil, is
laboriously and tenderly cultivated. Not only do the Japanese
cultivate every inch of their land but they also excel in the
number of crops and the quantity of yield from that limited space.
The rotation of crops is achieved by careful timing and planning,
while the quantity is increased by improving the quality, in which
the Agriculture Department of the Imperial Japanese Government
played an important part.

Many Indians were quick to learn the Japanese language and
were thus enabled to get a better insight into the Japanese mind
and manners. Some of them were invited to Japanese homes and
were struck by their artistic simplicity. In brief, the Indians by
their contact with the Japanese learnt a great deal which was for
their good and of their country, while they in turn by their bearing
may have left a lasting impression on the Japanese mind.

LOCATION OF BRINDIV

Brindiv, of which only 5 British Brigade had arrived, was
allotted the Hiro and Fukuyama areas at the eastern end of
Hiroshima and Shimane Prefectures:—

Hiro Area: Divisional Headquarters

Divisional Troops

Headquariers 5 Brigade

Ist Battalion Queen’s Own Cameron
Highlanders.

Northern Area: 2 Dorset.

(Shimane-Ken)

Shikoku Island: 9 RWF

Kure Area: Base Troops.

BRITISH AND INDIAN TROOPS IN JAPAN 99

System of Maintenance: The system of maintenance was norma]
and presented no difficultics. The supplies and stores were drawn
from the various depots in Kure and then distributed in the normal
way througout the division. But difficulty was encountered in
the despatch of fresh supplies to outlying units, as refrigerator vans
and plants were not available in the beginning.

Accommodation at Hiro: Accommodation in Japan was classi-
fied according to its use during the war. The Target Property,
which was used by the Japanese armed forces, automatically
belonged to the occupation authorities who had complete rights of
alteration, removal and destruction, as they thought fit. The
Imperial Japanese Government property was reserved for the use
of the Japanese Government and it was difficult to acquire this
property for the use of occupation forces, Such property included
schools, hospitals and other official and non-official institutions.
The third category was known as “ Procured Proprety" which was
Japanese civilian accommodation procured for the use of occupation
troops. Toobtain this the requisitioning authority had to go through
strict procurement channels,

The accommodation in the Hiro area was seized Japanese
property, old naval barracks and armament factories, which was
hardly in a condition to be considered hospitable, particularly as
it lacked lights, doors or windows. For the most part, officers
and members of the Women's Services were housed in houses
procured from the Japanese. These were flimsy structures, the
walls consisting of sliding paper screens were adequate for the
summer but not for the rigorous Japanese winter. Other ranks
were accommodated in practically every case in ex-Japanese
military barracks, which were mostly double-storied wooden
structures.

It was not considered advisable to use stoves and heaters in
these barracks due to the frequent risk of fire for which strict fire
orders were issued to all units. Arrangements were therefore made
to instal steam-heating. То assist in the reconstruction of this
accommodation and make it comfortable for the troops, all the
engineer resources were employed on this task, assisted by Japanese
labour. Extensive reconnaissance of the area was carried out
to find engineer stores. The [Japanese labour in the beginning
proved very unsatisfactory. They were slow in the uptake and
grumbied at long hours of work.

But it was hoped that with the move of the formation to the
new area of responsibility the accommodation situation would
be eased.

100 POST-WAR OCCUPATION FORCES: JAPAN— 1945-47
MOVE OF BRINDIV TO OKAYAMA

In May, 1946, it was decided to allocate the prefectures of
Okayama, Tottori and Shimane and the whole of Shikoku Island
to Brindiv. 'This move was made difficult and had to be taken
piecemeal as it depended on the move-out of the United States
24th Division which was in occupation of this area.

The move of 5 Infantry Brigade to occupy the whole of
Shikoku Island presented several problems. First, it entailed sea
transportation from Uno to Takamatsu and then dispersal of units
to their destinations inland. The maintenance and administration
of 5 British Brigade had, therefore, to be more or less independent.

Shimane and Tottori Prefectures were allotted to 268 Indian
Infantry Brigade which began to arrive in Japan from 18 May
1946 onward. They were lucky not to have made two shifts but
moved straight to their permanent locations. Brigade Head-
quarters was located at Matsue, a pleasant spot on the western
coast of Japan, while the two battalions were located, 5/1 Punjab
at Tottori and 1/5 Mahrattas at Hamada, on the same coast.
2/5 Gurkhas went to Okayama as Divisional reserve.

TAKING OVER OF THE NEW AREA

The Okayama area was taken over formally by Brindiv from
United States 24th Division by 1715 hours on 11 June 1946.
Major-General James Lester, Commander of the United States
Division, visited 7th Light Cavalry on 29 May 1946, and attended
a regimental durbar. On his departure, a guard of honour was
provided by 429 Field Company. The parade was a great success
and was followed by a volley-ball match with the United States
Anti-Tank Company which was won by the Indians after an
exciting game.

To avoid the dismantling of accommodation as had happened
in Hiro area, the accommodation was taken over by Brindiv troops
before the withdrawal of the Americans.

By 30 June 1946, most of the units of Brindiv were settled in
their permanent locations.

OKAYAMA PREFECTURE

Okayama Prefecture forms a rough square between Hiroshima
Prefecture to the west, Tottori Prefecture to the north, Hyogo
Prefecture to the cast, and the Inland Sea to the south. Distances
between north-south and east-west boundaries average some 55

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BRITISH AND INDIAN TROOPS IN JAPAN 161

miles. The main lines of communication were from east to west
and consisted of the Sanyo Railway system and the Sanyo-Do
Highway, both of which extended from Tokyo to Shimonoseki
Two railway lines crossed the prefecture from Okayama to Tottori
and Yonago (іп the north) and there were several “ feeder ”” lines.
Road movement from south to north was limited by difficult
natural conditions—narrow, winding tracks, occasional steep
inclines and the inevitable paddy fields.

Before the war, Okayama City was the permanent head-
quarters of a Japanese brigade and a Japanese regiment of the
10th (Himeji) Division. With the movement of this division
to China the base at Himeji became the headquarters of
a Depot Division and the facilities at Okayama were converted to
suit a Regimental Replacement Unit, responsible for raising
Japanese “‘new type" regiments (roughly equivalent to British
brigades). A similar organisation for raising engineer units was
located at Okayama. Among regiments and engineer units raised
there during the war were units of the 54th Division which fought
in Burma (154 Infantry Regiment and 54 Engineering Regiment).
Other formations raised there fought in Luzon, the Solomons and
New Guinea, and in North China, the remainder serving only in
Japan. The army barracks were situated on the north-west
outskirts of the town. An Ordnance Depot was in the north-
eastern sector, in Sanganya area.

This accommodation was taken over by Brindiv for head-
quarters and divisional troops.

MAINTENANCE

Advance Base Depots were organised in Okayama which
were replenished from the Base Depots in Kure—Hiro area. The
maintenance channels from Headquarters Brindiv to 5 Brigade
were by rail and road to Uno from where the supplies
were carried by rail and passenger ferry to Takamatsu on the
Shikoku Island, where detachments of maintenance and adminis-
trative units were located. From there the forward supplies were
by rail. The supply system for 268 Brigade was from Okayama
to Yonago and then to the two battalions at Tottori and Hamada
direct. Yonago also supplied 4 Royal Indian Air Force Squadron
at Miho.

SOME EVENTS

Soon after the arrival of the units in their locations they
had to start performing many duties. The first ceremonial in which

102 POST-WAR OCCUPATION FORCES: JAPAN—1945-47

the Indian troops took part was the celebration of the Empire Day
in Tokyo on 22 May 1946. General Northcott, G.B., M.V.O.,
Commander-in-Chief British Commonwealth Occupation Force,
took the salute. |
On 16 June 1946, Brigadier Thimayya, D.S.O., commanding
268 Brigade left for Tottori to meet the Commander-in-Chief on
his last visit to the Indian Contingent as he was soon returning to
Australia to take up his new appointment as Governor of New
South Wales. After inspecting 5/1 Punjab at Tottori the General
went to Matsue, inspected a Guard of Honour at the railway
station and met American and Japanese officials of the prefecture.
He stayed on for the night and dined in the Officers’ Mess. The
Kumaon Band played during the dinner. After completion of his
tour he sent the following message:
** Before leaving Japan I wish to thank the Headquarters
Staff, Gommanders and Staffs and the units of British
Commonwealth Occupation Force, for the splendid work that
has been done by them during the difficult period of concen-
trating our force from so many widely scattered parts of the
Empire and settling into the occupation areas. The first
phase of our task has been successfully accomplished but
much remains to be done and I am confident that the same
co-operation and loyal support that I have experienced will
be afforded to the new Commander-in-Chief, Lieut-General
Robertson. The British Commonwealth Occupation Force
is a great experiment in the integration of Empire forces and
Empire co-operation.

Success is of the greatest importance to the future security
of the British Commonwealth of Nations and I hope that
every man, whatever his rank or job may be, will whole-
heartedly contribute towards its success by his conduct,
devotion to duty and by playing the game as a member of
this great Empire team. Our association with the United
States Forces in the Pacific has been a very happy one. "Their
co-operation and desire to assist us in the common task of
the occupation of Japan has been greatly appreciated by us
all and the friendships which have been made will endure long
after we have finished our work together. I cannot let this
opportunity pass without thanking the British Commonwealth
Base troops for the excellent work carried out under most
arduous and difficult conditions. In conclusion I wish you
all good luck and success to British Commonwealth Occupa-
tion Force. Keep the Flag flying”. .

BRITISH AND INDIAN TROOPS IN JAPAN 103

During the months of July, August and September 1946
there were many changes in the disposition of troops. 1548 Indian
Pioneer Company which was employed at Kure docks for menial

_work was repatriated back to India because it was considered
invidious to have Indian troops doing the same menial work
alongside the Japanese. The Indians had resented doing so and
their employment was also considered an un-economical commit-
ment.

Brigadier K. S. Thimayya, D.S.O., who had returned from
Manilla on 17 July 1946 after attending the Philippines Indepen-
dence celebrations, received orders of another posting in India in
December 1946. On his departure he sent the following message
to all ranks:

** І have commanded 268 Indian Infantry Brigade for over

a year and have now to leave you for another appointment
in India. It has been a great honour to me, and I have
taken great pride in having under command thosc Battalions
who have distinguished and gallant records in World War II.
During our raising in Nasik and subsequently since our
arrival in Japan all of you have had a difficult time settling
in and now you face a severe winter. In all this time your
drill, discipline and your duties of occupation have been of
a very high order and you have set and maintained a standard
which is difficult to beat. You have won the respect and
admiration of the Japanese people and you have therefore kept
high the reputation of the Indian Army. I wish to thank
you all for the loyalty and co-operation you have shown me
and specially my staff who have worked unceasingly on your
behalf”.

On 21 December 1946, there was a very severe earthquake.
At 0411 hours, without warning, the buildings began to rattle like
a toy in the hands of a mischievous child. The wooden floors
began to move away from under the feet. Chunks of cement
began to fall from the walls and all electric fittings began to strike
against each other in mad fury. Orders were given to evacuate
all buildings. In pitch darkness, all electric power being switched
off at the source, everyone rushed towards the doors and
windows. At times it appeared as if the sea was rushing in to
engulf the whole area and, at others, as if the buildings were going
to have a headlong collision with the adjacenthills. "Thousands of
homeless people were trekking towards higher ground to find
refuge, which they knew would not be available. Food, clothes
and shelter was the problem, to solve which British Commonwealth
Occupation Force rose to the occasion. Supplies of all kinds,

104 POST-WAR OCCUPATION FORCES: JAPAN— 1945-47

thousands of blankets, warm garments, and tons of foodstuffs were
rushed 19 Shikoku by air.

British and Indian troops who garrisoned this island gave
away their rations to feed the hungry. They provided them shelter
in their own billets, gave them warm clothes to wear. The doctors’
worked day and night to inoculate the masses against the spread
of cholera and other infectious diseases. The gratitude of the
Japanese masses at this prompt help given without any obligation,
was to be seen to be believed.

On 19 January 1947 sudden orders were received for the
withdrawal of 5 (British) Infantry Brigade from Japan to Malaya.
This put further pressure on the Indian troops, who had to move
to Shikoku Island to guard the installations being left behind by
the British. The withdrawal of 5 Infantry Brigade was completed
during February and only small detachments of Indian troops and
AMG were left behind. Subsequently, however, it was decided
to post 34 Australian Infantry Brigade in Shikoku and Indian
detachments were withdrawn as soon as stores were removed and
installations closed.

With the withdrawal of 5 British Brigade the reorganisation
of the forces in British Commonwealth Occupation Force was
essential. 34 Australian Infantry Brigade which was located at
Hiro became responsible for the Shikoku Island. As this force was
short of men it was decided not to locate any major units there,
but to supervisé by frequent patrolling. At Headquarters British
Commonwealth Occupation Force, the formation of a Headquarters
Land Forces was favoured by Joint Chiefs of Staff, Australia, but
strongly opposed by Gommander-in-Chief, British Commonwealth
Occupation Force, who believed that it would fail to relieve
Headquarters British Commonwealth Occupation Force of its
administrative work but would rather duplicate it. The withdrawal
of 5 Brigade had also the effect of disbanding the Brindiv. But
the Indian Contingent was still there and it was almost one-third
of the total Commonwealth Occupation Force in Japan. A plan
of reorganisation was suggested by which the Indian force would
have effective representation at Headquarters British Common-
wealth Occupation Force. It was proposed that—

(a) the Units of Brindiv remaining in Japan should form

268 Indian Infantry Brigade Group, and its Commander,
who, General Robertson insisted, should be an Indian,
should be the * national representative ”;

(b) the appointment of AA and QMG at Headquarters

Britcom Base, Kure, should be held by an officer of the
Indian Army.

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BRITISH AND INDIAN TROOPS IN JAPAN 105

The proposal to appoint a Principal Administrative Officer
at Headquarters British Commonwealth Occupation Force and to
upgrade it to Major-General was turned down by General
Robertson.

Brigadier S. M. Shrinagesh (later General) who had taken
over command of 268 Brigade in January 1947, was selected to
command the 268 Brigade Group to be formed by the amalgama-
tion of certain divisional units with the existing units of 268
Brigade. On 12 March 1947, he took over command from Major-
General Cowan, who sent the following message to all ranks:

“On my departure from Japan I wish all members of
Brindiv past and present ‘ Au Revoir? and the very best of
good luck.

I can express my feelings on departure by saying to you
all, men and women of Brindiv, how deeply I have
appreciated your very loyal support, co-operation and hard
work throughout our time together. As a result of the
team work of the Brindiv family your reputation stands high
amongst the occupational forces in Japan. I leave you
under the command of my friend Brigadier S. M. Shrinagesh,
your new Commander, secure in the knowledge, that you
will support him as well as you have backed me throughout
my period of command. Thank you”.

The following signal was sent to Major-General D. T. Cowan
on board the ship H. T. Ranchi from Brigadier Shrinagesh:

“ On behalf of the officers, УСОв and ORs of 268 Indian
Infantry Brigade I would like to express our deep regret on
the breaking up of a famous division whose name will always
remain in history. I would like also to convey to you and
your staff our deep sense of appreciation and gratitude for
all that you have done for us. No troops have been better
cared for or in better mettle than those of Brindiv under
command, this speaks volumes for the work you and your
staff have done in overcoming the difficulües that beset
British Commonwealth Occupation Force when the force
first moved in. To you personally we offer our warm
appreciation of your brilliant leadership and submit that
we have been proud to serve under you. On behalf of all
members of Brindiv remaining behind in Japan we wish
you bon voyage, a happy reunion with your family and a
good, well-earned leave ”’.

On 19 March 1947, 268 Brigade Headquarters moved from
Matsue to take over Brindiv responsibility in Okayama while 9th
Light Field Ambulance from Imaichi moved in its place.

106 POST-WAR OCCUPATION FORCES: JAPAN— 1945-47

With the withdrawal of Headquarters 268 Brigade from the
north coast more districts (Guns) were allotted to units in that area.

From 1 May 1947, Brindiv was dissolved and 268 Brigade
Group came into being. An Order of Battle as on 30 June 1947,
is in Appendix ‘F’. As the war establishment of this Group
was not published till about the middle of September 1947, many
officers and ranks had to be held on the old divisional establishment
which created alot of misunderstanding and heart-burning among
the officers.

Along with the complete control of the three prefectures
passing over to the Indian formation, the units themselves were
being completely nationalised, and every officer helped to make
this first Indian formation overseas a great success.

With the achievement of Independence in August 1947, it
was decided to withdraw the Indian Contingent from Japan. The
Shimane Prefecture was taken over by BCAIR and Okayama
Prefecture passed to the 34 Australian Infantry Brigade. By 25
October 1947, the whole of the Indian Contingent was withdrawn
from Japan.

CHAPTER IX
Responsibilities of Brindiv in Japan

Each formation was allotted an area in which it was
responsible for operational duties, internal security, occupational
duties, and general duties. The original area allotted to Brindiv
was approximately the eastern half of Hiroshima and Shimane
Prefectures but with effect from 1 June 1946 the Prefectures of
Shimane, Tottori, Okayama and the island of Shikoku, an area
of approximately 14,000 square miles and containing at least 6
million inhabitants, were placed under Brindiv.

This area was subdivided as follows :—

5 (Br.) Infantry Brigade—Shikoku island

268 (Ind.) Infantry Brigade (Less one battalion)—
Shimane, Tottori. :

Divisional troops (plus one battalion) —Okayama.

The layout within the prefectures was throughout based on
battalion garrisons with an occasional company detachment in
order to cover satisfactorily the large area.

By the end of June 1946, the divisional troops, which had
been so far located in the Hiro area, completed their move to
Okayama while the British Brigade had already occupied Shikoku .
island. The Indian Brigade on arrival in Japan moved direct to
its new locations.’

The proper control of this large area depended on good means
of communication and availability of transport.

COMMUNICATIONS IN BRINDIV AREA

Except for rail, other communication facilities in Japan were
poor. Moreover 5 (Br.) Brigade in Shikoku was completely isolated
from the Brindiv units located on Honshu island by the Inland
Sea. The development of the communication system was Priority
One on United States Eighth Army list of developments. ,

Road Communications :? Due to scarcity of space and lack of
level areas, the roads in Japan are very narrow and run along steep
embankments and through numerous tunnels. During the summer
months it was possible to use 15 cwts trucks and Jeeps on the roads
between large towns, but large convoys with heavier loads were out

1 For dispositions as in June 1946 see map opposite p. 100. ^
а For roi communications in British Commonwealth Occupation Force Area

see map opposite page 109.

108 POST-WAR OCCUPATION FORCES: JAPAN—1945-47

of the question owing to the sandy nature of the top surface, which
disintegrated very quickly, and the weak wooden tressle bridges.
During the winter months only Jeeps could be used on those
roads which had not been blocked by land-slides or snow.

United States Eighth Army started an ambitious road repair
plan throughout Japan together with re-classification and road
marking schemes. But as blast and road-making materials were
scarce progress was very slow and effort was mainly concentrated
on highways which interconnected important centres. Recon-
naissance of all roads in Brindiv area was carried out. These were
properly marked and all bridges indicated with their load carrying
capacity. Roads were the second best means of communication.

Railway Communications: As road communication in Japan
was relatively poor it was necessary to rely largely on the railway
for the movement of troops and supplies, especially in the winter
months. The Japanese railways were fortunately excellent and it
was very easy to move troops, vehicles and stores by this means as
all important towns were interlinked by a well controlled railway
system. '

The railway system in Japan was controlled by United States
Eighth Army, Railway Division, which had its control offices at all
important centres. In the British Commonwealth Occupation
Force area, Headquarters British. Commonwealth Occupation
Force Movement Control Organisation handled all movements of
whatever force by rail within its area. All operating staff was
Japanese, and the trains were run by the Japanese Government
Railways. Movement of personnel was made possible by:

(a) Running special trains for Allied personnel only. No
Japanese were permitted to board these trains. In the
beginning all travel on such trains was free for all Allied
personnel, but from March 1947 all railway movement
was on payment. "Travelling Cash Vouchers could be
purchased by the Allied personnel with occupation
currency.

(b) Reserved Accommodation: In other areas where Allied
traffic was not so great, railway accommodation was
reserved in certain trains.

(c) Reguisitioned Accommodation: As and when necessary rail-
way accommodation could be requisitioned from the
Japanese Government Railways through United States
Eighth Army.

.. Sea Communications: As Japan is a land of scattered islands
with à vast coast-line it had a highly developed coastal mercantile
marine. This was taken over by the occupation authorities.

TRAM ...- m
5тон25 Eum emus ums uum

5 TON | STREAM—
15 СМТ 2 STREAM -

15 CWT | STREAM- —
JEEP- =

,

YAMAGUCHI
YAMAGUCHI

(
! U.S. FORCES AREA

RESPONSIBILITIES OF BRINDIV IN JAPAN 109

In Brindiv area the sea communications were important
because all supplies and maintenance had to go from Honshu to
Shikoku by sea. Bulk supplies were delivered direct from Kure,
while the daily maintenance was through Uno ferry terminus to
Takamatsu. The sea journey from Uno or Kure took approxi-
mately six hours in passenger ferries but in fast motor-boats it
could be done in three hours.

Air Communications: There were a certain number of airfields
for both Dakotas and light aircraft at Okayama, Tokushima,
Goman, Kochi and Miho which were maintained in good
condition.

TRANSPORT

Road Transport: Before the Indian Contingent left India it
was given the wrong information that roads in Japan were of good
quality. Brindiv was accordingly equipped with heavier type
vehicles, which in Japan could be used only in important towns but
could not be moved across country. The only vehicle found
suitable in the narrow, winding roads of Japan was the Jeep and,
even where heavier vehicles could ply, they had to be four-wheel

- drive due to the poor surface of the roads. As Jeeps in India were
in short supply the operational efficiency of the force suffered a
great deal.

Rail Transport: On the other hand, the rail transportation
system was very efficient and plenty of stock was available. It
was undoubtedly a very sensible move to avoid the bombing of
Japanese railway communications during the war, as without
these it would have been impossible to carry out any large move.
Rail accommodation was good and steam heated during winter
months and the trains were always punctual. The Japanese
railway staff was most efficient.

Sea Transport: Movement by sea was limited due to the
scarcity of landing craft. This deficiency was made good by
procuring Japanese craft and rehabilitating them for the use of
occupation troops. About 80 craft were requisitioned by Brindiv
to be used for maintenance, patrolling and recreation. The crew
were always Japanese, supervised by a Transportation Non-
Commissioned Officer. |

Air Transport: Due to the lack of aircraft and persistent bad
weather no great use was made of this type of transportation but
in an emergency the Air Force Transportation Squadron could be

called in to assist.

110 POST-WAR OCCUPATION FORCES: JAPAN— 1945-47
OPERATIONAL DUTIES

For operational duties Brindiv was under command of
British Commonwealth Occupation Force, which in turn was
controled by United States Eighth Army. |

In view of their rapid demobilisation and the destruction of
military stores and equipment it was considered doubtful if the
Japanese could resort to large-scale armed revolution. But this
contingency could not be completely ignored. All units had to
prepare “ Keep” schemes and had to practise them regularly.
Throughout Brindiv’s stay in Japan there was never any danger
of an uprising. But there was a greater danger, that of ever
recurring natural disasters in Japan. The British Commonwealth
Occupation Force area was particularly subject to severe typhoons.
It is however believed that adequate measures were available to
meet the problems arising out of the natural calamities. Each
area had a Disaster Plan? which was to be put into operation the
moment the warning order was received from the Japanese Warning
System. On the warning being issued everyone had to take
precautions, but in over-crowded, over-populated Japan it was
difficult to get away. No place was safe. The Japanese police
and civil authorities always co-operated with the occupation
forces in carrying out practices and putting the plans into
action.

On 29 July 1946 a typhoon warning was received from the
Japanese meteorological centre, and troops, Japanese police and
civilians were alerted. Strong gales at 50 miles per hour started
in the evening and by midnight a violent typhoon was raging.
No one had a wink of sleep in pitch darkness, all electric power
having been cut off. All the low lying areas were flooded and the
howling wind kept blowing the whole night. Luckily the morning
was quiet and damage was negligible.

A more severe typhoon struck the southern coast of Japan,
particularly Tokyo area, on 17 September 1947, when the fierce
** Kathleen ", code-name for the typhoon, hit Atami and Kawana
areas. The incessant rain for many days flooded the rivers, which
broke their embankments and washed away thousands of houses
and miles of precious paddy.

Despite all this loss of life and property and complete paralysis
of communications, there was never any breach of peace and
troops had never to be called out to quell disturbances. This
speaks very highly for Japanese self-control and discipline.

3 Disaster Plan 268 Brigade Group in Appendix *G',

RESPONSIBILITIES OF BRINDIV IN JAPAN 111
INTERNAL SECURITY

Maintenance of internal security was by far the greatest
problem in Japan. The internal conditions in the country were
not stable, and could not be, after a major defeat which had followed
great destruction of life and property, and most important of all,
economic dislocation. The problem of internal security was varied
and required constant vigilance and immediate action to nip
trouble in the bud.

" Security in the area of Brindiv responsibility was achieved
yim

(a) Having a network of intelligence centres: These centres were
manned by Combined Inter-Services Detailed Interroga-
tion Centre personnel who were assisted in this task by
American Counter intelligence Corps and Japanese
police.

(b) Garrisoning important centres: Garrisons were located at all
important communication centres and at the seats of
Japanese civil government.

(c) Patrolling: AM outlying areas were constantly patrolled
in Jeeps and on foot.

(d) Flag marches: Units carried out flag marches in their
respective areas at reasonableintervals. "These marches
restored confidence in the local population, who had
anticipated a hostile attitude on the part of the occupation
troops.

(e) Checks and searches: Regular checks and searches were
carried out by units and formations.

Each garrison had a security scheme, which was based on
the overall divisional security scheme. The infantry battalion in
Okayama was the divisional reserve and each garrison had a
* mobile reserve " ready to move out by rail, road or air to the
assistance of the neighbouring garrison or garrisons.

As armoured cars could only operate in the Okayama area
and certain parts of Shikoku island, 7th Light Cavalry was based
outside Okayama with a squadron on the island of Shikoku.

The problem of the Koreans: The Koreans in Japan were the
cause of some trouble. Many of them indulged in criminal activi-
ties and often duped the Japanese. In the beginning they claimed
privileges as “‘ Allied Nationals ", who could not be apprehended
by Japanese police under Japanese law, but later, with the clarifica-
tion of their position, they were brought to book. But the Japanese
police did not dare to take action against them without the support
of the occupation forces. Many Koreans had to be kept under

112 POST-WAR OCCUPATION FORCES: JAPAN— 1945-47

surveillance and constant patrolling and checks had to be carried
out to break their combines and prevent them from criminal action.
They were also guilty of inducing illegal Korean Marec uae
Japan. Supreme Commander Alied Powers ha eci E to
repatriate every Korcan who did not want to be a Japanese citizen
back to Korea and declared all unauthorised Korean immigration
illegal. It was therefore necessary for the occupation troops to
blockade all ports of entry and apprehend the blockade runners.

Illegal Korean immigration: The Koreans mostly came from
the southern part of Korea, which was in the occupational zone of
United States Eighth Army, but it was not possible for American
forces located there alone to frustrate every attempt at blockade-
running as the coast-line was very long and the resources very
limited. The Korean technique was to make all arrangements
secretly in some remote village in Korea from where the junk
usually left in darkness. If detected, all occupants will give out
that they were fishermen going out to sea for a night catch. If
they were lucky to get through the intercepting naval patrols, they
landed on the Japanese coast in darkness. Shimonoseki іп Japan
was the nearest place from Korea and the trip in the junk took
about six hours if the sea was calm. Therefore the whole operation
was completed under the cover of darkness and detection was made
more difficult as no night air reconnaissance was possible.

The blockade-running used to start generally after the mon-
soons; it began in August and lasted till October, when the
seas again became too rough for junks to hazard the journey. The
immigrants generally landed in the Prefecture of Yamaguchi, New
Zealand area of responsibility, and from there infiltrated into other
areas overland. The reasons for running the blockade were:

(i) better food conditions in Japan,

(ii) black-market activities under the impression that they
would not be apprehended, and

(iii) escaping the economic mess in Korea.

Prices paid for the trip were fantastic and, in most cases,
all family possessions were sold to pay for the passage. Theescapes
after landing in Japan were well organised and the general impres-
sion was that these were supported by the Communists.

In order to stop this illegal traffic it was necessary:

(i) To carry out patrolling of the China Sea, between Korea
and Japan. This was done by units of the Pacific Fleet,
which had ships from the American, British and Indian
navies.

(ii) To carry out air reconnaissance patrols. This was
carried out by air forces based on Miho. 4 Squadron

RESPONSIBILITIES OF BRINDIV IN JAPAN 113

Royal Indian Air Force which was stationed th i
this task admirably. = ee

(iii) To carry out coastal patrols. This was done by infantry
units located in Shimane and Tottori Prefectures in
patrol boats, which were procured from the Japanese.

(iv) To institute a good warning system. As soon as informa-
tion was received about a suspected boat it was passed
to the Japanese police, and the nearest occupation forces.
This system was poor in the beginning but when the
Japanese police were placed on the occupation forces
warning system the results were good.

(v) To use search patrols. Once the Koreans were landed it
was necessary to search and apprehend them. This
-was done by the Japanese police assisted by troops.

(vi) To use interception patrols. In order to discourage
blockade running it was necessary to intercept and seize
the junks. This was done during the day time on the
return journey to Korea by air and sea patrols.

(vii) To repatriate apprehended Koreans. All illegal immi-
grants had to be transported to Senzaki in Yamaguchi
Prefecture, where a repatriation camp was built for them.

With the introduction of a quick warning system, with patrols

constantly on the alert and with the full co-operation of the local
Japanese population all blockade-runners, who landed in Brindiv
area, were easily caught.

Patrolling : Prevention is better than cure and it was necessary
to patrol constantly the area of responsibility for any sign of unrest
or illegal activities. Such patrolling was generally carried out by
parties in jeeps or on foot. The main tasks were to check the
towns and villages for Korean immigrants, black-market activities
and civilian unrest. They had also to reconnoitre and report on
the condition of communicatons. The Japanese police always
assisted in these checks and accompanied all patrols. They were
of great help in detecting many cases of illegal sale of War Depart-
ment property. The co-operation shown by the Japanese officials
and police throughout the period of occupation was highly satisfac-
tory. They made genuine efforts to carry out all orders and
instructions by Brindiv. The Japanese police was both capable
and efficient considering the relatively small size of the force and
the lack of transport, which made them comparatively immobile.

Due to this constant vigilance the situation throughout the
area remained generally quiet and there was never an indication

114 POST-WAR OCGUPATION FORCES: JAPAN—1945-47

pulation would cease to co-operate
There were hardly half a dozen
d insolence and the culprits were

that the Japanese civilian po
with the occupation forces.
cases of insubordination an
generally the Koreans.

OCCUPATIONAL DUTIES

The occupation duties related to Supreme Commander
Allied Powers directives regarding the occupation and to insuring
that they were being carried out by the Japanese. | The occupation
troops had to protect Allied life and property, which meant provi-
sion of guards and patrolling. The most important duty was
detection of crime. :

Detection of Crime: Counter Intelligence Corps and Combined
Inteligence Service Detailed Interrogation Centre were mainly
responsible for this task but the occupation troops helped to keep a:
check of the vast area.

The incidence of crime in Japan was relatively small and
generally involved theft of property, mainly foodstuffs and clothes.
Japanese police was generally able to trace every culprit and once
apprehended, the Japanese generally confessed the crime and
disclosed all connecting links.

The cases were tried by Provost Courts composed of Allied
officers, and the accused had to serve sentences in Japanese prisons,
where the prisoners had to provide their own food. As these thefts
were mainly to obtain food, imprisonment was a very severe
punishment. 256 such cases were tried by Provost Courts in
Brindiv area.

With the spread of poverty and increasing scarcity of food
and clothing crime increased among Koreans, who instigated
Japanese juveniles to carry out their nefarious designs.

Disposal of Japanese war equipment: 'The location and disposal
of Japanese war material was an important function of the Intelli-
gence Staff. As these dumps were scattered over a large area, a
comprehensive Intelligence Directive was issued to all units so that
all ranks could assist in the detection of war material and the
tabulation of information.

The Disposal of Enemy Equipment Section was responsible
for the co-ordination of all activities connected with the disposal
of Japanese equipment. Large quantities of arms and ammunition
were traced and destroyed. These included such items as 3,000
eee naval shells and air-bombs and mines, which were

sposed of by dumping in the sea. Extensive patrolling had to

RESPONSIBILITIES OF BRINDIV IN JAPAN 115

be carried out to check new undisclosed < targets ".* Though a
thorough search of the area was carried out, no clandestine dumps
were revealed.

Supervision of repatriated Japanese soldiers: Another important
function of the Brindiv was to supervise the repatriation of a large
number of Japanese soldiers who were repatriated through Hiro-
shima, where a Japanese agency carried out all functions of docu-
mentation, medical examination and delousing. Each repatriate
was supplied with fresh civilian clothes, three days’ ration and was
then sent to his bombed-out home. The arrangements at Re-
patriation Centre, Ujina, were perfect. Тһе repatriated soldiers
did not show any sign of hostility but adopted an attitude of
resignation. They were under the impression that they would not
be tolerated by their own people as defeated soldiers. Hence the
Japanese authorities in all towns and villages used to arrange
social gatherings with light musical entertainment and refreshments
to remove this impression of being “© un-wanted "' from the minds of
the demobilised soldiers.

Ex-servicemen seemed to settle down well and never gave
evidence of any subversive activities or gave trouble to the local
authorities, though in many cases they had to undergo great
hardship owing to scarcity of food and clothing. The pinch of
winter and the shortage of housing made the problem still worse
but the Japanese authorities tackled this problem bravely by rigidly .
rationing the housing accommodation and distributing old con-
verted uniforms. It was necessary to keep a strict watch over the
activities of ex-servicemen and to prevent them from joining hostile
bodies or criminal gangs. The Japanese authorities tried to
rehabilitate them and provided for their amusement and uplift
through various societies for cultural instruction.

Guard duties in Tokyo: In addition to the normal guard duties
in their own area Brindiv had to provide a Guard Battalion by
rotation in Tokyo. This was a very important feature of the
occupation and most of the units were able to mount guard at the
Imperial Palace, Tokyo, twice during their tenure of duty in
Japan.

Gurkhas in Tokyo: 2 Dorsets from 5 Brigade were the first
Brindiv unit to mount guard in Tokyo. 2/5 Gurkhas took over the
guard duties from them, and from 21 July 1946 mounted guard at:

Imperial Palace
Ebisu Camp Quarter Guard
British Embassy

4 Target” meant a location of Japanese cquipment of any kind for disposal.

116 POST-WAR OCCUPATION FORCES: JAPAN— 1945-47

Meiji Shrine

Empire House

Canadian Legation

Yasakusi Shrine. |
During the changing of the Guard the Battalion Pipe-Band played
and a large crowd of spectators with a battery of cameras witnessed
this spectacle. Rifleman (64138) Budhi Bahadur Thapa had the
distinction of being the first Indian soldier to be posted as a sentry
at the gate of the Imperial Palace, Tokyo. |

On 6 August 1946 the unit carried out a ceremonial parade
at which the salute was taken by Major-General D. T. Cowan,
C.B., D.S.O., М.С. The parade was followed by a massed retreat
which provided a grand spectacle for thousands of Allied and
Japanese nationals.

During their stay in Tokyo the Gurkhas made good contacts
with the American forces. А “ Country Fair" was organised for
their benefit by the American Red Cross in Yokohama, where men
were served with ice-cream and pop-corn.

On 2 September 1946 the Gurkhas in Tokyo were relieved
by 65 Australian Infantry Battalion. The Guards at the Imperial
Palace and British Embassy were changed ceremonially, and
afterwards the Brass Band of the Australian Unit marched the
Gurkhas to the station.

I Punjab in Tokyo

5/1 Punjab took over guard duties from 2 Battalion Welch
Fusiliers in Tokyo and the Commanding Officer reported to
Brigadier General Hugh Hoffman at 2 Cavalry Brigade Head-
quarters. The battalion mounted guard at “ Meiji Shrine " and
“ Akasaka Palace". A detachment for Tokyo Guard was also
selected from 429 Field Company Indian Engineers which took
over guard duties at Canadian Legation, British Embassy and
Imperial Palace. |

On 6 January 1946, 66 Australian Infantry Battalion took
over guard duties from 5/1 Punjab. On the completion of duties
in Tokyo many congratulatory messages were received. General
Hoffman, Commanding General Ist Brigade of Ist United States
Cavalry Division wrote:

“ During the recent war we read of the hard fighting
engaged in by men of the 1st Punjab Regiment. Their opera-
tions at Rangoon and Ramree Island added brilliant pages
to the long history of the Regiment. I consider it an honour
to have your 5th Battalion of the Punjabis under my opera-
tional control during last month. The occupational duties

RESPONSIBILITIES OF BRINDIV IN JAPAN 117
assigned to your battalion while in Tokyo were performed in
an excellent manner. The state of discipline and the soldierly
appearance of your men were outstanding. We have en-
joyed our association with you and when you return for
another tour of duty in Tokyo we will extend a hearty
welcome to the wearers of the elephant and the dragon ”.

The folowing message was received from Major-General

Chase W. Rydr, Commander United States Army IX Corps:

** It is with pleasure that I add my expression of apprecia-
tion of your fine performance of duty during the recent
association of your battalion with the troops of my command”,

Mahraitas in Tokyo

On 6 March 1947, 1 Mahrattas took over guard duties from
the 3rd New Zealand Battalion. The Kumaon Band was in
attendance when the guard at the Plaza of the Imperial Palace
took over duties from the Maori Company of New Zealand
Division Cavalry. The parade was witnessed by a very large and
cosmopolitan crowd, firstly because for the first time a holder of
Victoria Cross was on parade, and secondly because it was also
the first time that the people of Tokyo were going to witness
Indian troops wearing hackles.

On 3 March 1947 the Mahrattas provided a Guard of Honour
for the New Zealand Minister of Defence, Mr. Frederick Jones and
the Army Chief of Staff, Major-General Weir.

The unit received great co-operation from United States
7th and 8th Cavalry Regiments. As a gesture of courtesy for their
valuable help in making a loan of their parade ground andsupplying
transport, the Mahrattas gave them a display of ** Malkhamb "',
** Lezim ” and wrestling at Headquarters 8th United States Cavalry
Regiment lines, which was a great success.

Gurkhas again in Tokyo

During April 1947, 2/5 Gurkhas were again detailed for guard
duties in Tokyo, their last turn before departure from Japan. They
took over from the 4th New Zealand Guard Battalion on 30 May
1947. On 12 June 1947, the unit took part in the King's Birthday
parade. A Gurkha officer described the occasion thus: “‘ Finally
12th June arrived and a large convoy was seen to leave Embisu
Camp for the Imperial Palace Plaza where we debussed and formed
up. With us was a troop from 30 Field Battery RA, and as we
waited for the arrival of General Robertson, we were amazed at the
number of star-bearing cars which, for twenty long minutes, drew
up to the spectators’ stand in a continuous stream. ‘There were
Generals from all nations and even Russia put in an appearance.

118 POST-WAR OCCUPATION FORCES: JAPAN—1945-47

At 1015 hours the Commander-in-Chief arrived, received the
General Salute, and then took command of the parade. The
firing of the “ feu de joie” by the 25’s (25-pounders) and our own
rifles went off very well and the three cheers for His Majesty was as
hearty as it could have been. The guns marched past to the
band of the Royal Northumberland Fusiliers and were followed
by ourselves headed by the Pipe Band, wearing their new
Glengarries. The men marched excellently, and their arms
_drill left nothing to be desired ”. | |

Оп 24 June 1947 Gurkhas took part in a unique parade when
jemadar Gaje Ghale VC and 50 Gurkhas and a similar number
of Americans carried out a combined Guard Mounting Ceremony
on the Imperial Palace Plaza.

1 Punjab in Tokyo .

On 1 July 1947, 5/1 Punjab took over guard duties from the
Gurkhas who left for Okayama to pack and get ready for the move
to India.

Guard duties at Headquarters British Commonwealth Occupation
Force (Etajima): Each formation in turn provided a ceremonial
guard company at Headquarters British Commonwealth Occupa-
tion Force. Due to scarcity of space and non-availability of facilities
for Indian troops there was no Indian guard at Etajima till May
1947, Then the first detachment was provided by 5/1 Punjab.
As this was the first time that an Indian Guard Company was
mounted at British Commonwealth Occupation Force, initially
serious difficulty arose about accommodation.

In June 1947, a Company of 1 Mahrattas took over Guard.
duties at Etajima from 5/1 Punjab. The detachment remained
there for six weeks.

On 7 July 1947 the Kumaon Band played Retreat as 1
Mahrattas changed the guard for the last time at Headquarters
British Commonwealth Occupation Force. The salute was taken
by Air Vice-Marshal Bladin, O.B.E., Chief of Staff, British
Commonwealth Occupation Force.

Guards on trains: All occupation trains carrying stores had
to be escorted by occupation troops, as there was considerable
pilfering in transit and strict precautions were essential.

_ Escorts for war Criminals: Many escorts were provided by the
Indian Guard Battalion in Tokyo to convey the Japanese suspected
of war crimes from Iugamo Prison, Tokyo, to Air Transit Centre,
Iwakuni.

_ Punitive action: In order to maintain law and order punitive
action had to be taken against various types of peoples and parties.

RESPONSIBILITIES OF BRINDIV IN JAPAN 119

The most active party in Japan were the Communists, but they
were always afraid of being © suspected ’’ and carried out most of
their activities underground. They were suspected of having direct
liaison with Russian controlled Korea through Korean immigrants
But the Communists never gave any trouble and confined their
activities to propaganda and electioneering campaigns and orga-
nising the dissatisfied unemployed labour. It was feared that they
would gain more following and power in the future.

The ultra-nationalists who were not war criminals had
adopted a non-committal attitude and had mostly retired in
seclusion. The wanted war criminals were easily and quickly
apprehended as they always gave themselves up.

Schools and factories were also checked to ensure that no
` ultra-national or underground activities were being carried out.
These checks were most repugnant to the Indian troops, and when
268 Brigade Group was formed these checks were stopped.

GENERAL DUTIES

Suppression of Black-Market Activities in Japan: As food was
scarce in Japanese towns, and clothing and other necessities of life
were not available in the villages, there was a thriving two-way
black-market trade for the exchange of village food surplus with
the town manufactures. "This trade was generally carried out by
Koreans, who were in most cases armed. The Japanese police
was at first reluctant to take action against them, because the
Koreans claimed to be Allied instead of Japanese nationals. But
with Supreme Commander Allied Powers clarification of this
point, and moral support from occupation troops, the Japanese
police got to grip with the problem.

In certain cases it was found necessary to station small
detachments—about one platoon in strength, at the ferry terminals
or railway junctions to stop illegal movement of controlled items.
In order to bring down prices to alegitimate scale all stall proprietors
were ordered to display a price-card on each article for sale and
these were checked by police and troops with very good results.
But as local manufactured goods became scarce another
channel for black-marketing was opened by stealing and selling
War Department goods. These stores had to be properly guarded
but as stores were scattered over wide areas with limited manpower
available to guard them, the locals with good knowledge of the
layout of the camp could pilfer them at will.

Supervision of Japanese general elections: The greatest event of
political importance, during the occupation of Japan by Indian

120 POST-WAR OCCUPATION FORCES: JAPAN—1945-47

troops, occurred during April 1947 when the whole of Japan went
to the poll to elect a democratic Diet. The elections were covered
by eighteen Intelligence teams both during the n. СА
paign and on 10 April, the polling day. One week later five о cers
covered the area again to make a first-election survey of public
opinion and opinions of local officials. These observations pointed
clearly to two distinct attitudes amongst the Japanese towards
these elections. Firstly, keen interest in the Village Head and
Gubernatorial election, and an even greater zeal in the Village and
Prefectural Assembly elections. Secondly, almost complete apathy
in respect of the House of Councillors’ election, and only a little
more interest in the House of Representatives’ election.

An estimate of the character of elections and the feelings of
the people is gleaned from the following observations of the British
Commonwealth Occupation Force Intelligence Team:—

“ The reason for this is clearly understandable, and was
reiterated time and time again by the more enlightened
people in the Prefecture, i.e. the Prefecture is inhabited by a
large proportion of low-educated peasantry, whose thoughts
do not go beyond the confines of their own village, Gun, or
at the most, Prefecture. Consequently, the local Village
Head and Village Assembly elections held for them a great
deal of interest, because the candidates were all people they
knew personally. In these elections, there were practically
no party affiliations among the candidates, and the voters
made their vote according to their own personal knowledge
of the candidate’s character during the past. When Election
Committee chiefs were asked by Observer Teams whether
Village Assembly candidates belonged to any particular
political party, they were invariably surprised, or half-amused,
as if to indicate that party affiliation as a qualification could
be of no possible use to a candidate. The general answer
was that no candidates whatever were politically attached,
and even if they were, the voters, being ignorant peasants,
would not appreciate the significance of this or that party.

“ Consequently, the campaigns for the councillors’ and Re-
presentatives’ elections being based on party politics, some-
thing almost incomprehensible to the average peasant of this
Prefecture— apathy was understandable. In the case of the
Representatives, however, there were many candidates to each
Сип,5 which narrowed down the geographical sphere some-
what, and in some cases, candidates were personally known

3 Constituency.

RESPONSIBILITIES OF BRINDIV IN JAPAN 121

in various villages of the Gun. 'This accounted for the
somewhat greater interest in the Representatives’ as against
the Councillors! election.

“The efforts of Election Committees in endeavouring to
awaken election interest among the villagers were really
praiseworthy, especially where they realised such propa-
ganda was most required—in case of the Councillors! and
Representatives’ elections. Many were the posters telling
women of their voting rights, and exhorting them to take an
equal place with the men in the election and use some
individuality.

“The conduct and dignity of responsible polling-booth
officials on polling days was exemplary, judged even by our
own standards. Those voters who did come to vote took
the whole business most seriously from the time of entering
the polling-booth until leaving it, regarding it as a duty of
the utmost dignity.

* Complaints received by Field Security and Military
Government teams on the whole seem to indicate, after
investigation, that they were mostly unfounded, and the
result of some personal feud between two people, invariably
caused by the failure of someone, or someone's friend, ín
the election.

** Almost 100 per cent of the voters were satisfied that the.
election officials were doing their utmost to ensure a free and
fair election, and it is also the opinion of the Observer
Teams who worked in nearly all parts of the Prefecture
during the month.

** To sum up—electional interest was high where the people
thought they had some personal knowledge or basis on which
to make a choice fairly; where they felt out of their path—
especially in the case of the Councillors’ election—they felt
it fairer to stay at home and abstain from voting". .
Because of the Social Democrat majority in the elections,

Premier Yoshida resigned his post as Prime Minister and was
replaced by Katayama Tetsu, the leader of the Social Democrat
Party. He was the first Christian and Socialist Prime Minister in
Japanese history and formed a Coalition Cabinet, with the Socialists,
Social Democrats and People’s Co-operative Parties. The Liberal
Party refused to join the coalition.

LIAISON WITH ALLIED TROOPS

One of the imporant functions of the occupation forces in
Japan was to carry out "integration ». This could only be

122 POST-WAR OCCUPATION FORCES: JAPAN— 1945-47

permanent and wholesome if there was proper liaison between the
various contingents of the Allied forces. Though Headquarters
British Commonwealth Occupation Force and the Base units were
integrated and Indian ranks in these units could meet the British,
Australian and New Zealanders, the units in formations like 268
Brigade had little opportunity of meeting members of other contin-
gents. To counteract this, a method of visiting parties was found
useful. 27 New Zealand Battalion which had served with
1 Mahrattas in the Italian Campaign of 1944 sent a party to
Hamada to meet old comrades. Similar parties came from other
formations. Indian athletic teams took part in many combined
shows and gave a good account of themselves. |

Liaison with United States Forces was also maintained,
particularly when units were stationed in Tokyo. Officers of
7th United States Cavalry paid a liaison visit to the Indian 7th
Light Cavalry.

During the visit of HMS Aanson and Barfleur to Kure,
harbour parties of officers and Indian Other Ranks went on board.
The reception was well organised and men had tea before leaving
the ship. The crew of the ship in turn paid a return call to the
units on shore.

Liaison with the Japanese

In the beginning the Japanese civil population was appre-
hensive of the Indian troops. They had heard much adverse
propaganda, but soon learnt how false it was. It took no time for
the Japanese to find out, and Indians to express, their true worth.
The friendliness and co-operation shown to Indians can to a great
extent be attributed to the high discipline of the troops which led
to the subsequent disappearance of the initial fear which was
entertained by the civil population towards the occupation forces.

The Japanese took to the Indian Sepoy with very great ease
and it was common sight, in Matsue, Hamada and Tottori or,
wherever an Indian unit was located, for scores of Japanese children
to gather round him, take him to places of amusement and try to
please him. Beyond this, fraternisation was not permitted.

The liaison with the Japanese civil officials was very satis-
factory and they co-operated fully in all functions. The Japanese
civil administration was conducted satisfactorily and the officials
gave the impression of being both efficient and reliable.

Relations with the Japanese, both official and non-official,
were very satisfactory and no cases of friction were reported.
The Indians were always greeted with a smile and cheer wherever
they went. On many occasions, particularly on the Independence

RESPONSIBILITIES OF BRINDIV IN JAPAN 123
Day, the Indian troops contributed their sugar and chocolate
rations for distribution to the Japanese children, a practice which
was commonly adopted throughout British Commonwealth
Occupation Force. Band displays were arranged which had great
response from the music loving Japanese population. The Japanese
arranged many entertainments for the troops in their lines,

CHAPTER X
Navy, Air and Divisional Troops

ROYAL INDIAN NAVY IN JAPAN

HMIS Godavari left Hong Kong, where she had been based,
on 15 January 1946 on her first visit to Japan, and arrived in
Yokohama on 21 January. The ship's cruise in Japanese waters
was arranged by S.O. Force “Т” in HMS Tyne and lasted
for ten days which consisted of two days in Toba, four days in
Tokyo and the remaining four days in passage. F rom Toba, a
party of officers and men went on an excursion by train to Nagoya;
and all were impressed by the standard of the dress and cleanliness
of the inhabitants and their very polite behaviour to the ship's
company. А

The ship's company, however, was not greatly impressed by
the visit to Tokyo and Yokohama both of which had been heavily
damaged by air raids.

On 30 January 1946, the Godavari took on board Colonel
Yama, under close arrest, for passage to Hong Kong. Colonel
Yama was the head of the Japanese police in Hong Kong for three
years during the Japanese occupation, and was classified as a War
Criminal No. 1.

At Yokohama, the Captain of Godavari made official
calls on the heads of the occupation forces including General
Douglas MacArthur. She left Yokohama on 31 January 1947
and arrived at Hong Kong on 8 February, having visited Okinawa
on the 3rd, 4th and 5th en route. During this passage Godavari
escorted HMS Tracian, a British destroyer which had been
captured by the Japanese during the war and had been used as an
experimental ship by them. She left Hong Kong for India, via.
the Philippines and Malaya, on 12 February 1946 and arrived in
Madras on 25 February 1946.

HMIS Godavari, then commanded by Commander S. G.
Karmarkar, Royal Indian Navy, again left Bombay for the
Far East on 1 November 1946 and arrived in Hong Kong on 26
November having had exercises with HM ships off Singapore.
Leaving Hong Kong on 2 December she arrived in Kure, japan,
on 7 December, from where she sailed on 11 December to carry
out exercises with various HM Ships, military units and Royal
Marines. On 21 December 1946 Southern Japan was shaken by a

NAVY, AIR AND DIVISIONAL TROOPS 125

very severe carthquake and the Godavari was detailed for duty in
carrying out relief work in ports which were normally considered
inaccessible to shipping.

During January 1947, the ship visited Kochi, Matsuyama,
Kure and Iwakuni, and on 21 January was placed in quarantine
owing to an outbreak of chicken-pox on board after which period
she sailed for Yokohama, Iwakuni and Tokyo. The usual formal
calls were made on service and civilian officials in each port.
Visits were returned by VIPs, both British and American.

During March 1947, the Godavari worked with the United
States navy from Sasebo on the Korean patrols for detection of
ilegal immigration. On 26 April, she sailed for Nanking from
Kure, and arrived at that port on 1 May having brought His
Excellency the Indian Ambassador from Woosung. She remained
at Nanking until 7 May, and then proceeded to Shanghai. The
ship's stay at Nanking was marked by intense social activity, and
during this time the Captain and Officers were presented to
Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. The Godavari remained at
Shanghai until May when she sailed for Hong Kong. Ор 29 May,
she sailed for Singapore leaving the British Pacific Fleet.

4 SQUADRON ROYAL INDIAN AIR FORCE IN JAPAN

The duties of No. 4 Squadron included demonstrations and
reconnaissance patrols over certain areas assigned to it. The most
important of these patrols were over the coastal areas of Shimane
and Tottori Prefectures to prevent illegal immigration of the
Koreans into Japan. These patrols were carried out at dawn,
noon, and dusk, direct Radio-Telephone contact being maintained
with army units at Hamada and Shimane Prefectures and Head-
quarters 268 Brigade at Matsue. The ground units were equipped
with motor-boats to intercept Japanese shipping. The area
patrolled was 15 miles out to sea along the Shimane and Tottori
coasts, and all Japanese shipping in this area was reported to the
above mentioned units.

The record of No. 4 Squadron’s occupational tour was
marred by one fatal accident in which two pilots were killed. The
pilots, Flying Officers Sekhon and Martin, were briefed to do a
patrol of the area between Miho and Hiroshima, weather
permitting. Тһе weather over base being good, they took off but
about twenty-five miles from base it closed in completely and
suddenly. The pilots decided to turn back but in doing so it
was necessary to climb into cloud to avoid the hills in that region.
The aircraft collided in cloud and crashed into the ground killing

126 POST-WAR OCCUPATION FORCES: JAPAN—1945-47

both the pilots. They were buried with full military honours at
Okayama. . |
The Squadron’s activities in the detection of illegal Korean
immigration into Japan comprised of reconnaissance off the coast
and about 50 miles inside the sea. This was carried out to
the satisfaction of the authorities. | |
General Cawthorn who visited 4 Royal Indian Air Force
Squadron at Miho in June 1946 signalled “ Royal Indian Air
Force Squadron is in good heart and put up an excellent fly-past.
Their administration stood comparison well with that of Royal

зэ I

Air Force units in same station ”.

INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Two Field Security Sections were attached to the Division,
the British section operating on the island of Shikoku and
the Indian in the Brindiv area of responsibility on Honshu.
Field Security personnel were spread out over the area and
maintained close contact with units, the American Counter
Intelligence Corps organizations and the Allied Military
Government.

Collation of information from the Brindiv area was carried
out by Divisional Headquarters Intelligence Staff and passed to
British Commonwealth Occupation Force. Information from the
whole of Japan was passed in the form of fortnightly reviews to
formations and units under command.

Intelligence personnel, in conjunction with Counter Intelli-
gence Corps and Allied Military Government, investigated a
number of cases, including illegal sale of Japanese army goods,
contravention of Supreme Commander Allied Powers Directives
covering elimination of public officials connected with specified
organizations, educational subversive organizations, and kindred
subjects. Careful watch was kept on certain personalities, generally
with a military or official background, and on organizations and
societies which appeared suspicious.

; The shortage of Japanese speaking officers trained in Intel-
ligence work hampered investigation in many cases, though a
number of officers and non-commissioned officers were allotted to
the Division by Combined Services Detailed Interrogation Centre.

Short courses in the Japanese language were not of much use to
Intelligence personnel.

1 INDEL/83 of 10 June *46,

NAVY, AIR AND DIVISIONAL TROOPS 127
TRAINING

Owing to heavy duties involved in disembarkation, settling
down and occupation duties, and also due tolack of training facilities
no training was carried out when Brindiv was in Hiro area. With
the completion of the move to Okayama, Shikoku and the north
coast, individual and company training was started in all units.
The new area had better facilities for training and had a few
small field firing ranges, one of which was suitable for artillery
firing.

A divisional school was established in the new area consisting
of a Wireless Transmission Wing and a Tactical Wing. At this
school personnel from other contingents, Australian and New
Zealanders, were also taken. Later this school became a British
Commonwealth Occupation Force responsibility.

| In addition to the above, there were schools for Physical
Training, Driving and Maintenance, Signals, Cooking and Provost.

i During the winter, when the snowfall was very heavy,
particularly on the north coast, all training had to be carried on
indoors. However, a skiing school was started at Mount Daisen
which was very popular. During the good weather period, April
to October, training was intensified. Each unit organised a camp
where each company was sent for a week. A longer stay was not
possible owing to the duties in camp.

MANPOWER PROBLEMS

Apart from the general shortage of officers and other ranks
in British units there was an ever increasing demand for officers
and non-commissioned officers to carry out duties normally
performed by sub-area personnel in India, such as Garrison
Engineers, Barrack Officers, Labour Officers, etc. A case for
additional work sections was put up through Headquarters British
Commonwealth Occupation Force, because the one Brindiv works
"section was completely inadequate to cover the very large area
and cope with the enormous amount of construction and mainte-
nance work to be carried out. Officers and non-commissioned
officers were provided by RA and other units, but this left them
very short of the personnel they most needed to carry out their own
training and to maintain their efficiency. Requests were submitted
through the usual channels for small increases to War Establish-
ments. Butit was practically impossible to cover these additional
and essential personnel commitments without an increase in the

128 POST-WAR OCCUPATION FORCES: JAPAN—1945-47

Owing to these shortages non-commissioned

ling.
overall ceiling hich were valued at approxi-

officers supervised even projects w

tely 300,000 yen.
77% In addition, many attempts were made to transfer Indian

units to British Commonwealth Occupation Force Order of
Battle, and after some discussion certain Indian units were ear-
marked as Headquarters and Base troops and placed under the
functional control of those formations, but their administra-
tive control remained in the hands of the Commander
Brindiv. Я 7

The greatest shortage was іп technical services where
personnel could not be replaced from local sources. These diffi-
culties were foreseen in India before the move of the force but in-
creases were not accepted. In the Engineer and Signal services
the position remained very critical; this was due to initial deficien-
cies which were never made good, recurring decreases due to
repatriation and release and increased commitments which
required an increase in the War Establishment. V

As far as Signals were concerned the communications were
extensively stretched and commitments at formation Headquarters
were very much greater than normal. As a result, though the
equipment was for the most part available, the personnel situation
remained difficult. The establishment of Division Signals did not
include teleprinter operators to operate teletype/printers between
division and brigades, and with otherwise heavy commitments it
was not possible to spare operators for training. А start was,
however, made; three line-men with a knowledge of typing were
attached to British Commonwealth Occupation Force Signals for
training as teleprinter operators. Moreover, the technical personnel
capable of maintaining high powered wireless sets and large
switchboards was also lacking.

The units in Japan were never manned up to 100 per cent
of establishment. In view of the wide dispersion of the force and
its limited tactical and administrative resources it was essential
to maintain these units up to the establishment, but because of
manpower shortage, General Headquarters (India) decided to
restrict the number of Indian Other Ranks in Battalions in Japan
to 760 excluding Viceroy's Commissioned Officers and Non-Com-
batants Enrolled. It was also decided to send back, as soon as
possible, subject to the shipping situation, before 1 April 1947, all
men who had not deferred their release, even if it meant a severe
reduction in numbers. Battalions were, however, assured prece-
dence in reinforcements from India even if it meant posting men
from regular battalions.

Scenes of Earthquake, December 1946

Pirate X

Resettlement Training

NAVY, AIR AND DIVISIONAL TROOPS 129

Due to this run-down and release of personnel there was a
grave shortage of mechanical transport drivers in all units To
meet this deficiency Japanese drivers were employed to run War
Department vehicles.

ARMOUR

7th Light Cavalry provided the armour for Brindiv. The
Regiment disembarked at Kure on 20 April 1946 and was stationed
in Hiro upto 10 May 1946, when it moved to Kurashiki by
rail. The main role of the unit during its stay in Japan was:

(а) То keep one mobile column ready at 6 hours notice. One
squadron at a time was detailed to deal with any even-
tuality. This column was called out only once to assist
against some Korean illegal immigrants smuggling black-
market stuff.

(b) To reconnoitre the various routes in Okayama Prefcc-
ture. The object was to gain knowledge of the land
communications in the area so that armour could be sent
quickly to danger spots.

(c) To raid dumps containing warlike stores. These raids
and searches were carried out regularly to locate warlike
stores.

(d) To maintain communications between Honshu (Brindiv
Headquarters) and Shikoku (5 Brigade Headquarters).
A troop was permanently located at the Ferry Point at
Ono.

In addition to the above tactical roles the unit sent detach-
ments to Tokyo for ceremonial parades. On 1 April 1947
this unit, with the United States 7th Cavalry, carried out a
combined guard mounting parade in front of the Imperial Palace
Plaza in Tokyo. An old cavalry trumpet was presented by it
to the United States 7th Cavalry who in turn presented an old
troop flag.

With the dissolution of Brindiv, 7th Cavalry was sent back
to India for reorganisation. On this occasion the following
communique was issued :*

“The Governments of United Kingdom, India, Australia
and New Zealand in consultation with the Government of
the United States have agreed that the 7th Light Cavalry
Regiment will return to India from Japan. Post-war
reorganisation of the Indian Army necessitates the movement

2 Tel No. COS 1458 dated 1 April 47 from File No. 6325/64 SD5 Serial No. 72A.

130 POST-WAR OCCUPATION FORCES: JAPAN— 1945-47

of this unit. In the fighting in Burma and Imphal since
1944 this unit had a distinguished record and was later
prominent in the spear-head of the advance to Rangoon.
Considerable Indian Army forces in 268 Indian Infantry
Brigade under Brigadier Shrinagesh and in the British base
at Kure together with Squadron of the Royal Indian Air
Force will continue to represent India in the British force
in Тарап ”.
ARTILLERY

30 (British) and 16 (Indian) Field Batteries provided artillery
support for Brindiv. On arrival in Japan they were first located
at Hiro and then moved to Okayama in July 1946. 16 Indian
Field Battery later moved to Wadashima, having very good barracks
by the sea near Tokushima on Shikoku island. "This move, due to
the necessity of finding additional accommodation in Okayama,
helped to provide covered accommodation for ali the 30 Field
Battery vehicles.

Both Batteries had an area of Okayama Prefecture to patrol
and to submit intelligence reports. This was very popular and
provided excellent training in initiative and report writing by
young officers and non-commissioned officers. It also enabled each
man to feel that he was really taking an active part in the occupa-
tion of Japan.

Owing to lack of suitable training areas close at hand, both
Batteries in the beginning concentrated on individual training,
but later both Batteries used suitable ranges for course shooting
and limited manoeuvre, some 30 miles north of Okayama.

Whilst at Hiro, 30 Field Battery celebrated its 150th anni-
versary with a feu de joie and a mounted parade. The salute was
taken by the General Officer Commanding British and Indian
Division, who complimented the Battery on the high standard of
drill, turn-out and driving skill. It was witnessed by a large
number of spectators from the Royal Navy, British and Indian
Division and 34 Australian Brigade. With the disbandment of
Brindiv, 30 Field Battery was transferred to Hong Kong and
the 16 Indian Field Battery returned to India.

ENGINEERS

The original decision to send the Works Section with the
Advance Party to Japan was changed at the last moment, and
429 Indian Field Company, Madras Sappers and Miners Group,
RIE, was included. Unfortunately, the Mechanical Transport

NAVY, AIR AND DIVISIONAL TROOPS 131

ship on which all the vehicles and most of thee
carried broke down and was long delayed.

'The shipping of the first maintenance lift of Engineers Stores
was a considerable problem as no definite instructions were given
up to the last moment owing to the uncertainty of the shipping
position. Another difficulty was that while shipping was provided
in Bombay, a very high proportion of the mechanical equipment
was located near Madras and it was not possible to move it by rail
with the result that it arrived in Japan very late.

The Engineer work in Japan mainly comprised the making
of Japanese barracks habitable; provision of electricity and water
supply, heating and cooking arrangements; road and bridge
repairs, provision of messes, canteens and playing fields, the
provision of light aircraft landing strips; the construction and
maintenance of camp areas and installation of water-borne sewage
where possible. This work was partly done by Field Companies
but mostly by Japanese contractors under the supervision of 907
Indian Works Section, RIE (See Appendix “Н”)

The Engineer Stores Depots handled in the first three months
more than 5,000 tons and in one year 50,000 tons of stores. This
was done by the wholesale employment of Japanese labour under
the supervision of the Field Park Company, who handled over
1,200 tons per week (mostly building materials, water and steam
pipes and fittings, and electrical gear, 2,500 odd electric and
kerosene stoves). The Sappers produced nearly 5,000 coal stoves
with above 32 miles of flue piping for space heating.

Engineer stores from Japanese sources were in short supply
and were strictly controlled by United States Eighth Army
Procurement Section. The following were the most critical items,
which formed a bottleneck in construction:

(a) sawn timber,

(b) electric stores including bulbs,

(c) heating and cooking plant,

(d) glass,

(e) iron gauze and screens,

(f) roofing material,

(g) piping and fittings.

The general engineer policy of the division was to:

(i) make all barracks and quarters habitable with the
minimum of work consistent with a reasonable standard
of comfort ;

(ii) after a careful examination of cach area and the require-
ments of the troops occupying the area, make the finished
plans for the area;

quipment was being

132 POST-WAR OCCUPATION FORCES: JAPAN— 1945-47

(iii) having obtained approval for the plans mentioned in
(8) above, carry out the necessary work, at the same
time providing all necessary facilities such as sports
grounds, leave centres, canteens, clubs, cold stores, ice
plants etc. .

Twenty-five per cent of the construction of housing for troops
was to be new while the remainder comprised rebuilding of existing
barracks. Several problems had to be faced, the chief of which
were :—

(i) Fire risk: All Japanese construction was of wood.

(ii) Heating: The only safe way was to heat barracks by
steam or electricity. Both were in short supply.

(iii) Cooking facilities: Field scale of cooking equipment could
not be used and engineers had to improvise and install
equipment suitable for Japanese housing.

(iv) Sewage: In Japan removal was mostly by hand and
direct disposal on the fields. This was most undesirable
but had to be accepted till water-borne sewage schemes
were completed.

The Brindiv Engineers carried out many major projects,

which included:
(1) Takuma Bay Holiday Home.

(4) Conversion of the Matsue shipyard into an Engineer
Stores Depot.

(iii) Gonnecting Engineer Stores Depot to railway.

(iv) Construction of hospital accommodation for British
General Hospital.

(v) Air-strip and hangar at Okayama.

(vi) Okayama race course.

(vii) Bailey Bridge at Kachimura.

The works procedure in Japan was very complicated and
liable to many delays. Project plans for semi-permanent work
had to be approved by British Commonwealth Occupation Force,
United States Eighth Army and finally by Supreme Commander
Allied Powers before work could begin. All data including costing
in dollars had to be provided. It took more than two months
for any project to be approved.

. In order to accomplish the considerable task of reconstruction
it was recommended by General Officer Commanding Brindiv?
те the following units should be added to the Brindiv Order of
айе:
Headquarters CRE works,
Two Works Sections.

5 Headquarters Brindiv letter No. 221/2G, SD dated 14 May 46.

NAVY, AIR AND -DIVISIONAL TROOPS 222183

A considerable reorganisation took place i 4
set-up of British Commonwealth саныны Pone "d Е
withdrawal of the British Brigade from Shikoku the en es
commitments were gradually reduced. With the iuc
withdrawal of the Indian Contingent, all construction in Brindis
arca, except of permanent nature, was stopped from 1 May 1947.
| The Works Section was extremely thin on the ground. Even
with such assistance as was provided from other units responsibilities
and tasks were abnormal, as is indicated by the following:—.

(a) Garrison Engineer, Matsue: Responsible for Tottori and

Shimane Prefectures, area of some 150 miles by 30 miles,

. containing two infantry battalion stations, and brigade
headquarters station and the necessary medical, supply
and transport, cold storage, canteen and allied facilities.
To assist the Garrison Engineer there was a staff of only
one Staff Serjeant and four Corporals.

(b) Garrison Engineer, Shikoku: Responsible for the whole of
Shikoku Island, some 145 miles by 45, comprising four
prefectures. The Garrison Engineer, and Assistant Garri-
son Engineer were both Engineer Officers provided from
Headquarters Royal Engineers and 429 (QVO) Madras
S & M Indian Field Company, Royal Indian Engineers,
respectively. The area contained three infantry battalion
stations, a brigade headquarters, infantry and armoured
corps detachments, a leave centre, and allied medical,
supply and transport, cold storage and canteen facilities.
In addition, one infantry battalion and the brigade
headquarters had to move to a new location on the island
for tactical reasons. The Works Section consisted of
one Staff Serjeant, two Serjeants and three Corporals.

(c) Garrison Engineer, Okayama: This was the main Divisional
Headquarters and Divisional Troops area and had an
off-shoot for the Armoured Corps station in Kurashiki.
The Garrison Engineer’s office was run by two officers
and two non-commissioned officers lent by the RA,
assisted by one Sapper Corporal. Kurashiki was run
by the second subaltern of 907 Works Section, who
combined this job with that of Headquarters Planning
Officer. He was assisted by one Sapper Corporal.

DIVISIONAL SIGNALS

The dispersion of units and formations raised many new
problems not usually met with in Divisional Signals. The distances

134 POST-WAR OCCUPATION FORCES: JAPAN— 1945-47

from Brigade Headquarters to Division Headquarters necessitated
the full use of existing permanent lines. These were for the most
part in poor condition, being maintained by the Japanese, and were
generally unreliable. Records such as route diagrams and route
plans were mostly non-existent and considerable labour was en-
tailed in compiling them from scratch. Bad condition of roads
made line reconnaissance very difficult, Teletype facilities were
non-existent. Additional lines with teletype facilities had to be
asked for as the aim was eventually to have teletype-printers working
between formation headquarters.

Moreover the additional services on the War Establish-
ment of the division called for greatly increased telephone
facilities, and though the equipment was available personnel were
not fully trained in the operation and maintenance of large
installations.

The poor condition of the existing permanent lines and
the lack of telegraph facilities made it necessary to use wire-
less to a very much greater extent than usual; in fact virtually
all Signal traffic to brigades was cleared by wireless. 'The sets
proved very reliable and, in spite of the mountainous nature of
the country, no difficulty was experienced in maintaining
communications. In particular the SCR 399 and 76 sets gave
excellent service. The sun-spot activity during monsoon (July
to September) caused, however, serious fade-outs on several
Occasions.

To meet the manpower shortage technicians from the Japanese
Communication Bureau were attached to Signal Office and proved
their worth. The teletype circuit to Kure gave satisfactory service.

Indian Air Formation Signals :* The Headquarters of the Indian
Air Formation Signals was located at Iwakuni, with detachments
at Miho and Bofu airfields and worked under British Common-
wealth Occupation Force being directly controlled by Headquarters
BCAIR. It did most commendable work. The IAFS consisted
of 233 Independent Company which prior to its move to
Japan was part of No. 4 Air Formation Signal Regiment in
Malaya.

Its move to Japan was carried out in stages, the first advance
personnel party arriving in Kure on 11 February 1946 and the
vehicles and stores arriving only in Мау 1946. On the setting up
of the Independent Company in Japan, it was allotted the role of
providing landline and signals despatch service facilities to
BCAIR at Iwakuni. To meet these commitments the Company
was deployed as follows:

* Report by Major K. D. Bhasin, Indian Signals.

NAVY, AIR AND DIVISIONAL TROOPS 135

Iwakuni
Headquarters 233 Independent Company Indian Air
Formation Signal Regiment.
Headquarters 231 Tele Operating Section,
Headquarters 220 DR Section.
221 (I) Line Section.
Bofu
214 Wing Signal Section.
228 (I) Line Section.
Miho
217 Wing Signal Section.
Detachment 220 DR Section.
Tokyo
A Detachment with the British Commonwealth Sub Area
Tokyo (BRIGOSAT).

It was the policy of British Commonweaith Occupation
Force to use existing Japanese civil and other telecommunication
facilities including equipment for its own signal commitments,
but this could not be effected in any considerabie degree because
the Japanese communication system had deteriorated for want of
equipment, spares, replacements and adequate maintenance during
the war. The cables, particularly on longer lines and trunk routes,
had outlived their usefulness by the end of the war.

Coupled with this the ever increasing demands of the occupa-
tion forces on the Japanese communication system almost broke
it down, depleted as it was already. As a long term policy it was
decided that occupation signal units would be responsible for the
provision of local communication, supplemented by as many
available Japanese technicians and tradesmen as were available
and could be trained, as opposed to reliance on the Japanese
communication system. These were to be employed in existing
unit War Equipment deficiencies. нот

With pressure on the Japanese Bureau of Communications
and a small reinforcement of equipment in short supply, the
efficiency of the trunk line circuits rose gradually from 50 per cent
in early 1946 to 95 per centin October 1947. These trunk lines were
mostly manned and maintained by the Japanese but this marked
improvement was in no small degree due to the constant vigilance
of signal units. A Japanese Communication Liaison Officer was
appointed with each major signal unit where his duty was to
maintain liaison between the Japanese Bureau of Communications
and the unit to which he was attached. The Japanese technicians
once trained were reliable and efficient.

136 POST-WAR OCCUPATION FORGES: JAPAN—1945-47

To assist the Japanese Bureau of Communications in repairing
faults on trunk lines, it was found advisable to provide War
Department transport, to lessen the fault-time.

The IAFS when it moved from Singapore to Japan was under
the impression that Chief Signal Officers’ pool of signal equipment
would be available in British Commonwealth Occupation Force,
from which items beyond the War Equipment Tables could be
drawn for British Commonwealth Occupation Force projects, but
on arrival it discovered that the available stores were entirely
inadequate, particularly in heavy exchanges. This caused much
delay in the initial stages, but later some Japanese automatic ex-
changes were discovered and the Bureau of Communications was
ordered to convert the major exchanges into automatic systems
with underground cables. Further planning was done by the
IAFS for a 800-line auto-exchange at Iwakuni and two 400-line-
auto-exchanges, one each at Bofu and Miho.

When the unit arrived at Iwakuni it maintained only a 200-
line command board. Even this was faulty, over-hearing being
the main fault. After a while 300-line T.C. 10 C.B. American
type of board was put in, but on 25. May 1947 the exchange was
gutted by fire in the Air Force Station Officers Mess. During the
fire, communications were set up with the outside links including
outside trunk stations with the help of a 80-line F. and F. exchange
and by 0300 hours all trunk circuits and major operational subs-
cribers in Headquarters BCAIR were put through in communica-
tion. Special mention was made of the efficiency of the unit by the
Air Force Commander, Air Commodore I.D. McLachlan, who
wrote:

“ During such a disastrous occurrence as occurred on the
morning of the 25th of May, when the Station Officer's Mess
was totally destroyed it is always difficult to select any indivi-
‘dual, or group, for special mention. From my own observa-
tion, however, and reports which I am continuing to receive
I wish to place on record my appreciationof the magnificent
work performed by members of the Air Formation Signals
both during and after the fire. '

The untiring efforts of both British and Indian . officers,
Non-Commissioned Officers and. men of your unit were
responsible for the speedy and efficient replacement of our
communication with the outside world.

Would you please convey my personal thanks to all ranks
under your command *'.5

5 D O to Major К. D. Bhasin from Air Officer Commanding BCAIR, Japan.

NAVY, AIR AND DIVISIONAL TROOPS 137

The unit was administratively under the control -
quarters British Commonwealth Occupation F Orce; i e
employment it was under the command of Headquarters BCAIR,
for local administration like leave, accommodation and welfare
etc. it was under the respective BCAIR Stations, and for domestic
purposes under Brindiv. It was a complicated business, creating
many difficulties, the more so as the Air Force generally tended to
regard the Air Formation Signals as an ‘Army baby’ which the
Army was not willing to accept as the unit was not doing any work
for them. The position was, however, clarified and channels of
communication were laid down.

During the stay of the unit in Japan a few important lessons
were brought home. These were:

(i) Due to the high incidence of fire in Japan owing to the
buildings being mostly wooden structures, it is essential
that all exchange buildings, and frame rooms should
be housed in Nissen huts or corrugated iron sheds.

(ii) Personnel selected from overseas service should be willing
and keen and have had their leave before proceeding
abroad.

(iii) The correct channels for Air Formation Signals should
be laid down by the higher formation in the form of an
instruction.

(iv) For liaison purposes Signal Liaison Officers should be
appointed and careful watch and supervision kept on
their activities and the agency they represent.

(v) The need for the formation of a theatre Chief Signal
Officers’ Pool of Stores at an early stage.

Indian Air Formation Signals during its tenure of duty in
Japan did remarkable work and was highly reported on by all Air
Force Commanders wherever it functioned. General Cawthorn
India's representative оп JCOSA, was highly impressed by their
performance and prestige and wrote to Commander-in-Chief
India, ** India Air Formation Signals is most highly thought of by
all Air Force components and is doing excellent job at all Air
Stations ??.8

SUPPLY AND TRANSPORT
All stocks on arrival regardless of the country of origin were
taken into the British Commonwealth Occupation Force Base

Supply Depot and pooled. Issues were made from the British

6 INDEL/83 of 10 June 46.

138 POST-WAR OCCUPATION FORCES: JAPAN—-1945-47

Commonwealth Occupation Force Base to supply units in
formation areas. ы

In the beginning, the Divisional Troops Composite Platoon
operated a Forward Supply Depot in Hiro supplying all units in
that area and making despatches to the other two Composite
Platoons, which were operating supply points at Yonago and on
Shikoku island.

No foodstuffs could be obtained locally and everything had
to be imported. The rations were very good indeed. The British
ranks appreciated, in particular, the Australian frozen meat and
beer. Although a few Indian Other Ranks accepted the offer of
frozen mutton, the issue of fresh meat to Indian troops presented
a serious problem, and many expedients were tried to solve it.
A delegation was sent to Australia to inspect the facilities available
for the preparation of meat in the orthodox way. А contract was
arranged but was later cancelled as it was found that the contractor
was not in fact preparing meat in the orthodox way.’

The main complaint of Indian troops was the quality of
cigarettes which were not of the same type as issued to other British
Commonwealth Occupation Force troops. This was taken up by
Headquarters British Commonwealth Occupation Force but
Commander-in-Chief India ruled that Indian troops would only
get Indian cigarettes as a ration but could purchase better quality
cigarettes through canteens.

A Pacific scale of rations was put into force on 1 June 1946.
This was a good scale with full nutritive value, and where certain
increases were recommended and accepted the meals became very
enjoyable. The scale of rations on payment from canteens was
also not meagre, though many Other Ranks did not find it quite
adequate specially because nothing else was available in the form
ofsnacks outside their barracks. To meet this difficulty an increase
in staple items was later accepted.

Due to lack of refrigerator shipping some fresh vegetables
and fruits were initially spoilt in transit. Another difficulty was
that owing to the wide difference in season between Australia and
Japan, proper fruits could not beimported. However the situation
improved later with the provision of refrigerator shipping and
facilities at Kure and other supply points.

Fresh items on the following approximate scales were provided
in cold storage by British Commonwealth Occupation Force. All
these articles were of excellent quality: |

Fresh Meat ... 6 days per week for British troops.

Fresh Butter ... 3 days per week for British troops.

? DCGS/G/100.

NAVY, AIR AND DIVISIONAL TROOPS 139

Fresh Potatoes 3 days per week for all troops.

Fresh Onions... 3 days per week for all troops.

Fresh Fruit ... 6 days per week forall troops.

Fresh Mutton Sufficient ordinary frozen mutton for
Indian Troops (not kalal or Jhatka)
available for all troops who would eat it.

59 Indian Supply Company operated in the Commonwealth
Base Supply and Petrol Depots and on the move of the division
to Okayama, it moved there to operate a large Field Supply Depot
and Petrol Depot from which requirements of the division were met.
Supplies were despatched to Composite Platoons, which operated
supply points at Yonago and Takamatsu.

The transport companies were very hard worked, carrying
stores and personnel from Kure Docks to Hiro and later from
Okayama to unit locations. 8 Company RASC was eventually
located at Wadashima on Shikoku island and one platoon of this
company went to Tokyo to provide transport for the British contin-
gent there. 169 Indian Company concentrated at Hiro and later
moved to Okayama. This was replaced by 227 General Purposes
Transport Company in March 1947.

As has already been mentioned, road communications in
Japan were extremely poor, and jeep was the only really practicable,
vehicle for general reconnaissance on country roads. The few
jeeps which were brought from India proved invaluable and it was
a pity that the vital necessity of a high proportion of such vehicles
was not emphasised in the early stages of Brindiv organisation. It
was expected that future maintenance would be based on jeeps
butas this responsibility was taken over by the Australian authorities
who were anxious not to spend dollars on American purchases the
proportion of jeeps remained inadequate.

RIASC units also organised:

(a) Fishing—Boats were requisitioned and enthusiastic
volunteers organised a fishing fleet. Small amounts of
fish were caught. Sufficient fish was obtained for issue
to the troops and canteens.

(b) Launch Service—Supply and Transport crews were
trained to man procured Japanese launches. Nine boats
were obtained and used extensively for patrolling and
recreational trips.

ORDNANCE

A small amount of captured Japanese barrack and accommo-
dation stores was found and issued to implement the rather meagre

140 POST-WAR OCCUPATION FORCES: JAPAN— 1945-47

scales which units had brought with them. No large stocks of use-
ful Japanese equipment were found as the American forces, which
occupied the area before Brindiv, had taken what they required,
and had handed the remainder to the Japanese Home Ministry.

The Ordnance Distribution Centre was first established in a
warehouse and dealt with 15 to 20 3-ton lorry loads of stores daily.
The fastest moving item was furniture.

Laundry contracts were made with local Japanese laundry
companies, the contractor undertaking to wash and iron seven
articles per Other Rank cach week for the sum of six Yen. In
addition, he carried out two dry cleanings (Battle Dress) per month
for an additional sum of two Yen.?

14 (m) Laundry and Bath unit arrived in Oakyama on 19
April 1946 and took on the washing for 80 British General Hospital.
The call for the bath section was not pressing as all barracks were
well equipped with washing facilities.

At Okayama there were excellent sites for the laundry and
for store dump. The living quarters were centrally heated and
there was plenty of room to organise canteens and recreation rooms.

The supply of furniture in Japan was an Ordnance respon-
sibility. The procurement demands were first placed direct on
Prefectural Governments by the local commander concerned but
with the abuse of this privilege and great scarcity of many items in
Japan, Supreme Commander Allied Powers fixed the scales, though
procurement was still handled by British Commonwealth Occupa-
tion Force. The quality of furniture supplied was uniformly good
thougb the wood was not of a very strong variety.

Three sheets, two pillow slips and one case pillow were issued
to each man as accommodation stores. The provision of an
additional battle dress (olive green) suit was approved, raising the
scale from two to three, per person. :

The repair of civilian shoes by Ordnance with ordnance
material was also approved but due to scarcity of grindery and
material this was given very low priority.

The advent of families in Japan necessitated larger holdings
in officers’ shops and canteens together with a number of additional
items covering the peculiar requirements of wives and children,
such as clothes, medicines and furniture.

Most of the Ordnance units were located in Sanganaya, a
few miles from Okayama, which was also a Japanese Ordnance
Depot. The stores were placed in caves which had first to be
cleared of Japanese equipment and properly rehabilitated and
made secure against pilfering.

8 Five Yens to the Rupee.

NAVY, AIR AND DIVISIONAL TROOPS 141

Mechanical Transport stores were always in short supply
Due to extreme wear and tear, the greatest casualty ratio was
amongst the fan-belts.

ELECTRICAL AND MECHANICAL ENGINEERS

The Advance Party on arrival was allotted a site for work-
shops in what had been an auxiliary marine engine-erecting shop
in Hiro, about seven miles inland from Kure. This required exten-
sive clearing of machinery and junk, but it had fine possibilities as
a workshop with more than sufficient space to accommodate all the
R/IEME elements of the Division.

For living accommodation, EME was allotted Japanese
barracks known as “ Infantry Lines South ". These Lines consisted
of five wooden two-storyed barrack blocks in a very dilapidated
state and much hard work was needed to make them habitable.

All EME units were originally located in Hiro and worked
to an interim plan of maintenance and repair for divisional units,
111 Indian Infantry Workshops Company arrived on 23 April
1946 and moved direct to the 268 Indian Infantry Brigade Area.

The final locations of EME units after the move of Brindiv
to Okayama were as follows:—

Unit Location Remarks
(i) HQ CIEME .. Okayama
(ii) Division Recovery
Company IEME 3% Responsible for divisional

recovery.
(iii) Independent Section
152 Indian Mobile
Workshop one 5% Maintenance and Repair for
Divisional Troops Transport.
(àv) Refrigerator Repair
Component wee 35 Maintenance of Divisional
Refrigeration Plant.
(v) 111 Indian Infantry
Workshops .. Matsue Maintenance and repair for
268 Infantry Brigade.
(vi) 5Infantry Workshops
Company REME Kochi Maintenance and repair for
5 Infantry Brigade.
(vii) 1083 Indian Troops Okayama Maintenance and repair for
Company Work- General Purposes Trans-
shops Section port Company RIASC.

142 POST-WAR OCCUPATION FORCES: JAPAN— 1945-47

With the withdrawal of 5 Brigade and disbandment of
Brindiv, 111 Indian Infantry Workshop was moved from Matsue
to Okayama and took over the responsibilities of Division Recce
Company in addition to its own.

Owing to very bad roads, the amount of repair work was
considerable. With the employment of Japanese drivers the acci-
dents increased. Hence a driving school was opened to train
personnel in driving and maintenance and the Japanese authorities
were ordered to take up road repair as high priority.

EDUCATION BRANCH

Two considerable activities, which reached early fruition,
were the provision of library facilities and a daily newspaper. A
Central Library to cater for British and Indian troops alike was
established. Stocked with some 13,000 fiction for British troops,
reference, technical and miscellaneous sections, several thousand
volumes in Hindi, Urdu, Marathi, Punjabi, Gurmukhi, Nepali,
Tamil, Telugu and Malayalam for Indian troops, classical music
records and Indian records, the library was capable of issuing up
to 60 books a day to personal callers and supplied boxes of up to
500 books to Brindiv units, clubs, and canteens. Га addition,
Education Branch took on the commitment of producing *' Brindiv"',
the daily news bulletin which summarised broadcast commentaries
from Australia, Tokyo, the BBC and All India Radio. This
bulietin ceased with the production of BCON by Headquarters
British Commonwealth Occupation Force as its daily newspaper.

The educational set-up in the Okayama area included the
establishment of a polytechnic, and the American Divisional School
was taken over complete for this purpose. Besides courses in
educational method, the polytechnic catered for training in agri-
cultural subjects and cottage industries, instructor training for the
Indian Army Certificates and technical subjects and the Forces
Preliminary Examination.

Much informal education was done by the organisation in
canteens and clubs of quizzes, musical shows and recorded concerts
of classical music. Regular Sunday night music was organized and
quiz contests were held with other contingents.

{ An Amateur Dramatic Society was started and two plays
which were staged at four stations in the Brindiv area were a great
success.

Classes in Japanese for Divisional Headquarters Officers,

Warrant Officers and Viceroy's Commissioned Officers were also
organised.

NAVY, AIR AND DIVISIONAL TROOPS 143

INDIAN FAMILIES IN JAPAN

The families of Indian officers began to arrive in Japan
in December 1946. By May 1947, when an embargo was placed
on the move of families of Indian Army to Japan, 96 families
had arrived from India.

The maintenance of “dependents”, as the families were
known in United States and British Commonwealth Occupation
Force circles, created a few snags as they had to be fed, allotted
accommodation and supplied through British Commonwealth
Occupation Force channels. However, the arrangements made
were very satisfactory and it can be stated without exaggeration
that they had the best of time at the least expense to themselves.

The families created a very good atmosphere all round.
They not only helped to raise the morale but also the prestige of
the Indian Contingent. For the first time Allied personnel and
Japanese met the Indian families, saw them in their reality, exa-
mined their mode of living and realised that the impressions which
they had formed before were the result of false propaganda.

The Japanese public received the families very cordially and
at all detraining stations like Kure and Okayama very good recep-
tions were organised.

Arrangements were also in hand to call forward the families’
of Other Ranks but these had to be held in abeyance firstly as
accommodation was not available and secondly owing to the
impending withdrawal of the contingent.

Educational arrangements for children were made and
schools were started in Etajima, Kure and Okayama. The school
teachers were provided by the United Kingdom Ministry of
Education and the Australian authorities.

MORALE OF INDIAN PERSONNEL

The morale of the Indian personnel remained very high
throughout the period of duty in Japan. This was exceptionally so
with combatant units under Brindiv. The laxity of discipline
and morale of the Indian units in Integrated Headquarters was
criticised by General Haydon.? But that was mainly due to the
lack of supervision by the Headquarters of the units concerned,
and improved considerably in the Integrated Formations by the
efforts of their commanders.

The introduction of the New Pay Code, which benefited the
Indian Other Ranks considerably was a great morale raiser but it

9 BCOF AF 16915 dated 18 November 45.

144 POST-WAR OCCUPATION FORCES: JAPAN——1945-47

had a critical reception from the Indian Commissioned Officers,
who were badly hit.

The communal riots in the Punjab, from where more than half
of the Indian personnel in Japan came, were a great disturbing
factor. Stories of atrocities committed by one community against
the other were boldly splashed in British Commonwealth Occupa-
tion Force news-sheet ВСО,М and also іп the American press. It
goes to the credit of Indian Officers, who had only recently assumed
responsibility, that there were no disturbances or friction between
the different communities in units. Brigadier S. M. Shrinagesh
maintained strict neutrality and ensured that there was no dis-
crimination or communal propaganda in the units while in Japan.
268 Brigade Group came back to India as the last undivided contin-
gent of the Indian Army.

The Other Ranks while in Japan were greatly interested in
the Japanese way of living, their education and their social system
as a whole. They were greatly impressed by the universality of
education and taking this as an example almost all Indian Other
Ranks became keen enthusiasts of education. All ranks showed
great keenness and interest in the country and its people.

LEAVE

No leave ex-Japan to India was allowed except in extreme
compassionate cases. Leave ex-Japan for British Other Ranks
was according to existing rules regarding leave from overseas.
But shipping was the limiting factor.

Leave in Japan was eight days in a year which the troops
generally spent in one of the many leave centres. Later on this
was increased to two periods of eight days.

MEDICAE,

Medical Layout: Hospitalisation for Indian personnel was
provided by 92 Indian General Hospital at Kure while the British
personnel were covered by 80 British General Hospital at Okayama.
With the opening of the Australian General Hospital at Etajima,
all surgical and infectious cases were transferred there. It also
provided hospital cover for the families.

5 (British) Field Ambulance and 9 (Indian) Light Field
Ambulance provided medical detachments for the troops in
Shikoku island and North Coast respectively. The medical
layout was:—

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Indian Troops in Etajima

NAVY, AIR AND DIVISIONAL TROOPS 145

92 Indian General Hospital (C) 300 Beds at Kure.

92 Indian General Hospital (C) 150 Beds at Kegoya (VD
Gentre and Isolation Hospital).

80 British General Hospital, 200 Beds at Hiro (moved to
Okayama).

5 British Field Ambulance Headquarter and 1 Company

at Hiro (moved to Kochi).

9 Indian Light Field Ambulance at Hamada (moved to

Imaichi).

1 Company 5 British Field Ambulance at Matsue (20 Beds).
Lb 2. at 80 British General Hospital.
Dental Centre Indian at 92 Indian General Hospital (C).
Evacuation from Shikoku was to Okayama or to Etajima

depending on the case. As the evacuation to Okayama required
transhipment at two places, the evacuation to Etajima by sea was
speedier and more comfortable. Evacuation from 268 Brigade
Area was by rail. Evacuation by air for emergency cases was
available at all centres.

HEALTH OF THE TROOPS

Japan has extremes of climate, the winter is very cold while
the summer is humid and hot. Considering the poor initial
accommodation it was anticipated that Indian troops would have
many cases of frost-bite but there were only a few cases of chilblains
and the Indian troops stood the rigors of winter very well.

The summer is the most dangerous period when epidemics
break outin Japan. The diseases spread very quickly because the
Japanese use fresh night-soil in the fields. This not only generates
bad odour but also intensifies the distribution of germs. Most of
the areas in close proximity to the troops were air sprayed with
DDT with good results. Inoculation against cholera and all
communicative diseases was essential. All men had to be inoculated
against B-Encephalitis in three doses as this disease is endemic in
Japan.
The incidence of venereal diseases in British Commonwealth
Occupation Force was great but the Indian Contingent had a very
low percentage (as low as in India itself). Instructions were given
to all ranks regarding its prevention. .

Extensive screening of barracks and drainage was carried out
to combat mosquito borae B-Encephalitis which was endemic in
the Okayama area. There were only three cases reported in

Brindiv,

146 POST-WAR OCCUPATION FORCES: JAPAN—1945-47

Local Prevalent Diseases

Typhus—In 1947 there was a very extensive outbreak of

this disease among the civil population. Allied Military

Government carried out large-scale dusting and the epidemic

soon declined. Indian force was 100 per cent protected and
had no casualties.

Small Pox—A fairly large number of cases among civil
population were reported. Allied Military Government
arranged for vaccination by preparing lymph in Japan.
Period of revaccination in Brindiv was reduced to 12 months.

Hygiene and Sanitation
Latrine and disposal of contents—
This was a complicated problem because of
(a) high water level (in many parts 1-3 ft. below surface)
which ruled out deep trench latrines;
(b) very few latrines being fitted with water carriage
system ;
(c) free use of human faeces in Japan as manure.
Two types of latrines were mainly used:
(a) Japanese (squatting type) with a pit underneath.
This was the commonest type oflatrine. Practically
all houses were fitted with this type. The pit was
emptied by scooping out contents once a week or
fortnight. Those used by troops were emptied every
other day by local labour;
(b) Bucket removal type with seat. These were largely
constructed by Brindiv, and were emptied daily.
Emptied contents were taken away by farmers in wooden
buckets with closely fitting lids and were used to fertilize crops.
Water: T'wo sources of supply were available:
(a) pumping from ground,
(b) collection in a catchment area.
| Water supply on the whole was good, but as a precaution
drinking water used by troops was chlorinated.

WELFARE

The maintenance of morale, discipline and health depended
mostly on welfare facilities available within the area. As fraternisa-
tion was not allowed, with meagre recreational facilities and with
poor initial accommodation and severe weather conditions it was
essential to divert the attention of men into healthy channels.
In view of the lack of indigenous amusements and amenities in

Japan, every effort was made to im
that troops could have comfortable

NAVY, AIR AND DIVISIONAL TROOPS 147

prove all forms of welfare, so
clubs etc. to visit and have

adequate amusement in their free periods.

After careful planning and hard work by welfare services a
very high standard was reached, and General Scott who visited
units in February-March 1947 wrote, ** The men arc having th
time of their lives ''.'? SUR

The following were some of the items of welfare provided ;—

(a) Canteens/Clubs

(b)

Separate canteens both wet and dry were established in
the majority of units. Certain difficulties in the begin-
ning were experienced over the question of supplies, but
with Australian Canteen Services taking over the overall
responsibility of Canteen Services, the supplies became
adequate. Indian Other Ranks could have English
cigarettes and two bottles of Australian beer a weck,
besides chocolates and other delicacies at very low price.
The following Central Clubs were established and catered
for a large number of troops both day and night:—
(i) Wavell Club—British and Indian troops.

(11) Auchinleck Club—Indian troops.

(iii) YMCA—British troops.

(iv) YMCA—Indian troops.
Such clubs were established at Okayama, Matsue,
Hamada and Kochi.

Entertainments
The following entertainments were provided and were
widely attended :—

Films:

The supply of films in the beginning only allowed one
16-mm. and one 35-mm. film for British troops each
week and a similar allocation for Indian troops. In
view of the complete lack of local entertainments or
amenities, two films per unit per week were found to
be insufficient. The Army Director of Service Kine-
matography from Supreme Allied Commander, South-
East Asia, visited Japan in May 1946 and stepped up
the film supply per week which was:

Two 35-mm for British troops.

Two 16-mm for British troops.

19 9504/B/DCGS(B) dated 5 February/1 March 47.

148 POST-WAR OCCUPATION FORCES: JAPAN— 1945-47

One 35-mm for Indian troops.

One 16-mm for Indian troops,
One 35-mm film per week was also provided from
stocks withdrawn from general circulation.
In view of the extremely poor state of the roads, mobile
projectors could not be used except where rail journeys
were involved; consequently they were used in a static
role. For that role thirteen 35-mm projectors were
required. Out of this only two 35-mm projectors were
available with 9 Kinema Section. Five more were
received from Australian sources and with the with-
drawal of 5 Brigade they proved adequate.

ENSA Concert Party

The above party did a circuit of Brindiv units and was
withdrawn on 4 May 1947, after which ENSA parties were not
available. Australian Services organised many concert parties
which visited all the units in rotation.

Fauji Dilkhush Sabha

No. 83 Fauji Dilkhush Sabha Concert Party gave a few
concerts to Indian troops but was returned to India owing to its
proving unsatisfactory.

Kumaon Band

The Kumaon Band played numerous programmes of light,
orchestral and dance music both for British and Indian troops
of Brindiv and other formations and had very good reception.

Local Entertainments

In addition, the following entertainments were provided
periodically and proved very popular :—

(a) Dances

(b) Concerts

(c) Whist Drives etc.

Ladies Services

Detachments of FANYs, WAS(B), WVS(UK) and WVS(I)
which accompanied Brindiv to Japan assisted in all welfare pro-
jects. They rendered considerable assistance in the running and
furnishing of unit and central club/canteens. The majority
of ladies had to be concentrated in Division Troops and
5 Infantry Brigade Area, but small detachments were despatched

NAVY, AIR AND DIVISIONAL TROOPS 149

to live in the unit areas to assist in the canteens and the runnin
of all forms of entertainments. Their help was leaba
Representatives of SSAFA and SSAHA were fully occupied with
the various family and home problems of the troops.

The YMCA ran a mess for members of the Women’s Service.
This proved a most comfortable mess run on most efficient lines.

The withdrawal of the FANY from Japan created a difficult
situation. Members of the Women's Voluntary Service were
required to run the welfare centres and canteens, and they rose
to the occasion by making the centres efficient and attractive.
Six members of WVS(I) were insufficient for the purpose and it
was strongly recommended to СНО (1) that Indian ladies should
be sent to look after the welfare of Indian troops. This was an
urgent requirement which was never fulfilled.

Takuma Bay Holiday Home

A first class Holiday Home for British and Indian troops
was opened at Takuma Bay on the island of Shikoku on 1 Septem-
ber 1946. "This home was very popular with troops who spent ten
days holiday by turn.

Shimatsue Leave Centre

The Cherokeon Hotel on the beach near Shimatsue was
converted into a Leave Centre where 70 men could stay for short
periods upto three days. As it was only 20 miles from Okayama
by good road and could be reached by sea in a few hours by
Inland Sea, it was a very popular summer resort. Allarrangements
were made by Women's Voluntary Service.

Ebisu Leave Centre in Tokyo

Leave in Tokyo was very popular and during the tour of
duty of an Indian unit there 50 leave vacancies were provided.
From there trips were arranged to Nikko, Kamakura and other
places of interest.

Ujji Leave Centre

A British Commonwealth Occupation Force Leave Centre
was opened on 1 October 1947 for Indian troops ten miles from
Kyoto. It was a luxurious place and arrangements were compar-
able to those in the best hotels in India. Its proximity to such
famous places as Nara, Kyoto and Kobe made it very popular.

Other Leave Centres |
British Commonwealth Occupation Force had holiday homes
at Kyoto, Kawana, Nikko and Beppu and the trips to these places

150 POST-WAR OCCUPATION FORCES: JAPAN— 1945-47

were very popular. Every one had an opportunity to visit one of
these centres twice during his stay in Japan.

Recreational Trips

Tours and welfare parties were organised to visit atom-bombed
Hiroshima and the blasted docks of Kure. As an antidote to war
memories, trips were organised to various beauty spots; Miyajima
Island, known as, ‘‘ Paradise Island ", being the most popular.

All the roads of Miyajima were lined with souvenir shops
full of many interesting toys, mementos and junk. The main road
which ran from the wharf south of the shrine ended on the west
side on a small beach near which was located a small hotel, which
was converted into a Convalescent Depot for British Commonwealth
Occupation Force. Every Sunday and on holidays many British
Commonwealth Occupation Force personnel used to visit Miyajima
to enjoy the beautiful scenery and to be photographed with the
sea-Torii іп the background.

Indian troops had a good look at the destruction and recons-
truction of Hiroshima. They were told by those who were fortunate
enough to survive that when the town was burning there was no
panic, there was no crying and cursing. How like the Japanese
to suffer with patience. It was these qualities of character, patience
and perseverance which were helping them to rise again. Indians
could profit by the good example of the Japanese and help in the
rise of their country to greatness.

Okayama Race Course

To provide some amenities to troops it was decided to use
the Okayama Race Course, which lay on the main road from
Okayama to Kobe via. Himeji. It was about three miles from the
town and was patronised by the Japanese before the war, but during
the war, horse racing was stopped by law and the race course
had fallen into decay. Тһе first race of the season was organised
оп 10 August 1946. It was a great success.

British Commonwealth Occupation Force Sports and Amusements

On 29 October 1946, British Commonwealth Occupation
Force sports were held at Kure. The Indian athletic team was
selected from the persons taking part in the Brigade sports held at
Matsue on 9 October. 268 Indian Infantry Brigade came out
third, losing to 34 Australian Infantry Brigade and BCAIR Group.

A grand musical display by British and Indian Military Bands
was given in the Okayama Park on 16 November 1946 at 2-30 p.m.
Major-General Cowan was present on the occasion. An extract
from the Japanese press reads:

NAVY, AIR AND DIVISIONAL TROOPS 151

“The paper mulberry trees were beginning to bloom and
the impressive array of the bands arrested the attention of the
crowds.

Firstly the Band of the Cameron Highlanders marched
around the lake with the ribbons of their dark blue hats
trailing and their golden hair glistening in the sun. The
marching was spirited and courageous and in perfect time.

Continuing, General Cowan's Headquarters Band gave
a solemn marching display. Their coloured coats painted a
beautiful picture in the sun. After half circling the lake and
ев a brilliant musical display they returned to their

ase.

Soon afterwards the band of the Gurkhas, marching with
dauntless carriage and full of strength marched around the
lake playing their bag-pipes. As they returned to their base
the main part of the musical performance came to an end.

The Headquarters Band marched once more around the
lake and finally as a present for the people of Okayama, the
“ Apple"' song was played and amid the applause of the
large audience the display was concluded at 3.30 p.m. 7,5:

Pay

The pay organisation began to function in Japan from 17
February 1946, when the Air Advance Party arrived at Kure.
Supply of cash and exchange of currency, the main things aimed
at, were achieved smoothly in spite of the large volume of currency
to be dealt with and the fact that British personncl at Headquarters
British Commonwealth Occupation Force as well as Royal Navy,
Royal Air Force and Royal Indian Navy requirements had to be
attended to. "This involved a great deal of work but was carried
through satisfactorily. 'The currency question was complicated
by the fact that the Japanese Government introduced a new
currency and commenced a system of restrictions on bank drawing
at the same time as the Sea Advance Party arrived in Japan.

It was thus necessary to collect non-Japanese currency from
personnel on board without giving Yen in return. This latter
had to be deferred for two days owing to the late arrival of the
“New” Yen notes and Military Issue Currency. The “ New"
Yen notes were reissued and consisted of old Yen notes with
adhesive stamps affixed to the top right hand corner. These stamps
were printed to show the denomination to which they referred.

Various complications followed, such as the adhesive stamps
becoming “ non-adhesive ” and the 100 Yen notes being tendered

п From Japanese press.

152 POST-WAR OCCUPATION FORCES: JAPAN— 1945-47

with 10 Yen stamps affixed. This-of course rendered them
valueless.

Further currency restrictions were introduced with a view to
eliminating black-market transactions and proved effective, Sup-
plies of New Bank of Japan notes were circulated in October
1946.

Contacts had to be made with Headquarters British Common-
wealth Occupation Force, Royal Navy, Royal Indian Navy, Royal
Air Force bodies, as well as other components of the force and cash
supply to them was co-ordinated. The Staff Paymaster Japan
was the sole channel of currency supply to all British formations
in Japan.

The move to Okayama involved some alteration in the Pay
“layout”. One cashier was sent to Shikoku with Headquarters
5 Brigade and one for 268 Brigade. Owing to the small strength
of this unit, it was necessary for units to be supplied by cashier’s
visits till additional paymasters were made available. Time and
distance were great factors in cash supply and efforts were made
to arrange transfers from British Commonwealth Occupation Force
to Royal Navy and Royal Air Force by cheque. Till this was
arranged, bulk supplies had to be collected and delivered by the
cashier.

It is considered that a civilian with banking experience would
have done better owing to the pressure of work and volume of
currency to be dealt with.

Despite many reminders to FCMA regarding the correct
exchange rate between £/Rupee/Yen, the Military Accounts
continued to deduct at the pre-war exchange rate of 15 2d to
the Yen. This eventually necessitated the review of all
accounts.

Public Relations

The Public Relation Detachment originally consisted of
DADPR and one Cine Photographer at Brindiv Headquarters.
СНО (1) later agreed to appoint one officer with each brigade.

At Nasik it was decided to give the fullest publicity cover
possible to every contingent of Brindiv leaving India. As a result
it was decided to divide the Public Relation Detachment into three
different parties.

An All India Radio correspondent was attached to the first
party with Brindiv Headquarters which included DADPR and
one Cine Photographer, One observer was attached to 5 Infantry
Brigade to cover its departure. One Cine Officer was attached
to 268 Indian Infantry Brigade, to travel with the Brigade, cover

NAVY, AIR AND DIVISIONAL TROOPS 153

its departure from Bombay and on its way, with the help of PROs
Bombay and Singapore.

The work of the Public Relation Detachment was handicapped
by shortage of officers and consequent lack of personal contacts
with the scattered units.

Before departure, a feature broadcast on the Brindiv force
was arranged through All India Radio correspondent from Bombay
Radio Station. Major-General Cowan took part in the feature.
The Camerons’ Band and the Kumaon Band were included in
the programme.

In the evening an informal tea party was held on the ship
HMT Dunera to enable Bombay Pressmen to meet Major-
General Gowan and other officers and men proceeding to Japan.
Thirty Pressmen representing English and Indian papers and News
Agencies attended the party.

Another feature broadcast on Brindiv was arranged by
AH India Radio correspondent on board the ship Dunera,
through All India Broadcast Recording Unit in Singapore. The
parade through Singapore, at which Lord Louis Mountbatten took
the salute, was covered by representatives of SEAC and other local
papers and also by the Recording unit of Singapore Radio.

In Hong Kong the local press was very hospitable. Posters
bearing headlines “ British and Indian troops, here on way to
Japan", heralded the arrival of Brindiv in Hong Kong.

In Japan the arrivals of various contingents, receptions
and subsequent functions were reported and photographs and
material were despatched to GHO(T) and other countries for
distribution.

2 Dorset taking over guard duties in Tokyo was fully
covered by news agencies and correspondents there. Тһе
departure of 268 Indian Infantry Brigade from India received
full coverage with the help of PRO Bombay and was filmed.

2/5 Royal Gurkha Rifles taking over guard duties in Tokyo
was covered by PR Photographic Team and also news agencies
and correspondents in Tokyo. Brindiv Retreat ceremony in
Tokyo was also successfully covered by PR Photographic Team and
a dozen other photographers and correspondents representing
news agencies in Japan.

Various correspondents, both British and American, visited
and wrote about Brindiv. Among them were Mr. Jack Potter
of Daily Express, Mr. Morris of BBC, Mr. Massey of Telegraph
Sydney, Mr. Eston of ZHustrated London and Mr. Brian of А. P.
America. Mr. john Ulm paid a visit to Brindiv where he
conferred with the General Officer Commanding and Staff Officers.

154 POST-WAR OCCUPATION FORCES: )АРАМ--1945-47

Photographers of Nippon News paid a visit to film VJ Day
celebrations.

The Retreat Ceremony was broadcast throughout Japan by
American Forces Radio with a complete commentary on Brindiv.
Recordings of the ceremony were also made and copies sent to the
BBC London for broadcast. The other two copies were sent to
Melbourne and India.

Arrangements were made with the Nippon News, Tokyo, to
show the Retreat Ceremony film, taken by them, to the troops
at Brindiv Headquarters. The film was shown to the troops at
Okayama for three nights and was a great success.

Mr. Collings and Mr. Pearce of the Department of Informa-
tion, Melbourne, paid a four day visit to Brindiv to make а
documentary film. For this purpose—

(a) A motorised march past by Brindiv units was held at

Okayama.

(b) At Matsue, Headquarters of 268 Indian Infantry
Brigade, some Indian folk dances and wrestling were
arranged by 5/1 Punjab.

(c) 1 Mahrattas at Hamada organised some very colourful
national dances.

Stars and Stripes, the official newspaper of the United
States army, BCON, the official paper of BCOF and both
Japanese English and vernacular press showed great interest in the
Division. ВСОМ gave generally one full page for Indian news
exclusively and printed a large portion of itin Urdu.

The literature produced by PR India and Information
Department of Great Britain was published through the agency of
the Japanese press. It was important to tell the Japanese people
of our contribution in the war. A steady flow of stories was also
maintained. These stories were released to the local press, sent
to Public Relations, India Office, London, and DPR India.

On Empire Day, literature on the Force was distributed to
the American troops through Information and Education Depart-
ment of the United States Army. It included ‘ Brindjap ’ booklets,
Fighting Men of India, Three Famous Divisions, and Indian VCs in two
World Wars. These helped to dispel many doubts and misunder-
standings from the minds of American troops about the British
and Indian soldiers.

_ The photographic situation in Brindiv improved with the
arrival of a PR. Photographer. Brindiv dark room catered for the
needs of local papers, but owing to the shortage of paper it was
impossible to meet the demand of various units. Military History
Section, Melbourne, with British Commonwealth Occupation

NAVY, AIR AND DIVISIONAL TROOPS 155

Force, covered nearly every Brindiv function and sent pictures of
prints to every Brindiv unit. The situation regarding cine film
remained unsatisfactory. Cine film brought from India was either
exhausted or stale. Brindiv required ten thousand feet of 35-mm
film in 200-feet spools and ten thousand feet of 35-mm film in 100-
fect spools during six months.

During the earlier period of its duties in British Common-
wealth Occupation Force the Indian Contingent did not get very
good publicity in Japan or abroad. This was partly due to an
initial lack of PR arrangements with JCOSA and British Common-
wealth Occupation Force and partly due to the hostile attitude of
the Press in general about happenings in India. In India “it was
extremely difficult to get any publicity about British Commonwealth
Occupation Force because Indian editors were convinced that con-
ditions were bad and that the Indian Contingent in particular was
regarded as inferior to the other Contingents and was so treated"?
After the disbandment of Brindiv and formation of 268 Indian
Infantry Brigade Group, as a separate entity, the position of Indian
vis-a-vis other contingents was one of equality and what little
doubts remained in the minds of the few were removed after the
declaration of Independence on 15 August 1947. While important
political and civilian Heads of the United Kingdom, Australia and
New Zealand visited their contingents in Japan, no senior Govern-
ment representative from India or Indian newspaper correspondent
visited the Indian contingent in Japan. Their attitude may be
gleaned from this communication: ** Government of India appre-
ciate Robertson’s desire for visit of senior Government representa-
tive and are now considering the matter but I anticipate their
refusal owing to uncertainty regarding future "'.?

12 TNDEL/45/11/[1 dated 8 October 46,
13 Armindia signal 245247/SD5 dated 14 January 47.

CHAPTER XI

Withdrawal of the Indian Contingent
from Japan
NEGOTIATIONS FOR WITHDRAWAL

The rumours about the withdrawal of the Indian Contingent
from Japan were afloat from the beginning of 1947, and with the
withdrawal of 5 (British) Brigade it became obvious that the with-
drawal of Indian Contingent was a matter of time; though the
two had no connection whatsoever. The British withdrawal was
essentially governed by conditions of manpower, and United
Kingdom had still a fair size contingent in Japan. The Indian
withdrawal, however, was the result of the principle enunciated by
the Prime Minister of India, viz., ‘‘ We have to bear in mind the
strong feeling in India about the use of Indian troops abroad and
because of this we should not retain any troops in foriegn countries
unless there are imperative reasons for doing so ".'

It is not unlikely that for prestige considerations the Govern-
ment of India might have preferred to retain the contingent in
Japan. But the impending constitutional changes prompted the
Indian Interim Government to finalise their views in March 1947,
when they stated: “ In view of the constitutional changes which
will be put into effect by 1 June 1947 and consequent reorganisation
within the Indian Army, the Government of India now wish to
withdraw all Indian troops serving overseas by end of 19477,

According to the MacArthur-Northcott agreement it was
necessary for Australia to give six months' notice to the United
States to withdraw this contingent. Australia was not keen to
forward this request and was still hoping that India might change
her views on further consideration. She felt that the withdrawal
of the Indian Contingent “ will not only destroy the representative
character of the Commonwealth Force but create many adminis-
trative difficulties for the forces remaining behind in Тарап ”, most
of the installations and integrated administrative units being of
Indian origin. Tt was urged that their complete withdrawal would
cause a breakdown, as replacements could not be easily provided
from Australian or New Zealand sources.

Dr. Evatt, Minister of External Affairs, Government of
Australia, informed General Cawthorn, Indian Representative on
JCOSA, that he was holding up the despatch of notice to America
“ pending a further official Australian request to Pandit Jawahar

1 EAD шо No, D729-ME/47 dated 11 February 47.
? Telegram No. 1164 dated 22 March 47 in File FUO/47/D7.

WITHDRAWAL OF THE INDIAN CONTINGENT FROM JAPAN 157

Lal Nehru, Prime Minister of India, to reconsider his decision "'.3
But it transpired later that the Australian Cabinet decided not to
send an official request but authorised Dr. Evatt to write to Pandit
Nehru urging reconsideration of the withdrawal or at least to leave a
small token force in British Commonwealth Occupation Force.
On 9 April 1947, however, the Australian Government sent the
following notice to the United States Government:

** At the request of the Government of India the Australian
Government gives formal notice to the United States Govern-
ment in accordance with Paragraph 3(B) of the MacArthur-
Northcott Agreement, of the intention of Government of
India to withdraw the whole of the Indian Contingent from
the British Commonwealth Force in Japan.

At the same time the Government of India would be
grateful if the United States Government could see its way
clear to agree to the withdrawal! being effected earlier than
the date of expiry of the formal six months’ notice "'.*

Head of the Indian Liaison Mission in Japan signalled to the
Government of India on 14 February 1947, ** General MacArthur
would not object to the withdrawal of the Indian troops if the
Government of India so decided although he is very proud of
Indian troops and highly praised them for their excellent work in
Japan "'.5

Not only India but New Zealand also expressed her desire to
reduce her contingent. Dr. Evatt, who had done so much for the
establishment of British Commonwealth Occupation Force deplored
the attitude of both the Indian and New Zealand Governments.
He was under the impression that these Governments were not
acquainted with the value of British Commonwealth Occupation
Force and asked JGOSA to prepare a paper on the subject for the
information and enlightenment of the various Governments, which
might induce them to change their decision. Dr. Evatt was keen
that India as an interested power in the Pacific should maintain
her contribution to British Commonwealth Occupation Force. In
his opinion, “ the Indian withdrawal and the reduction of the New
Zealand Contingent will be detrimental to Australian Forces, as.
it will raise a public demand for their withdrawal 77 Dr. Evatt
had various interviews with General Cawthorn, and Dr. Paranjpye,
Indian High Commissioner in Australia, who on 28 April 1947,

3 Signal INDEL/287 of 28 April 47 and INDEL DO192/2 dated 29 April 47 from

to Smith. |
ао оү 134 dated 14 February 47 in File No. 6385/120/SD5 Serial No. 50-A-

5 Ibid И 7
6 essct of British Commonwealth Occupation Forces File INDEL/98.

? INDEL DO 192/2 dated 29 April 47 from Cawthorn to Smith.

158 POST-WAR OCCUPATION FORCES: JAPAN— 1945-47

wrote to Pandit Jawahar Lal Nehru urging him to consider the
retention of a token Indian force in Japan to maintain Indian
prestige. The Government of India were not prepared to alter the
decision and informed him that ‘‘ the decision to withdraw the
Indian Contingent of British Commonwealth Occupation Force
was taken in the Cabinet after fully considering all aspects of the
question. Defence Department do not consider that any new
points have been raised which would justify a revision in policy.
The reversal of previous decisions will interfere with the nationa-
lisation of the Armed Forces"? Due to the political develop-
ments, the partition of India into the two Dominions—India and
Pakistan, and the consequent division of the Armed Forces, such
a course had become inevitable.

On 16 July 1947, therefore, the following communique was
issued with the concurrence of SCAP :—

‘ The following announcement has been made by Head-
quarters of the British Commonwealth Occupation Force in
Japan. During the period from July to September this year,
with the concurrence of the United States Government and
of the British Commonwealth Governments concerned, there
will be a gradual reduction in the strength of the British
Commonwealth Occupation Force in Japan. The whole of
the Indian Contingent will be withdrawn and a reduction
will be made in the New Zealand Army component. There
will however be no alteration in the areas occupied or the
responsibilities allotted to British Commonwealth Occupation
Force. The withdrawal of the Indian Contingent is neces-
sary in view of the constitutional changes and consequent
reorganisation of India’s Armed Forces. The RNZAF
Squadron in Japan will continue to be maintained at its
present strength ??.9

Warning Order and Plan of Withdrawal

At the end of May 1947, warning orders were issued for the
withdrawal of the Indian Contingent to be completed by the end of
December 1947.

The original plan envisaged the withdrawal in three stages by
the end of December 1947. Orders to this effect were issued by the
Headquarters British Commonwealth Occupation Force on 30 May
1947. 268 Brigade Group was made responsible for the withdrawal

8 DO No. 302-AA/47 dated 4 June 47 from A. V. Pai to Paranjpye.
9 British Commonwealth Occupation Force Signal No. COS 1585 dated 14 July 47.

WITHDRAWAL OP THE INDIAN CONTINGENT FROM JAPAN 159

of the whole of the Indian Contingent and this had to be carried
out in the following phases:—

Phase I -- 1 Mahrattas.

2/5 RGR.

4 Squadron Royal Indian Air Force.
Phase II — Ancillary Base troops followed by Base troops.
Phase ITI — 5/1 Punjab.

Headquarter 268 Infantry Brigade Group.
Administrative details.

The plan was later slightly modified in detail due to the
pressure from India to accelerate withdrawal and the consequent
changes in the administrative plan,

1 Mahrattas were completely nationaliscd on 17 May 1947,
and as there was still hope that a token contingent might be retained
in Japan, 1 Mahrattas were scheduled to move last to obviate the
Defence Department objection about the difficulty of
nationalisation.

2/5 Gurkhas were stepped up to move first so that they could
go straight to Kure after completion of their guard duties in Tokyo.
They were to be reinforced by the rear details of Brindiv units and
such 268 Brigade units as were not needed for the maintenance of
the remaining Phases.

Considerations affecting withdrawal of Indian Contingent

Units of the Indian Contingent formed part of many adminis-
trative units of British Commonwealth Occupation Force, which
not only provided for Indian needs but also for other elements.
Their withdrawal was possible either when replacements were
received from Australia or a complete reorganisation of the supply
and maintenance system had been effected. In any case these
units had to remain in situ till the last to look after the Indian
Contingent, which could not be administered or maintained by
British Commonwealth Occupation Force sources, as it was outside
their jurisdiction and beyond their means.

268 Brigade Headquarters therefore had to be broken up
into four echelons :—

(i) Advance Headquarters for establishing the Force in
India. As it turned out later this party was completely
wasted because 268 Brigade Group was never formed in
India and the advance elements were dispersed, thus
causing serious administrative dislocation.

(ii) Main Headquarters to leave with the main body. It was
expected that before the departure of this group, three-
fourth of the troops and stores must have been withdrawn.

160 POST-WAR OCCUPATION FORCES: JAPAN— 1945-47

(iii) Rear Headquarters to arrange for the withdrawal of the
remaining force and stores.

(iv) Rear party to arrange for the liquidation of any
outstanding items which could not be cleared by
group (iii). This party was to consist of a couple of
officers.

The priority of withdrawal of administrative units of the
Indian Contingent in Integrated Headquarters and Base installa-
tions was to be determined by those formations and they were not
keen to let them go till the very last. Their retention meant a
further retention of more administrative units to look after them.
This situation was explained to British Commonwealth Occupation
Force, who were helpless in the matter because of replacement
difficulties. To fill the shipping space it became necessary to break
up units and send unessential personnel under command of other
units. This created many difficulties during the voyage and on
arrival in India. The broken up units were not self-contained and
in many cases did not have their own officers, and on arrival in
India did not find, as they had been led to believe, their own
formation to look after them. They were dispersed to their Depot/
Regimental Headquarters in India waiting there for many months
for their main body to arrive.

The position of the British officers of the Indian Army on
integrated and national headquarters was never clarified. It was
quite obvious that all British officers of Indian units could not be
withdrawn without creating chaos and the majority of them desired
to remain behind in Japan.

Another difficulty was that the Indian units were dispersed
over a wide area, where they were responsible for occupation
duties. These units could not be withdrawn unless their respon-
sibilities were taken over by other units, which were not then
available from British Commonwealth Occupation Force.

On the withdrawal of Indian units it was decided that
Okayama and Tottori Prefectures were to pass to 34 Australian
Infantry Brigade and Shimane to 2 New Zealand Expeditionary
Force. It was easier for 2 New Zealand Expeditionary Force to
take over the additional responsibility as it was adjacent to their
existing area but 34 Australian Brigade could notadminister detach-
ments in Tottori without occupying Okayama, which was to
remain under 268 Brigade control till their final departure. It
was therefore necessary to withdraw the Tottori garrison last of all.

The smaller detachments of the contingent had, moreover,
to be concentrated at a central place to facilitate their administra-
tion and maintenance before embarkation.

WITHDRAWAL OF THE INDIAN CONTINGENT FROM JAPAN 161
CONCENTRATION AREA

There were two possible concentration areas in British
Commonwealth Occupation Force, Kure Base and Okayama city.
To make the selection it was necessary to take the following factors
into consideration :—

(i) accommodation for troops awaiting embarkation;

(i3) maintenance facilities during detention;

(iii) transport facilities from concentration area to port of

embarkation;

(iv) covered accommodation for stores;

(v) space for vehicles and engineer stores;

(vi) facilities to guard (iv) and (v);

(vii) transportation to carry stores and equipment to the point

of embarkation.

It was considered a waste of effort to transport large quantities
of stores and equipment from Okayama to Kure and then move
them again for transhipment. As the great majority of stores was
already at Okayama it was decided to make a central dump there
instead of sending out-station stores direct to Kure. The latter
would have meant creation of another detachment and consequently.
further dispersion.

Surplus accommodation was available in Okayama, but was
not available in the close vicinity of Kure.

Depending on the shipping information, troops and stores
could be moved from Okayama to Kure within 24 hours and
embarked direct. In case of any unforeseen event a small escort
party was made available from local Indian units in Kure to guard
the stores which could not be loaded.

The main problem was manpower; with dwindling resources,
the mounting stores had to be guarded, loaded and escorted.
This was a formidable task, considering the desire of all to take
what could be taken. It was therefore decided to make the con-
centration area at Okayama under 268 Brigade control and to
concentrate all Rear Parties there and to move all units except
those in closer proximity of Kure, the port of embarkation, through
Okayama.

Shipping Position : |

'Тһеге was no proper forecast about shipping. Headquarters
British Commonwealth Occupation Force was asked to arrange for
two, store ships to precede each personnel ship. As Headquarters
British Commonwealth Occupation Force did not control any
shipping they could not arrange this. Unfortunatey the attitude

162 POST-WAR OGCUPATION FORCES: JAPAN—1945-47

of General Headquarters (India) did not smooth matters as they
declared that they were not responsible for the provision of
shipping for stores and vehicles'? and kept on insisting that personnel
must be withdrawn by 15 September 1947, without taking into
consideration that they would be leaving behind stores worth many
thousands, to the mere mercy of adverse elements.''

The withdrawal of the personnel did not involve great
difficulty and by 25 October all Indian troops were withdrawn
along with five ship-loads of stores.

Time Factor

Considering the amount of stores to be shipped it was
necessary that the withdrawal should be spread over six months.
The original plan was to complete withdrawal by 31 December
1947, but on 22 July 1947 General Headquarters (India) signalled,
“ For political reasons must plan for all Indian troops to leave
Japan by 15 September 1947 ".'* This upset the whole applecart;
the stores, equipment and vehicles of Brindiv, which were moved
in April, were still lying in Okayama, while the personnel of 268
Brigade Group had begun to move out and there was no news of
the store ships.

It was again represented to India “‘ that British Common-
wealth Occupation Force would not undertake responsibility for
stores and equipment left behind by Indian Contingent not
required for British Commonwealth Occupation Force ригровев”,13
Supremind who had taken over the control of overseas contingent
signalled that ‘‘ all personnel must be withdrawn by 1 October
1947 the latest, and no Rear Party will be left behind "'.'* This
meant “ that stores left behind would become virtually dead loss to
India unless shipment could be arranged before last phase sailed”.

There was no relaxation in the time limit and the last Indian
soldier left Japan by НТ Dilwara on 25 October 1947. The
result of this acceleration and the uncertainty about the title to
the stores was that much valuable store had to be left behind
without any financial adjustments about its value.

Departure of Units
‚ The first unit to leave Kure was 2/5 Gurkhas and Rear
Parties of Brindiv. The Gurkhas left Fukushima in the early hours

7? Armindia 24588/1 SD5 dated 17 July 47.

TT BIE JCOSA INDEL/368 dated I September 47,
12 BIE JCOSA INDEL/368 dated 1 September 47.
t3 BIE JCOSA INDEL/364 dated 1 September 47.

14
i Melbourne 4/M. G, O. dated 13 August 47 and BCOF QG/7974, dated 12

WITHDRAWAL OF THE INDIAN CONTINGENT FROM JAPAN 163

of 17 July, and the special trains were met at Kure station by
Brigadier Shrinagesh, the Commander of Kure Base and the Band
of 4 New Zealand Battalion. The whole Battalion was embarked
on HMT Devonshire by 1300 hours. In the evening 2/5 Gurkhas
Pipe Band with the Kumaon Band played a final Retreat at the
Kure sports stadium; many spectators said it was the best Retreat
the two bands had given. The applause given by a very large
crowd at the end was indicative of the great appreciation of the
combined efforts of the bands. General Robertson, Commander-
in-Chief, British Commonwealth Occupation Force, sent the
following message :—

‘* Тһе departure of the Kumaon Band brings to a close a
period of one and a half years service in Japan. During this
tour of duty the Band has served with distinction in the
British and Indian Division, at my Headquarters at Eta-
jima, at Tokyo, at Kure and also with the military and air
components of the National Contingents, comprising the
British Commonwealth Occupation Force in Japan.

Before they embark for India, I desire to express my
thanks to Jemadar Abdul Ghafur, OBI. and members of
the Kumaon Band for their willing response to the many
calls made upon them and for the valuable welfare services
they have rendered ”’.

Many messages of goodwill were sent by various commanders.
The Head of the Allied Government Team at Okayama wrote to
Brigadier Shrinagesh: “© As the first echelon of the Indian troops of
your command depart from Okayama on the journey back to
India, we wish to express to you, and through you to all ranks, our
deep appreciation for the splendid co-operation this command has
received from 268 Indian Infantry Brigade Group.

* The entire period of our relationship has been singularly
marked by a complete absence of differences of opinion, by mutual
trust and assistance, and by superlatively cordial and harmontous
professional and social dealings. |

** Our military government duties have been made easier and
pleasanter by the understanding of our problems in relation to the
Japanese people that has been displayed by you and your staff.
Our surroundings have been made much more home-like by the
interest shown in improving our military and personnel quarters.
Our social lives have been expanded by the whole hearted welcome
we have received in the Okayama Officers’ Club and in the several
Indian messes, and our understanding of India, it’s customs, people
and ideals increased far above the average by the friendships we
have made among your people.

164 POST-WAR OCCUPATION FORCES: JAPAN— 1945-47

* You have been personally most gracious in your dealings
with the American contingent in Okayama. We will recall in
later years with great pleasure, our acquaintance with you and your
family. It is a distinct pleasure to serve with senior officers who

53 19

are as completely harmonious as you have been”.

Departure of Brigadier S. M. Shrinagesh

On 17 August 1947, orders were received for Brigadier
Shrinagesh to proceed to Australia as the Indian representative on
Japanese Peace Conference to be held in Canberra. The orders
were very sudden as they were received so soon after the Indepen-
dence Day celebrations. In view of the fact that the withdrawal
of the Indian Contingent was speeded up, it was arranged for him
to return to India direct after completion of his task in Australia.

On the departure of Brigadier S. M. Shrinagesh the command
devolved on Lieutenant-Colonel J. A. C. d'Apice, O.B.E., of 5/1
Punjab Regiment. It was decided that the Main Headquarters
of 268 Indian Infantry Brigade Group would close at Okayama,
at 0001 hours on 25 August 1947 and Lieutenant-Colonel D. A.
Surve, Commander 5/1 Mahrattas would take over the command
of 268 Brigade Group Rear Headquarters.

On his departure from Japan on the midnight of 18 August
1947, Brigadier S. M. Shrinagesh sent the following message to all
ranks—

** On my departure from Japan, I want you to know that

I have appreciated deeply your very loyal support, co-

operation and hard work. As a result of our team work,

we һауе:-

(a) represented worthily the British Commonwealth in the
eyes of her Allies,

(b) consolidated and enlarged, during our time of duty in
Japan, the fellowship and unity of effort which were
forged in war.

I am convinced that the effect of the Indian Occupation
on the Japanese people will prove beneficial to both the
Dominions of India and Pakistan.

I wish most sincerely all members of 268 Indian Infantry
Brigade Group all good wishes in the future, wherever they
may Бе”,

The sudden departure of the very popular Commander

was a great shock to all concerned who only learnt of his departure

*3 DO from Licutenant-Colonel Karl. L. Springer, Commanding Allied Military
prd team Okayama to Brigadier S. M. Shrinagesh, Commander 268 Brigade

WITHDRAWAL OF THE INDIAN CONTINGENT FROM JAPAN 165

the next morning. But the news had trickled through and
hundreds of Japanese and a large number of troops came to wish
him *' Bon Voyage” at the Okayama Railway Station.

Departure of 268 Brigade Headquarters

Units, one after the other began to leave Japan. Тһе main
body of Brigade Headquarters with all the families and 5/1 Punjab
left in the second Phase. The remaining personnel were cleared in
НТ Тата and Dilwara on 25 October 1947. On that occasion
Commander-in-Chief British Commonwealth Occupation Force,
Lieut.-General H. C. H. Robertson sent the following signal to
Lieutenant-Colonel Rajendra Singh. “ On the eve of your depar-
ture from Japan I wish to express to you and to all ranks under
your command my deepest regret that the time has at last come to
say farewell. It has been a great privilege to have had you under
my command and I wish you all the safe voyage, happy home
coming and all good fortune in the future ”,16

In reply Lieutenant-Colonel Rajendra Singh, sent the
following message:

** On behalf of myself and all ranks Indian Contingent I
thank you for your kind farewell message. During our time
of duty in Japan we worked together with forces of other
Dominions and United States of Ámerica; the ties of com-
radeship born out of this association, I am sure, will endure
for ever. We have gained valuable experience, we had the
best of time with British Commonwealth Occupation Force
and thank you and your staff for all they did for us. We
are proud of having served under you’”’.’”

As the ships carrying these Indian stalwarts sailed down the
Inland Sea, the memory of their stay in Japan must have reminded
them of the hectic and trying days, pleasant and cheerful time, dull
and boring periods, but none regretted his stay in Japan.

As Dilwara carrying the last Indian soldier left Kure a loud

roar arose:
* GOODBYE "—* SOYA—NARA "—'* GOOD LUCK ".

16 British Coramonwealth Occupation Forces Signal 20505 dated 24 October 47.
17 Rear 268 Brigade Group Signal Q S 140 dated 27 October 47.

“BOUNDARY INTERNATIONAL .........— -—-—

RAILWAYS ННН
HUADSR = с=с со зу сг

ИРЕНЕ о eee
HILLS ARAM be ts.
ААРААН санат те ле УНА АЕ Hd

тез ovrt rte

CHAPTER XII

The Overall Plan

INTRODUCTION

Many months before the Japanese had actually surrendered,
Lord Mountbatten had ordered the preparation of plans for
liberating the territories in their occupation in South-East Asia.
This work was taken up by the Joint Planning Staff, whose appre-
ciation was that for obtaining immediate control of the territories
under Japanese occupation, it would be necessary to use their
chain of command till such time as direct control over these arcas
had been established by the Allied troops. It was therefore of
the utmost importance to seize control of the Headquarters of the
Japanese Southern Army at Saigon, as quickly as possible.

The plan adopted was to send a control party with suitable
escort to take over this Headquarters for the purpose of obtaining
information and intelligence by gaining access to all Japanese files,
records and confidants, and ensuring that the terms of surrender
were carried out, and that all orders of the Supreme Commander
and his subordinate commanders were correctly transmitted to
subordinate formations of the Japanese Army. The primary duties
of the escort were to ensure the personal safety of the control party
and to disarm and take over control of Japanese troops at their
Southern Army Headquarters and in its immediate vicinity. The
escort of at least a brigade strength was to be flown to an air-field
in the Saigon area where it might be raised up to a division, at the
earliest possible moment. n

? For this purpose it was necessary to use naval ships in the
Saigon river, but in the existing situation of air and naval resources
it was difficult to provide a suitable escort early enough. However,
it was expected that the commanders of China and South-West
Pacific Area theatres might also like to send control parties to the
Headquarters of Japanese Southern Army.

PRIORITIES FOR DESPATCH OF TROOPS TO THE OCCUPIED AREAS

In addition to the seizure of the Japanese Headquarters in
Saigon, there were other regions to which troops had to be ide
liberation purposes. The following priorities were, therefore, lai
down: —

(1) Singapore and Penang (Butterworth area)

(2) Southern Army Headquarters at Saigon

170 POST-WAR OCCUPATION FORCES: SOUTH-EAST ASIA

(3) Remainder of Malaya

(4) Batavia and Sourabaya

(5) Hong Kong after its initial occupation by British Pacific

Fleet and Australian forces

(6) Remainder of South-East Asia Command (SEAC) area.

In addition there were two other tasks, viz., participation
in the occupation of Japan and the occupation of main ports
on the coast of China, other than Hong Kong, which were assigned
to the SEAC. The liberation of Andaman and Nicobar islands
which were Indian territory, was entrusted to the Commander-
in-Chief of India.

Allotment of Areas for Liberation

The areas for liberation were allotted as follows: —

(a) Twelfth Army Headquarters—Burma, Siam and

southern French Indo-China

(b) Fourteenth Army Headquarters —Singapore, Malaya,

Java and Sumatra.

It was accepted in principle that the bulk of the Twelfth
Army would be lifted by air, while the Fourteenth Army would
move by navaltransport. It was further expected that the Twelfth
Army would get assistance from the Siamese army, while the
Fourteenth Army expected the collaboration of the Dutch Civil
Affairs (NICA) staffs direct from Australia.

DISTRIBUTION OF FORCES AT THE INITIAL STAGE

Tasks Location Air Force

2 divisions with 6 squadrons
armour

1 brigade to be
raised to one
division

1 division

First priority | (a) Singapore
task

(b) Saigon 1 squadron

(c) Bangkok 2 squadrons
Second priority (a) Port Swet-
task tenham area

(b) Java-Batavia

1 squadron
2 squadrons

1 division
1 division less

1 brigade
(c) Sourabaya | 1 infantry brigade
(d) Hong Kong | 1 brigade group
(e) Northern 1 division less
Siam one brigade

1 squadron
1 squadron

THE OVERALL PLAN 171

—————————— ERN
Tasks Location

(f) Sumatra and

other off ly-
ing islands:
Padang etc. | 1 division less 1 squadron
one brigade і
Medan etc. | 1 division 1 squadron
Palembang | 1 infantry brigade | 1 squadron
etc.
(в) Kra Isthmus} 2 brigades
(Һ) Japan 2 brigade groups 2 squadrons
(1) Chinese 1 brigade group
ports

It was noted that Burma would require not less than two
divisions, while a brigade would be adequate for Andamans and
Nicobars. It was expected that in French Indo-China and
Netherlands East Indies, French and Dutch forces would be avail-
able for carrying out liberation duties.

Naval forces were available, as required, for support and
protection of operations, for mine-sweeping and other escort
duties.

While the plans for the liberation of these territories were
being formulated, it was decided that the Supreme Allied Com-
mander would accept the Japanese surrender and the commands
were to be kept informed of the whole process and of all instruments
of surrender.

Concurrently with the acceptance of the surrender of Japanese
troops in Burma, it was planned that the South-East Asia Gommand
would seize strategic areas with utmost speed and subsequently
reoccupy the remaining parts of that expansive region.

To carry out the above policy the following tasks were assigned
to the commands: —

(a) disarm and concentrate all Japanese forces; :

(b) protect, succour and subsequently evacuate Allied
prisoners of war;

(c) establish and maintain law and order;

(d) introduce food and other civil supplies; .

(e) set up the appropriate civil administration in accordance
with the wishes of the people, if possible, but consistently
with the honour and dignity of the United Nations,
everywhere without exception.

172 POST-WAR OCCUPATION FORCES! SOUTH-EAST ASIA

In accordance with these general directions each Force
Commander prepared a plan to carry out his assignment. The
South-East Asia Command prepared outline plans for each area
for the guidance of the local commander. Instructions were
prepared for division, brigade and down to the lower units.

All the details of the plans for liberation had been formulated
by the time that the Japanese decided to lay down their arms.
On 20 August 1945, All India Radio established communications
with Field-Marshal Terauchi, commander of the Japanese Southern
Army at Saigon, and the Supreme Allied Commander ordered him
to send a delegation by air to Rangoon to sign a preliminary
agreement prior to a formal instrument of surrender to be signed at
Singapore.

At the same time the following troop movements were
ordered': —

(a) to fly in the 7th Indian Division from Burma to Bangkok,
to seize Don Muang air-field as a staging post and
carry out Allied tasks in Siam (including recovery of
Allied Prisoners of War and Internees (APWI);

(b) to fly in the 20th Indian Division from Burma to Saigon
via the staging post in Siam and to control the Head-
quarters of Field-Marshal Terauchi;

(c) to carry out by sea the build-up of the 7th and 20th
Indian Divisions, as soon as lift should be found and
channels and ports had been swept;

(d) to reoccupy Penang with the Royal Marines of the
East Indies Fleet; with one brigade from the 5th Indian
Division (destined for Singapore) in case of any local
resistance beyond the capacity of the Royal Marine
force ;

(e) to reoccupy Singapore Island from the sea with the
6th Indian Division as soon as a channel could be swept;

(f) to despatch the Commando Brigade to Hong Kong in
order to take over occupation duties from the British
Pacific Fleet and the Australian contingents;

(g) to carry out Operation Zipper;

(h) to despatch the 26th Indian Division to either Java or
Sumatra, as soon as channels had been swept and lift
found; and

(1) to reoccupy Lower Burma and the Andaman Islands
at a later date, when the approaches and ports of these
areas had been cleared.

! Mountbatten's Report, p. 226, para 640,

Рілте XIII

uedef’ jo 1opuoans
oy? әзе fury ou) (іе БІҢ шол) Bessou v Bupe “уус ләриишщшогу porpy ourudng fuojeqjunoJA sinorp pio oy) [eunuipy
Ча 191) UM ey IA ЗІН J Ц VAS ләү D Priv S {ROT T

Prate XIV

Lieut.-General Sir Philip Christison,
Allied Force Commander in
Netherlands East Indies

Lieut.-General E. С. Mansergh,
Allied Force Commander in
Netherlands East Indies

THÉ OVERALL PLAN 173

On 26 August 1945, Field-Marshal Terauchi’s delegates
arrived at Rangoon and signed the preliminary agreement on the
night of 27 August 1945. Operations for the recovery of APWI
began on the following day. The operations for landings of the
forces in South-East Asia began on 2 September, as soon as news
was received of the formal signature of Japan's unconditional sur-
render to General MacArthur in Tokyo. The interval was spent in
distributing stores and relief to APWI and in mine-sweeping and
buoying the channels. On 12 September, the Supreme Allied
Commander accepted the surrender of the Japanese Expeditionary
Forces of the Southern Regions in the Singapore Council Chamber,
in the presence of the representatives of the armed forces of India,

United States, Australia, China, France, Holland and Great
Britain.?

2 Mountbatten's Report, p. 229.

CHAPTER. XIII

Recovery of Allied Prisoners of
War and Internees

In the course of their conquest of South-East Asia in 1941-42
the Japanese had captured many thousands of British Common-
wealth and Allied servicemen and kept interned a large number of
civilians residing in those countries. Owing to the vastness of the
area, the speed of the Japanese advance, the unprecedented quick
capitulation of the British forces and the non-availability of records
it was not possible to make accurate documentation about the
number of prisoners or the places where they were kept. Many
units or their sub-units, which had been cut up by the Japanese
advance, had drifted to areas different from the place where they
were supposed to have surrendered. Moreover, no information was
obtained from the Intelligence sources as no underground intelli-
gence organisation had been established during the quick capitula-
tion of the Allied forces. Further, no notification was made by
the Japanese authorities about the prisoners they held, which was
required under the Geneva Convention. However, during 1944,
some information about the prisoners had trickled in from various
sources, particularly the clandestine forces operating in the
Japanese occupied territory. These scraps of information made it
possible to reconstruct a picture of the distribution of prisoners
between areas and camps and the following figures were assembled
according to the distribtion, countrywise, of the prisoners of war: — _

!
Country Prisoners | Internees | Total
Burma Е „| 1,100 102 | 1,209
Siam ... € ie 28,639 171 28,810
Singapore Island ... — 13,000 3,334 16,334
Malaya 14+ -— 3,940 "S 3,940
French Indo-China - 6,150 ` 85 6,185
Sumatra e ..| 7,700 1,700 9,400
Java ... wwe жже 27,000 28,840 55,840

87,529 | 34,182 | 121,711

These men were distributed over various camps of which
227 were then known to exist. These figures became the basis
for the planning of evacuation of the prisoners of war.

RECOVERY OF ALLIED PRISONERS OF WAR AND INTERNEES 175
PLANNING AND ORGANISATION

In the month of February 1945, the War Office, London
issued an instruction directing plans to be prepared for the recove ;
and evacuation of the Allied Prisoners of War and Internees The
Supreme Allied Gommander assigned this duty to the Commander-
in-Ghief, Allied Land Forces South-East Asia (ALFSEA). The
sudden surrender of the Japanese demanded quick evacuation of
nearly 100,000 men, who were scattered all over South-East Asia.
| A new organisation was therefore set up to deal with this
immense problem. On 18 August 1945, a special section of the
Adjutant General's Branch of the Headquarters ALFSEA, com-
prising 16 officers, was set up under the Director of Organisation to
deal with it. 'The principal subjects to be dealt with by this.
organisation included : —

(a) plans and operations in connection with repatriation of

Recovered Allied Prisoners of War and Internees

(RAPWT;
(b) RAPWI intelligence and dissemination of informa-
tion;

(c) RAPWI stores;

(d) statistics,

This organisation incorporated the Searcher Clearing House
which undertook the responsibility for the collection and distribution
of nominal rolls of all prisoners of war and internees.

However, it was soon realised that for rapidity of execution
of the plans, a greater degree of co-ordination would be required
between the three services and the various Commonwealth and
Allied Missions and Governments. Hence a ‘ RAPWI Co-ordina-
ting Committee’, with representatives of the three services and. of
some Allied Missions, was set up at the Headquarters SACSEA,
on 22 August 1945, under the Principal Administrative Officer.
This committee acted as a clearing house for information and gave
decisions on policy, priorities and allocation of responsibility.
Decisions on day to day problems, which were numerous, were also
made by this committee, which became the nerve-centre of the
whole RAPWI organisation. .

In addition to the establishment of this high level organisa-
tion, the Headquarters SACSEA, in conjunction with the
Commander-in-Chief, prepared a plan outlining the mode of
operation. This was divided into the following four phases: — |

(a) establishment at the earliest possible moment of initial

contact and communication with the prisoner of war
camps throughout the SEAC, and the immediate provi-

' 176 POST-WAR OCCUPATION FORGES: SOUTH-EAST ASIA

sion of medical attention and urgently required supplies
there ;

(b) the delivery to camps of bulk-supplies of food, medicine,

clothing and other requirements;

(c) the documentation and movement of prisoners of war to

the centres of evacuation; and

(d) the final evacuation of the Allied Prisoners of War and

Internees outside the SEAC.

An immediate need was to prepare and position the contact
teams, medical stores, clothing and food adequate to meet the
requirements. This was made the responsibility of General Head-
quarters, India. Many of the requirements were special items, not
normally carried in the field and had to be specially packed in India
for the purpose. The lack of definite information as to the numbers
of RAPWI in each area made the task rather difficult.

Although the japanese intention to surrender had become
definitely known on 15 August 1945, RAPWI operations were not
started immediately, because, firstly, the reaction of the Japanese
in the SEAC to the surrender was not definitely known, and, as
such, there was the likelihood of undertaking an assault operation
for the reoccupation of Malaya; and, secondly, General MacArthur
had definitely laid down that no occupational forces were to land
in the SEAC until the unconditional surrender had been signed.’

INITIAL OPERATIONS TO CONTACT AND SUCCOUR RAPWI

At the outset it was necessary to gain contact with the many
RAPWI camps. However, before any such action was initiated,
it was essential to drop warning, instructional or informative leaflets
in the camps for the guidance respectively of Japanese guards,
prisoners of war and the civil population in major towns. But the
task of preparing and dropping different types of leaflets was not
an easy one. The difficulty was heightened by the number of
languages involved and by the fact that only two printing presses
were equipped with Japanese type, and these were located only in
Calcutta and Colombo.

These preparatory operations were given the code-name
* Birdcage ’ which started on 28 August and were completed in
three days.

After the leaflet operation, the next task was to ascertain the
number and condition of the prisoners in each camp and to тесі

1 The surrender was signed on 2 September, 1945.

This ruling was subsequently modified to allow all the contact teams to be
parachuted into camps before that date. -

RECOVERY OF ALLIED PRISONERS OF WAR AND INTERNEES 177

their urgent requirements, It was essential that medical aid,
comforts, food, clothing and, where necessary, RAPWI control
Staffs, and other preliminary needs were provided in the camps,
as early as possible. The known 227 prison camps were widely
scattered throughout the whole of South-East Asia. If normal
ground resources were employed it would have taken considerable
time, hence air resources had to be used to the maximum extent to
contact camps not within the immediate range of the ground forces.
Operation Mastiff covered the initial phase until control and
administration of RAPWI by land and sea became practicable.

The following resources were available for this initial

operation: —

(a) Personnel : There were in the SEAC two clandestine forces
(Force 136 and * E? Group) whose organisation, training
and equipment made them particularly suitable for the
task of establishing contacts. Many men of these forces
had operated, or were then operating, in the Japanese
occupied territory, and were familiar with local condi-
tions, іп the various territories. Some, notably in ʻE?’
Group, had been in contact with the prisoners of war in
Japanese hands for some time. Hence, till such time
as the ground forces might establish contact, the services
of *E' Group and Force 136 were utilised to render
succour to RAPWI. Forty contact teams were formed
from these forces, and from the 44th Indian Air-borne
Division, of which thirty were parachute teams. These
teams comprised one officer and one non-commissioned
officer as Control Staff; one medical officer and a
medical orderly with medical stores, special foods and
comforts,

(b) Aircraft: Owing to the distances involved the long-range
aircraft had to be employed. The following forces were
available: —

9 RAF Liberator Squadrons
4 RAF Sunderland Squadrons
1 RAF Dakota Squadron

1 RAF Liberator Squadron.

(c) Stores: Various types of stores were made available from
the army, Red Cross, Force 136 and ‘E’ Group resources.

CONTROL ORGANISATION

To achieve the purpose in view and execute the various
operations, a control organisation was evolved, and orders for
setting it up were issued on 17 August 1945:

178 POST-WAR OCCUPATION FORGES: SOUTH-EAST ASIA

(a) Main Control: Thiswaslocated at Headquarters ЅАСЅЕА.
It consisted of staff officers of Headquarters SACSEA,
ALFSEA, Force 136, ‘E’ Group and ACSEA, Its
functions were:

(1) to receive, collate and disseminate information;
(ii) to allot priorities for the flying in or parachuting of
personnel, stores etc.; and
(iii) to arrange the bulk provisioning and positioning of
stores at the air-fields.

(b) Sub-controls: These were located at Calcutta for French
Indo-China, and at Rangoon for Siam, and acted, in
the same manner as the Main Control, at the local
air-fields. These sub-controls consisted of representatives
of ALFSEA, Force 136 and ‘ E "Group.

Later a sub-control was also established at Singapore
to co-ordinate supply-dropping operations in Java and
Sumatra from the Cocos Islands.

(c) Despatch Organisation: 'This was located at Colombo and
consisted of an ALFSEA representative and the existing
organisation of Force 136 and * E ° Group. Its function
was to work out flight plans and to pack and position
containers for dropping.

The provision of personnel and stores by ALFSEA and their
positioning at appropriate air-fields by ACSEA was well in hand
before operations commenced on 28 August 1945.

The control system described above came into operation on
22 August 1945. On 28 August, the Supreme Allied Commander
authorised operation Mastiff to begin. Pamphlet dropping on
camps was started at once and was completed by 31 August 1945.

CONTACTING THE RAPWI CAMPS

Meanwhile clandestine contact teams in Siam had gained
contact with the local Japanese authorities. With the arrival of
further teams and Japanese co-operation the situation was well
under control.

No. 5 RAPWI Control Staff arrived with the leading elements
of the occupying troops. In French Indo-China it was not until
5 September that control of RAPWI by clandestine forces became
effective, because five out of the eight parachute teams were un-
fortunately interned on landing.

No. 3 RAPWT Control Staff arrived at Saigon with the
SACSEA Control Commission on 6 September 1945. In Malaya
clandestine forces commenced gaining contact on receipt of orders

RECOVERY OF ALLIED PRISONERS OF WAR AND INTERNEES 179

on 30 August 1945. RAPWI Control Staff disembarked at Singa-
pore on 5 September and at Port Swettenham on 9 Septemb
1945, and took over from the clandestine forces. ш T

From the beginning of September, teams and stores were
dropped regularly, an average of thirteen sorties a day being flown
The actual situation in Java and Sumatra became known by mid.
September and operations commenced from Singapore. Some
assistance was obtained from the Australians (operating from
Darwin) and a little from the Dutch (operating from Balik
Papan), and the activities of Mastiff were extended to Java.

It may be emphasised that it was not until 15 August that
responsibility for Java was transferred from SCAP to SACSEA;
and this sudden and heavy increase in commitment introduced a
new problem in the production, positioning and carrying in of
large quantities of additional stores. By the end of September
the arrival of occupying forces had reduced the commitments for
which this operation was planned and the controls began to close
down except the one at Singapore, which continued to function
under the control of advanced echelon, RAPWI, HQ ALFSEA,
until November, dealing with RAPWI in Java and Sumatra.

GARE OF RAPWI PRIOR TO EVACUATION

Operation Mastiff covered the movement by air of
medical staff, RAPWI control staffs and urgently needed supplies
of all natures to the prisoners of war and internment camps. Once
RAPWI control staffs were established and supply by air to camps
ceased to be essential, operation Mastiff was completed. There-
after RAPWI were to be administered by the control staffs directly.

Immediately the Japanese capitulation became known,
Headquarters ALFSEA raised more RAPWI control staffs to
accompany the Allied forces going into Siam, French Indo-China,
Hong Kong and Java and provided additional officials for the staff
of the Twelfth Army at Rangoon. No Allied force was at that
time detailed to occupy Sumatra. Hence No. 1 RAPWI control
staff accompanying the Allied force occupying Malaya was ear-
marked, after completing its task in Malaya, for diversion to
accompany such forces as might be sent to liberate Sumatra. By
early September the six control staffs had been established in
Malaya, Singapore, Bangkok, Siam, Hong Kong and Batavia.
The flow of RAPWI from Siam and French Indo-China was
handled by the RAPWI staff with the Twelfth Army at Rangoon.

The situation in Singapore demanded a different treatment.
There were 35,000 RAPWI as against the carlier report of 16,000.
It was also the focal point for evacuation of all RAPWI from the

180 POST-WAR OCCUPATION FORCES: SOUTH-EAST ASIA

Netherlands East Indies, Borneo, Hong Kong and even the
Australian areas in New Guinea, as far as the British and Indian
RAPWTI were concerned. As the staff attached to the formations
sent to Malaya was inadequate to handle this large number of
RAPWI, the ALFSEA established an Advanced Headquarters
RAPWI under the Director of Organisation. This formation
utilised the APWI themselves and local civilians, and formed
them into an organisation which controlled the RAPWI operations
in Singapore, the Netherlands East Indies and Borneo, and assisted
the Hong Kong and the Australian RAPWI coming by air from
Siam and French Indo-China.

The Advanced Headquarters obtained representatives from
the Royal Navy and Royal Air Force, and set up a staff which
represented various branches and services. It defined policy,
seeking guidance from the Headquarters SACSEA, through the
Headquarters ALFSEA, when necesary. It organised the entire
feeding, clothing, transport, embarkation and evacuation of RAPWI
in Singapore and of those coming into that place. It co-ordinated
all RAPWI air operations and set up an Air Maintenance Organisa-
tion for the air supply of RAPWI in Java and Sumatra. Its
Medical Section was responsible for the entire hospital arrange-
ments in Singapore and directed and supervised those in Java and
Sumatra.

The problem of Sumatra was, however, peculiar. No
occupying force was included in the initial contingent entering
Malaya. The Japanese were in complete control there, and all
Dutch subjects were in the prisoners of war or internment camps.
It was observed from air reconnaissance that there were nearly
21,000 RAPWI scattered in camps throughout the country and
living in a wretched condition of existence. A party from the
Advanced Headquarters RAPWI ALFSEA, therefore, flew to
Medan and collected together a few Dutch officers and civilians of
standing from the RAPWI camps. А meeting was then held, and
plans were suggested to the Dutch for the evacuation of all sick
prisoners of war to Singapore, and for the settlement of the Dutch
in the towns of Medan, Padang and Palembang. This was grate-
fully accepted by the Dutch authorities.

Internal communications in Sumatra were completely non-
existent. The whole operation therefore had of necessity to be
directed from Singapore, and communications were made by
wireless to the clandestine personnel in Sumatra who had a few
receiving sets with them, and messages were also sent by the daily

supply aircraft which carried in food and clothing and brought out
RAPWI to Singapore.

RECOVERY OF ALLIED PRISONERS OF WAR AND INTERNEES 18] `

There was at that time little political trouble in Sumatra
and the resettlement of all RAPWI in the country into reasonably
comfortable conditions in the towns was virtually completed when
the first occupying forces arrived.

It had been estimated, prior to the Japanese surrender, that
88,530 prisoners of war and 34,170 civil internees, all of whom were
in camps, would be recovered, making a total of 122,700. At
that time the subsequent trend of events in the Netherlands East
Indies, which was not then part of SEAC, could not be foreseen.
Later their numbers considerably increased and many of them were
not strictly RAPWI in the sense that they were not prisoners of
war or had been interned, but in fact they were only refugees.

The statement of prisoners and internees recovered in SEAC
shows a total respectively of 80,419and 16,156, making a grand total
of 96,575, but this does not include some 110,000 Dutch and
Indonesian civilians recovered from Java and Sumatra and for
whose well-being also the Supreme Allied Commander ultimately
became responsible. Nor doesit include 245,000 displaced persons
of Asiatic origin.

The problems which faced the control staffs were many
and varied in each area. The principal ones may be outlined
below:

(a) The number of different nationalities involved, with
their different languages, customs and needs—nationals
of seventeen different countries were evacuated from
Singapore alone.

(b) The number of civil internees permitted to defer their
repatriation for various reasons—until they could be
disposed of they remained a RAPWI commitment.

(c) The problem of accommodation and provision of staffs
for RAPWI camps—although ultimately it was the
responsibility of the Force Commander, the whole task
fell to the RAPWI control staffs.

(d) Documentation and distribution of nominal rolls in
accordance with the movements of RAPWI.

(e) The medical treatment of sick RAPWI.

(f) The speed with which RAPWI were being evacuated
and the carrying out of certain administrative functions
with small staffs.

MOVEMENT OF RAPWI

At the time of Japanese surrender there were in the Indian
Ocean approximately fifty-two personnel ships with a trooping

, 182 POST-WAR OCCUPATION FORCES: SOUTH-EAST ASIA

capacity of 95,000 and also six hospital-ships with a carrying
capacity of 3,050. This shipping had been assembled in the ports
of India and Burma for the purpose of assault on Malaya; and the
movement and sea transport authorities were thus able to make a
very early start in transferring the recovered prisoners of war to
their ultimate destinations. In addition to the Red Ensign shipping
available, every advantage was taken of White Ensign lift which
was immediately offered by the Commander-in-Chief of the British
Pacific Fleet and East Indies Fleet. The Royal Navy rendered all
assistance in the movement of RAPWI and converted even some
aircraft carriers to remedy shipping difficulty, for these vessels
with their large capacity and speed made a very considerable
addition to the shipping lift otherwise available.

Movement of the recovered prisoners of war involved two
definite stages, one from the camps to collecting centres or hospitals
within SEAG and India, and the other their evacuation from
collecting centres to the ultimate destinations within or outside
the SEAC. Both these operations had their peculiar administra-
tive aspects. In addition there was the problem of evacuation
from Netherlands East Indies to Singapore.

The principal collecting centres within the SEAC were
Rangoon, Singapore and Hong Kong. The majority of the
prisoners recovered in French Indo-China and Siam were moved
to Rangoon, with the exception of Australians, who as far as
possible were concentrated in Singapore. Those found in Nether-
lands East Indies and Malaya were concentrated in Singapore,
except for those who were evacuated by Zipper shipping from
Port Swettenham, Port Dickson and Penang. Others recovered
from the territories controlled by the Commander-in-Chief, British
Pacific Fleet or South-West Pacific Area were normally concen-
trated in Hong Kong.

These men were moved to collecting centres by all means of
transportation available except that the movement to Rangoon
from Frerch Indo-China and Siam was exclusively by air.

The plan had to provide for a double process, maximum
evacuation of RAPWI and simultaneous movement of the British
occupying forces into the countries liberated within the SEAC.
The latter task, although of lower priority than the former involved
the transportation of a vast number of men and their equipment
to the various countries to be occupied. Bearing in mind that the
maximum personnel shipping had already been allocated to the
theatre for many weeks, it was essential to prepare very carefully
the plans to ensure the utmost economy in both White or Red
Ensign personnel shipping.

RECOVERY OF ALLIED PRISONERS OF WAR AND INTERNEES 183

Several plans were worked out and eventually a finally
agreed detailed plan was produced by SACSEA which had the
agreement of the movement and shipping authorities in Lond
India and Australia and also that of Com i dre

i mander-in-Chief, British
Pacific Fleet.
| Once the overall plan had been agreed to, the broad alloca-
tion of shipping was relatively a simple affair and was done in the
following manner: —

(a) Certain ships were allocated for repatriating to the
United Kingdom, from Rangoon and Singapore; and
subsequent to their leaving Colombo these were lost to
the SEAC pool.

(b) Certain ships were allocated for the repatriation of
Australians from Singapore to Australia and on their
return voyage were utilised to repatriate Indian prisoners
of war from the South Pacific to India or to assist the
Commander-in-Chief, British Pacific Fleet in moving
personnel from the areas under his control,

(c) The remainder of the personnel shipping lift was occu-
pied in building up the occupation force in Malaya,
and on their return journey to take Indian prisoners of
war back to India.

(d) Allsick RAPWI, other than Australians, were evacuated
to India apart from a small proportion who were moved
to Ceylon by air. These were carried by Sunderland
Squadrons which had carried Red Cross parcels to
Singapore. Australian sick were evacuated direct to
Australia or staged through Labuan. To assist such
movement the Australian authorities had provided some
hospital-ships.

From the information available from medical sources, it
was obvious that the condition of many RAPWI prevented them
from being embarked at full trooping capacity. Ships were
therefore carefully classified as to accommodation, and allocation of
capacity was made as follows:—

Cabins — .. 100 per cent of normal
Standees ... ... — 70 per cent of normal
Troopdeck ... .. 50 to 60 per cent of normal.

This schedule was communicated to embarkation ports to
operate as a guide. The medical authorities at these ports were
allowed discretion as to the actual numbers which might be
embarked, and that depended on the condition of recovered
prisoners as also the number of women and children among the

infernees.

184 POST-WAR OCCUPATION FORCES: SOUTH-EAST ASIA

Reception centres had to be staffed and equipped. This
involved a movement of administrative and medical units, with
supplies of equipment to reception centres, before full-scale con-
centration of the prisoners and internees was undertaken.

All ships had to be victualled with special food. Additional
staff including medical and nursing personnel, and welfare workers
had to be provided; ships had to be equipped with blankets,
clothing, knives, forks, spoons and many other items because
the recovered prisoners, unlike the normal soldier, had not been
provided with these at the time of their recovery. There was
variation in items provided depending on whether the ship was
allocated to carry British or Indian prisoners of war.

The various authorities at the ports on the route were kept
informed of the overall plan as it developed. They were thus in
a position to handle ships expeditiously as these passed through.
The principal ports affected were Colombo and those of the Middle
East where ships were watered, refuelled, or took on special
supplies; as, for example, in the Middle East where the recovered
prisoners were equipped with warm clothing prior to their entering
the European waters.

From the two ports of embarkation, under the organisation
outlined above, a considerable number of repatriated persons were
sent to India or the United Kingdom. The figures are given
below: —

(a) Rangoon: Repatriated Allied Prisoners and Internees
began to arrive from Siam and French Indo-China by
air on 26 August 1945, and by 30 September 9,700 had
left for the United Kingdom by sea. During this period
1,600 had sailed for India including 750 invalids; and
157 had been moved to India (including those for on-
ward passage to the United Kingdom) by air. In all
19,543 were brought into the Rangoon area by air.

(b) Singapore: The first troops entered on 5 September 1945.
The first RAPWI vessel sailed for India on 10 September,
for the United Kingdom on 11 September, and for
Australia on 15 September 1945. By 30 September
1945, 33,000 prisoners and internees had been evacuated
by sea (8,000 to United Kingdom, 7,000 to Australia,
and 18,000 to India). Air evacuations during this
period were 526 to Australia and New Zealand and
723 to India and Ceylon. By 30 September 1945, in
all nearly 54,000 prisoners had been evacuated out of
the SEAC from these two stations—Rangoon and
Singapore, of which 2,216 were moved by air. By the

RECOVERY OF ALLIED PRISONERS OF WAR AND INTERNEES 185

end of October 1945, the figure had risen to 71,000.
Thereafter the process became slow depending en the
availability of RAPWI after their release from the
hospitals. Many had deferred repatriation.

RED CROSS ORGANISATION

The Red Cross also collaborated in the schemes of repatria-
tion. Its activities were directed throughout the Command by
the Red Cross Co-ordinating Committee at the Headquarters of
the SACSEA. This committee, which was formed in May 1945,
consisted of the Director Medical Services HQ SACSEA as Chair-
man, assisted by members of the Red Cross organisations of Great
Britain, Australia, India, Burma, France and the Netherlands.

The principal functions of the committee were to co-ordinate
the requirements of Red Cross aid throughout the Command and
the allocation of the available resources to meet a constantly
changing situation. Necessary resources for implementing the
policy outlined by the Co-ordinating Committee were under the
general control of the Gommander-in-Chief ALFSEA. АП execu-
tive action was undertaken by the Red Cross representative at that
Headquarters, who worked under the DMS there.

Red Cross aid to the prisoners of war and internees included :—

(a) the affording of moral and material assistance at the

earliest practical moment to the camps and hospitals
where these people were located;

(b) the location of reception parties at overseas ports to

assist RAPWI before and during embarkation;

(c) the provision of assistance in hospital-ships and trans-

ports during the voyage;

(d) the distribution of enquiry messages from their relatives

: in the United Kingdom and other countries which were
sent out under Red Cross auspices.

From the very beginning it was evident that this plan would
strain the existing resources of the Red Cross to the full, and would
involve augmentation, particularly in the matter of personnel.
This was achieved by organising teams of Red Cross workers in
the localities where prisoners were recovered and a suitable leader
for each team was appointed, regardless of the community to which
he or other members of his team belonged. "These teams visited
camps and hospitals regularly, and distributed comforts including
food and cigarettes. Similarly teams were formed at the ports
used for purposes of evacuation. These teams provided reception
parties who served tea and administered comforts at the docks or

186 POST-WAR OCCUPATION FORCES: SOUTH-EAST ASIA

at the air-ficlds. The teams also received Red Cross stores at ports
and distributed them to the varióus parties working at the camps,
hospitals and in the reception organisation. І

Red Cross personnel met each hospital-ship and workers
accompanied every transport on its way to the United Kingdom
or Australia. In addition, all the ships arriving at Colombo and
at the Indian ports were met by Red Cross parties. RAPWI
hospitals in India were visited regularly by Red Cross personnel
who distributed comforts. In the early stages a large number of
gift parcels were delivered to the camps by the Royal Air Force,
whilst more parcels were provided at Singapore and Colombo
for such of the prisoners as had not formerly received them.

Lady Louis Mountbatten (Chief Superintendent, Nursing
Division, Joint War Organisation St. John's Ambulance Brigade)
toured all the recovering areas immediately after RAPWI Control
Staffs had been set up and visited thc prisoners in the camps and
hospitals. She also assisted local Red Cross workers in obtaining
their requirements by the most expeditious means and did much to
improve the morale of RAPWI.

Enquiry bureaux were formed in Singapore and Rangoon to
answer enquiries received from the United Kingdom and other
countries.

In all, between August and November 1945, 294 Red Cross
workers were in action in the areas outside India. Another 361
of them were employed in India in connection with RAPWI
hospitals, the Red Cross depots, port parties and the searcher
organisation.

A total of 1,200 tons of Red Cross stores to the value of
£300,000 was despatched from India. Additional 5,000 tons, of
the value of 4,800,000 were provided by the Australian Red Cross.
The gift parcels issued totalled 120,000.

THE INDIAN PRISONERS OF WAR RECOVERY MISSION

The ALFSEA directive on the ** Treatment and Evacuation
of Recovered Allied Prisoners of War and Civil Internees" had
been drawn up in consultation with the General Headquarters,
India. When the war suddenly ended, the Viceroy and the
Commander-in-Chief in India decided that it would be desirable
to send an Indian Army Mission to advise and help the ALFSEA
RAPWI Control Staffs, for it was presumed that many of these
would have little experience of Indian troops. The proposal was
agreed to by the SACSEA and the ALFSEA. A similar mission
was sent to the American Zone while one.had been established at

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RECOVERY OF ALLIED PRISONERS OF WAR AND INTERNEES 187

Brisbane, and was dealing with the Indian prisoners of war
recovered by the Australians in New Guinea.

The object, as defined in the directive issued to the Mission
was to give advice and every possible assistance to the ALFSEA
RAPWI Control Staff in the recovery and disposal of prisoners
of war of the Royal Indian Navy (if any), Indian Army, Royal
Indian Air Froce (if any), and of the Indian personnel! of the
Burma Army and Hong Kong—Singapore Royal Artillery
as also Indian merchant seamen, who all had the status
of prisoners of war, and Indian civilian internees. Their
co-operation was, in particular, to extend to the following
operations:—

(a) collection;

(b) sorting of JIFs (members of Indian National Army)

from the other prisoners of war;

(c) sorting of the latter by Regiment/Corps;

(d) documentation, pay and fitting out with clothing;

(e) despatching these to India:—

(i) in the best conditions possible as to travel;
(ii) well-primed as to conditions to be expected in
India;

(iii) rehabilitated both mentally and physically to the
utmost extent that circumstances and time available
permitted and instilled with the idea that they were
still soldiers.

Perhaps the most important of the Mission's duties was
personal contact and by that means to show to the recovered
prisoners of war that they had not been forgotten and that the
government wanted to help them in every way possible; to tell
them that their regiments and relations were eagerly awaiting
their return; to explain to them the changes in pay that had taken
place in their absence, and how their pay had been accumulating
for them, details of which they would receive on arrival at their
depots; and to explain the political and economic situation (in-
cluding such matters as food and cloth rationing) that they must
be prepared for on their arrival in India.

The Mission worked with, but under the command of, the
Headquarters ALFSEA, or of any subordinate ALFSEA formation
with which it, or any part of it, happened to be located. It
consisted of a commander, with the rank of brigadier, two deputy
commanders as colonels and a staff captain, with small staff, and
two contact teams (later four), each consisting of one lieut-colonel,
two majors, two captains, eight VCOs, and a number of clerks,
drivers, batmen and followers.

138 POST-WAR OCCUPATION FORCES: SOUTH-EAST ASIA

The commander and his two deputies arrived at Rangoon
by air on 29 August 1945, when Operation Mastiff had begun,
and the first batch of recovered prisoners of war was already
arriving from Bangkok. Tactical Headquarters of the British
Forces in Siam and in South French Indo-China, and the RAPWI
Control Staffs, were about to fly in. One of the deputies was left,
therefore, at Rangoon as the Mission’s representative in Siam and
South French Indo-China and for liaison with the Headquarters
Twelfth Army at Rangoon.

A signal was also sent to the General Headquarters India for
a third and fourth contact team, for Siam and French Indo-China
respectively, The commander and the other deputy sailed by the
second convoy to Singapore arriving on 7 September. There the
Mission Headquarters was established with No. 2 RAPWI Control
Staff (and Advanced Headquarters ALFSEA RAPWI when it
was formed), at Goodwood Park Hotel, the deputy being respon-
sible, pending the arrival of 1 and 2 Contact Teams, for Singa-
pore, Malaya, Sumatra and Java.

1 and 2 Contact Teams were held up at Madras through
lack of shipping space and eventually landed at Port Swettenham
on 20 September. Their transport did not arrive until 20 October.
The commanders of 3 and 4 Contact Teams, with nearly half of
their officers, arrived by air at Bangkok and Saigon, respectively,
on 23 September. The remainder of their personnel arrived at
Rangoon early in October. But their transport never reached
them.

The number of Indian Army RAPWI in South French
Indo-China was small (107) and by the time No. 4 Contact Team
arrived at Saigon, all had been evacuated.

The problem of the Indian National Army in South French
Indo-China also was not a major one, and was well under control
of the British Mission. No. 4 Contact Team was therefore brought
into reserve, first at Rangoon, and later at Singapore whence it
was sent eventually to deal with the Indian RAPWI at Rabaul
and Morotai and in Borneo.

In Siam, also, the number of Indian prisoners of war was
comparatively small (760) but there were over 300 British officers
ofthe Indian Army. These officers and men were soon evacuated
to Rangoon. Commander ALFSIAM put the Mission’s re-
presentative in complete charge of the Indian National Army
personnel in Bangkok, numbering about 2,000. The work com-
bined with liaison on behalf of the Mission with Headquarters
Twelfth Army in Rangoon and with the British troops in South
French Indo-China, kept him fully occupied until he handed over

RECOVERY OF ALLIED PRISONERS OF WAR AND INTERNEES 189

the INA men to the 89 Indian Infantry Brigade (of the
di Indian Division) in November 1945, and returned to
India.

No. 3 Gontact Team arranged, with the local Headquarters,
for the administration, accommodation, interrogation (by CSDIC),
and eventual despatch to Rangoon, of the prisoners of war (distinct
from the INA) and stragglers, as they came in. Searcher parties
were sent out to comb Siam for more stragglers, who brought in
a considerable number of them.

Records of those already evacuated were collected and
despatched to the General Headquarters India. Assistance was
given to the British Mission in Siam in reconnoitring and organising
camps for displaced coolie labour that had been working under
the Japanese on the Siam—Burma Railway. No. 3 Contact Team
completed its work and returned to India towards the end of
November 1945.

For evacuation from Singapore, Sumatra and Java, the
commander with one of his deputies, as the sole representative of
the Mission, arrived at Singapore on 7 September. Arrangements
had already been made for the evacuation of RAPWI to India
from 9 September 1945 onwards. British officers of the Indian
army had been separated from their men during their captivity
and had just rejoined them in the Indian camps. All the detailed
work involved in running these camps, such as the issue of food,
clothing, pay etc., and all the work of selecting and preparing men
for evacuation, and making out their embarkation rolls, had-to be
done initially by these officers and the prisoners of war themselves.
Gradually the work was taken over by the officers of the XV Corps
and by locally employed clerks. If arrangements could have been
made for 1 and 2 Contact Teams to arrive at the same time as the
commander of the Mission, their assistance would have been in-
valuable during this rush period.

Besides the above activities the Mission’s representatives
had personal contact with the recovered prisoners of war and
assisted in separating their own prisoners of war from the INA
men. The latter were already living in separate camps at Bidadari
Road, but, on the capitulation, the Japanese had mixed up the
** Changi Guard ” with the prisoners of war. But these could not
be allowed to get back to India along with the others. A plan
for their separation was worked out with the Headquarters XV
Corps. The deputy commander of the Mission continued to work
with the Headquarters ALFSEA, Fourteenth Army, XV and
XXXIV Corps on matters relating to the Indian National Army,
until he returned to India in November 1945.

190 POST-WAR OCCUPATION FORCES: SOUTH-EAST ASIA

The rush period of evacuation from Singapore to India ended
about 20 September, and the chief task of the detachment of the
Mission in Singapore then came to be the accommodation, ad-
ministration, and despatch (after interrogation) of Indian prisoners
of war passing through Singapore from other areas such as
Sumatra, Java, Sumbawa, etc.

A staging camp was established at Buller Camp and
administered by the contact team which had arrived just in time
to take over this work.

Liaison parties went by air to contact RAPWI control staffs
throughout Sumatra and Java, and to confirm that no Indian
prisoners of war remained in those islands.

Turning to Malaya, the personal contact between the Mission
and the Indian RAPWI camps in Kuala Lumpur and Port Dickson
was established by the middle of September. When 1 and 2
Contact Teams arrived on 20 September, the former remained at
Kuala Lumpur and the latter moved to Penang to deal with the
mainland. Searcher parties were also sent out to comb the main-
land from Alor Star and Kota Bharu in the north to the Johore
causeway in the south, and they brought back considerable numbers
with them.

Most of the later evacuations to India of small parties of
stragglers, including a few Indian prisoners of war who had
married local wives, were brought by air from Penang to Madras.
No. 1 Contact Team handed over to the Headquarters Four-
teenth Army in the middle of November 1945,

It had been intended originally that the Indian prisoners of
war from Borneo, Morotai and Rabaul areas should be evacuated
to India via Australia. The end of the war made this no longer
necessary, and HQ SACSEA became responsible for the evacuation
direct to India.

After a liaison visit by the commander of the Mission to all
the camps, and to the various Australian Headquarters concerned,
detachments (mostly from No. 4 Contact Team) were flown from
Singapore, to assist in the administration of the camps and the
evacuation of the prisoners of war, and to accompany them as
Draft Conducting Officers.

Following RAPWI including the sick, of whom there was a
large number in Rabaul, were evacuated by the end of November:

Place British Indian
Borneo (Labuan) wis Жа 5 90
Borneo (Balik Papan) .. -— -— 190
Morotai i. ee - 390

Rabaul gs Е | is 5,674

RECOVERY OF ALLIED PRISONERS OF WAR AND INTERNEES 191

The Mission closed down and left the SEAC by the end of
November 1945.

Altogether about 600 British officers of the Indian Army
and 19,677 Indian prisoners of war were evacuated from the
SEAC (excluding Burma and the Andamans, which were not
touched by the Mission) ; and 5 British officers and 6,344 Indians
from Borneo, Morotai and Rabaul.

The members of the Mission were very greatly struck by the
high morale of the Indians, their discipline and patience, their
pleasure in finding somebody who could tell them in their own
language the latest news from India, and their gratitude for any-
thing that was done for them.

CHAPTER XIV

Restoration of Law and Order in French
Indo-China and Thailand after the defeat
of Japan

After the defeat of Japan the French dependency of Indo-
China was divided into two parts by the 16? north latitude, the
northern portion becoming the responsibility of Nationalist China
of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and the southern half falling
under SACSEA. It is with the latter portion that we are mostly
concerned in this narrative; but some knowledge of the basic
problems of this region is essential to understand the course of
events which followed the defeat of Japan.

French Indo-China is a mass of fertile land sandwiched
between the land-masses of India and China. With India it is
not directly connected because of the interposition of Burma and
Siam, but it is an adjacent neighbour of China and that is how its
policies and problems got connected with the Chinese. Before
World War II, the French had divided their colony into five
regions of Tonkui, Laos, Annam, Cambodia and Cochin-China.
The SEAC was concerned generally with the last three, though
mostly with the Saigon area, bounded on the south by the northern
channel of the Me-kong river from Mytho and on the north by an
arbitrary line of Mytho—Thu Dau Mot—-Nha-trang.

Topographically the region was a mixture of delta land,
coastal low-lands, low plateaus and jungle-covered mountains. It
has fairly good communications; roads connect the important
towns, the railways though few converge on Saigon, telephone and
telegraphic lines run along railways and principal roads, all focus-
sing on Saigon, the capital of Cochin-China, which also boasts of
the air-field of Tan Sun Nhuat just outside the town.

The climate of south Indo-China is tropical, subject to the
seasonal influences of the Asiatic monsoon circulation. From May
or June the south-west monsoon continues for many months and
renders the climate of Cambodia and Cochin-China hot and humid,
and from November the north-east monsoon fills Annam with a
wet misty weather. But the peculiarity of weather is the variation
in visibility. At Saigon, for instance, the clouds are below 1,000
feet and visibility is less than one and half miles for some time
during the day, particularly during September. F lying on those
days is possible only in the mornings when there is generally a

RESTORATION OF LAW AND ORDER IN FRENCH INDO-CHINA 193

short spell of fair whether. But flying at night is undoubtedly
dangerous not only because of the turbulent clouds but also due
to the mist over the delta.

The region is self-sufficient in food-stuffs, with a surplus
produce ofrice. Its economy is based entirely on agriculture and
export of rice. In 1945, the rice surplus was very small for distri-
bution to civil population and it could not be augmented till the
harvest of 1945.

The most important towns are Saigon, Bien Hoa, Dalat,
Mytho, firing and Phan Rang. Cholon is the commercial and
Chinese quarter of Saigon. The important ports and anchorages in
the area, which came under the British control, were, Tourane,
Kwinton, Kam Ranh Bay and Nha-trang. Saigon was largely
built by the French to a standardised rectangular street pattern
and contained several fine buildings and boulevards with attractive
names. During the period of fapanese administration post and
telegraph facilities had increased and the wireless transmitting
station was considerably improved.

French Indo-China below 16°N may be divided into three
parts :—

(a) Cochin-China, which was a French colony and adminis-
tered as such in normal times by the French colonial
authority;

(b) Cambodia, which was a kingdom under the French
protectorate, administered by local officials but closely
supervised by French residents; and

(c) Annam, which was like Gambodia in all respects.

The political history of Indo-China ran on parallel lines
with those of other nations in South-East Asia, but it was mainly
Annam with some support of Tonkin which bore the brunt of the
struggle with the French. A strong independence movement
existed before the war and had been a problem for the French
authorities. When the Japanese occupied the country they
fostered the movement and the Vichy administration in Indo-
China looked on helplessly. In March 1945, when Germany
and the Vichy regime were about to collapse, the Japanese decided
to assume complete control of the state. This led to resistance by
the French army in Indo-China, but the opposition was suppressed
and the bulk of the army and civilian French personnel were
interned or placed under severe restrictions. In August, Japan
itself was defeated. There was a hiatus in the general adminis-
tration of the country. The Annamite independence movement
at once grasped the opportunity thus offered and drove Bao Dai,
the emperor, from the throne and set up a republic at Hanoi,

194 POST-WAR OCCUPATION FORCES: SOUTH-EAST ASIA

under the very nose of the Chinese, who were in occupation of
North Indo-China. This movement was known as Viet Minh.
It was in possession of arms, was anti-French and during the post-
war period became also anti-British.

From the stand-point of the SACSEA there were three
organisations, besides the Annamites, which caused uneasiness to
the British military authorities. The Baodaists, whose field of work
was mainly іп Gochin-China, were most active in Saigon uptil
the end of March 1945, and their aim was to eliminate the white
man from Indo-China. When in August 1945, Japan was about to
surrender they formed the National Front with other pro-Japanese
elements to take over the civil administration from the Japanese.
Unfortunately for them, the National Front was overthrown by
the Viet Minh and its members were absorbed into the latter
party. It is most probable that it were the Baodaists, armed by
the Japanese, who led the demonstrations on 2 September 1945,
when a number of French and Allied prisoners of war were killed
and wounded and several European houses were sacked.

The second group was the Dao-Xen, founded in 1939, in
the western provinces of Cochin-China, with the object of over-
throwing French domination by resort to terroristic activities. But
they joined the Viet Minh party at the end of August 1945. It
is stated that after the lapse of a few months they became hostile
to the Viet Minh and attacked its troops in the Cantho
province.

The third party was the Voluntaires de la Mort, which was
a terrorist body, pure and simple. Its aim was looting and
murdering and sabotaging in the Allied territory. But like the
Dao-Xenists, the Voluntaires were suspected by the Viet Minh
to be its enemies and were therefore suppressed by the latter at an
early date.

At the Potsdam Conference, the Combined Chiefs of Staff
had allotted to the SEAC the part of French Indo-China lying
south of 16° north and instructed Lord Louis Mountbatten to
secure control of the Supreme Headquarters of the Japanese army
in the south, which was then in Saigon, under Field-Marshal Count
Terauchi. This objective was superimposed by the restriction:
*“ that not more than what was required to ensure control over the
Japanese army was to be occupied in southern Indo-China, that
the British occupying force must be withdrawn as soon as its
military task was done, and that the French be responsible for all
political and administrative key-areas in which the SEAC army
would be operating as well as in Indo-China in general by virtue

of their historical position in the country ”’.

RESTORATION OF LAW AND ORDER IN FRENCH INDO-CHINA 195

The Supreme Commander prepared his plans according to
this clear-cut policy. He stated the object of reoccupation as
* to introduce a force into French Indo-China south of 16? north
in order to control Japanese Southern Army Headquarters, to
concentrate and evacuate Allied prisoners of war and internees
and to disarm Japanese forces'*, and added that the eventual
reoccupation of Indo-China was a matter for the French; and all
matters affecting the civil population would be dealt with through
the French representatives on the Control Commission, while the
British Foreign Office representative on this commission would
direct by advice the French handling of the political affairs of
Indo-China.

The strength of the British force depended on two factors:
the strength of the Japanese army and the adequacy of the French
resources to support their general responsibilities. It is on record
that for six wecks from the middle of September 1945, the only
troops available to the French authorities outside the key areas
were 1,000 men of 5 Colonial Infantry Regiment (5 RIC) in
Ceylon, 500 French released prisoners of war and local inhabitants
and certain warships, one of which was Richelieu. The 9th and
3rd Colonial Infantry Divisions (DIC) were still in Europe and
inadequately equipped. The 1 Far East Brigade could not come
safely into Indo-China until the 9th DIC had arrived which
was due only in the first week of November. The British had,
therefore, to bring a larger force into Indo-China than was
necessary for a more restricted task, like that of merely controlling
the Japanese and evacuating the RAPWI.

The strength of the Japanese army was still unknown; its
morale after surrender was not gauged; and its dispositions were
not easy to trace. It was therefore decided to control the whole
of Japanese army through Field-Marshal Count Terauchi and
make him responsible for its loyal and proper conduct. The
chain of command was helpful as all services, land, sea and air,
were directly controlled by the Japanse Southern Army HQ
from Saigon. The total strength of the Japanese forces was esta-
blished at 71,000, with 31,000 in the north and 40,000 in the south.
The latter figure was made up mainly of three divisions, the 2nd,
the 22nd and the 55th Divisions, distributed in Saigon, Phnom
Penh and Tourane areas. Besides these there were a number of
non-divisional ancillary units of air, ground and naval forces and
other unidentified troops. There were about sixty-seven aircraft
of both army and navy, with 5,880 men attached to them, the

1 Force Plan No. 1 * Occupation of French Indo-China’, 31 August 1945, para 2.

196 POST-WAR OCCUPATION FORCES: SOUTH-EAST ASIA

majority of the aircraft being based on air-fields in Cam-
bodia.

BRITISH FORCES IN FRENCH INDO-CHINA

Lord Louis Mountbatten decided to move into Indo-China
the following units, personnel and vehicles :—

Personnel Vehicles

Royal Navy вла i — 140 30
20th Indian Division and attached troops 22,287 2,036
Royal Air Force ... € 2,250 320
One Company SAS 5 French Colonial

Regiment кей те к 178 4
One Light Coramando 5 French Colonial

Regiment - - se 623 10
SACSEA Control Commission ne 260
Public Relations ... dai Sick 10

it i in — — ——À — —

Total ... 25,748 2,400

— M — —— — — — — — —

He also resolved to continue liaison with the old clandestine
organisations, and for that purpose he included an officer in the
Control Commission. The policy behind this move was to keep
these forces concentrated in their areas to perform the following
duties under British direction :—

(a) to provide local intelligence particularly about the
actions taken by the Japanese, to comply or otherwise,
with surrender orders;

(b) to give topographical and other local information to
the Allied occupational forces when these arrive;

(c) to supply guides and interpreters to Allied occupational
forces;

(d) to establish contact with the Allied prisoners of war
camps in certain cases; and

(e) in the event of continued Japanese resistance in certain
areas or of their failure to comply with surrender orders,
to join the army in a common operation against the
enemy.

It may be repeated that the naval and air forces were very
meagre and their roles minor. The naval forces swept the channels
for shipping, organised port services and imposed surrender terms
9n the Japanese naval surface and naval air forces, while the air

RESTORATION OF LAW AND ORDER IN FRENCH INDO-CHINA 197

forces lent а ' show of force’, provided air lift to Saigon and air
supply to the Allied troops of occupation.

Lord Louis Mountbatten warned his officers in good time
that they should not become involved in Indo-China politics and
that their sole duty was the maintenance of law and order. But
he advised them, at the same time, that they must keep themselves
well-informed about political happenings in order to avoid all
politics. The Viet Minh party promised to co-operate with the
Supreme Commander as long as the above policy was strictly
adhered to.

On 2 September 1945, before the SEAC forces had arrived,
a serious riot broke out against the French authority. It was
suppressed by the released British and Australian prisoners of war,
who were without arms and by a RAPWI control officer who had
just been flown in.

On 17 September, the day on which the independence of
the Viet Nam republic was declared, the Viet Minh organised
the closure of markets in Saigon and enforced a boycott of ali
French employers. Also sporadic fighting took place in the town,
and there were riotous conditions all over the place. For a few
days no legal writ ran, and no steps were taken to restore law and
order. Mob violence had spread all over the country, and armed
bands had resorted to killing the French and terrorising the
neighbourhood.

OCCUPATION OF FRENCH INDO-CHINA

The post-war occupation of French Indo-China lasted for
five and a half months. It began on 12 September 1945. Lord
Louis Mountbatten could not, however, send an adequate force
there before the middle of October. Consequently, he had to
make use of the Japanese army to maintain the minimum of control
over the people there. ‘‘ For this purpose," the Supreme Gom-
mander reported, “‘ I maintained the existing Chain of Command,
through their Supreme Commander, to publish and enforce my
orders. I consider that if the Japanese Chain of Command had
been disrupted for fear that it might provide the enemy Com-
manders with a means of controlling their forces in resisting us
before we had fully replaced it with our own, it would have been
impossible for us to use their forces for our own purposes as
effectively as we did "' *.

The units which were moved into Indo-China were informed
exactly about their duties. They were told: “ Our task is not yet

2 Mountbatten's Report, p. 257.

198 POST-WAR OCCUPATION FORCES! SOUTH-EAST ASIA |

FRENCH INDO-CHINA |

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RESTORATION OF LAW АМЬ ORDER IN FRENCH rNpO-cHINA 199

over. Countries occupied by Japan earlier in the war have still
to be reoccupied, prisoners of war have to be freed, fed and
rehabilitated, civil administration of these countries has to be
restored, buildings, railways, ships, roads, all these and many more
have to be restored and repaired. It is no easy task and will take
time. We must now even more than before maintain that discipline
and bearing which have been the bed-rock of success. Much of
the future will depend on the way we conduct ourselves in re-
occupied countries. We may still have to use force of arms to
clear these countries ofthe Јар”.з General Douglas Gracey, the
commander of the 20th Indian Division, was appointed to com-
mand the Allied Land Forces in French Indo-China south of 16° N
and was instructed to:
(i) secure the Saigon area including the Headquarters of
the Japanese Southern Army;
(ii) disarm and concentrate all Japanese forces in accordance
with policy;
(iii) maintain law and order and ensure internal security;
(iv) protect, succour and subsequently evacuate Allied
prisoners of war and civilian internees; and
(v) liberate Allied territory so far as resources permitted.
The 20th Indian Division was warned that it was not entirely
an operation of peace and that resistance might be met. They
were to take all precautions of war and observe the principles of
warfare. “ There is no front in these operations: we would be
dealing with bands of guerillas and are likely to meet opposition
on flanks and from rear; we may find it difficult to distinguish
friend from foe. Same vigilance against ambushes and doubtful
friends as one observed in North-West Frontier of India, would be
required all over. Also beware of ‘nibbling’ at opposition.
Always use the maximum force available to ensure wiping out any
hostiles, we may meet. ІҒопе uses too much no harm is done. If
one uses too small a force and it has to be extricated we will suffer
casualties and encourage the enemy "*. АП the units were also
given full information about the political situation in the land and
also maps of Japanese concentration areas.

MOVE-IN OF TROOPS

The 20 Indian Infantry Brigade with elements of 1/1 Gurkha
Rifles and the Clontrol Commission were the first to arrive from

3 War Di 14/13 Frontier Force Rifles, 15 August 1945. ,
4 War Diaty, uie 100 Indian Infantry Brigade, 27 October 1945. Operation
Instruction No. 220, October 1945.

200 POST-WAR OCCUPATION FORCES: SOUTH-EAST ASIA

Rangoon by air and landed at Saigon on 11 September 1945.
They occupied vital points such as the airfield, the banks, the
powerhouse, the police stations, and relieved the Japanese guards
there. Later they occupied the jail and the Post and Telegraph
offices. This quick action deprived the Annamites, who were in
administrative control of Saigon, of their hold over the capital
and forced them into opposition to the Allied army.

On 17 September 1945, the Annamites celebrated their
Independence Day when disorder prevailed in Saigon, which made
the position of the Allied army extremely delicate, if not difficult.
Hence Major-General Gracey issued a proclamation on 21 Septem-
ber 1945, in the languages? of the people, that it was his firm
intention to ensure with strict impartiality peace throughout south-
ern Indo-China and to dislocate public services and legitimate
business and trade as little’ as possible so that peaceful citizens
might carry on their normal occupations without any interference
from anybody. Calling on all citizens to co-operate to the fullest
extent the proclamation warned all wrongdoers (specially looters
of public and private property and saboteurs) that they would be
summarily shot. No demonstrations or processions, it stated,
would be permitted; no arms of any kind including sticks, staves,
bamboo-spears etc. would be permitted to be carried except by
the Allied troops and other authorised persons.

The Annamites demonstrated against this order on the
grouad that it interfered with their relations with the French and
stifled their political aspirations. Lord Louis Mountbatten also
instructed Major-General Gracey to confine himself and the forces
under him to those limited tasks for which he and they had been
appointed. The Chiefs of Staff agreed in this warning but added,
with due regard to the sentiments and sovereignty of the French in
Indo-China, that the Indian troops should assist the French every-
where south of 16°N, as long as this did not prejudice the Allied
primary responsibility for Saigon. In the meantime, Lady Mount-
batten toured Saigon on 20 September in her capacity as Chief
Superintendent, Nursing Division, Joint War Organisation, St.
John’s Ambulance Brigade, and she assisted the local workers in
doing their work expeditiously and enthusiastically with the
RAPWI, many of whom were evacuated by the returning planes
from Saigon.

On 23 September, the French under their military com-
mander General Leclerc took Major-General Gracey’s permission
and seized control of the administration of Saigon wholly, and

inte el to War Diary of the 80 Indian Infantry Brigade the date is 19

RESTORATION OF LAW AND ORDER IN FRENCH INDO-CHINA 201

installed their own government in the state. This led to bitter
fighting with the Annamites for nearly one week.

The military position in Saígon was deteriorating and the
appreciation was that soon it might well prove beyond the capacity
of the only brigade of the 20th Indian Division to tackle it. Hence
Lord Louis Mountbatten called a meeting on 28 September, which
was attended by Major-General Gracey and Colonel Cedille in
Singapore. The British Secretary of State for War, who was
visiting the British troops in India and SEAC, was also present.
The Supreme Commander told the French colonel that the French
and the Annamites should meet and come to an amicable settle-
ment of their outstanding differences. The Secretary of State for
War also added that it was the policy of the British Government
not to interfere inthe internal affairs of Indo-China but to encourage
mutual understanding between the rulers and the ruled.

From 1 to 10 October, the British encouraged the holding
of a conference between the French and the Annamites with a view
to bringing about reconciliation between them. On 1 October
1945, Major-General Gracey and Mr. Н. М. Brain, his political
adviser conferred with the Viet Minh party leaders and enunciated
the British policy. A cease-fire followed and an armistice was
declared during the period of the conference between the French
and the Annamites. But the discussions bore no fruit. The
Annamites broke the truce on 6 October by firing on the British
and Indian troops in Saigon. Major-General Gracey thereupon
warned the Annamites, that ' maximum force would be used in
the event of further disturbances" 8. Fortunately the remaining
formations of the division had arrived in Saigon and it was possible
for Allied Land Forces French Indo-China (ALFFIC) to carry
out the warning if it was necessary.

On 9 October 1945, Major-General Gracey, General Leclerc
and Colonel Cedille met Lord Louis Mountbatten at Rangoon to
discuss the situation. During the meeting the news came that the
Annamites had again broken the truce by ambushing and killing
one officer, one Viceroy’s Commissioned Officer and two Indian
Other Ranks and wounding others of an engineer reconnaissance
party, and it became clear that the Viet Minh spokesmen were
incapable of guaranteeing the terms of the armistice. Lord Louis
Mountbatten, therefore, ordered that strong action must be taken
by the Indian forces to secure further key-points, and to widen and
consolidate the perimeter of these areas, while the efforts to nego-
tiate peace with the Annamites might continue. The Annamites

6 War Diary, the 20th Indian Division, G. Branch, 8 October, 1945.

202 Post-Wak OCCUPATION FORCES! SOUTH-EAST AsiA

begged for extension of truce; their leaders * came in to HQ 20th
Indian Division to say that they would not oppose the British entry
into Gia Dinh but that any móvement of French troops would be
resisted to the utmost. It was accordingly decided not to employ
French troops іп the operations planned on 11 October 1945,
But these assurances proved futile and led to the negotiations being
broken.

There was at this time some cause for anxiety about the
surrender of the Japanese forces in Cambodia. Тһе establishment
of the Annamite regime in Cochin-China, Annam and Tonkin
had its repercussions in Cambodia, and the Japanese were behaving
rather funnily. The SEAC, therefore, sent the Officer Comman-
ding 4/10 Gurkha Rifles to Phnom Penh, the capital, and at the
same time General Leclerc arrested the pro-Japanese Prime
Minister and took him to Saigon. These two measures helped to
make the Japanese in that area observe the terms.

DEVELOPMENTS IN SAIGON—CHOLON AREA

Meanwhile, the situation necessitated a few engagements
between the Allied troops aided by the Japanese and the Annamites,
in particular in north-western Saigon. Also a successful sweep
was made through Gia Dinh, which demonstrated the British
potentiality to move troops out of Saigon whenever they wished.
This made the Viet Minh leaders agree to an armistice from 1800
hours on 2 October. The following day was quiet and a certain
influx of Annamite population from north of the Arroyo de
l Avalanche gave rise to the hope that negotiations for peace would
be successful. On 4 and 5 October, however, the truculent attitude
of their rank and file gave the lie to the pacific assertions of their
leaders. Grenades were thrown at the sappers guarding artesian
wells, crowds demonstrated in front of the British positions on
Khanh Hoi island and in the Rue de Verdun and subversive
leaflets were distributed. On the night of 6 and 7 October, the
evacuation of civilians started again and concentration of Annamite
troops was reported in Gia Dinh and to the south of Khanh Hoi.
On 9 October, British troops were snipped at at the Tan Sun Nhuat
airfield. On 10 October, as stated earlier, an engineer reconnais-
sance party was ambushed. Consequently,Gia Dinh was occupied
by the 32 Indian Infantry Brigade on 10 October, and Go Vap
was taken оп 11 and 12 October 1945, For the first time, armoured .
cars were used. By 13 October the 32 Indian Infantry Brigade
had established itself on all the bridges across the river Cho Moi.

7 War Diary, 16th Light Cavalry, В Squadron, 10 October 1945.

Prate ХУП

Major-Gencral G. C. Evans,

Commander 7 Indian Division

Major-General О de Т. Lovett,
Commander 7 Indian Division

Р.лте ХУШ

Major-General D. D. Gracey,
Commander 20 Indian Division

Major-General D. €. Hawthorn,
Commander 23 Indian Division

RESTORATION OF LAW AND ORDER IN FRENCH INDO-CHINA 503

Meanwhile, the Annamites in Cholon and Khanh Hoi made
strenuous attempts to destroy European stores and installations
and to gather arms, On the night of 13/14 October 1945, an
abortive attempt was made to storm the docks and to анада а
Japanese position at Phu Lam. On 16 October, a resin factory
in Khanh Hoi was gutted by fire, and numerous other attempts at
arson were reported. An attempt was also made by a crowd of
four hundred men armed with rifles, spears, bows and poisoned
arrows and even a mild type of tear gas to capture a bridge on the
32 Indian Infantry Brigade perimeter. But the attempt failed
and with it the Annamites ceased to fight openly and began a
guerilla warfare.

DEVELOPMENTS IN THU DUC—BIEN HGA—THU DAU MOT AREA

The Annamites were collecting large forces in the area,
between Thu Duc and Dian, with the intention of opposing the
British advance along the railway. There was also a report that
there were several huge non-violent demonstrations in Thu Dau
Mot. But with the liquidation of Annamite trouble at Saigon the
opposition in this area subsided by itself.

BARIA-CAP. ST. JACQUES AREA

The fortifications in the Baria-Cap. St. Jacques area were
held by the Japanese, who were reported to be negotiating with the
Annamites. An attempt to barter 107 rifles for food was forestalled
by an order from General Manaski. Surrender discipline was
enforced.

DEVELOPMENTS ON THE EAST COAST

The coastal area as a whole continued to be disturbed. A
patrol from Phan Rang to Dalat on 10 October 1945 was ambushed.
One man returned to tell a sorrowful tale that a thousand Annamites
had congregated at Phan-thiet and ambushed the patrol. The
real centre of disturbance was Nha-trang where again the Japanese
had compromised with the Annamites with the result that the
latter adopted a threatening attitude towards the European popula-
tion. They demanded the handing over of public buildings. But
the situation was brought under control by the Japanese ordering
their nationals to observe surrender terms and by the landing of
seventy French marines.

204 POST-WAR OCCUPATION FORCES: SOUTH-EAST ASIA
TAY NINH AREA

During October 1945 the Tay Ninh area remained inactive.
The insurgents, estimated at 10,000 assisted by 1,000 deserters, who
were natives of Cambodia were believed to be planning an
offensive. But this estimate was not accepted by the Japanese who
placed the figures at 500 Baodaist troops and a few Viet Minh
regulars and irregulars. Their conjecture was correct and no
trouble took place.

PHNOM PENH AREA

There was little difficulty in establishing a friendly govern-
ment in the Phnom Penh area. Siamese and Annamite influences
were very strong in Cambodia. The Prime Minister was anti-
French. Following his arrest there were one or two signs of unrest,
mainly Annamite inspired. The railway employees, for instance,
went on strike fora few days. But the Cambodian element returned
early to work, with the result that the Annamites were arrested.
Further the whole police force was de-Annamitised and brought
under the control of the commander of the Allied Land Forces
in Phnom Penh. One consequence of this strong measure was
that the small Annamite community in the outskirts of Phnom
Penh became very demonstrative in their loyalty to the Allies and
accepted the situation without demur.

DEVELOPMENTS IN MYTHO-GANTHIO AREA

Public opinion in the Mytho-Ganthio area was highly
excitable but the Japanese acted more vigorously here than in other
districts. They removed road-blocks on the Gholon—Mytho road

and secured important bridges. The Viet Minh party also was
not strong in this area.

VIET MINH ACTIVITIES

_ The main Viet Minh strength was in the area Thu Duc—
Bien Hoa—Thu Dau Mot area. Whether it was being reinforced
from the north of 16°N remained to be confirmed. The Annamite
forces were better organised and disciplined in this area than
elsewhere and it was feared they might attempt organised warfare
as opposed to mere guerilla tactics.

_ All the dirty work, to fight and disarm the Annamites, was
assigned to the Japanese troops. Order No. 1, dated 25 October

RESTORATION OF LAW AND ORDER IN FRENCH INDO-CHINA 205

1945, by Lieutenant-Colonel E. C. Pickard, Commanding 14
Frontier Force Rifles, to Colonel Miyake illustrates this point.
The effect of this system was that the British troops had nothing
to do and so became irresponsible and idle. One unit confessed
that * with the rest of the 100 Brigade arriving the battalion was
in the fortunate position of being responsible to no one (except the
Mission for guard duties)'?. Lest the Indian element of the British
force might be seduced by Annamite propaganda, which was strong
and persistent, a warning was given about the Annamites being
treacherous. It was also announced that ‘the answer to this
(Propaganda) is that if they (Annamites) obstruct our disarmament
of the Japs, as they are doing, they will be dealt with by force
of arms ? 9,

The last week of October 1945 was comparatively of less
anxiety for the Allies. The ‘ hostile acts of Annamites to a large
extent receded from our expanding perimeter within and on the
edge of which they have now confined themselves to minor guerilla
tactics''?, Thu Duc, Bien Hoa and Thu Dau Mot were occupied by
4/10 Gurkha Rifles, 14/13 Frontier Force Rifles and 1/1 Gurkha
Rifles, respectively, and pending the arrival of Japanese reinforce-
ments Dalat area was guarded by strong, offensive reconnaissance
by air. President Hala of Chinese Chamber of Commerce was
arrested and the Foukien Boy Scouts were banned. Ali British
units commenced systematic patrolling beyond the existing peri-
meter on the principle that offensive is the best form of defence.
Peaceful inhabitants who were ready to carry on their normal
occupation wanted also evidence of the superiority of the Allies
over Annamites which they were now assured of.

On 30 October, Vice-Admiral d' Argenlieu arrived in Saigon
to takc up his appointment as High Commissioner for French
Indo-China and nominal Commander of the French forces in the
theatre; in the latter capacity he was subordinate to Major-General
Gracey.

If October was a month of strain attended with success,
November was one of success without strain. The Chinese were
helpful with useful information, French troops arrived from out-
side, and the Japanese were willing to do their task. There was
little for the British troops to do. They searched Long Kisen, a
forest village, arrested and jailed a hundred and sixty-six men of
the Kempei Tai (Japanese Gestapo), and searched the Coast

8 War Diary, 1/1 Gurkha Rifles (King George V's Own) 17 October 1945.

9 War Diary, 4/17 Dogra ey кен 9 October 1945. .

19 War Diary, the 80 Indian Infantry Brigade, Operation Instruction No. 33,
25 October 1945.

206 POST-WAR OCCUPATION FORCES: SOUTH-EAST ASIA

Church for the arrest of a priest. And then started the pictorial
ceremony of Japanese surrenders, the best of which was the one
at the Mission Headquarters on 1 December 1945 at which Lord
Louis Mountbatten ‘accepted the personal surrender of Field
Marshal Count Terauchi's family swords 7??.

The logical result of the expansion of the perimeter was the
formation of the occupied area into inner and outer zones, for
the latter of which the Japanese were made responsible. Ben Cat
was considered as being vital to the Annamite defence, and so it
was attacked by a special column known as Clarkol, with the inten-
tion of encircling and destroying the Annamitesin the area. While
the French established a firm base in Tay Ninh and drove the
Annamites eastwards to Ben Cat, the Japanese at the same time
moved south of Loc Ninh and established a block at Chon Thanh.
The plan succeeded.

In spite of the decrease in the disturbances, the animosity
of the local population towards the British forces had increased.
It was reported that: ‘ During the period under review, the civilian
disturbances have decreased, and this coupled with the arrival of
more French troops etc. has enabled a start to be made with the
formal surrender and disarmament of the Japanese. Although
disturbances have decreased, there is, however, stillan atmosphere of
animosity towards us among the indigenous population and there
has been no improvement in our relations with them °:°. This was
mainly due to the indifference of the commanders to the complaints
of the people against the units or individuals, and even if the
pretence of investigation was made the offenders were let off.
Moreover, the conduct of some of the Allied commanders towards
the Japanese commanders was not proper.

FIGHTING IN SAIGON AREA

28 October was the quietest day for some time in the stormy
area of Cholon, Gia Dinh and Go Vap. This lull was used by
the British to do propaganda in the villages. 29 October saw
the establishment of an armoured column base at Xuan Loc and
the patrolling of the route Baria —Dalat—Nha-trang.

On 1 November, however, fighting started in the area north
of Saigon. During the night of 2/3 November the British positions
in Gia Dinh area were attacked with light machine-guns, grenade
discharger and tear-gas bombs. At the same time a bridge between

* War Diary, the 23rd Indian Mountain Regiment, 1 December 1945,

та War Diary, the 32nd Indian Infan Brigade, Annexure ovember 1945,
No. 43/1/A. HQ 32nd Indian Infantry Brigade. SEAG 22 eie da 1945. ”

RESTORATION OF LAW AND ORDER IN FRENCH INDO-CHINA 207

Go Vap and Gia Dinh was attacked. The fighting lasted two days.

Thereafter firm action was taken to search and recover
Annamite arms and to prevent grenade throwing and sniping.
A large part of the male population was rounded up and subjected
to a severe security check. Sweeps were carried out extensively in
the 100 Indian Infantry Brigade area, and roads were cleared of
all obstacles. Thus the key-area was wellsecured against organised
opposition. The arrival of more French troops facilitated the task
of the British and they took over certain sections, extending south-
wards into the Mekong delta, relieving the Japanese forces to be
withdrawn.

DEVELOPMENT IN BARIA - CAP ST. JACQUES AREA

Until 29 October, the Japanese had an extremely anxious
time owing to the presence of a large number of armed Annamites
in the Baria area. "They first tried to pacify them, but the senior
British naval officer attached to the area ordered a firmer policy.
The Japanese carried out his instructions and rounded up and
disarmed a large number of Annamites at Baria. They also cleared
the roads Baria—Long Thanh and Baria-Xuan Loc and reduced
Annamite influence to a great extent.

DEVELOPMENTS ON THE EAST COAST

The east coast was the play-ground of Viet Minh forces who
had reduced the isolated Japanese garrisons to a state of helpless-
nes. All Annamite troops were trained here and also in Dalat
and Ban Me Thout area. The hill tribes of this area, the Mois,
who were under the influence of the French, were reconciled to
the Annamite control; their hills and jungles offered a splendid
refuge to the Annamite guerillas when pursued by the Allies,

The largest concentration of the Annamite troops in this
area was at Phan-thiet, where the forces driven from Xuan Loc
and Bien Hoa had also collected. The Japanese garrison in this
place was threatened and asked for further reinforcements. The
Annamites attacked the French marines at Nha-trang on 22
October, and this developed into a serious fight. On 27 October
the town was cleared of all Annamite forces.

During November there were reports of Annamite reinforce-
ments for Nha-trang area from the north and from Phan-thiet
in the south. But the area remained uneasily quiet, perhaps due
to the landing of 1,200 men on 19 November from the French
battleship Richelieu.

208 POST-WAR OCCUPATION FORCES: SOUTH-EAST ASIA
DEVELOPMENTS IN LOC NINH — BEN CAT — TAY NINH AREA

During October the withdrawal of Viet Minh forces from
Bien Hoa to Loc Міпһ--Веп Cat area caused anxiety. The
Japanese were ordered to take strong action against this concen-
tration. They had swept the area on 25 October and encountered
some opposition. By 30 October the situation was under control
but within a week the trouble started again. A combined British
and French operation to clear the triangular area made up of Loc
Ninh, Tay Ninh and Saigon commenced on 8 November. A
mobile column of armoured cars and Indian and Japanese infantry
occupied Ben Cat without opposition. Tay Ninh was occupied
by a French armoured column from Saigon in the evening of the
same date while a river-borne force moving on the Vacio river
arrived at Tay Ninh on 9 November.

Both these forces encountered opposition en route although
Tay Ninh itself was found deserted. The British column from
Ben Cat occupied Chon Thanh on 9 November without opposition,
but on the following day a six hour battle was fought with the
Annamites at a road-block (RD 158870). A French column from
Tay Ninh reached Loc Ninh unopposed on 11 November, while
Budop, to the north-east of Loc Ninh, was occupied on 12 November.

THE FRENCH TAKE OVER

The Viet Minh resistance in the Allied occupation areas
was broken. They had either withdrawn into Annam in the
south-east or behind the Song Bo in the north or retreated into the
* Plain des Jones’ in the west. They were also trying to enter
Gambodia. In Cochin-China, therefore, there was only guerilla
activity left, which even at best did not profit the Annamites in
any way.

The French thereupon endeavoured to take over respon-
sibility for the area as quickly as possible. On the political side,
Admiral d'Agrenlieu repeated his country's intentions to pacify
the hostile elements in the population. On 1 November, he
addressed the public in Saigon to say that France would give
autonomy, not independence, with suitable reforms in the economic,
political and financial spheres of government. The Annamites
did not accept this offer and replied that they would attack the
French only and, if necessary, their new allies, the Japanese, but
would spare the British who were mere birds of passage.

, On 14 November again, the Admiral broadcast on the same
subject and stated that the programme of the Government of France

RESTORATION OF LAW AND ORDER IN FRENCH INDO-CHINA 209

included the setting up at the earliest moment of ‘a very broadly
conceived political and administrative economy, with the assistance
of counsellors and experts, as required, in every one of the Indo-
Chinese countries". The Annamites responded to it by a rebellion
in the south of Saigon which called for * Can Gioc’ action оп 16
November and for an armed offensive on the 18th. A third time,
on 23 November, the High Commissioner repeated the policy of
his government of granting internal autonomy to all provinces and
protectorates in French Indo-China and added that he was still
maintaining contact with Viet Minh representatives and hoping
for good results; to which the Annamites answered with isolated
attacks on the French and the Japanese. Lord Louis Mountbatten
was pressing for more substantial changes in the French policy,
and this may account for the new attitude of the French shown in
a press conference held at the end of November. This attitude
favoured the creation of a ‘Federation of Indo-China’ with
freedomin economic affairs, abolition of race distinction, educational
reform and development of national culture. The High Com-
missioner also gave an assurance that the revolutionary members
of the Annamite population would not be touched by officers of
law and order. This produced a slightly better effect on the other
party.

On the military side, too, the French made much progress
in taking over responsibility. In the first week of November their
forces were well established in the delta up to a point eighty miles
from Saigon, after replacing the Japanese troops stationed there.
In the next two weeks the French assumed real responsibility for
the east coast with two battleships ready for action. The last
week saw the extension of French control in the north-easterly
direction from Cochin-China to Annam, although many tracts in
the former still remained unpacified. Оп 29 November Lord Louis
Mountbatten discussed with Admiral d’Argenlieu at Saigon all
problems relating to the ultimate assumption of control by the
French troops and the subsequent departure of the 20th Indian
Division. He even hoped that the withdrawal of his troops might
possibly begin within two or three weeks in view of the steady
progress in disarming and concentration of the Japanese troops.
The French also thought likewise as their military strength and
experience of warfare with the Annamites was gradually improving.
They had in the city the 2nd Armoured Division, two regiments of
colonial infantry, 300 Marines and 1,500 locally recruited
troops. The elements of the 9th Colonial Infantry Division
arrived in Saigon on 25 November and greatly improved their
morale.

210 POST-WAR OCCUPATION FORCES: SOUTH-EAST ASIA

The disarming and concentration of the Japanese forces went
on according to programme. They had been fulfilling their
responsibility fully and correctly. .

By 24 November nearly half of the total service personnel
of 65,000 had been disarmed and concentrated in different
places, before the French took over from them on 25 November
1945.

The expansion of the perimeter hastened the work of the
Allies. This quickened activities in Cambodia and in north-
eastern Cochin-China. But every time Cambodia or the east
coast was brought under control, there were fresh disturbances,
within a few days owing to their being close to Loas and Annam.
So full and definite control of Cambodia and east coast was only
possible after strong action both in Cambodia and Laos and by
concentration of troops in Nha-trang and adjacent areas in the
interior. These were achieved by a formal expansion of the Allied
perimeter around Saigon.

The French forces assumed responsibility on 6 December
for the area immediately south of Saigon, formerly held by the
80 Indian Infantry Brigade, but this brigade did not leave French
Indo-China until the next month and stood by the French for any
emergency. In the first week of December, the French were still
anxious to decimate the rebels. They encountered resistance їо
the south-west of Saigon in the Mekong delta and also in the most
westerly part of Cochin-China and north-east of Cantho. The
French won in every place, occupied Tra-vinh on 6 December and
cleared Cantho on the 8th. The result of this was that the next
week was quiet, except for a grenade-throwing incident on 14
December when ten Gurkhas were killed, during a football match
in Saigon. Some casualties were inflicted at Mytho and Gia Dinh
on the 15th and in Vinh Long—Cantho sector on the 17th. These
provoked the local Annamite partisans to fresh hostility, and the
French retaliated by sweeps of coastal areas at the mouth of the
Mekong. This action and reaction process continued until the
end of the month, but all actions ended with the extension and
consolidation of the French control in the area west of Mytho,
where important resistance centres had been located.

The French took over also the responsibility for the centre
on 19 December from the 32 Indian Infantry Brigade, partly
because this brigade had to go to British North Borneo, about 25
December, for the relief of Australian troops stationed there, and
partly because the Annamite stronghold of Han Phu island in the
o a к» miles north-west of Saigon, was captured by 4/2

€s, assisted by 9/14 Punjab Regiment on 15

RESTORATION OF LAW AND ORDER IN FRENCH INDO-CHINA 211

December." Following a concentration of mortar fire, landings
were made on the island against fairly light opposition; 31 Anna-
mites were killed and 415 were captured, together with a large
arms dump, a radio station and a printing press. There were also
a hospital, a kitchen, a telephone exchange and an armoury in
that place.

As a result of the French taking over, the 32 Indian
Infantry Brigade left Saigon in the middle of the last week of
December, while the 80 Indian Infantry Brigade was waiting
for orders to move out. But the 100 Indian Infantry Brigade
continued to be active. The operation instructions of this brigade
repeated that the hostile elements were increasing, their attacks
were serious and they were planning a co-ordinated offensive
between the end of December and 10 January. Instruction No. 63
of 31 December stated that the Viet Minh bands had been placed
under the control of one man and he was said to have stated that
this would be ‘ the last grand offensive before the British leave ’,
The opposition concentrations were four in number, viz., between
the Thu Dau Mot and Ben Cat, west and south-west of Bung,
Ben Go area and north-east of Bien Hoa. The Allied army was
to strike at these areas and demoralise them even at the starting
point. But at the same time the commander recognised the
difficulties of the actual fighters. He said as follows: * The diffi-
culty is to select him (the enemy), as immediately he has had his
shot or thrown his grenade he pretends to be friendly. It is,
therefore, perfectly legitimate to look upon all locals anywhere
near where a shot has been fired as enemies, and treacherous ones
at that, and treat them accordingly. Similarly if, when following
up a report, no enemy are met with suspects must be brought in
from the area concerned. They are probably the hostiles reported,
who have for the moment become friendly villagers’. This special
warning was considered necessary, because Lord Louis Mountbat-
ten’s idea was not to terrorise but to reconcile authority with the
Annamites. The brigade had to spread itself out over the whole
area to inspire the peaceful citizens with confidence in the fairness
of the British officers and thereby to secure their co-operation in
the restoration of law and order on the one side and the disarma-
ment and evacuation of the Japanese on the other.

The record of the 100 Indian Infantry Brigade during
December 1945 was as follows: Taking the units one by one, 14/13
Frontier Force Rifles was ordered оп 2 December to *encircle and
clear the forest area between Tan Phong and Ben and prevent the

13 War Diary, the 20th Indian Division, 11 December 1945.

212 POST-WAR OCCUPATION FORCES: SOUTH-EAST ASIA

escape of 20 Viet Minhs presumed to be encamped there’. The
operations were carried out on 3 December'*, and the battalion did
its work thoroughly on the next day and returned to its Head-
quarters. 1/1 Gurkha Rifles was busy in Bung area, and the
greatest achievement of 4/10 Gurkha Rifles was the detection
of a quantity of opium worth approximately £2,000 sterling and
the back-loading of ammunition. This brigade also carried out
patrolling against harassing opposition in Bien Hoa—' Thu Dau
Mot (3 January), Thu Duc and Tang Phu areas with remark-
able success.

The Saigon radio station passed from the British to the French
control on 9 December. Figuresgiven on 17 December revealed
that 42,254 Japanese army and air force personnel had been
disarmed and concentrated in south French Indo-China, leaving
15,020 to be dealt with later. The latter were still required for
garrisoning outlying areas, but in view of the rapid progress in
pacifying local population it was expected that these remaining
personnel would be disarmed and concentrated by the end of
December 1945. "The surrender of the last 7,988 Japanese naval
personnel in south French Indo-China was accepted at Saigon on
15 December. About 5,000 Japanese were expecting to be repat-
riated by the end of the year if shipping could be made available.
Interrogation of RAPWI had enabled the British military authorities
in Saigon to draw up a list of 400 Japanese war criminals and
Indo-Chinese collaborationists, 20 of whom were accused of mass
murders.

The year 1946 started therefore with everything moving
quickly towards the firm establishment of the French authority in
southern French Indo-China and the withdrawal of the British
occupation forces in the first month. Lord Louis Mountbatten
gave the following account of the situation: —

“ Outside Java the state of affairs in South-East Asia gave no
causeforanxiety. In French Indo-China the situation had cleared
up by the end of the year; the 9th DIC had arrived, and the 3rd
DIC was expected to arrive soon......... On the Ist January, Vice-
Admiral d’Argenlieu and I issued a joint statement, announcing
that the French authorities assumed full responsibility for military
commitments in FIC and on the 28th January, command of all
French forces in the country passed from Major-General Gracey
{who then left French Indo-China) to General Leclerc; while
command of the British/Indian forces which remained passed to
a reduced SACSEA Inter-Service Mission established under

*4 War Diary, 14/13 Frontier Force Rifles, Operation Order No. 3, 3 December 1945.

Prare ХІХ

Major-General Cawthorn, representative of C-in-C India on Joint Ghici oi
Staff, Australia

Major-General H. M. Chambers, Commander 26 Indian Division

PLATE ХХ

ТІ м

ктш”
au

6

“

Resettlement Training of Repatriates

RESTORATION OF LAW AND ORDER IN FRENCH INDO-CHINA 213

Brigadier M. S. K. Maunsell, late Chief of Staff of the SACSEA
Commission No. 1. The commission itself ceased to exist'!5,

On 1l January 1946, the 80 Indian Infantry Brigade was
relieved of “all operational commitments by the French forces
from 1600 hours "'?, On 12 January it came under the 20th Indian
Division for administration and under ALFNEI for operations",
Between 10 and 18 January, 23 Mountain Regiment, 114 Field
Regiment and 16th Light Cavalry left French Indo-China. The 80
Indian Infantry Brigade sailed for Makassar in the last week of
the month.

The 100 Indian Infantry Brigade was still left in French
Indo-China. Its responsibility was not confined to any town or
compact area but spread over an undefined space in north-eastern
Saigon in which the French had not been able to attain mastery.
This population was in no mood to be friendly to either the British
ог the French. “ There is no contact as yet between the troops
and civilian population either Annamite or Chinese. The troops
NE TERME view them with suspicion......... (and) friendly Annamite
and Chinese are still frightened to co-operate to any great extent
for fear of possible reprisals "''5.

The patrols of the 100 Indian Infantry Brigade, in Thu
Dau Mot and Thu Duc areas, were still subjected to sniping,
grenade throwing and light machine-gun fire. An unusually heavy
action took place in 14/13 Frontier Force Rifles area near Bien Hoa
during the night of 2/3 January when a force of 200 men, armed
with heavy and light automatics, rifles and grenade-dischargers
attacked two bridges and tried to wreck the railway. The attack
was repulsed without any loss to the Indian troops but with a loss
of 33 dead to the other side. There was heavy sniping in the
brigade area on 4 January. 4/10 Gurkha Rifles was warned that
the Viet Minh all-out offensive was expected between 2 and 10
January, and that besides arresting every male the regiment must
hit hard and discourage the opportunists from the very start.
'The unit carried out this operation effectively on 10 January, it
killed 7 and arrested 120 Annamites in Thu Duc area. The
brigade commenced operations on 10 January, in conjunction with
the French forces, to establish posts on the east bank of the Saigon
river. The French cleared the area between Saigon and Thu
Duc Mot and swept the area in the north up to Ben Cat. These
operations continued for over two weeks with good results, and

15 Report to the Combined Chiefs of Staff by the Supreme Allied Commander,
South-East Asia, 1943-46, pp. 278-79, para 83.
16 War Diary, the 20th Indian Division, 11 January 1946.

17 War Diary, the 80th Indian Infantry Brigade, 12 January 1946.
18 Monthly Summary Security Intelligence, 20 Tanuary 1946.

914 POST-WAR OCCUPATION FORCES: SOUTH-EAST ASIA

had to be repeated in the area between the Saigon and Don-nai
rivers.

The last week of January saw the passing of military control
to the French, The Headquarters ALF FIC closed on 20
January after the embarking of the main Headquarters of the 20th
Indian Division the previous day.

REPATRIATION OF JAPANESE

During January 1946 the Japanese were asked to leave Bien
Hoa for Cap St. Jacques. By 15 January, 21,150 disarmed
Japanese were concentrated at that place.'? About 25,000, simi-
larly, arrived at Saigon and Thu Dau Mot. By 18 January, about
70,000 Japanese were disarmed and concentrated in southern
French Indo-China. There were still 3,000 on garrison duty,
and they were expected to be concentrated at Cap St. Jacques by
the end of February.

WITHDRAWAL OF INDIAN CONTINGENT FROM FIC

Nothing of importance occurred in February 1946. Between
the ist and 7th, all matters relating to French Indo-China were
handed over to the SACSEA Inter Service Commission. On
8 February, the rear headquarters of the 20th Indian Division
closed, and command passed to the Mission. On 9 February, the
Headquarters of the 100 Indian Infantry Brigade, 14/13 Frontier
Force Rifles and remainder of 1/1 Gurkha Rifles (half of this
regiment having left on 27 January 1946) left Saigon for India.
The rear headquarters of the 20th Indian Division, 9 Jat (MG
Battalion) and 4/10 Gurkha Rifles left for India on 12 February.

On 1 March, the SEAC received the approval of the
Combined Chiefs of Staff for its proposal to exclude French Indo-
China south of 16° N from SEAC. This was given from the
midnight of 4/5 March 1946. Thus Lord Louis Mountbatten’s
responsibility to the General of the Army, MacArthur, was limited
to the repatriation of the Japanese and for this the Inter Service
Mission was detailed. On 13 February, the SEAG transferred
Field-Marshal Terauchi with a skeleton staff to Singapore; two
days later he bade good-bye to Admiral d’Argenlieu and concluded
with him the arrangements for handing over to the French
authorities 68,000 Japanese still in the couniry. By the end of the
month the remaining two battalions of the British army left for

19 Weekly Intelligence Summary No, 221.

RESTORATION OF LAW AND ORDER IN FRENCH INDO-CHINA 215

India. The phase-out of the Royal Air Force had already been
completed, only one small staging-post being left behind in Saigon.
On 3 April 1946, the Chiefs of Staff transferred all the
SEAC's remaining duties to the French military commander, who
alone was thereafter responsible to the General of the Army,
MacArthur, for French Indo-China. Lord Louis Mountbatten
relinquished his responsibility at midnight on 13 May 1946.

THAILAND

The reoccupation and liberation of Siam or Thailand had
a course different from that of French Indo-China, particularly in
so far as there was no Chinese intervention or responsibility any-
where in the country. 'The Siamese Government welcomed the
Supreme Allied Gommander's authority and co-operated with him
atevery stage. Their problem was essentially economic, and their
policy was the earliest elimination of foreign elements and streng-
thening of internal administration so as to establish peace and
prosperity for the state.

Siam stretches from 6°N to 20°N latitude and from 97°E
to 106°E longitude, and consists of an almost square mass of
continental land, with a peninsula running south into Malaya. At
its broadest Siam is about 500 miles, but in the Kra Peninsula it
is only about ten miles in width. The coast-line is immense, 1,200
miles along the Gulf of Siam and 300 miles on the Indian Ocean.
During the Japanese regime, between 1941 and 1945, two Shan
and four Malaya states were included to enlarge the area.

The railways and roads were fairly good and had mostly
replaced river and canal communications, which had been the
sole effective means of communication in the historical past. lu
the central plains through which the Menam Chao Bhraya (the
most important river in Siam) flows the waterways still constitute
the normal means of communication. For about sixty miles north
of Bangkok the rivers and the canals provide, besides irrigation,
navigation by poled or towed lighters.

Strategically the country can be divided into five broad zones;
mountainous north, Karat basin of the east, south-eastern Siam,
Karat peninsula and the central plains. "The first three important
towns of the state were Bangkok, Chiengmai and Puket, with a
total population of 7,60,000, with Bangkok alone accounting for
7,00,000. In 1941, the total population of Siam was estimated at
16,367,000.

Until 1936 the Siamese Government had discouraged road
construction for fear of competition with railways, which were

216 POST-WAR OCCUPATION FORCES: SOUTH-EAST ASIA

state-owned. Although the Japanese opened new routes they were
in a neglected condition at the time of their surrender. The
Japanese during their occupation had constructed railways to con-
nect lower Burma, and through Kra Peninsula to Join with the
Malaya railway network.

The temperature is hot and humid throughout the year,
with south-west and north-east monsoons in the two seasons into
which the year is divided. Troop movements from Burma to Siam
and from Bangkok or Muang Don or to any other town had to be
regulated according to rainfall at any particular place and time.
Air-lifts were a real problem; the air distance from Rangoon to
Bangkok is about 380 miles, but it involves the crossing of hills
with an altitude of 5,000 feet and covered with thick clouds. The
time for safe flight is between 1000 and 1300 hours. A light rain
would spoil the airfield; a prolonged spell of bad weather makes the
airfield unfit for use for many days.

Since 1932 the Government in Siam was a constitutional
monarchy, but as the ruler was a minor, a council of regency per-
formed these functions. The Regent, Luang Pradit, was friendly
to the Allies even during the war, and on the defcat of Japan he
had overthrown the pro-Japanese Government and announced his
intention to try its leaders as war criminals. The local adminis-
tration in Siam was generally troublesome due to poor communica-
tions and inefficient police force. This involved avoidance of inter-
ference with local politics for which strict instructions were issued
to the unit commanders of the occupation force. Lord Louis
Mountbatten, therefore, decided to treat Siam as a friendly power
for military purposes and invited a Siamese military mission to
his headquarters at Kandy. Led by Lieutenant-General Sena
Narong, it arrived on 3 September 19457°, and signed a military
agreement relating to ‘details of Allied military operations in
Siam for surrender and disarming of Japanese *'.

In September 1945, the post-war reoccupation of Siam
began. The South-East Asia Command had planned to employ
two full divisions, but as the Siamese had promised full co-operation
as a friendly power and there were also clandestine forces favourable
to the Allies (through Allied Force 136 and OSS) it was decided
to send only one division from Rangoon. The 7th Indian Division
was chosen for this purpose, while the 26th Indian Division was
kept in reserve. The 207 Military Mission was attached to the
division selected for liaison with the Siamese army, and Royal Air

РТ 204] September’ із another date. Vide page 279, рага 87 of Mountbatten's
at Те, Мо. SEACOS 466, SACSEA to AMSSO, 5 September 1945.

RESTORATION OF LAW AND ORDER IN FRENCH INDO-CHINA 217

Force support, at the estimated strength of 1931 personnel, was also
provided.

The South-East Asia Command's task, throughout the first
month of reoccupation, was organisation and negotiation of a
treaty of peace and friendship with Siam. With a view to helping
the subordinate commanders to grasp the complete picture of his
plan, Lord Louis Mountbatten prepared instructions pertaining to
all major tasks. There are three such documents which may serve
as illustrations of the South-East Asia Command's method of work.
The first is Force Plan No. 2, dated 2 September 1945, the second
is Detailed Order, dated 8 September 1945, for the concentration
of the 18th Area Army, while the third is ‘Notes by General
Officer Commanding ALF Siam, dated 19 November 1945, on
the post-war surrender tasks in Siam’. The administrative instruc-
tions of ALF Siam gave considerable latitude to the subordinate
commanders as it was admitted that, owing to the large number of
additional troops allowed to this formation (ALF Siam) and the
size of the country to be controlled, it was necessary to decentralise
responsibility to a greater extent than сізеу/һеге 7.

The Order of Battle in Siam was as follows :—

7th Indian Division
136 Field Regiment
30 Indian Mountain Regiment

The Division had three brigades with the following infantry
battalions: —

33 Indian Infantry Brigade
1 Queens
4/15 Punjab
4/1 Gurkha Rifles

89 Indian Infantry Brigade
1 Sikh
3/6 Gurkha Rifles
4/8 Gurkha Rifles

114 Indian Infantry Brigade

1 Royal Jat
4/14 Punjab
4/5 Royal Gurkha Rifles

On 5 September 1945, the King of Siam returned from
Switzerland at the request of the Regent. On the 20th, Seni
Pramoj (former Siamese Minister in Washington and leader of the
Free Thai Movement abroad) was appointed as Prime Münister.
On 24 September, the Siamese delegation arrived at Kandy,

за War Diary (A/Q and С Branch), the 7th Indian Division, 29 September 1945.

218 POST-WAR OCCUPATION FORCES: SOUTH-EAST ASIA

headed by Prince Viwatcha Chaiyant, at the invitation of
Mr. Dening, the British plenipotentiary for negotiating the treaty
with Siam. The discussions started well but proceeded rather
slowly for, among other reasons, lack of instructions from Bangkok.
No conclusive agreement was therefore reached until the close of
the year. :

The new year 1946 opened with the signingof a treaty bet-
ween the United Kingdom and Siam. Consequently the whole of
January was spent in rejoicings, ending with the bestowal of Siam's
highest honour on Lord Louis Mountbatten. Australia followed
the United Kingdom in making a similar treaty with Siam. China
too sent a good-will mission and signed a treaty with Siam in
Bangkok. Elections took place in Siam on 6 January, and within
a few weeks a new government was installed. Meanwhile, the
recovered prisoners of war had been sent to Rangoon, and the
members of the Indian National Army were sent by sea to Calcutta.
A part of their work being completed on 14 January, the 33
Indian Infantry Brigade left Siam, and the Headquarters of the
7th Indian Division was closed on 26 January. French observers
were attached for the first time to ALF Siam for the mutual benefit
of the French, the British and the Siamese. The demobilisation of
the Siamese army continued which ceased to be a tool of un-
scrupulous politicians,

Normal conditions were now re-established in Siam, which
reverted to its status as a sovereign power but for certain under-
takings relating to restitution and readjustment to security and
commercial and economic collaboration......... *3 She had to pay
as reparation 1,500,000 tons of rice out of her old savings and the
1946-47 crop which was to be sold. United Kingdom and India
promised to help Siam to become a member of the United Nations
Organisation

By the third week of January 1946, 1,12,630 Japanese had
been disarmed and only 600 remained at Nakhon Nayok for simi-
lar disposal, A formal surrender parade was held at Bangkok on
11 January, when two admirals and eightcen generals surrendered
their swords. On 8 February, the Chiefs of Staff delegated the
authority to the French, Dutch and-Siamese to hold surrendered
Japanese troops?*. Thereafter the occupation forces were free to
leave Siam.

In March 1946, the 207th Military Mission was disbanded.
In April, the 114 Indian Infantry Brigade left for Malaya, and by
31 May all British forces had left Siam, with the exception of the

73War Diary, the 7th Indian Division, 5 January 1946
*4Telegraph No. COSSEA 473, Combined Offices to SACSEA, 8 February 1946.

RESTORATION OF LAW AND ORDER IN FRENCH INDO-CHINA 219

naval officer in charge at Bangkok, the Royal Air Force Transport
units and two battalions. The repatriation of the Japanese surren-
dered personnel and of the few RAPWI was the only responsibility
of SACSEA in Siam thereafter which was accomplished smoothly
as troop-ships became available.

CHAPTER XV

Restoration of Law aud Order in the
Netherlands East Indies

INTRODUCTION

The British Government had no idea that the responsibility
for the restoration of law and order in the Netherlands East Indies
would fall to them. But a month after the Japanese surrender the
situation in that country was reported to be one of anxiety, hence
the restoration of law and order there was assigned to the SACSEA,
with effect from 15 August 1945. The estimate of forces to be
employed under the Joint Planning Staff was that for this task
a division less two brigades would be required at Batavia, to be in
position there by 4 October, and that a brigade group should reach
Sourabaya by 16 October. However, the problem there ceased
to be an easy one, owing to its complicated political background.

POLITICAL BACKGROUND

Before World War II, the large number of islands which
string like beads between Malaya Peninsula and Australia were
subject to the Dutch colonial domination. There was a growing
movement for national emancipation in these lands, which the
Japanese did not fail to exploit. They had defeated the Dutch
easily and promised freedom to the people. Their policy of
appeasing the nationalists and employing Indonesians in large
numbers in the administration and the exclusion of the Dutch,
provided further strength to the independence movement.

The Dutch had lost heavily in Europe and were not able to
recover completely by the time the Japanese surrender came about.
None-the-less, they dreamt of restoring their lost authority and
regaining their former possessions. They naturally found them-
selves in a dilemma because they could find neither men nor
material to reoccupy the Netherlands EastIndies immediately after
the Japanese surrender. The gap of time which thereby intervened
was their undoing because in the interval the Indonesians prepared
themselves for a fight against the Dutch, the war of liberation
which many nationalist Indonesians had been contemplating for
a long time. On 17 August 1945, the Indonesians under the
leadership of Dr. Soekarno and Dr. Hatta, declared a Republic
іп spite of the Japanese opposition to it, and thereby united the

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RESTORATION OF LAW AND ORDER IN THE NETHERLANDS 221]

diverse elements of public life, the nationalists and underground
extremists. Dr. Soekarno, the pride of the Indonesian people,
headed the government, and they organised the country to resist
the restoration of colonialism, which the European powers were
not yet prepared to relinquish.
It was at this stage that the South-East Asia Command was
assigned the responsibility of maintaining peace in that country.
The main tasks were defined as, firstly, the enforcement of the
surrender of the Japanese troops and their disarmament; and
secondly, the release of British and Indian prisoners of war there.
Lord Louis Mountbatten appointed General Christison as the
Allied Force Commander in Netherlands East Indies and to him
were given detailed instructions which ran as follows:
*(a) to take such measures as you consider necessary to
ensure the effective control of Japanese headquarters
within your command; |
(b) to disarm and concentrate under Allied control all
Japanese forces within the area under your command;

(c) to arrange for the care and disposal of all APWI in
accordance with instructions which have been or may
be issued to you separately.”

“Іп the execution of your role you will be guided by the
principle that operations undertaken by British troops are confined
as far as possible to the immediate areas in which they land."

The Supreme Allied Commander also wrote privately to
General Christison, as he had written previously to his other
generals in South-East Asia Command, to restore confidence in
the people.

The British Government concluded a Civil Administration
Agreement with the Dutch Government on 24 August 1945."
According to this document, the Supreme Allied Commander was
empowered to exercise final local authority over every branch of
the Indonesian Government in all matters of a military nature.
In purely civil matters the Dutch Lieutenant-Governor-General
continued to be the supreme authority, but his actions were required
to conform to military orders. Furthermore, it was up to the
Allied Force Commander to note the changes in the military
situation and to notify the Governor-General of the extent to which
responsibility for the civil administration might be resumed by the
Netherlands East Indies Government. Аз military situation
became quieter and happier, the Dutch civil administration would
enlarge its scope of authority.

т Van Mook: The Stakes of Democracy in South-East Asia, pp. 186-87.

222 POST-WAR OCCUPATION FORCES: SOUTH-EAST ASIA

In September 1945, the month after the surrender, all the
parties concerned were making hectic preparations. The British
were preparing to land to restore the military situation,the Dutch
to restore their empire and the Indonesians to fight the Dutch and
the Allies if they obstructed their path in their march for freedom.

BRITISH LANDINGS

After the Japanese surrender on 2 September 1945, British
landings became possible. But preparatory work was necessary,
Mines had to be cleared to let the ships sail safely up to the coast.
Between 5 and 10 September, only a few detachments were landed
in Java and Sumatra to ‘ show the flag and symbolise the reconquest '
and to release the prisoners of war. But full landings at Batavia
were scheduled for 4 October 1945 (one month later) and after-
wards. On 16 September, four days after the Japanese surrender
in Singapore, and thirteen days before the arrival of the expected
British force, one advance battalion of the Seaforth Highlanders
and a few other detachments from the British cruiser Cumberland
and the Netherlands cruiser Tromp reached Tanjong Priok (the
port of Batavia).

The Dutch preparations were visible not in Java but in
Australia, where they had a camp-government, and in Holland
where the government was straining itself to fill the vacuum of
colonial administration. Until October 1945 there was not much
evidence about Dutch ability to restore authority in the country,

By far the best preparations were made by the Indonesians.
During the six weeks between the declaration of independence
and the landing of the British force, the nationalists had worked
day and night to create a government of their own. They brought
about essential unity among themselves for the achievement of
independence, collected arms from every conceivable source and
created a nucleus of Indonesian state army. The Índependence
Preparatory Committee met from 18 to 29 August and filled all
appointments in the state with suitable personnel and drafted the
Indonesian Constitution which was promulgated. It prepared a
blueprint for the administration. On 29 August 1945, the In-
dependence Preparatory Committee was dissolved and in its place
the Komite Nasional Indonesia Poesat (KNIP) was established as
an advisory body to the President without legislative functions.
Batavia was selected as republican headquarters and named
Djakarta. In quick succession, regional governors for the eight
provinces (west, central and east Java, Sumatra, Borneo, Celebes,
the Moluccas and the Lesser Soendas) were appointed.

RESTORATION OF LAW AND ORDER IN THE NETHERLANDS 99%

Dr. Soekarno chose his cabinet. The Sultanates of Djakarta,
Soerakarta, Mang-Koencgearan and Pakoelaman announced their
support for the republic. The Japanese-raised puppet Hei-Ho
was disbanded. All buildings flew red and white merdcka Bags,
sign-boards in Javanese were placed outside the offices, and posters
with quotations from Lincoln's Gettysburg address were pasted.
Indonesian civil police began regular rounds of the streets of Batavia,
and life slowly became peaceful and normal. Also, fitful fighting
continued between the Republicans and Japanese forces, for the
former sought Japanese arms and the latter contested the new civil
authority.

Lord Louis Mountbatten was not well informed about the
developments in the Netherlands East Indies; hence he decided to
send a mission to report upon the actual conditions there. The
advance party of this mission of observers was literally dropped on
the Republic of Indonesia by parachutes on the Kemajoran
acrodrome as also on Batavia, on 8 September 1945. They were
seven officers and were sent in advance of the main Allied party
which sailed by HMS Cumberland, arriving a week later. The
observers, contrary to facts, reported, on 12 September, that the
bulk of the population in Java was indifferent to all political
movements, that the nationalist movement was the handiwork of
the intellectuals, and that once transport and security problems
were solved other tasks would be comparatively simple’.

With a report of this kind in his hands, it was only natural
for the Supreme Allied Commander to feel highly optimistic about
the successful accomplishment of his assigned task. He gave orders
to the Japanese Command to maintain law and order, and on
3 September 1945, desired them to dissolve the Republic un-
conditionally. Three days later he further warned them not to
hand over the administration to any political party in the country.
But all these orders could not be carried out by the Japanese,
because they were notin contiol ofevents. Insome places they did
check nationalist opposition with conscientious efficiency, in other
places they relapsed into an attitude of listless indifference, while
at some places they voluntarily interned themselves in camps
awaiting the arrival of the Allied troops, and in other places they
joined the Indonesian extremists. The whole situation was in
a flux. In these circumstances, on 28 September 1945, Lord
Mountbatten reversed his former order of the non-recognition of
the Republic. When General Christison was appointed Allied
Commander, on 27 September 1945, with no knowledge of Indo-

2David Wehl: The Birth of Indonesia, pp. 37-38.

224 POST-WAR OCCUPATION FORCES: SOUTH-EAST ASIA

nesian country and people and with only two days to join his post
in Batavia, the BBC announced that he was going to hold a round
table conference of the British, the Dutch and the leaders of the
Indonesian Republic. He declared that * The Indonesian Govern-
ment will not be expelled and will be expected to continue civil
administration in the area outside those occupied by British forces.
We intend to see the leaders of the various movements and shall
tell them what we are coming for. I intend to bring Dutch
representatives and Indonesian leaders together at a round-table
conference which the Dutch have steadfastly refused to do hitherto’.
In other words, the General recognised the nationalist leaders as
a de facto political power, gave them an international status and
invoked their assistance in the solution of the problems of that
country. He also refused to keep the Indonesians out of the
administration of the country, whether it was occupied or not by
the British forces for the time being. In fact he asked the party
leaders to treat him and his troops as their guests and make them-
selves responsible for the distribution of supplies in the area which
were controlled by them. "Thus was Lord Mountbatten's policy
expressed in effect, which did not coincide with the expectations
and objects cherished by the Dutch. Hence Admiral Helfrich
protested to the Supreme Allied Commander, on 30 September,
against his policy which he termed a betrayal. Dr. Van Mook
joined him in it. But Lord Louis Mountbatten refused to crush
the Indonesians. He was supported by the Rt. Hon. J. J. Lawson,
the Secretary of State for War, who declared on 30 September
that ‘although he understood the Dutch attitude, British
forces would not be allowed to become involved in political
strife 77,

The troops used by the South-East Asia Command in the
Netherlands East Indies were mainly troops of the Indian army
and quite a large number of them subscribed to the same faith
as the Indonesians. Moreover, Java had been made over to this
Command to be treated on the principles of the United Nations
Charter, which assured the people sovereignty and freedom. The
United States had assured the Japanese that they would be released
and repatriated, and not massacred at the altar of Dutch
imperialism.

The situation in the Netherlands East Indies presented a
contrast to that in French Indo-China or Siam. In the former,
the French had sent in several divisions and had saved the British
troops from being implicated in local hostilities, while the govern-

3 Gerbrandy, P. S.: Indonesia, p. 99
+ Mountbatten's Report, p. 270.

RESTORATION OF LAW AND ORDER IN THE NETHERLANDs 225

ment in Siam had assumed responsibility for administration quite
readily. But the position of Holland was quite different. She
was not in a position to take over control, yet wanted Java back
as part of her empire immediately, and like the Bourbons of
France had learnt or forgotten nothing. The people of Indonesia
feared the revival of the hated imperialism. Consequently their
pent-up emotions, the accumulated hatred of the oppressor, vented
themselves in violence against the Dutch, the Chinese and the
Ambonese, who, in the eyes of the people, symbolised the institu-
tions of colonial government.

'The disposition of troops sent by the South-East Asia
Command aggravated suspicion and heightened the alarm and
anger of the people. The only troops that arrived were three
Indian divisions, which were located separately at Batavia,
Sourabaya and Sumatra. The South-East Asia Command's policy
in this disposition of the troops was, as in French Indo-China, to
station them at strong-points in the country, in order to round up
the Japanese, liberate and repatriate the Allied prisoners of
war, and to maintain law and order. Though Dr. Soekarno had
issued general orders against interfering with the British, the
Indonesians suspected that the presence of these troops was only a
preliminary to the return of the Dutch. They were strengthened
in this belief by the protected landings of Dutch troops. Whatever
the British professions, the Indonesians felt that the practical effect
of British policy would be to hold the ports until the Dutch could
amass enough troops to return to Java inforce. This apprehension
influenced the views expressed by the nationalist leaders in India
also.?

The proclamation issued by Rear-Admiral Patterson and
Lieut.-General Sir Philip Christison, as well as the activities
of the Dutch and their colonial troops further confirmed
the apprehensions of the Indonesians. Patterson had announced
on 29 September that the Allied troops were there * to maintain
law and order until the time that the lawful government of the
Netherlands East Indies is once again functioning". And the
commander of the land forces indiscreetly proclaimed that the
Japanese forces in Java would be used to maintain law and order
as a temporary measure—the Japanese who had created so much
hatred for themselves. То cap all this came the almost insane
military operations of General Van O Yen, whose “ trigger-happy
Dutch and Ambonese soldiers shot at anything that looked suspi-
cious, and when hunting was poor, they were not above forcing an

5 Armindia to SACSEA on 18 October 1945.

226 POST-WAR OCCUPATION FORCES: SOUTH-EAST ASIA

Indonesian’s house and dragging off, without charges or warrant,
some or all of the inhabitants", As a result of all these political,
military and psychological factors, October 1945 began with
horrible scenes of violence and ugly expressions of mass hysteria
against the British forces. An explanation of this may be found
in the statement of Lord Louis Mountbatten that ignorance of
British motives and methods was responsible for the attacks by
Indonesians. Major-General Hawthorn, commanding the 23rd
Indian Division, issucd printed leaflets on 14 October 1945, to
inform the citizens of Batavia about the objects of the British occupa-
tion of Java and seeking their co-operation. This was perhaps a
rejoinder to a proclamation issued by the nationalists on 11 October
1945, that guerilla warfare would start in Batavia and the city had
been put in a state of siege. Lord Louis Mountbatten has hinted
also on a second cause of opposition by the Indonesians to the
British force. The Dutch troops associated with the British unit
“created a number of incidents which though in themselves of
minor importance had the cumulative effect of provoking the
Indonesians............ I directed, at Lieut.-General’s request
that no more Dutch forces should be brought into Java until the
situation was clearer and the risk of insurrection less acute'?. The
British attitude towards the Indonesians was one of readiness to
meet the situation at any cost and at any moment, but only in
defence of their position and power. "They, therefore, built up
their military strength as quickly as they could. Having selécted
certain key-positions in Java they sent their troops only to those
places and maintained communications with them?. On 29
September, as stated already, Batavia was occupied, and between
2 October and the end of the month, sufficient force was collected
at that centre. One brigade arrived on 2 October and started
building up the divisional headquarters there. "Together with
seven Netherlands East Indies army companies and one ex-prisoners
of war battalion, both of which arrived on 4 October, and with an
advance Royal Air Force Headquarters, which arrived on 7
October, the brigade constituted adequate force for the time being.
By the third week a second brigade of the 23rd Indian Division
had come in as also the main headquarters of the Royal Air Force,
with two squadrons of the RAF Regiment, two RAF Thunderbolt
(P-47) squadrons and two Netherlands squadrons of Catalinas
(PBY-5). Gonsequently, in the last week of the month, the British
force in the island of Java consisted of one brigade of the 23rd

6 Crockett. How the Trouble B.
7 Mountbatten's. Report, p. 2 T hi nS

®Telegram No, SEACOS 523, 17 October 1945, SEAC to Cabinet Offices.

KESTORATION OF LAW AND ORDER IN THE NETHERLANDS 227

Indian Division at Batavia, another at Bandoeng (with a detach-
ment at Buitenzorg), one battalion at Semarang (together with an
improvised brigade under the command of the divisional artillery
commander) and a brigade at Sourabaya for the whole eastern half
of the island. The last unit was opposed by the Indonesians in
the harbour but was permitted to enter after an assurance was
given about its real intentions of being messengers of peace and
good-will and not the harbingers of Dutch imperialism. Asa further
proof of British sincerity in this respect, General Christison con-
verted Netherlands Indies Civil Affairs Organisation, which was
hated by the Indonesians as an organ of Dutch power, into Allied
Military Administration, Civil Affairs Branch, whose task was to
engage in welfare services, distribution of supplies and custody and
interrogation of prisoners.

But accidents do happen in history and an accident of a
miserable nature happened at Sourabaya on 29 October and chang-
ed the course of Anglo-Indonesian relations avdersely. Ав stated
earlier, Sourabaya was held by the extremists and the Supreme
Allied Commander had no knowledge of it. So when the Royal
Air Force dropped leaflets on the city on 27 October, warning its
inhabitants to hand over their arms within forty-eight hours or
be shot thereafter for default, there was a flare-up in the city.
Road-blocks, seizure of motor cars, removal of national flags and
confiscation of firearms before the expiry of the forty-eight hours
provoked the Sourabayans to fury. They retorted by killing and
abducting Dutch women and children and fighting the British
force at every point of contact. On 29 October Dr. Soekarno
arrived by air, followed by the commander of the 23rd Indian
Division from Batavia ; and together they succeeded in arranging a
truce with the local Indonesian leaders., Later in the day,
Brigadier Mallaby, commanding 49 Indian Infantry Brigade at
Sourabaya, toured the town with the Indonesian leaders, who
cxplained to the crowds about the agreement made with the
commander of the 23rd Indian Division. Some extremists in the
crowd shouted down their leaders and shot dead Brigadier Mallaby.
Mob rule ensued in the town; British positions and units were
attacked everywhere with swords and spears; and a number of
Allied prisoners of war were killed. All that the British could do
in the circumstances was to retreat and concentrate their brigade
in the dockyard area, to rally all available persons among the
prisoners of war at Dharmo, which was a mile south of the town,
and finally, to warn the city once again, but in more rigorous
terms. Surrender if you arc a criminal and co-operate if an
innocent citizen '.

228 POST-WAR OCCUPATION FORCES: SOUTH-EAST ASIA

Life elsewhere was no better for the British or the Japanese,
At Bandoeng, which ís a pleasant hill station seventy miles from
Batavia, the Indonesians had very nearly got possession of an
internment camp with thousands of Dutch, men, women and
children, but the Japanese defended the city succesfully until the
arrival of 37 Indian Infantry Brigade. At Buitenzorg two
companies of 3/3 Gurkha Rifles rescued quite a large number of
captive women and children; at Depok, between Buitenzorg and
Batavia, 1,250 Christian women and children were saved and
sent to Batavia. At Semarang the Japanese handed over arms and
prisoners of war to the Indonesians, while there was fighting at
Cheribon, Jogjakarta and other places. In fact as the British
penetrated into the interior, to places like Ambarawa, Semarang
and Magelang, they saw nothing but fighting, looting, killing,
kidnapping and ruthless scramble for weapons of destruction.
Everywhere streets were unsafe after dark, canals stank with odour
of putrefying flesh, and civilians had to go to internment camps
for protection.

By an irony of fate the British and the Japanese came closer
together in self-interest, and the British had to use the Japanese to
maintain law and order outside their eight bridge-heads. But they
prohibited offensive action by their troops and instructed them to
fire only when fired upon.

Dr. Van Mook has observed correctly that ‘in Sourabaya
ali the succeeding phases of the French Revolution from the first
seizure of power to the Terror seemed to follow each other in a
few weeks, ending with a gruesome “ people's tribunal" in the
principal club, where a number of defenceless Dutch and Eurasians
were “‘ tried ” and delivered to the mob to be cruelly clubbed and
speared to death'?. Java was, in other words, in revolt against
Holland and had adopted violence and terror to achieve her
freedom.

Lord Louis Mountbatten had, in the circumstances, to act
warily and thereby bring peace in the land'^. Не outlined his
task into two phases, one diplomatic and political and the other
military and economic. The first of these belonged really to the
Cabinets of the United Kingdom and Holland. Hence he dealt
with the representatives of * Indonesian Free State? and Holland
within Java as two separate parties whose disputes could only be
solved by the Government of Holland, but in whose combined or
collective welfare the British Government was deeply interested
and for whose mutual understanding United Kingdom was ever

S Тһе Stakes of Democracy in South-East Ала. О i
А р. cit, p. 210.
"Telegram No. SEACOS 519, 16 October 1945, SACSEA to Cabinet Offices.

RESTORATION OF LAW AND ORDER IN THE NETHERLANDS 229

ready to offer any kind of service. It is from this broad and
humanitarian Point of view that Lord Louis Mountbatten sent
his Director of Intelligence to London to explain the true position
to the Chiefs of Staff. This officer later went to Holland on the
same mission. Unfortunately, the Dutch proved to be obdurate,
and the Indonesians adamant, on the question of international
status and recognition. There could be no progress in their talks
or agreement. On 14 November, Dr. Sjahrir formed a cabinet
of moderates and indicated his willingness to co-operate with the
foreign powers. Dr. Soekarno, who was the president of the
Republic, appealed to President Truman and Premier Attlee for
intervention, and to Marshal Stalin for moral support. Other
Indonesians expressed the idea of calling upon the Mussalmans of
the world to join in their struggle. Lest the political situation
should deteriorate for lack of a clear understanding of British
intentions in Java, Mr. Noel Baker stated in the House of Commons,
on 17 October 1945, that Great Britain recognised only Holland
as the ruler of Java. This was further clarified by Mr. Ernest
Bevin on 23 November 1945, as follows: ‘ Our military tasks were,
first, to disarm and concentrate the Japanese forces; secondly, to
rescue and bring home our prisoners of war; and thirdly, to rescue
the thousands of internees in the camps throughout the large island.
We had no intention of using any British forces for any other purpose
or against the inhabitants. Indeed, our efforts to avoid the
shedding of blood have resulted in our being accused of weakness.
It is essential for the fulfilment of our military task to secure and
maintain law and order, and naturally General Christison has
authority to use his forces for that purpose.

* (But) we have no intention of being involved in any constitu-
tional dispute between the Netherlands and the people of the
Netherlands East Indies......... We began, however, to advise
that negotiations should be opened, and I do not propose to go
into any controversy about personalities—of this individual or the
other. The Netherlands Government refused to negotiate with
Dr. Soekarno. On the other hand, our generals met him and
had a talk with him '.

There was one fortunate circumstance within Java, which
deserves notice. Whatever the attitude of Admiral Helfrich,
commanding the Netherlands forces in the Far East, might be,
the co-operation of Dr. Van der Plas and Dr. Van Mook was
available. Both had opposed the recognition of Dr. Soekarno in
September 1945, but by the end of October 1945, they had agreed
to invite him for negotiations. On 1 November, Dr. Van Mook
conferred with Dr. Soekarno, on the authority of Dr. Logemann,

230 POST-WAR OCCUPATION FORCES: SOUTH-EAST ASIA

who was then the minister of Holland for overseas territories.
Dr. Van der Plas concurred in the ideas and procedure of his
Lieutenant-Governor-General,

EVENTS IN JAVA

November 1945 was more conspicuous for military achieve-
ments than political ones. On 22 November, extremist Indonesians,
inspired by the example of Sourabaya, killed and dishonoured the
dead bodies of twenty Indian enlisted men'' and four members of an
air crew of a C-47 which had crash-landed at Bekasi due to engine
trouble. Three days later a force of infantry with a detachment
of tanks was sent to wipe out the terrorists and burn the place and
raze it to the ground". Lord Louis Mountbatten was naturally
shocked at the two massacres but found it late to intervene. So
he issued a stern warning: < It was perfectly understandable that
soldiers after discovering such an incident should be strongly
moved and react as they did but that, whereas reprisals visited
deliberately on guilty and innocent alike might be intelligible if
taken in the heat of the moment and under intolerable provocation,
any form of calculated reprisal whatever or punitive measures of
that kind taken in cold blood was absolutely opposed to his policy
and would be punished with the greatest vigour ". Elsewhere too
the example of Sourabaya was emulated. It had become the
symbol of invulnerability, procured by magic amulets and in-
cantations. Unarmed boys tried to rush into advancing tanks
and armoured cars in a trance-like mood and mass psychosis. In
central and western Java the presence of prisoners of war and the
Japanese, with the absence of communications between them
and the British made the Indonesians attack almost all places of
importance like Ambarawa and Bandoeng.

Two facts however emerged clearly from the fight between
the British and the Indonesians. The first was that the British
did not swerve from their adopted policy of moderation. None-
the-less, they met terror with terror, though only in grave situations
like Sourabaya and Bekasi murders. Normally they adopted the
principle of discretion as the better part of valour. Major-General
E. C. Mansergh's!? letter to the Indonesian governor of east Java,
R. M. D. Soerio, in November 1945, bears testimony to this view,
while his letter to General Christison, dated 9 November, assured
him that * I have taken every precaution to delay the use of force,

н: се a о 7 Hyderabad.
ar Diaries of the 23rd Indian Division and units.
53 Commanding 5th Indian Division. TW Mes

RESTORATION OF LAW AND ORDER IN THE NETHERLANDS 231

to confine the areas to be struck to the most important and then
only one at a time. There will be pauses in the operations during
which the Indonesians will be able to contact me".

At this time the Supreme Allied Gommander was confronted
with a difficult problem. At the fourteenth inter-command
meeting General Auchinleck had raised the question of employment
of Indian troops in Burma and South-East Asia and observed as
follows: ‘ There can be no objection to the employment of Indian
troops to deal with any Japanese or disturbances inspired and led
by the Japanese in the occupied countries. It is essential, however,
that Indian troops are not employed against nationalist movements
save in the most exceptional circumstances, as such action would
have grave political repercussions in India’. As no solution was
found, the question was repeated at the next meeting on 7 November
1945. The Chiefs of Staff informed Lord Louis Mountbatten that
the Indian troops ought to be confined to maintenance of simpie
law and order, that no more Indian troops would be available for
reinforcing those in Java and that above all it would be necessary
to send them back to India form March 1946. То these they added
that the 2nd British Division then in Malaya would not be sent to
Java to take the place of Indian troops which would be withdrawn.

All these in effect meant that in December, Lord Louis
Mountbatten was to find a political solution for a most critical and
difficult military problem. He raised therefore the question of
British policy once again. On 3 December, he discussed it with
the Chief of Imperial General Staff at Singapore and asked specifi-
cally for the approval of reinforcing Batavia with brigades of the
7th Indian Division, evacuating Semarang absolutely and evacua-
ting Sourabaya after political settlement with the Indonesians.
The Chiefs of Staff agreed to this as a long-term policy. Ten
days later Lord Louis Mountbatten sought instructions for authority
to reduce bloodshed by either persuading Dr. Sjahrir’s group to
cease fire or compelling the extremists and anti-social elements to
abide by law. On 21 December he was empowered to adopt the
police power to round up and hold in custody the known or suspec-
ted extremists, disarm and concentrate the Indonesian elements of
police force and take over all transport from the hands of extremists,
after duly informing Dr. Sjahrir and publishing it in the newspapers.
As a corollary to this, all the Dutch troops were sent out of Batavia,
and the Supreme Allied Commander fixed 27th of the month for
the commencement of police action against disturbers of peace.
The area covered by Batavia, Buitenzorg and Bandoeng was cleared

14 D.O. No. G/165 dated 9 November 1945, Main HQ 5th Indian Division, SEAC
Para 2.

232 POST-WAR OCCUPATION FORCES: SOUTH-EAST ASIA

of all snipers, road-blockers etc. by a tactical disposition of troops
and undoubted reprisals upon reckless extremists.?

The Dutch and the Indonesians protested vehemently against
this policy of exclusion. The former complained that they were
betrayed. On 30 December 1945, and, as a special concession to
Admiral Helfrich, General Christison permitted 800 Netherlands
marines to land at Tanjong Priok, but he would allow no more than
these. When this order was questioned in the House of Commons
on 23 January 1946, Mr. Ernest Bevin said that ‘landings of
large contingencies of Netherlands troops might have led to a
calamity'.'€ Dr. Sjahrir's protest was more reasonable than that of
the Dutch. He felt honestly that ‘if the British tried to keep law
and order by force of arms or by planned military action, the Indo-
nesians would resist to the best of their ability." The Indonesian
attitude generally was * Dutch to clear out or British to be considered
as hostile ’.*®

At the same time the Indonesians saw the situation more
clearly and realistically than the Dutch. Dr. Sjahrir’s visit to
important centres in eastern Java had the good effect of subduing
the impassioned Soetmo of Sourabaya famé, who agreed to obey
Djogjokarta thereafter. The TKR was recognised as the only
army of free Indonesia, and, above all, the prisoners of war were
well treated. The only confusion yet was the ambiguity of Allied
policy in the midst of food scarcity, currency difficulty and anti-
Chinese demonstrations. Guerilla warfare could not be avoided
or prohibited. Dr. Sjahrir himself spoke of resistance by force when
a conference of Allied commanders at Singapore considered force
as a means of establishing order in the Netherlands East Indies.
In these circumstances, Dr. Van Mook left for Holland on 15
December for consultations, and he was not expected to return
before the second week of January 1946. One good result of his
visit was that the Dutch Prime Minister, accompanied by the
Foreign Minister, his deputy and Dr. Van Mook arrived in Britain
on 26 December, and opened discussions with the Government
there on the following day.

The Indonesians were more lucky than the Dutch in gaining
world estimation. The American press was so outspoken in their
favour that the Dutch had to assure America of their honourable
intentions. The British newspapers called for the speedy

15See Operation Order No. 1 in War Di f th s Р
December 1945. 2 ar Diary of the 23rd Indian Division dated 15

16 Gerbrandy, P. S.: Indonesia, p. 101.
17 Mountbatten's Report, page 275, para 66.

185ес Major-General Mansergh’s D.O. С/165 to AL EI
1945, HQ 5th Indian Division South-East Asia Coe ави

RESTORATION OF LAW AND ORDER IN THE NETHERLANDs 233

4. of British forces from the Netherlands East Indies while
е soviet press criticised Dutch imperialism and urged the United
Nations to intervene. Reports of strikes and demonstrations
sympathising with the Indonesians, continued to arrive from
Australian ports.

It appeared that January 1946 would be the beginning of the
end of all troubles in the country and that the ‘police action’ '? would
be attended with conspicuous success. The departure of General
Christison on the 28th of that month from his post as the comman-
der indicated that after all the situation in the country had been
brought under control. Two days before his journey, Dr. Van Mook
had arrived from Holland with Dutch proposals for settlement,
and two days later the Allied forces had impressed the trouble-
makers with the superiority of their strength. The TKR also
co-operated most loyally under Dr. Sharifuddin's administration.
In fact the last week of January witnessed radical developments in
the negotiations between the Indonesians and the Dutch. Criti-
cism of the British policy against the aspirations of the Indonesians
led Holland to send a Parliamentary Commission to visit Java and
collect full information about the problem there; but it had no
control over government policy or over Dr. Van Mook's actions in
the country. Ап explanation of this action of the Dutch Cabinet
at this moment may be in fact that both the Dutch and the
British had ‘reached the joint view that we should indeed ack-
nowledge the right of Indonesia to independence '^?. Another
unexpected event was the deputation of Sir Archibald Clark Kerr
as special ambassador of the United Kingdom to Java, but not
as an arbitrator. А third important occurrence was the censure
of government for using Indian troops in Indonesia and French
Indo-China. Simultaneously with this the news arrived in
Batavia that Russia had asked the Security Council ‘to put an
end to the existing situation’ in Java and Greece. Nothing could
be more auspicious for a people struggling for freedom than this
trend of events inside and outside their country.

The narrative of military operations during the month of
January is therefore a simple one. In Batavia area, the east was
troublesome; Krawang-Ijakampek zone was dangerous and
Cheribon was full of extremists. But bullets mixed with bulletins
subdued the irresponsibles. Western Batavia too called for action,
but it was controlled more easily. The TKR became TKI to
symbolise a national army while Semarang developed into a regular
theatre of war. These two rather alarmed the British, partly

19 Weekly Intelligence Summary No. 218, para 7, sub para 2.
29 Gerbrandy, P. S.: Indonesia, op. cit. page 137. .

234 POST-WAR OCCUPATION FORCES: SOUTH-EAST ASIA

because they called for punitive operations. So ALCNEI had to
declare that even in the worst situation no punitive action should
be undertaken without the prior authority of ALCNEI*?'. He also
encouraged the idea of dropping ‘peace bulletins’ on troubled
areas, especially in eastern Java. He transferred Semarang to the
5th Indian Division, approved of extending Sourabaya area of
occupation and removed the Japanese from Semarang so as to
dissolve the source of irritation to the extremists belonging to that
area. A strict but vigilant control was exercised on the press.
For example, a newspaper, Pewaria, was suppressed for publishing
an article inflaming the people on a political issue, with a note
that * such action, whether by word or deed, cannot be allowed.
It is to establish and maintain peace, law and order that I and
my forces have been ordered here by the United Nations'?*,
ALCNEI also set up courts under Dutch Presidents, one or more
members of which were qualified Indonesians to deal with looters,
strikers, boycotters and saboteurs. One direct result of this was
Soctomo's approach for British recognition”.

Dr. Soekarno during January 1946 moved to Jogjakarta.
On the 5th of the month and with Drs. Hatta and Sharifuddin on
his side, he changed his Headquarters from Batavia to Jogjakarta,
leaving Dr. Sjahrir and the rest of his cabinet to remain at Batavia.
This meant either greater freedom to Dr. Sjahrir, to discuss Dr. Van
Mook’s proposals (still to come from Holland), or all rights reserved
by himself in a far off town of Java. It also gave greater powers
to Dr. Sharifuddin as head of the national army.

February 1946 was a period of comparative calmness and
therefore it wasa most suitable time for constructive statesmanship.
All towns except Bandoeng were quiet, but TKI was not above
suspicion after its raid on Serpong in the first week of the month.
It was hoped that Bandoeng ‘ could become a Batavia rather than
a Sourabaya '**, and so it turned out to be. On the politico-military
side both the Indonesians and the Dutch were preparing themselves
for mutual war after the withdrawal of the British, and both of
them ‘played a waiting game’ on the diplomatic table. The
Indonesian army was sent to camps for training and ordered to be
in readiness for war. Soedirman, Commander-in-Chief of that
army, forbade his men from co-operating with the British officers.
The idea of a Holy War was abandoned, and the RAPWI were
made a bargaining counter for alltalks. 'The Dutch too were

?: War Diary , Sth Indian Division, January 1946. Log Sheet No. 4 Serial No. 31.
22 Letter G/820/118 Main НО. 5th Indian Division d AMACAB, Sourabaya.
*3D.O. G/165 Major-General Mansergh to ALCNEI, 22 February 1946.

^^ War Diary, the 23rd Indian Division, WIS No. 15 dated 27 February 1946.

RESTORATION OF LAW AND ORDER IN THE NETHERLANDS 235

getting stronger by bringing in more and better trained troops
from Holland, whenever an opportunity occurred. But they had
to wait until March for doing so more regularly with Supreme
Allied Commander’s permission and sanction.

On 10 February 1946, Dr. Van Mook submitted the fresh
proposals from Holland, to a conference of Dr. Sjahrir, Sir Archi-
bald Clark Kerr and himself. The principle adumbrated in
those proposals ran as follows:

“The Netherlands Government............ take the view that
the peoples of Indonesia should, after a given preparatory period,
be enabled to decide their political destiny.

** Therefore the Netherlands Government ......... considered
it their duty to do everything in their power in order to create
and to fulfil as soon as possible the conditions which will permit
such a free decision to be taken and which will assure its inter-
national recognition, thereby complying with article 73 of the
United Nations Charter.

** The Netherlands Government therefore intend, in consulta-
tion with authoritative representatives of the Indonesians, elected
from a large variety of groups, to draft a structure for the Kingdom
and for Indonesia based on a democratic partnership.

“ This new organisation is to be maintained for a limited
period, believed to suffice for the fulfilment of the conditions for the
free decision referred to above. At the end of this period, the
partners shall decide independently about the continuation of their
relations on the basis of a then complete and voluntary partnership.
Any difference of opinion as to the question whether the period
should be extended before a free decision is possible, shall be
solved by a procedure of conciliation or, if necessary, by arbitra-
tion",

Obviously these terms were unacceptable to the Indonesians
who demanded ‘100 per cent independence here and now’.
Dr. Soekarno looked upon Netherlands East Indies as one unit and
claimed freedom for all its parts.

At this time world opinion was stirring itself on behalf of the
Indonesians. In the United Nations Organisation, two resolutions,
one by Russia and another by Egypt were moved on 7 February,
but both of them failed to secure the necessary support. Moreover,
on 12 February 1946, the Legislative Assembly of India passed
a resolution, without division, on an adjournment motion, to
censure the Government of India on its ‘ failure to instruct its
delegates to the United Nations Organisation to convey the strong
views of the elected members of the Assembly on the subject of
British-Indian and Dutch operations against the nationalist forces

236 POST-WAR OCCUPATION FORCES: SOUTH-EAST ASÍA

of Indonesia?*. These moves enthused the Indonesians to greater
zeal. At the same time, Holland also came out more enthusias-
tically with her reform proposals on 12 February 1946. The
Chinese Gommunists of Malaya were allowed to move to Indonesia,
with Dr. Sjahrirs permission. The local opinion within Java
hardened and Dr. Sjahrir warned that if negotiations with the
Dutch failed, foreign ‘intervention would besought'. Bandoeng
radio laid emphasis on the example set by Russia in her own
revolution as a pattern for Indonesia to follow.

The net result was that Dutch proposals of 10 February 1946
were put into cold-storage. Dr. Soekarno observed, ' This makes
no advance’. Contrary to expectations nationalists increased their
opposition to the Dutch plan and the extremists revived their
terrorist methods against the Dutch and the British. Bandoeng
became an active centre of opposition. The Headquarters of the
23rd Indian Division and 49 Indian Infantry Brigade were
shifted to that place to save the Japanese who had been sent there
for concentration and disarming. Resistance continued to be stiff
in Sourabaya area where the British forces were practically
encircled.

Sir Archibald Clark Kerr (now Lord Inverchapel) however
showed qualities of statesmanship. He became the persona grata
of the rival parties within a few weeks of his arrival. He succeeded
in convincing them that their mutual interests lay ultimately in a
reasonable settlement of their dispute. This enabled him to get
the cordial consent of Dr. Sjahrir for Dr. Van Mook’s proposition
that the Netherlands troops should be introduced into Java early
in March and in turn to get the approval of the British Chiefs of
Staff for the plan 76,

April 1946 saw a lull in the whole situation. The Indo-
nesians showed evidence of moderation and discipline and forwar-
ded a memorandum on the lines of the Franco-Viet Namese agree-
ment in French Indo-China. This was not acceptable to the
Dutch, whoresented any mention of the conferment of international
status on Indonesia and the transfer of control over Sumatra to
them?’. The negotiations marked no progress and Java again
reverted to terror and extremism. However, the Supreme Allied
Commander was successful in getting the Indonesian agreement

35SAC's real hurdle was his Chiefs of Staff. They would not let SAC either reduce
or modify his Indian forces. They said that ‘there will be the utmost difficulty in
finding British troops to replace them and not only your plans but all plans for the
Ppeace-time employment of our forces wil need reconsideration ^. Telegram Мо.
еВ 473, dated 8 February 1946, Cabinet Office to SACSEA.
25 Telegram No. SEACOS 640 dated 26 February 1946, SACSEA to Cabinet Offices.
Telegram No. SEAC 688, 30 April 1946, SACSEA to Cabinet Offices (not to Dutch).

RESTORATION OF LAW AND ORDER IN THE NETHERLANDS 237

to the evacuation of Allied Prisoners of war and the Japanese by
rail from every point in the interior of Java.’ At this time, Major-
General Mansergh took over as the Allied Commander. Lord
Mountbatten visited Java and met the Dutch acting Lieutenant-
Governor-General, the new Dutch Commander-in-Chief and
Dr. Sjahrir. Later he held a meeting of his own officers and the
British Cionsul-General in Batavia, at which Lord Killearn, as
controller of foreign affairs in SEAC was also present. Lord
Louis Mountbatten decided, as a result of these meetings and
further conferences at Singapore, to recommend to the Chiefs of
Staff to transfer all but key points in Java to the Dutch from ! July
1946, for the purposes of law and order and to hand over ail Java
to them from the end of that month. The Dutch were destined
to pay a heavy price for this decision, because west Java was a
scene of continued terrorism, Bandoeng was to be defended while
Batavia too had its share of nightmares. In Sourabaya there were
definite indications of a build-up of an underground organisation.
A fast of three days was imposed on TRI and their families to
strengthen their spirit for the struggle for freedom and to prepare
them for sacrifice for freedom.?° An attempt was also made to
starve the Dutch by a scorched-earth policy.

Consequently clashes between the Dutch and the Indonesians
became inevitable in May 1946. "The presence of the Supreme
Allied Commander until the end of the month averted an immediate
war between them. The military situation was largely influenced
by the fact that the Government of India and the United Kingdom
were asking for the return of their troops, the task of evacuation of
Allied prisoners of war was nearing completion, and the political
factor of the existence of a conservative government in Holland
strengthened the grim determination of the Indonesians to win
back their freedom. Java was held by the extremists, and a
government loan had been floated there to unite all parties in the
cause of independence. However, the Indonesians made a distinc-
tion between the Dutch and the British: against the latter they
did not wish to fight for they had conceded freedom to India. |

Events in the next few months moved with kaleidoscopic
rapidity. Terrorism broke out in Java in June, and a state of
emergency had to be proclaimed there. The Chinese became the
victims of national fury. The Indonesians used mortars and other
military stores which the Japanese had left there. The extremist
section was in the ascendant; but unmindful of the temper of the
people, civil authority over Netherlands East Indies was transferred

28 WIS No. 20 dated 3 April 1946. 23rd Indian Division.
39 WIS No. 26 dated 15 Мау 1946, 23rd Indian Division.

238 POST-WAR OCCUPATION FORCES: SOUTH-EAST ASIA

to the Dutch in July 1946. This had the effect of provoking the
extremists to further action. Dr. Sjahrir, a moderate in views,
was kidnapped by them, but restored a few dayslater. Dr. Soekarno
assumed supreme power and extremists controlled Batavia and
other key points.

However, August, the month in which the first anniversary
of the Republic of Indonesia was celebrated, brought fresh hopes
of peace and compromise, when the Dutch Government appointed
a Commission General to decide urgent matters on the spot; and
it began negotiations with the Indonesian leaders on 20 September.
Lord Killearn acted as an intermediary and ultimately a truce was
agreed to on 14 October 1946. These terms were finally incorpo-
rated in the Linggajati Agreement on 15 November. "Thus ended
a difficult political situation and the British-Indian troops were in
a position to leave Batavia on 30 November. The occupation was
a short one, but it involved fighting leading to 2,300 casualties, in
a force of 100,000 men.

SITUATION IN SUMATRA

Next to Java in importance was the occupation of Sumatra,
a part of the Netherlands East Indies. This island is situated on
thc Equator and is about 1,600 miles long and 250 miles wide,
thrice as big as Java. The west coast is backed by a mountain
range with several peaks over 10,000 feet high. "There arc clouds
and heavy rains on the coast and windward slopes of the moun-
tains; the rain averages more than 100 inches a year, most of it in
the two monsoon months of April and October. On the mountain
slopes there are often heavy storms. The low marshy plains to the
east of the mountain range have less rain than the west coast, and
this falls during October to December. The weather is hot and
humid in the eastern parts, and even the land and sea breezes
are not of much help. The population is over 13 millions, the
majority being Muslims.

The main focal points of the island are Medan, which was
the capital under the Dutch administration, Padang and Fort
de Kock, which were the Headquarters of the Japanese 25th Army,
and Palembang, famous for its neighbouring oilfields. Roads
and railways were limited in number, except in the vicinity of
large towns, but comparatively good. Rivers which are navigable
by shallow draught ships for long distances, form the chief means
of communication between inland towns of the alluvial plains of
the east. The principal ports of Sumatra are Olehleh, Belawan,
Emmahaven, Palembang and Oostahavon, the middle three were
mined during the war. Airficlds suitable for reoccupation craft

RESTORATION OF LAW AND ORDER IN THE NETHERLANDS 239

were at Medan, Padang, Palembang and Pakan Baroe, while
Emmahaven provided an alighting area for flying boats.

Originally it was estimated that there were nearly 77,0003°
Japanese troops in Sumatra. The main concentrations were
28,000 in north Kota Radja and Medan areas, 11,000 in west-
centre, Fort de Kock and Padang area, 6,000 in east-centre and
10,000 in south Palembang area. Orders were issued to clear all
the Japanese forces from Padang, Medan and Palembang areas.
There were also 8 to 9 thousand Japanese air force personnel,
chiefly in Palembang area with about 100 aircraft.

The main objects of the reoccupation of Sumatra were:—

“(а) to reoccupy, with sufficient force, key-areas, secure

effective control, enforce the surrender and disarm the
Japanese forces;

(b) to render assistance to APWI."

Sabang having already been occupied by Royal Navy was
a separate responsibility.

There was, apart from guerilla warfare, for which the country
was most suited, the problem of internal security, created by a
Chinese tribe even before the war. During the Japanese occupation
this tribe had armed itself with modern rifles and automatics.
They were suspected of being unfriendly to the Allies, thus making
movement off the roads and railway dangerous except when it was
made in strength.

All matters affecting the civil population were handled
through the Netherlands Indies Civil Affairs (NICA) Organisa-
tion attached to the Force Commander. But there were also twelve
small underground parties in Sumatra, of which eleven were en-
gaged in assisting the prisoners of war, and the remaining one was
active in arming the police force of the Medan area in maintaining
law and order. АП these were in wireless communication with one
another.

The force made available for Sumatra consisted of the 26th
Indian Division, with a complement of squadrons of air force and
a few naval vessels, a Royal Air Force regiment and the existing
Netherlands East Indies forces within the island.

It was decided to occupy the following areas which corres-
ponded roughly to the civil divisions :—

(a) Padang ins Fort de Kock
(b) Kota Radja €: Medan
(c) Palembang "- Talock Beteong

3° Figures given by the Japanese delegates to the Conference at Rangoon on 27 August
1945. The figure mentioned in ALFNEI’s Despatch on Sumatra and report of 26th
Indian Division, 13 November 1946, is 70,000.

240 POST-WAR OCCUPATION FORCES: SOUTH-EAST ASIA

Medan was occupied first of all. Then Padang was taken,
but as Japanese offered little opposition to these principal move-
ments, only a small force was sent to the two places. Similar
course was adopted in the case of Palembang also.

The general orders were quite clear to the units. Full
authority over military personnel and civilians was to be exercised
only in key areas, and even there civilians were to be dealt with
through NICA. Outside these key areas full responsibility rested
with the Dutch authorities who were permitted to ask the Supreme
Allied Commander for military assistance through the normal
chain of command. The general tasks of the army forces in
Sumatra were defined as follows :—

*(a) to secure the Padang area and assume control of
Headquarters 25th Japanese Army,

(b) to secure the Medan area,

(c) subsequently to occupy the Palembang area,

(d) to disarm and concentrate all Japanese forces in Sumatra

in accordance with the policy laid down by ALFSEA in
August 1945,

(e) to protect and succour all APWI and subsequently to

evacuate the deserving among them,

(f) to occupy the key areas until the NEI could take over,

(g) toset up a military administration in the occupied areas,

(h) to set up a message filtering and monitoring service, and

(i) to introduce food and other civil supplies ”.

The air force was to give tactical support and to fly in priority
personnel and stores and to evacuate the prisoners of war and
casualties, until a routine traffic was established between Malaya
and Sumatra.

The 26th Indian Division began to arrive in Sumatra on
10 October 1945, and by the end of the month it was concentrated
in Medan, Padang and Palembang areas with headquarters at
Padang. Out of its three brigades (the 4th, 36th and 71st)
earmarked for service in Sumatra, the 36th was diverted to Java.

MEDAN AREA

Between 10 October and 5 November 1945 the following
units landed in Belawan, the port of Medan:
Headquarters Royal Artillery
6 SWB
Administrative units.
On 10 October 1945, representatives from the 2nd Imperial
Japanese Guards met the commander of the Royal Artillery 26th

RSTORATION OF LAW AND ORDER IN THE NETHERLANDS 241

Indian Division on board HMS Venus to sign surrender terms.
Headquarters Royal Artillery was established at Medan as Head-
quarters Medan Area.

The following troops, together with 8/8 Punjab Regiment
1. іп Belawan during the period 30 October to 5 November

Headquarters 4 Indian Infantry Brigade
2 Rajput Regiment
2 Frontier Force Rifles.

On landing, 8/8 Punjab Regiment moved across Sumatra
to Pedang to join 71 Indian Infantry Brigade, and 6 SWB
came under command of the 4 Indian Infantry Brigade. Неад-
quarters 4 Indian Infantry Brigade and 2 Frontier Force Rifles
moved out to the area of Bindjai, about 25 miles west of Medan,
on the main road and railway. 6 SWB remained in Medan.

The role of 4 Indian Infantry Brigade was to form a
striking force for the defence of Medan, and to be prepared to
operate anywhere in northern Sumatra. During November 1945
reconnaissance of the whole area was carried out, including pairols
to Fort de Kock in the Padang area, some 200 miles distant, to
contact the 71 Indian Infantry Brigade. Elements of 6 SWB
moved to Brastagi, about 45 miles south-west of Medan, as
advance party for possible moves of 4 Indian Infantry Brigade.

The situation in this area was quiet until 25 November 1945,
when a patrol of 6 SWB was fired upon by an organised party
of Indonesians in the Brastagi area, with the result that this advance
party was withdrawn to Medan.

During November and December 1945, the Indonesians in
the town area of Medan were restless but politically unco-ordinated,
and patrols and small detachments of the Allied troops were sniped
nightly.

By 5 January 1946, the following troops arrived in Medan-
Belawan area from India:—

7 Indian Field Regiment, less one battery

1 Indian Anti-Tank Regiment

6 Rajputana Rifles

Machine-Gun Battalion Frontier Force Rifles

* A? Squadron 146 Royal Armoured Corps (Armd. cars)

2 Patiala Infantry.

Up to February 1946, searches and raids for arms and known
extremist leaders were constantly made in the town and their
immediate vicinity. Opposition consisted mainly of sniping, but
road-blocks began to appear outside the towns. The Indonesians
had for some time been trying to persuade Indian troops to desert

242 POST-WAR OCCUPATION FORCES: SOUTH-EAST ASIA

with arms, for which they were prepared to pay large sums of
money. Апа as their good luck would have it, six of them deserted
“оп 8 March with rifles and ammunition, and search parties which
were sent after them were waylaid by an ambush, as a result of
which the searchers suffered several casualties, including one
officer killed and one wounded.

During this month there was also considerable increase in
shooting in the town, and raids were therefore carried out day and
night on the headquarters of the extremists. On 12 February, the
first “ battle’? occurred, when the 2 Rajput Regiment met many
rond-blocks and considerable opposition with machine-guns.
Consequently, the British artillery was brought into action for the
first time.

During April, the Indonesians made frequent night attacks
on the Allied Prisoners of War and Internees camps at Helvetia,
just north of Medan.

In May, parties of thirty to forty armed Indonesians clashed
with the British patrols at various times. Оп 9 May, a party of
the 625th Indian Field Security Section was ambushed; one officer
was killed and two British other ranks captured. Brigade operations
to trace these captured men were not successful.

In June continuous patrolling was carried out in the town.
There were many clashes with the Indonesians and their opposition
was sometimes considerable. Frequent brigade operations were
carried out and villages in the area were searched for arms and
ammunition,

The Indonesians had an excellent warning system in all areas,
including the firing of warning-shots by sentries, the use of public
and private telephone system, and listening in to radio telephone
conversations. Thus the news of the movement of the occupying
troops was quickly passed. To defeat this warning system, opera-
tions were now mainly carried out at night. Two of these opera-
tions, in particular, were successful and resulted in the capture of
large quantities of arms and ammunition and the release of 200
Chinese from Indonesian hands.

By the end of August 1946, the Indonesian opposition had
become more co-ordinated and more boldly led. In September
1946, all operational troops came under command of 4 Indian
Infantry Brigade which assumed responsibility for the whole area.
The “set up ” in the Medan area оп 16 September was:—

Headquarters 4 Indian Infantry Brigade

7 Indian Field Regiment, less 5 Indian Field Battery

“А” Squadron 146 Royal Armoured Cars

6 Rajputana Rifles

RESTORATION OF LAW AND ORDER IN THE NETHERLANDs 243

2 Rajput

Machine-gun Battalion Frontier Force Rifles

2 Frontier Force Rifles

2 Patiala Infantry.

6 SWB had been disbanded in April 1946, and Headquarters
Royal Artillery had moved to Padang in August 1946.

During the period September 1946 to November 1946, the
Allied troops met with a determined opposition and encountered
many road-blocks and trench system. On 26 and 27 September
4 Indian Infantry Brigade carried out operations with three
battalions to clear the area. Determined opposition was effectively
dealt with, and the Indonesian casualties were estimated at 43
killed and a further 55 killed or wounded.

By 10 October the whole of Medan area was much quieter.
On 26 October 1946, the Netherlands troops started to relieve the
SEAC troops; and the machine-gun battalion of the Frontier Force
Rifles and the Ist Indian Anti-Tank Regiment embarked for India.
That night was the noisiest in Medan.

The arrival of the Netherlands troops was not popular with
the Indonesians, and for the first time a convoy on the road Medan-
Belawan was attacked. After this, movement on the road was
restricted, and all convoys had to be escorted.

By 30 November 1946, the Dutch troops had taken over
control in Sumatra, and all foreign troops therefore left.

PADANG AREA

Headquarters 26th Indian Division landed at Emmahaven,
the port of Padang, on 10 October 1946, with the following:

Headquarters 71 Indian Infantry Brigade

1 Lincolns

1 Royal Garhwal Rifles.

Headquarters 26th Indian Division was established in
Padang and dispositions of major units were as follows:—

1 Lincolns ... south-west of area of town

1 Royal Garhwal Rifles

(less one Company) ... north of town

One Company Royal
Garhwal Rifles .. Emmahaven, the port of Padang.

On 10 October 1945, 8/8 Punjab Regiment arrived in Fort
de Kock, 10 miles north of Padang, from Medan and came under
the command of 71 Indian Infantry Brigade. The journcy
from Medan, about 200 miles to the north, was accomplished with-

out incident.

244 POST-WAR OCCUPATION FORCES: SOUTH-EAST ASIA

During October and November 1945, the Allied prisoners of
war were concentrated, wired in, and protected by the British
troops. These unfortunate souls previously scattered throughout
the town, had suffered considerably at the hands of the Indone-
sians.

On 3 December 1945, the Brigade-Major of the 71 Indian
Infantry Brigade and a lady worker were found murdered in
Padang. Proclamations were therefore issued imposing a Civilian
Curfew and forbidding the carrying of any sort of weapons under
penalty of death. Strong action was taken against infringement
of these orders. Further, 8/8 Punjab Regiment was moved from
Fort de Kock to Padang to strengthen the local force.

In consequence of these measures there were no incidents in
Padang from mid-January to mid-March 1946, when Headquarters
71 Indian Infantry Brigade and 1 Lincolns left Padang for
Palembang asit was felt desirable to have a formation Headquarters
with the senior officers in command, in the Palembang area, where
tension was increasing.

During April and May 1946, many raids were made in
Padang and local villages, and small quantities of arms and
ammunition were recovered. In subsequent months, active opera-
tions sometimes became necessary when the Indian troops,
particularly of 8/8 Punjab, in the course of their escort duties were
ambushed or attacked.

On 5 August, 5 Indian Field Battery (7 Indian Field Regi-
ment) and 2 Kumaon Rifles arrived in Padang from Java, and
Headquarters Royal Artillery moved to Padang from Medan.
This enabled the whole of Padang town to be brought under
effective control.

During September, operations were carried out to clear
areas in the vicinity of Padang of hostiles who had been persistently
attacking the perimeter.

During October and November 1946, except for minor
incidents, Padang was quiet. By 30 November 1946, the Dutch
had taken over control in Sumatra and all occupying troops were
therefore withdrawn.

PALEMBANG AREA

The 1 Burma Regiment landed at Palembang on 25
October 1945, and was disposed as follows :—

Battalion (less two companies) .. Palembang Town

One company "" .. RAPWI Block

One company m .. Airfield

RESTORATION OF LAW AND ORDER IN THE NETHERLANDs 245

Palembang town was then unquiet, and spasmodic attacks
were being made on individuals, specially the Chinese, but no
clashes occurred with the Allied troops. In December, however,
three naval officers were ambushed, two being killed and one
wounded. Tension in the area continued to increase during the
early months of 1946. This led to the movement, on 13-15 March
1946, of Headquarters 71 Indian Infantry Brigade and 1 Lincolns
into Palembang from Padang. The Indonesians grew suspicious
at the arrival of the British troops and showed their resentment
by sniping their convoys. On 30 March, a patrol of 1 Lincolns
consisting of one officer and fifteen British other ranks was subjected
to heavy fire, and was further attacked by two parties of the
Indonesians, armed with rifles, spears and swords. The patrol
had to be cventually extricated by a company of 1 Lincolns, who
suffered some casualties. The Indonesian casualties were estimated
at 112 with a minimum of twenty-seven killed. As a result of this
action and the fact that the Japanese, who had been guarding the
oil refineries in the area, were due to be evacuated, the 3/4 and
3/9 Gurkha Rifles disembarked at Palembang during July 1946.

No further incidents, however, occurred and the handover
to Netherland troops, which started in October 1946, proceeded
smoothly.

SITUATION IN SMALLER REGIONS OF SOUTH-EAST ASIA

The Bangka Island was reoccupied by Netherlands East
Indies forces on 11 February 1946, in the face ot minor opposition
from the Indonesians. Bali was reoccupied similarly on 2 March
1946, and Lombok on the 27th following, with no opposition,
although there were subsequent minor disturbances in the interior
of Bali, which were dealt with by the Dutch. .

The outer islands (which included Netherlands New Guinea
and the whole of the Archipelago except Java and Sumatra) were
partiallyoccupiedin August 1945 by the Australian forces who could
not be relieved of their responsibility until January 1946, when a
brigade of the 20th Indian Division was transferred from French
Indo-China and a Royal Air Force staging-post was set up at
Macassar. А number of Netherlands Internal Security Companies
were made available from Australia at about this time, and the
Supreme Allied Commander deployed them throughout the islands
to eke out his own troops. When he left SEAC on 31 Мау 1 946,
there were 36 Native companies and 6 Netherlands companies in
the outer islands as well as six battalions formed from theex-prisoners

of war.

246 POST-WAR OCCUPATION FORCES: SOUTH-EAST ASIA

The Australian forces reoccupied British Borneo, because
they were fighting with the Japanese there and it was to them
that the Japanese surrendered in August 1945. In December
1945, Lord Louis Mountbatten visited the Australian forces in
British Borneo, Celebes and Dutch Borneo, and on 5 January 1946
he received the control of British Borneo. On the 8th of this
month he established a military administration under his own
nominees and the Australian forces were thereupon relieved by a
brigade of the 20th Indian Division.

On 10 January 1946, the British Cabinet decided to re-
establish civil government in British Bornco under the authority
of the Colonial Office by 1 March 1946. But apart from Sarawak
reverting to the Raja on 15 April nothing could be done to imple-
ment the scheme for several months?'.

Thus ended the relief of the Netherlands East Indies from
the Japanese occupation which paved the way for the evacuation
of the Japanese back to their homes.

31 Mountbatten's Report, page 292.

CHAPTER XVI

The Disarming, Concentration and
Repatriation of the Japanese Prisoners
of War. in South-East Asia

INTRODUCTION

When the Japanese surrendered, their strength in South-East
Asia was nearly three-quarters of a million, and they were scattered
all over the area. They had in their possession millions of tons
of explosives, munitions and weapons, and with these they could
be a source of trouble to the Allied forces. Lord Mountbatten was
fully conscious of this danger, particularly because he did not have
the means to keep them in full control, and took ample precau-
tionary measures to prevent any untoward developments. Instruc-
tions were issued to the subordinate commanders that the Allied
forces must provide for self-defence, and meet any sudden treacher-
ous attacks. They were asked to arrest at once personnel of the
following organisations (subject to confirmation): Kempei Tai,
Tokomu Kikan, Hikari Kikan, G. S. Intelligence personnel,
War Criminals, and Guards of Allied Prisoners of War. Strict
injunctions were issued against fraternisation, as also maltreatment
of the Japanese or use of violence against them. Disarmament
of the Japanese forces was to be the first task, and in all dealings with
them subordinate officers were exhorted to adhere strictly to
international conventions.

Lord Mountbatten, at the same time, adopted the policy of
dealing with the Japanese through their Supreme Commander.
In his report to the Combined Chiefs of Staff he has stated that
there was no alternative to this procedure, and added that ‘for
this purpose I maintained theexisting Japanese Chain of Command,
through their Supreme Commander, to publish and enforce my
orders. I consider that if the Japanese Chain of Command had
been disrupted for fear that it might provide the enemy commanders
with a means of controlling their forces in resisting us—before
we had fully replaced it with our own, it would have been im-
possible for us to use their forces for our own purposes as effectively
as we did'". This policy made it possible to concentrate and rapidly
evacuate large numbers of Japanese troops and considerable

1 Mountbatten's Report, p. 257, para 4.

248 POST-WAR OCCUPATION FORCES: SOUTH-EAST ASIA

quantities of material from the wide-flung territories that comprised
the South-East Asia Command.

EVACUATION OF JAPANESE FROM FRENCH INDO-CHINA

The total strength of the Japanese forces in French Indo-
China was estimated originally at 71,000 which was not far wrong.
On V. J. Day which was 15 August 1945, the figure stood at 60,360
besides 2,000 civilians. These forces were concentrated mainly in
Saigon, Phnom Penh and Tourane areas in the south, in Hanoi
and Langson areas in the north, and in detachments of various
sizes along the road line of communication and on the Mekong
river. In French Indo-China south of 16°N, there were 40,000
Japanese in the ‘southern’ part. Very little of this number had
gone to Siam, when Japan surrendered.

There were three divisional formations in southern French
Indo-China, viz. 2nd, 22nd and 55th, one Independent Mixed
Battalion (TMB) and Headquarters and non-divisional units in
Saigon area, totalling 19,000 troops. The strength at Phnom
Penh, Tourane and the remaining areas, was 4,600, 3,300 and
13,000 respectively. In Saigon, there were in addition 2,250
personnel of the Headquarters of Southern Army (part of which
was at Dalat) and part of the Headquarters of the 38th Army. The
2nd Division, which was withdrawn from Burma before it was fully
formed, and various non-divisional ancillary units including air
(ground and naval) were 9,000 strong. In Phnom Penh, Head-
quarters of the 55th Division had been set up with a nucleus of
1,000 divisional troops; elements of the 22nd Division were also
in the vicinity amounting to 2,000; and above all there were a
number of small non-divisional units. In the Tourane area the
34th IMB (with only two battalions) and ancillary troops held
3,300 men. The remainder of 13,000 was mainly made up of:

Army тн ie 5,300
Air/Navy € € 4,700
Unidentified ... -— 3,000

13,000

The remnants of 4 Air Brigade which was now in southern
French Indo-China after its fight in Burma, were disposed as
follows :— .

Saigon 16 Aircraft -. 1,420 personnel

Phnom Penh 19 3% x .. 1,400 E

Thu Dau Mot ӛз 0% uuu 150 » (Navy)

REPATRIATION OF JAPANESE PRISONERS IN SOUTH-EAST ASIA 249

Kompong Chnang ka sx 825 Personnel
Hanoi КРИ DES aid 255
Arakor 18 Aircraft $i 750 т
Phu My (Ѕаівоп)5 ,, . 0550 7.
Bien Hoa Catlai 9 ,, (Navy) oes 300 » (Navy)
Kompong Trach ые 230 T
Total (Aircraft) 58 Army 5,430 Army
9 Navy 450 Navy

The strength of these Japanese forces in southern French
Indo-China, their status and influence, called for the most delicate
handling by the Supreme Allied Commander, not only for the
reason that anything done in excess of law and morality would lead
to serious military and political complications but also because it
would bring disgrace to the United Nations.

The Japanese attitude was correct if not cordial. When
Major-General Gracey arrived at Saigon on 13 September 1945,
he was met by two Japanese Generals and one Vice-Admiral and
given charge of airfield straightaway. According to the operation
order of 19 September there were 17,700 Japanese who obeyed
promptly the strange orders of the British General to disarm the
Annamites in the police force, to provide lorries for the British
troops, etc. In the following month the British General assigned
quite a large number of minor duties to the Japanese, like combing
the areas for armed Annamites and hidden arms, guarding bridges,
patrolling cross-roads, and garrisoning etc.

In November the personnel of Kempei Tai surrendered and
were removed to Surete. All Japanese relieved by the French
moved to Headquarters Southern Army on the 27th of the month
for concentration, while those from Loc Ninh area moved and
prepared a block at Ghon Thanh in the morning of 9 November.
It is stated that by the third week of this month “‘ disarmament and
concentration of the 65,000 Japanese services personnel and 6,000
civilians in southern FIC is proceeding well. Nearly half the
services total was reported disarmed by 24 November’’.’

Figures given on 17 December 1945 reveal that 42,254
Japanese army and air force personnel had been disarmed and
concentrated in south French Indo-China by that date, leaving
15,020 to be dealt with. The latter were chiefly engaged in
garrisoning outlying areas. But in view of the considerable progress
made so far, it was then expected that all Japanese service personnel

2 Weekly Intelligence Summary, India Command No. 213.

250 POST-WAR OCCUPATION FORCES: SOUTH-EAST ASIA

and civilians would have been disarmed and concentrated by the
end of the year. The surrender of the last 7,988 naval personnel
was accepted at Saigon on bchalf of the senior British Naval Officer
there on 15 December, and it was hoped that 5,000 of them would
be repatriated by the end of the year, if shipping became available.
Lest any unforeseen incident should retard progress, Cap St. Jacques
was prepared for the concentration of 60,000 persons by middle
of January 1946, and Major-General Gracey visited the place on
11 December and approved of the plans?. By 15 January 1946,
21,150 disarmed Japanese had been concentrated at Cap St.
Jacques*.

February was the month of the final withdrawal of the
British from South French Indo-China. Consequently it was
planned to transfer Headquarters Southern Army to South Johore
in Malaya at the end of the month. The Japanese were still
involved against the Annamites, and Baria—Cap St. Jacques were
protected by the British and Japanese troops jointly. By 18
February all the 70,000 Japanese, remaining in South French
Indo-China, had been concentrated and disarmed except for
3,000 still doing duty in outlying garrisons. 47,000 Japanese
were in final concentration areas at Cap St. Jacques, Saigon,
Thu Dau Mot, and it was expected that the concentration at
Cap St. Jacques would be completed by the end of the month.

EVACUATION OF JAPANESE PRISONERS FROM SIAM

Siam was the easiest country to manage so far as the Japanese
were concerned. Information about their strength, distribution
and disposition with full co-operation of the Siamese army and
citizens in dealing with the Japanese was welcome, and the sacri-
ficing spirit displayed by the Japanese was remarkable.

According to Force Plan No. 2 dated 2 September, the
estimated strength of all Japanese forces in Siam was 58,000,
disposed as follows:

(a) Bangkok—Kanburi ... -— .. 28,700
(b) Lampang—Ubon ... Бә .. 18,700
(c) South Siam (Garrisoned troops) .. 2,300

(d) Unlocated sii es . 8,300

There were barely 9 army fighter aircraft, with the Head-
quarters 4 Brigade still in Bangkok.

In September, the Supreme Allied Commander's forces
were still in the process of formation. So the Japanese were left

3 War Diary, 9/12 Frontier Force Regiment, 4 and 11 December 1945.
4 Weekly Intelligence Summary, India Command No. 221.

REPATRIATION OF JAPANESE PRISONERS IN SOUTH-EAST Asta 951

free to themselves wherever they were. But they handed fou
million ticals over to the Allies on 15 September °, and they held
themselves responsible for the safety and well-being of prisoners of
war until the Aliies could take them over and they promised full
information about the strength and disposition of the 18th Area
Army. Тһе RA were appointed to supervise all Japanese camps
at Ubon, Nakon Sawon, Lampang and Chiengmai. At the same
time instructions were given for the movement of Japanese troops
to prescribed areas of concentration:—

No. 1 Area Chiengmai ... = .. 23,000
No. 2 , Lampang ... "T .. 7,000
No. 3 ,, Макоп Sawon T шир 8,000
No. 4 ,, Pong ee ase . 19,000
No 5 ,, Nakhon Pathom Ре ids 9,600
No 6 ,, Lopburi ag КЕЗ C 9,000
No.7 ,, Sarabun .. ет x» 9:000
No.8 ,, Nakhon Nayok za .. 18,000
No. 9 , Ubon Н .. 8,000

It was stated that 16,000 Japanese troops would move from
Bangkok on 23 September 1945, and the troops outside Bangkok
would complete their shift from their respective places to places
fixed for them by 27 September 19456. But this was obviously
impracticable.

In October the conditions changed most favourably to the
Alles. By the end of the month a total concentration of 96,429
Japanese had been achieved; and a considerable number of the
remainder, including the Japanese 56th Division, about 4,000,
were moving to the concentration area at Chiengmai. Railway
troops on Siam-Burma railway (about 4,500) and railway troops
in South Siam remained for essential transport duties and
for the move of the Japanese 94th Division to Malaya. Included
in the total were 4,800 troops who remained in Bangkok with
Headquarters 18th Area Army and for labour duties. The total
number of Japanese disarmed by 1 November was 110,131 com-
prising 1,330 naval, 100,805 army and 7,996 air force personnel,
In addition, the 7th Indian Division had a plan under way to
concentrate 70,000 Japanese at Nakhon Nayok from several other
places’, The Japanese Burma Army with reinforcements had been
caught in Siam in the middle of August 1945 when Japan capitula-
ted to the Allies, and this had to be ordered to move to concentra-
tion areas like any other Japanese force. Kempei Tai and such

5 War Diary, 7th Indian Division dated 15 September 1945.
6 Ibid., С. S. Branch, J. 94.
7 Ibid, 1 November 1945.

252 POST-WAR OCCUPATION FORCES: SOUTH-EAST ASIA

other organisations were wound upand confined to Bangkwang Jail.
Civilian Japanese who had surrendered but were not charged with
crimes were disarmed and concentrated like military personnel.

By the middle of November, a gradual move of the Japanese
forces southwards from Lampang? was started at the rate of 2,000
per day. To ensure a constant flow from that place, Japanese
were moved from Chiengmai to Lampang and from there to the
south. Some of the Japanese in the Chiengmai area were found
selling arms in small quantities to the Chinese and Indians. This
led iogically to the destruction of all dumps without the knowledge
ofthe Japanese. During this month 1,400 tons of arms and stores
were dumped in the sea, while 207 Military Mission had handed
overall responsibility for the Japanese to 114 Indian Infantry
Brigade?. At the close of the month the position was as follows:
total of all Japanese in concentration area was 83,633; movement of
Japanese to final concentration area at Nakhon Nayok and Naung
Hoi was in progress, and the Japanese still outside concentration
areas and engaged as work parties totalled 7,938. A further 1,553
Japanese KT, HK and personnels wanted for war crimes were
detained in Bangkok. Grand total 1,13,005'°.

The attitude of the Japanese towards Allied forces in Thailand
was exemplary. They did not show any sign of fraternisation with
the Siamese. They said, ‘We would have continued to fight
willingly were it not for the Imperial Proclamation'". But it was
the Allied army which disarmed the Japanese army, because they
were now withdrawing from Siam leaving the Japanese to the care
of the Siamese.

On 14 January 1946, the Chiefs of Staff authorised Lord
Mountbatten to hand over to the Siamese the responsibility for
guarding the surrendered Japanese personnel. 'The figures of
disarming and concentrating the Japanese in the beginning of
this month were: At Nakhon Nayok 49,590, in Bangkwang Jail
and Bangkok camps 1946 war criminals and such like persons
in custody; grand total 1,13,238 and disarmed out of these
1,12,630.

The Japanese showed definite signs of deterioration in
February 1946, because the date of their repatriation was as far
off as ever. On 31 May 1946, therefore, the Supreme Allied
Commander stopped all further apprehension of the Japanese and
confined the Allied attention to repatriation only'*,

$ Dar Diary, 7th Indian Division, 15 November 1945.

9 War Diary, 114 Indian Infantily Brigade, November 1945.
19 War Diary, 7th Indian Division, 1 December 1945.
1! Дид, Insum 28 November to 4 December 1945.

78 Mountbatten’s Report, p. 280, para 90.

REPATRIATION OF JAPANESE PRISONERS IN SOUTH-EAST ASIA 253
EVACUATION OF JAPANESE PRISONERS FROM JAVA

The story of disarming and concentrating the Japanese in
Java follows a different course from that in French Indo-China
and Siam. Here the Indonesians had become an adolescent
nation, declared themselves as an independent republic and looked
upon the British mission with open suspicion. The Japanese to a
very great extent were responsible for this unenviable position of
the British, they had not only helped the Indonesians to declare
themselves as a republic, but had surrendered their armsand stores
to them and themselves had gone into self-exile in the interior of
Java.

Lord Louis Mountbatten restricted his task to controlling
the key areas and leaving the remainder of the country to the
Japanese and the local government. But he soon found himself
confronted by a peculiar situation. The Indonesians would not
unanimously co-operate, and the Japanese in eastern and western
Java were hostile or indifferent. He had therefore to use his influence
and strength in getting the maximum help from both with the
minimum loss of prestige, and it is on account of this necessity to
swim along with the current rather than against it that he changed
his policy towards the Indonesians, the Dutch and the Japanese.

He left the Japanese in east Java, more or less to themselves.
It was impossible to get at them with the Indonesians having
interrupted his communications. He took greater care of central
and western Java and presented some strength at Semarang,
Ambarawa and Magelang. He built up a really formidable force
at Bandoeng with Headquarters 16th Japanese Army and 37 Indian
Infantry Brigade. Elements of Japanese force were also kept
roundabout Batavia. |

In November 1945 a terror was created by the extremist
Indonesians. Many Japanese joined them, many fought against
them and several others stood watching. There was heavy fighting
in central Java, roundabout Magdang; and in east Java, the
Supreme Allied Commander ordered the 16th Japanese Army to
concentrate all Japanese forces in that area at Sourabaya. ' The
Japanese have been ordered’, an order declared *to bring with
them their personal arms and equipment, limited ammunition
and all transport, but to destroy all other equipment and warlike
stores. They will bring rations for two months "3. Itis doubtful
if this order served any purpose, because nothing remarkable
occurred on subsequent dates.

13War Diary, 5th Indian Division. Operation Instruction No. 13 dated 30
November 1945.

254 POST-WAR OCCUPATION FORCES: SOUTH-EAST ASIA

The strength of the Japanese army in Java in the middle of
January 1946 was as follows:

Batavia area бес газ . 10,469
Buitenzorg area iay i ане 4,448
Bandoeng area - бга ын 13,425
Cheribon area sae кы” sis 1,074
Total for western Java ... ғ ix 29,416
Total for central Java ... e ins 11,425
Total for eastern Java ... 2 .. Not known

It was realised that the Indonesians were extremely perturbed
at the use of Japanese military personnel against them in Java.
So the Allied Commander issued a general order that their continu-
ed use was politically most undesirable as it was upsetting arrange-
ments with the Indonesians for getting the Allied prisoners of war
out of central and eastern Java. The Japanese in these regions
were numerically strong and militarily well equipped, and unless
a cordial attitude was adopted there could be no chance of con-
centrating them at all. So far as the Indonesians were concerned
they had come to consider the evacuation of Allied prisoners of
war and Japanese forces as essential for the success of their struggle
with the Dutch for freedom, and so the Indonesian leaders also took
a practical view of the duties of the Supreme Allied Commander
in Java. An officer of the 7th TRI Division addressed his audience
on 31 January 1946, as follows: ‘Some may doubt whether co-
operation with the British should be permitted. This is a very
stupid question. General Christison himself declared once that
he was unable to carry out his task without full co-operation from
the Indonesians. This task, consisting of maintaining law and
order, disarming the Japanese and releasing ex-prisoners of war
and internees is imposed upon him by agreement of the United
Nations. Hence our help is indispensable and will be beneficial to
ourselves 74,

But the greater problem of disarming, concentrating and
repatriating the Japanese was dealt with in the next month, April
1946. Onthe 25th of that month 700 Japanese arrived in Batavia
from central Java, and the Indonesians started the slogan * Let us
be grateful to Japanese with the idea of getting rid of them very
early. The rate was fixed at 1,000 per week from central and
my Java, and it was followed strictly throughout May and

une.

The position was very hopeful in June. It is recorded that
42,000 were shipped out of the country by the 5th of that month,

1 Ibid. Weekly Intelligence Summary No. 13.

REPATRIATION OF JAPANESE PRISONERS IN SOUTH-EAST ASIA 255

and there werconly about 8,000 left in Indonesian controlled areas

By the 18th ofthe same month, 54,000 were evacuated, and it vs
then estimated that there could be another 20,000 in the whole of
Java, with two to three thousand in Indonesian controlled areas.
After this date arrangements were made to lift 2,000 per week by
air. Consequently a war diary of 28 June 1946 recorded that the
evacuation of the Japanese had been almost completed and it had
amounted to 58,000. There were still some 1,500 Japanese south
of Buitenzorg to be evacuated. Even these were cleared out on
29 June by pulling pressure on the Indonesian officials concerned.'5

EVAGUATION OF JAPANESE PRISONERS FROM SUMATRA

When the 26th Indian Division arrived at Sumatra, there
were about 71,500 Japanese, in the north 33,000, іп central Sumatra
12,500 and in the south 26,000 Garrisons had been established in
the areas of the larger towns of Medan, Padang and Palembang,
but small detachments of troops were scattered throughout ihe rest
of the island. These were mainly at the ports of Koetaradja,
Sigli, Belawan, Pakan Baroe, Djambi, Teloek Betoeng, Mana,
Piana, Emmahaven and Sibolga. During the early part of Japanese
occupation the Japanese were working in the ports and were
employed in general administration, but as it became apparent
that Allied troops were about to take the offensive on the sea,
these troops were employed for the defence of the island’s coast.
There were also specialists working the oilfields, the silver, tin and
gold mines. After the cessation of hostilities the Japanese closed
down the mines and the large stocks of raw material which had
accumulated at the ports due to shipping shortage over the previous
year further increased. Shortly after the arrival of the 26th Indian
Division the Japanese were ordered to commence concentrating
their personnel for evacuation to Japan. The dispositions of the
main Japanese forces were as follows:

North Sumatra

Sabang-Koetaradja ... — xis 4,000
Medan area КҮЗ же .. 27,630
Sibolga ... кем was Wis 1,270
Tangjoeng Balai ... эге is 100

33,000

15War Diary, 23rd Indian Division —Weckly Intelligence Summary for June 1946
and for 10 July 1946.

256 POST-WAR OCCUPATION FORCES: SOUTH-EAST ASIA

Central Sumatra

Padang ... ТР ТЕ 54% 4,775
Pakan Baroe diate к pe 2,595
Fort de Kock 5 ids vs 5,130

12,500

South Sumatra

Palembang ais -— .. 12,250
Djambi ... 45% > S 5,500
Benkoelen one x . 12,750
Bangka—Billiton — ... -— ше 450

30,950

The planned withdrawal of the Japanese garrison in the
Koetaradja area to Medan was hampered by the local Achinese
tribesmen. They molested and looted the Japanese attempting
to destroy their arms and ammunition before concentration, and
during this period managed to obtain a quantity of war equipment
from the Japanese. As a result of this and in order to avoid an
incident with the locals, it was decided to evacuate that group of
4,022 Japanese directly from Koetaradja and it was the first evacua-
tion to be completed in 1945. Sabang remained under Allied
control but the rest of the area was completely overrun by the
extremists and the Achinese who now closed down on the Japanese
garrisons to the north of Medan for the purpose of capturing or
buying arms and equipment. A protective screen of Japanese
was laid from Langsa on the coast through Pangkalan Brandan to
Bindjai, Arnhemia and Brastagi. The outlying garrisons in the
north were withdrawn inside this perimeter and established protec-
tive road-blocks and check-posts.

Similar concentration was achieved in central and south
Sumatra, but it was not until January/February 1946 that the first
batch of approximately 11,259 Japanese was evacuated from
Palembang to Rempang Island. These had been withdrawn from
Bangka, Billiton, Benkoelen and Telock Betoeng. As in the north
the local extremists looted and bought arms and ammunition
from the Japanese and as each area was evacuated the locals
assumed immediate control.

At the same time another 5,265 Japanese were concentrated
in central Sumatra and evacuated from Pakan Baroe to Batu
Pahat in Malaya. These came from the areas of Padang and Fort
de Kock and the interior of central Sumatra and were not parti-
cularly interfered with by the local inhabitants.

Also during February 1946, 5,706 Japanese had been con-
centrated in the Medan area and were evacuated from Belawan

REPATRIATION OF JAPANESE PRISONERS IN SOUTH-EAST ASIA 257

and Tangjoeng Balai. This evacuation entailed a tightening up
of the protective screen around Medan, and, as many Japanese
had been withdrawn from the Langsa/Koesla Simpang areas, the
northern sector was pulled back into Pangkalan Brandan.

This completed the first phase in which approximately 26,252
Japanese were evacuated. The remaining 45,248 were disposed
as follows :—

North Sumatra КЕР дей .. 93,279
South Sumatra "n ET .. 14441
Gentral Sumatra 222 oos 7,235

'The second phase of the evacuation was carried out during
March/April 1946. In north Sumatra 11,132 Japanese were
evacuated from Belawan and this resulted in drastic changes in
the disposition of the remaining Japanese personnel. In order to
retain intact the screen around Medan the Japanese were deployed
as follows:

Pangkalan Brandan ... in е.) 2,942
Bindajai ion ез bats 1,429
Medan zs m бей Кен 1,272
Tebingtinggi das zum а 4,446
Pematang Siantar is "E .. 2009

464

Taroetoeng sis ses

Also during March/April, 2,063 Japanese had been evacuated
from Pakan Baroe leaving approximately 5,100 in central Sumatra.
These were located at Fort de Kock, Pakan Baroe and Pajakoemboe.
In phase two 13,200 Japanese were evacuated.

During May/June 1946, the evacuation of Japanese from
central Sumatra was completed when over 5,000 left from Pakan
Baroe. Padang alone remained under Allied control, the rest of
central Sumatra passed completely into the hands ofthe Indonesians.

In north Sumatra during the same period a further 4,260
Japanese were evacuated from Belawan. No large-scale change in
the Japanese defence screen was made. The concentration of all
outlying detachments in north Sumatra was completed, and only
slight alterations in the locations and strengths of the Japanese

check-posts were made.
The situation at the end of June was as follows:

Remaining in north Sumatra 7,455
Remaining in south Sumatra 12,873
War criminals in Sabang - die 451
Deserters/ Missing Sie — а 518
Dead a - T ei 485
During July a total of 5,692 Japanese were evacuated from

south Sumatra. These were made up of two ship loads to Japan

258 POST-WAR OCCUPATION FORCES: SOUTH-EAST ASIA

carrying 4,828 personnel, a group of hospital patients numbering
83 and 781 Japanese to Singapore. This left only 7,141 Japanese
in south Sumatra who were deployed in the Palembang, Pladjoe,
Soengai Gerong and Talang Betoetoe areas.

In north Sumatra 693 Japanese were evacuated to Singapore
and 2,592 to Japan during july. The remaining 4,375 were pulled
into a tight ring running through Tangjoeng Poer, Bindjai,
Berastagi, Tandjoeng Morawa and Tanamara Estate.

There were still 451 war criminals held on Sabang Island
and the number of Japanese deserters/missing was 505. The total
number of Japanese in the whole of Sumatra at the end of July
was 12,472.

In August 2,420 Japanese were evacuated from Palembang
direct to Japan leaving 4,721. This figure did not alter until
October when a further 1,231 were evacuated. This caused a
large-scale thinning out of the personnel in the Pladjoe/Soengai
Gerong areas and as a result the Allied troops had to be supple-
mented and redeployed in areas of the oil refineries.

In October 2,232 Japanese were evacuated from Belawan
leaving only 1,839 in north Sumatra. "This meant the end of the
Japanese screen around Medan and these remaining personnel
were concentrated at Belawan. In mid-October two final ship-
loads of 1,298 Japanese were evacuated leaving 540 in Medan
and Belawan.

The final evacuation of the Japanese from south Sumatra
was completed during the first week of November 1946 and 2,799
Japanese were shipped out leaving 643 technicians and labourers
in the oil refineries at Pladjoe and Soengai Gerong. Included in
this evacuation were 150 Japanese war criminals and suspects who
were transferred to Sabang Island.

CONCLUSION

On 17 November 1946, the remaining Japanese in Sumatra
deployed as follows passed into the hands of the Dutch for
evacuation:

North Sumatra

Medan E ro ids T 146
Belawan (Dock labourers) sii Ет 400
Sabong Island (War Criminals and suspects) ... 584

1,130

South Sumatra

Pladjoe/Soengai Gerong (Technicians and labourers) 643
Total remaining in Sumatra ` as — 1,773

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

Memorandum of the General Headquarters
Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers

18 December 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

Tentative arrangements covering establishment of the British
Commonwealth Occupation Force in Japan have been effected
between Staff Conferences of the Supreme Commander for the
Allied Powers and the British Commonwealth Force as enumerated
below. These arrangements have been concluded on a staff level
to facilitate establishment of the Force in Japan when directed.
It is understood that they are subject to agreement between the
Governments concerned and in no way constitute commitments of
the parties to specific courses of action. The substance of these
arrangements is being communicated by the Supreme Commander
for the Allied Powers to the United States Government, and by the
GOC, British Commonwealth Force, to the Australian Government,
for appropriate action.

1, COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS

(а) Mission:

The British Commonwealth Force will constitute a component
of occupation forces in Japan under the supreme command of the
Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. It will be charged
with the normal military duties of a force of its size and composi-
tion, including military control of Hiroshima Prefecture and such
other ground and air areas as may be allocated to it for this purpose,
demilitarisation and disposition of Japanese installations and arma-
ments within such ground areas and measures necessary for the
security of the Force. These areas do not constitute a national
zone. It will accomplish such ground and air patrol and surveillance
missions within allocated areas as may be directed. Military
Government functions within areas allocated tothe British Common-
wealth Force will be conducted by U.S. agencies as directed by
SCAP. Relationships of the British Commonwealth Force with the
Japanese, and routine security functions pertaining primarily to
Eighth Army operations as a whole, will be prescribed by the CG,
Eighth Army. The British Commonwealth Force will conduct such
military operations outside normally allocated areas as may be

APPENDIX A 261

directed to the CG, Eighth Army for Ground F
Fifth Air Force for Air Forces. orces and the CG,

(b) Command Organization:

SCAP will assign ground forces of the British Commonwealth
Force to operational control of the CG, Eighth U.S. Army.
SCAP will assign operational control of the air component of the
British. Commonwealth Force to the CG, PACUSA. Such air
component will function as a separate air command under the
Fifth Air Force. SCAP will assign operational control of Royal
Naval Port Party, British Commonwealth Force, to the U.S. Naval
Commander exercising jurisdiction over Japanese ports, for opera-
tion of the port of Kure. Such assignments to operational control
will become effective upon arrival of the forces concerned at
Japanese ports of debarkation. Ground Forces of the British
Commonwealth Force will function as a corps of two divisions under
the command of the GOC, British Commonwealth Forces as Gorps
Commander. The Corps will be composed of one British-Indian
Division of two brigade groups with supporting troops. Logistic
organization of the British Commonwealth Force will be as pres-
cribed by the Commander thereof. СОС, British Commonwealth
Force will remain responsible for the maintenance and adminis-
tration of the British Commonwealth Force as a whole.

(c) Command Administrative Channels

(1) СОС, British Commonwealth Force will have the right
of direct communication with the British Commonwealth Joint
Chiefs of Staff in Australia on administrative matters affecting the
Force.

(2) СОС, British Commonwealth Force will have the right
of direct access to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers
for matters of major policy affecting the operational capabilities of
the Force.

(3) Itisunderstood that for matters of governmental concern
effecting the policy and operations of the British Commonwealth
Force, the channel of communication lies from the Australian
Government as representative of the British Commonwealth of
Nations through the United States Government and the United
States Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Supreme Commander for the
Allied Forces. | ‚

(4) In administrative matters pertaining to relations with
United States Forces or with the Japanese, the GOC, British
Commonwealth Force will be governed by policies prescribed by
Commanders exercising operational control. Such policies will

262 POST-WAR OCCUPATION FORCES: JAPAN AND 5.-Е. ASIA

in general conform to those prescribed for United States Forces,
In case of conflict between such administrative instructions received
from the CG, Eighth Army and the CG, PACUSA (or his designa-
ted representative), the matter will be referred to GHQ, SCAP
for decision.

(d) Liaison

GOC, British Commonwealth Force is authorised to exchange
liaison officers by mutual arrangement with CG’s, I Corps and
Fifth Air Force. Provisions for liaison between British Common-
wealth Force and Japanese Central Liaison Committees in areas
occupied, are subject to future arrangements between British
Commonwealth Force Headquarters and GHO, SCAP on Military
Government matters will be conducted through the Eighth Army.
Liaison between British Commonwealth Force and U.S. Naval
authorities will be conducted through Naval Port Director of the
port or ports concerned for local matters pertaining thereto.
Liaison with U.S. Naval authorities on all other matters will be
conducted through GHO, SCAP.

2. AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY

(a) The British Commonwealth Force will be allocated
Hiroshima Prefecture for exercise of the functions and responsibi-
lities enumerated in sub-paragraph Ja above.

(b) If proven necessary by reconnaissance, the British
Commonwealth Force may be allocated an additional area or
areas by SCAP for air base purposes. Within such areas, British
Commonwealth Force will exercise the security and surveillance
functions and responsibilities prescribed for Hiroshima Prefecture,
subject to local modification at the direction of CG, Eighth Army.

3. FORCES

(a) It is understood that the total strength of the British
Commonwealth Force will be determined by inter-governmental
decision. It is also understood that the British Commonwealth
Force plans to maintain its basic organisation as a Corps of two
divisions of two brigades each, with suitable air and (air and
ground) service supporting elements within the strength eventually
determined. Major unit strength will be adjusted to meet the total
strength. determined by inter-governmental decision. Composi-
tion and strength of the air component of the Force is also subject
to inter-governmental decision.

APPENDIX A 263

(b) It is understood that the British Commonwealth Force
may be withdrawn wholly or in part upon agreement between
the Governments of the United States and Australia or upon six
months notice by either party. It is also understood that reductions
will be made in the British Commonwealth Force from time to
time in conformity with progressive reductions in United States
Occupation Forces in Japan.

(c) GOC British Commonwealth Force will provide SCAP
with troops lists including units strengths, upon final determination
of the composition of the force.

(d) For planning purposes, the GOC, British Commonwealth
Force has submitted tentative designation of units of the Force,
current location and availability for arrival in Japan as follows:—

Unit and Location
Force Headquarters, Australia
Headquarters Anzac Division, Australia 34th Aust. bde.,
Morotai
New Zealand Bde, Italy
British-Indian Division, Bombay
(Hq. and 2 Bdes.)
Force Troops, Australia and SEAC
RAAF, Labuan (Borneo)
3 Sqdns. Mustangs
На. Staff Planes (2) and Dte. (Australia)
RNZAF, New Zealand
1 Sqdn. (Spitfires)
RAF
2 Sqdns. Mosquitos (BR), Madras
1 Sqdn. Spitfires (Ind.), Madras
2 Sqdns. Spitfires (BR), Singapore
1 Sqdn. TC (BR), Rangoon
Com. Flt. (BR), Madras
RN Port Party, Singapore
AF Const. Sqdn., Labuan
Base and Port troops, various locations.

Target Arrival Dates in Japan
RN Port Party—28 January
34th Bde.—1 February
AF Const. Sqdn.—1 February
Adv. Ech. Force and Base Troops—1 February
ist Ser. Air Ground Ech.—1 February
Hq. Anzac Div.—23 February

264 POST-WAR OCCUPATION FORCES: JAPAN AND 8.-Е. ASIA

Main Body Air Ground Ech.—23 February

Main Body B-1 Div.—15 March.

NZ Bde.—23 March.

(e) (1) It is understood that actual arrival dates of the
above units are subject to clearance by SCAP upon evacuation by
U.S. forces of areas to be occupied.

(2) Arrangements will be made by PACUSA for staging
of air echelons of the Force to Japan via. the Philippines and
Okinawa, except for RAF spitfires and airplanes of the New
Zealand Squadron, which it is understood will be delivered by
water transport.

5. MISCELLANEOUS

(a) Initial arrangements for establishment of British Commonwealth
Force in Japan:

(1) The Australian Services Mission in Tokyo will be dis-
banded and its functions taken over by an Advance Echelon,
Headquarters, British Commonwealth Force, made up of Australian
Services Mission personnel, augmented by three or four additional
officers to be designated by GOC, British Commonwealth Force.

(2) Direct communication between’ the СОС, British
Commonwealth Force, or his authorized representatives, and CG,
Eighth Army, GG, PACUSA and CG, Fifth Air Force, for matters
pertaining to the establishment and operation of the Force, will
be authorised by SCAP upon receipt of authority for entry of the
Force from the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff.

(3) Pending further instructions, travel of staff officers
of the Force Headquarters and of preliminary reconnaissance
parties and individuals for inspection of areas and otner orienta-
tion purposes js authorized subject to current clearance procedures
by SCAP.

(4) Quartering, subsistence and transportation of advance
parties of the British Commonwealth Force will be provided by
the Force.

(5) Preliminary movement of casual airplanes of British
Commonwealth air forces to and in Japan for staff purposes will
be subject to current clearance procedures by SGAP. "Temporary
use by such air-craft of U.S. facilities in Japan and enroute will
be arranged by PACUSA.

(6) Signal Communications :
(1) It will not be necessary for the British Commonwealth
Force to establish radio communications in Tokyo as SCAP will

APPENDIX A 265

be able to handle its required traffic until such time as the Common-
wealth Force moves into its proposed area. Matter of co-ordinating
the use of codes and ciphers will be worked out by technical
representatives of U.S. and British Commonwealth Forces at a
later date.

(2) Existing wire facilities used by X Corps will be made
available to the British Commonwealth Force.

(3) Courier service in Japan will be continued as presently
established by the Eighth Army and Fifth Air Force and will be
made available to the British Commonwealth Force.

(c) Press Releases:

No press release concerning the British Commonwealth
Force will be made pending governmental arrangements for
simultaneous announcement in Washington, Tokyo, Canberra,
Wellington, New Delhi and London of the formation of the Force.
Necessary steps will be taken to insure against premature press
reports in this respect.

6. LOGISTICS

(а) The British Commonwealth Force agrees to assume
complete logistic responsibility for the support of the Force.

(b) Transportation required for the Force will be furnish-
ed from British Commonwealth sources (Rail within Japan
excepted).

(c) The British Commonwealth Force will be equipped
with tentage.

(d) Considerable housing is known to be available in the
area to be occupied. Details as to procurement will be worked
out by the British Commonwealth Force and Eighth Army based
on schedule of withdrawal of U.S. and arrival of Force units.

(e) Maintenance of the Force will be furnished by the
British Commonwealth Force. Plans provide for 90 days supplies
to accompany troops, with ammunition to conform to Fighth
Army and PACUSA levels.

(f) In as much as strength of British Commonwealth Force
is indefinite at this time, tonnages involved in troop and supply
movement are undetermined. Preliminary investigation indicates
a sufficient port capacity to handle the Force.

(g) Intransit and substantial permanent storage ware-
housing is available in contemplated areas. The British Common-
wealth Force will be prepared to provide such additional storage

as may be required.

266 POST-WAR OCCUPATION FORCES: JAPAN AND S.-E. ASIA

(h) Аш Base facilities in areas allocated to the British Com-
monwealth Force for such purposes will be made available to the
Force, subject to arrangements for continuation of essential United
States functions therein. Additional construction and maintenance
becomes the responsibility of the British Commonwealth Force.

(i) Upon arrival of its port director personnel the British
Commonwealth Force will assume port director functions for the
entire port of Kure, under operational control of the U.S. Navy.
U.S. personnel will be withdrawn. The Kure Navy Yard will
remain under United Sates control.

() The control of shipping schedules pertaining to the
British Commonwealth Force will be a Force responsibility.

(k) Requirements for a minor increase of the British
Commonwealth Force advance Headquarters in the Tokyo Area
will be submitted to SCAP.

(D Іп area of occupation, requirements for office space,
officers' billets, enlisted men's billets, warehouse and ammunition
storage areas will be procured through the Eighth Army.

(m) The British Commonwealth Force desired to secure
three airdromes. Decisions on this point will be made after physical
inspection of existing facilities in Hiroshima Prefecture and, if
deemed essential, in adjacent areas. Inspection of Itami airdrome
at Kobe as a possible alternate site is authorized.

(n) Bulk petroleum products and packed aviation lubri-
cants will be furnished by the U.S. on a dollar reimbursement
basis while all other packed petroleum products will be furnished
by the British Commonwealth Force. U.S. Force will deliver
bulk products to the water line. The British Commonwealth
Force will be responsible for receiving and distributing bulk pro-
ducts. Informal reports indicate that adequate bulk tankage
exists in the proposed area of occupation.

(o) Local procurement for the British Commonwealth
Force Area will be accomplished in conformance with Eighth
Army directives,

(p) Rail transportation will be procured through normal
Fighth Army channels.

(4) The British Commonwealth Force agrees to furnish
such railway guards as may be required for its own operations.

(r) Yen currency will be supplied through the Eighth
Army procedures, Current conversion rate on basis of 15 yen to
1 U.S. dollar will obtain for the British Commonwealth Force.

(s) The British Commonwealth Force will be prepared to

furnish pay schedules, both military and civil, to the Eighth Army
when requested.

APPENDIX A 267

(t) Improvements made to Japanese facilities with U.S.
materials will be accepted by the British Commonwealth Force on
a dollar reimbursement basis, when such facilities are needed and
desired by the British Commonwealth Force.

Lt.-General J. Мовтнсотт, A.I.F.,
Commanding British Com. Force.
Major-General К. J. MansHarr, G.S.C.,
Chief of Staff, Supreme Commander for the
Allied Powers.

APPENDIX B

Occupation Instruction No. 3, General
Headquarters Supreme Commander
for the Allied Powers

12 February 1946

1. (a) Military control of JAPAN has been established and
js being effectively exercised by the Supreme Commander for the
Allied Powers. Demobilization of the Japanese military forces
within JAPAN has preceded in schedule and is over 98 per cent
complete. Approximately 15,000 former Japanese naval personnel
are engaged in repatriation duties and 12,000 in mine-sweeping
operations.

(b) The Commanding General EIGHTH United States
Army is responsible for all land areas (other than that occupied
by FIFTH United States Fleet ashore) in JAPAN proper. See
General Headquarters United States Army Forces Pacific Opera-
tions instructions Number 4 and Number 7 with amendments
thereto.

(c) The Commander-in-Chief United States Pacific Fleet,
employing the FIFTH United States Fleet and attached Allied
Naval Forces, controls the coastal waters of JAPAN and occupied
certain Japanese naval facilities in Japan, routes Allied naval
shipping and controls Japanese naval and merchant vessels, con-
ducts reconnaissance and essential operations including mine-
sweeping and verifies the disarmament and demobilization of
Japanese naval forces by inspection and surveillance. See General
Headquarters Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers Occupa-
tion Instructions Number 1.

(d) The Commanding General Pacific Air Command United
States Army, employing the FIFTH United States Air Force,
provides the air garrison for JAPAN, aerial reconnaissance and
photography, surveillance, air warning, and air support for the
Occupation Forces. See General Headquarters United States
Army Forces Pacific Operations Instructions Number 4 and 7 with
amendments thereto.

2. (a) The British Commonwealth Occupation Force will
augment the Occupation Forces in JAPAN and will constitute a
component of the Occupation Forces under the supreme command
of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers.

(b) Composition of major units: —

British Commonwealth Occupation Force—Lieutenant

е J. dia rne CB, MVO, AIF.
roun orces—Lieutenant General J.
МУО, AIF. J. Northcott, CB,

British-Indian Division—Major General D. T. Cowan
CB, DSO, MC, Indian Army. f

34th Australian Infantry Brigade Group—Brigadier
R. H. Nimmo, AIF.

New Zealand Brigade Group— Brigadier K, L. Stewart,
CBE, DSO, NZEF.

Royal Naval Port Party—Captain J. A. Grindle, RN.

Air Forces—Air Vice Marshal C. A. Bouchier, CB,
CBE, DFC, RAF.

81st Australian Fighter Wing (3 Mustang Squadrons),
RWAF.

llth Spitfire Squadron RAF.

17th Spitfire Squadron, RAF.

96th Transport Squadron, (Medium), RAF.

4th Spitfire Squadron, RTAF.

14th Corsair Squadron, RNZAF.

3. (a) General Officer Commanding British Commonwealth
Occupation Force will:—

(i) Progressively establish around, naval and air forces of the
British Commonwealth Occupation Force in HIROSHI-
MA Prefecture, as arranged with the Commander
FIFTH United States Fleet (representative of Gom-
mander-in-Chief United States Pacific Fleet) and the
Commanding General Pacific Air Command United
States Army. Dates of arrival of forces in JAPAN will
be as approved by this Headquarters.

(ii) Pass operational control of the British Commonwealth
Occupation Force, less Air force units and the Royal
Naval Port Party, to the Commanding General EIGHTH
United States Army upon arrival of units at ports of
debarkation in JAPAN.

(iii) Pass operational control of air force units of the British
Commonwealth Occupation Force to Commanding
General Pacific Air Command United States Army upon
arrival of units at airfields or ports of debarkation in
Japan. Arrange with Commanding General Pacific
Air Command United States Army for the staging of
air echelons through the PHILIPPINES and OKINAWA
to JAPAN as required.

270 POST-WAR OCCUPATION FORCES: JAPAN AND S.-E. ASIA

(iv) Pass operational control of the Royal Naval Port Party,

British Commonwealth Occupation Force to the Com-
mander FIFTH United States Fleet (representative of
Commander-in-Chief United States Pacific Fleet) upon
arrival of the Royal Naval Port Party at the port of
debarkation in JAPAN.

Subsequent to the establishment of the British Common-
wealth Occupation Force in HIROSHIMA Prefecture,
progressively established ground and air forces in the areas
of SHIKOKU Island and OKAYAMA, TOTTORI,
SHIMANE (to include the OKI-RETTO) and
YAMAGUCHI Prefectures, as directed by the Com-
manding Generals Eighth United States Army and
Pacific Air Command United States Army.

(b) Commanding General EIGHTH United States Army

will:—

6)

(ii)

(iii)

(iv)

(v

че

Arrange with the General Officer Commanding British
Commonwealth Occupation Force for the progressive
movement of the British Commonwealth Occupa-
tion Force, les Air Force units and the Royal
Navy Port Party, to assigned areasin JAPAN.
Dates of arrival of forces will be as approved by this
headquarters.

Assume operational control of the British Common-
wealth Occupation Force, less air force units and the
Royal Naval Port Party, upon arrival of units at ports of
debarkation in JAPAN.

Assign HIROSHIMA Prefecture, and other areas if
and when so designated, as the zone of occupation of
the ground forces of the British Commonweatlth Occupa-
tion Force for the exercise of the functions and respon-
sibilities of Occupation Forces under the Commanding
General EIGHTH United States Army.

Employ the British Commonwealth Occupation Force,
less air force units and the Royal Naval Port Party, for
such military operations as are required in JAPAN in
areas other than the assigned occupation zone of the
British Commonwealth Occupation Force.

Subsequent to the establishment of the British Common-
wealth Occupation Force in HIROSHIMA Prefecture
progressively extend the zone of occupation of the
ground forces of the British Commonwealth Occupation
Force to include the areas of SHIKOKU Island and

APPENDIX B 271

OKAYAMA, TOTTORI, SHIMANE (to include the

OKI-RETTO) and YAMAGUCHI Prefectures. See
paragraph 3b(iu).

(c) Commander FIFTH United States Fleet ( representa-
tive of Commander-in-Chief United States Pacific Fleet) will:—
(i) Assume operational control of Royal Naval Port Party
British Commonwealth Occupation Force upon arval
in the KURE area.

(ii) Establish the Royal Navai Port Party in the KURE arca
as arranged with the General Officer Commanding
British Commonwealth Occupation Force and the
Commanding General EIGHTH United States Army.

See Paragraph 4d(iv).

(d) Commanding General Pacific Air Command United
States Army will:—

(i) Arrange with the General Officer Commanding British
Commonwealth for the progressive movement and esta-
blishment of air forces of the British Commonwealth
Occupation Force at designated air-fields in JAPAN.
Dates of arrival of units will be as approved by this
headquarters. See Paragraph 4e(ii).

(8) Assume operational control of air force units of the
British Commonwealth Occupation Force upon arrival
of units at airfields or ports of debarkation in JAPAN.

(üi) Assign theair component ofthe British Commonwealth Oc-
cupation Force as a separate air command under the opera-
tional control of the FIFTH United States Air Force.

(iv) Assign to the air forces of the British Commonwealth
Occupation Force the primary mission of security and
surveillance in the area occupied by the ground forces
of the British Commonwealth Occupation Force. Assign
other missions as required in support of occupation
forces in JAPAN.

(e) (i) General Officer. Commanding British Commonwealth
Occupation Force wil have the right of direct access
to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers for
matters of major policy affecting the operational capa-
bilities of the British Commonwealth Occupation Force.

(ii) In administrative matters pertaining the relations with
United States Forces or with the Japanese, the General
Officer Commanding British Commonwealth Occupation

,

272

POST-WAR OCCUPATION FORCES: JAPAN AND S.-E. ASIA

(iii)

(iv)

(v)

Force will be governed by policies prescribed by com-
manders exercising operational control Such policies
will in general conform to those prescribed for United
States Forces. In cases of conflict between such adminis-
trative instructions received from the Commanding
General EIGHTH United States Army, the Commander
FIFTH United States fleet and the Commanding
General Pacific Air Command United States Army (or
their designated representatives), the matter will be
referred to General Headquarters Supreme Commander
for the Allied Powers for decision.

General Officer Commanding British Commonwealth
Occupation Force will retain the right of direct
communication with the British Commonwealth Joint
Chiefs of Staffin Australia on administrative matters
affecting the British Commonwealth Occupation Force.
Military Government functions within areas assigned
to the British Commonwealth Occupation Force will be
conducted by United States agencies as directed by the
Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers.

(a) Exchange of Liaison officers between the General
Officer Commanding British Commonwealth Occupation
Force and the Commanding General I United States
Corps and FIFTH United States Air Force is authorized.
(b) Provisions for liaison between the General Officer Com-
manding British Commonwealth Occupation Force and
Japanese Central Liaison Committees in areas occupied,
will be as arranged between the Commanding General
EIGHTH United States Army and General Officer
Commanding British Commonwealth Occupation Force.
(c) Liaison between the General Officer Commanding
British Commonwealth Occupation Force and General
Headquarters Supreme Commander for the Allied
Powers on military government matters will be conduc-
ted through the Commanding General EIGHTH United
States Army.

(d) Liaison between the British Commonwealth Occupa-
tion Force and United States naval authorities will
be conducted through the Naval Port Director of the
Port or Ports concerned for local matters pertaining
thereto. Liaison between the British Commonwealth
Occupation Force and United States naval authorities on
all other matter will be conducted through General Head-
quarters Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers.

APPENDIX B 973
4, Locistics

(a) Responsibility Jor logistic support: Тһе General Officer
Commanding British Commonwealth Occupation Force will be
responsible for logistic support of all British Commonwealth
Occupation Forces engaged in the occupation except that certain
petroleum products as described below will be furnished from
United States sources.

(6) Supply:

(i) The British Commonwealth Occupation Force will
arrive in the occupation area within 90 days accompany-
ing supplies of all classes. Tentage will be included.

(ii) After establishment of the British Commonwealth
Occupation Force in the occupation area, levels of
supply maintained for the force will conform generally
to those of the EIGHTH United States Army and
Pacific Air Command United States Army.

(iii) Resupply of the British Commonwealth Occupation
Force, except for bulk petroleum products for ground and
air forces, will be from British Commonwealth sources.

(iv) Bulk petroleum products for ground and air forces of
the British Commonwealth Occupation Force will be
supplied by the United States on a dollar reimburse-
ment basis. The Commanding General EIGHTH
United States Army will arrange for delivery of authorized
bulk petroleum products to the waterline at which
point(s) the General Officer Commanding British
Commonwealth Occupation Force will receive and
distribute them.

(c) Hospitalization and Evacuation: The General Officer Com-
manding British Commonwealth Occupation Force will be
responsible for the hospitalization and evacuation of personnel of
the British Commonwealth Occupation Force within the occupa-
tion area and to overseas destinations.

(d) Transportation: | |
(i) Except for rail transportation, all transportation required

by the British Commonwealth Occupation Force for move-
ments to and from the occupation area and within the
area will be furnished from British Commonwealth sources.
(ii) The General Officer Commanding Bri tish Commonwealth
Occupation Force will procure rail transportation in

274 POST-WAR OCCUPATION FORCES: JAPAN AND S.-E. ASIA

JAPAN through procedure as established by the
Commanding General EIGHTH United States Army.

(iii) The General Officer Commanding British Commonwealth
Occupation Force will furnish such railway guards
as may be required for its own operations.

(iv) British Commonwealth Occupation Force Port Director
personnel will assume port director functions and
responsibilities for the entire port of KURE upon arrival
in JAPAN, under operational control of the FIFTH
United States Fleet (see paragraph 3a(iv). KURE
Navy Yard remains under control of the Commander
FIFTH United States Fleet.

(v) The General Officer Commanding British Common-
wealth Occupation Force will be responsible for the
control of shipping schedules pertaining to the British
Commonwealth Occupation Force.

(e) Construction and Facilities:

(i) The Commanding General EIGHTH United States
Army will allocate to the General Officer Commanding
British Commonwealth Occupation Force such housing
as is available in the area to be occupied by that force
and as is required by the force. The Commanding
General EIGHTH United States Army will allocate
in transit and storage warehousing to the General Officer
Commanding British Commonwealth Occupation Force
as required and available. The General Officer Gom-
manding British Commonwealth Occupation Force will
furnish additional storage if required.

(ii) The Commanding General Pacific Air Command
United States Army will allocate IWAKUNI airdrome
and facilities, and air bases and facilities as required
within the area occupied by the British Commonwealth
Occupation Force as bases for operations of the air forces
of the British Commonwealth Occupation Force. The
Commanding General Pacific Air Command United
States Army will arrange to continue functions in these
bases which are essential to the Pacific Air Command
United States Army.

(iii) The General Officer Commanding British Common-
wealth Occupation Force will procure in the area of
occupation office space, officers billets, enlisted men’s
billets, warehousing and storage space sufficient for his
requirements in accordance with methods and policies

Gv)

(v)

(vi)

APPENDIX B 275

as prescribed by the Commandi
United States (on тшш uenerat EGITE
The General Officer Commanding British Commonwealth
Occupation Force will accept on a dollar reimbursement
basis improvements made to Japanese facilities with
United States materials, when such facilities are needed
and desired by the General Officer Commanding British
Commonwealth Occupation Force.
The Commanding General EIGHTH United States Army
and the Commander FIFTH United States Fleet will
allocate, as available, berths, piers and unloading arcas
to the General Officer Commanding British Common-
wealth Occupation Force in sufficient quantity to meet
British Commonwealth Occupation Force discharge
requirements.
The Commanding General EIGHTH United States
Army will furnish, as available, existing wire communi-
cations facilities required by the General Officer
E ANE British Commonwealth Occupation
orce.

(f) Miscellaneous:

(i)

(ii)

(iii)

The General Officer Commanding British Common-
wealth Occupation Force will be responsible for the
completion of demilitarization and disposition of Japanese
installations and armament in their assigned areas in
accordance with instructions prescribed by the
Commanding General EIGHTH United States
Army.

The British Commonwealth Occupation Force will
furnish pay schedules, both military and civil, to the
Commanding General EIGHTH United States Army
when required.

The General Officer Commanding British Common-
wealth Occupation Force will require exclusive use of
yen currency in the occupation area by the British
Commonwealth Occupation Force and will procure
required yen currency from the Commanding General
EIGHTH United States Army. The current cxchange
rate on the basis of 15 to 1 United States dollar obtains
for the British Commonwealth Occupation Force,
conversion from British Commonwealth currency to
be at the exchange rate of 3:228 United States dollars to
one (i) Australian pound.

276 POST-WAR OCCUPATION FORCES: JAPAN AND S.-E. ASIA

5. COMMUNICATIONS

(a) Information concerning Japanese Signal communications facilities :

(3) Civil Communications facilities in JAPAN are operated
by the Board of communications, and agency of the
Japanese Government, in accordance with directives
of Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. The
Occupation Forces employ japanese civil communica-
tions facilities to the maximum «extent consistent with
maintaining essential communications required for the
internal Japanese economy.

(Gi) Japanese Military (Army and Navy) communications
facilities in JAPAN have been deactivated except where
such facilities are required in connection with demobiliza-
tion and repatriation purposes and for mine-sweeping
operations.

(b) For information concerning Allied signal communications
see current index to Standing Signal instructions and signal
operation Instructions, General Headquarters United States Army
Forces Pacific.

(c) Authority has been granted and frequencies allocated for the
British Commonwealth Occupation Force to establish a radio
circuit between Headquarters British Commonwealth Occupation
Force JAPAN and MELBOURNE, AUSTRALIA for transmission
of communications authorized under paragraph 3e(iii) above.

(d) Command Posts:
(1) Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers-- TOK YO.
(ii) United States Army Forces Pacific—TOKYO.
(iii) United States Pacific Flect -CPEARL HARBOUR.
(iv) EIGHTH United States Army—YOKOHAMA.
(v) British Commonwealth Occupation Force—to Бе
ANNOUNCED.
(vi) Pacific Air Command United States Army—-MANILA
Advance Echelon—TOKYO.
(vii) FIFTH United States Fleet —AFLOAT.
(viii) Naval Activities Japan—TOK YO.
(ix) 68th Army Airways Communications System Group—
TOKYO.
(x) FIFTH United States air Force—TOKYO.

(e) Commanding General EIGHTH United States Army will :
(i) Provide assistance as may be required by Commanding
General Pacific Air Command United States Army in

APPENDIX B 277

the integration of the British Commonwealth Occupation

E Force into the air warning system for the Japanese Islands.

(ii) Make available to the British Commonwealth Force
existing safeguard courier service in JAPAN.

(f) Commanding General Pacific Air Command United States Army will :
(i) Insure that the British Commonwealth Occupation
Force is integrated into the air warning system for the
Japanese Islands.
(ii) Coordinate with Commanding Officer 68th Army Air-
ways Communications Systems Group United States
Army to insure proper integration of the air navigational
facilities of the British Commonwealth Occupation Force
air units with those of the United States Army Air Force.

(g) Commanding Officer 68th Army Airways Communication
System Group United States Army will, in coordination with
Commanding General Pacific Air Command United States Army,
arrange for the British Commonwealth Occupation Force air force
navigation facilities to become an integral part of the navigational
facilities of the United States Army Air Forces.

(h) Commander FIFTH United States Fleet will insure estab-
lishment of communications by Royal Naval Port Party to ade-
quately control shipping in the KURE Port.

(i) Commanding General EIGHTH United States Army, Com-
manding General Pacific Air Command United States Army, and
Commander FIFTH United States Fleet will:

(i) Allocate radio frequencies and call signs to elements of
the British Commonwealth Occupation Force under
their operational control. :

(ii) Arrange for the transfer of fixed United States conununi-
cation facilities not required by United States Forces to
the elements. British Commonwealth Occupation Force
under their operational control in accordance with
provisions of 4e(iv) above. .

(iii) Arrange for the assignment of Japanese Civil Communi-
cations facilities as may be required by elements of the
British Commonwealth Occupation Force under their
operational control. By command of General MacArthur.

S. J. CHAMBERLAIN,
Major-General, G.S.C.,
Acting Chief of Staff.

APPENDIX C

Directive to the Commander-in-Chief,
British Commonwealth Occupation
Force in Japan

18 February 1946
APPOINTMENT

1. This directive is issued to you as Gommander-in-Chief
British Commonwealth Occupation Force (hereinafter referred to
as B.C.O.F.) on behalf of and with the approval of His Majesty's
Governments in the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand
and India, hereinafter referred to as the “ British Commonwealth
Governments concerned ”’.

2. Your command will comprise such formations and units
of the naval, army and air forces as may be allotted to it from
time to time by the British Commonwealth Governments concerned.

3. Subject to any exceptions expressly mentioned below,
you may delegate any or all of the powers conferred on you in this
directive to any officer or officers under your command.

OBJECTS AND ROLE

4. The objects of British Commonwealth Occupation Force,
from the aspects of the British Commonwealth Governments con-
cerned, аге:--

(a) To represent worthily the British Commonwealth in

the occupation of Japan;

(b) To maintain and enhance British Commonwealth
prestige and influence in the eyes of the Japanese and of
our Allies; and

(c) To illustrate to, and impress on, the Japanese people,
as s as may be possible, the democratic way and purpose
in life.

5. In addition to furthering these objects, you should also
bear in mind that the organisation of British Commonwealth
Occupation Force and the establishment in connection therewith
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Australia (hereinafter referred to as
J.O.O.S.A.) are regarded by the British Commonwealth Govern-
ments concerned as constituting a further development in British

APPENDIX С 279

Commonwealth co-operation. You should therefore foster, in your

Headquarters and in Force and Base units, the principle of the

maximum integration of services and personnel of each

сад contributing forces to British Commonwealth Occupation
orce.

6. You are to take as the military basis on which British
Commonwealth Occupation Force participates in the occupation
of Japan the Memorandum for Record signed at Tokyo on 18
December 1945, as modified by the provisos set out by
the United States Government in its note dated 22 January,
1946 to the Australian Legation at Washington. The Memo-
randum and provisos have been approved by the United States
Government and the British Commonwealth Governments
concerned.

7. Broadly, your military role, under the direction of the
Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers in Japan (hereinafter
referred to as S.C.A.P.) is, within the area allotted to British
Commonwealth Occupation Force :—

(a) The safeguarding of all allied installations, and of all

Japanese installations awaiting demilitarisation.

(b) The demilitarisation and disposal of Japanese installations

and armaments.

(c) Military control This does not include Military

Government.

RELATIONSHIP WITH UNITED STATES SERVICE AUTHORITIES

8. You are placed under the supreme command of Supreme
Commander for the Allied Powers to whom you have the right of
direct access on matters of major policy afffecting the operational
commitments of British Commonwealth Occupation Force. The
shore based naval personnel of British Commonwealth Occupation
Force come under the operational control of the United States
Naval Commander exercising jurisdiction over Japanese ports.
The army component comes under the operational control of the
Commanding General of the 8th United States Army, and the air
force component under that of the Commanding General, Pacific
Air Command, United States Army, (P.A.C., U.S.A.) as a separate
air command under 5th United States Air Force. Though it is
through you that these United States commanders exercise this
operational control, you may authorise direct communication
between them and your subordinate commanders to the extent you

consider necessary.

280 POST-WAR OCCUPATION FORCES: JAPAN AND S.-E. ASIA

RELATIONSHIP WITH SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS
FOR ADVICE ON SERVICE MATTERS

9. Should Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers
require advice on service matters you are to adopt the following
- procedure:—

(a) You should deal direct with Supreme Commander for
the Allied Powers on all service matters affecting British
Commonwealth Occupation Force in respect of the land
and/or air services represented in British Commonwealth
Occupation Force.

(b) Should Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers
raise any question requiring co-ordinated British
Commonwealth views on land and/or air service matters
outside British Commonwealth Occupation Force’s
immediate sphere but concerning the British Common-
wealth countries represented in British Commonwealth
Occupation Force as a whole, you should act as the
channel of communication to Supreme Commander for
the Allied Powers, obtaining such co-ordinated views
as may be necessary through Joint Chiefs of Staff in
Australia. If he raises a matter concerning the United
Kingdom only, you should refer it to the Prime Minister
of the United Kingdom’s representative with Supreme
Commander for the Allied Powers.

{c) You should deal direct with Supreme Commander for
the Allied Powers on naval matters only insofar as they
concern the Naval shore Party of British Commonwealth
Occupation Force, keeping the Commander-in-Chief,
B.P.F., informed.

The Commander-in-Chief, B.P.F., should continue to deal
direct with Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers on matters
of naval policy keeping you and Joint Chiefs of Staff in Australia in-
formed whenever subjects affecting British Comonwealth Occupa-
tion Force are under consideration.

RELATIONSHIP WITH BRITISH COMMONWEALTH AUTHORITIES

10. You are responsible for the command and administra-
tion of British Commonwealth Occupation Force as a whole to
the British Commonwealth Governments concerned through Joint
Chiefs of Staff in Australia, whose instruction to you will be issued
through the Australian Chiefs of Staff acting as the agents of Joint
Chiefs of Staff in Australia. The normal channel for communica-
tions from you on these matters is through the Australian Chiefs of

APPENDIX С 281

Staff to Joint Chiefs of Staff in Australia. You are to submit to
Joint Chiefs of Staff in Australia monthly reports on the activities
and general welfare of your command.

_ ll. On matters of Governmental concern affecting the
policy and operations of British Commonwealth Occupation Force
as a whole, you are to communicate through Joint Chiefs of Staff
in Australia to the Australian Government who act as the represen-
tative of the other British Commonwealth Governments concerned.

12. The relations of your subordinate commanders with
their Governments and national authorities are governed by
directives issued to them by their Governments. You will be given
copies of these directives.

13. Subject to any special instructions you may issue, the
commander of a Service component of a national contingent may
communicate direct with his national Service authorities on
matters of domestic administration concerning the personnel of his
national Service wherever serving in British Commonwealth
Occupation Force. In addition he may make periodical reports
on the activities and general welfare of his command direct to his
national Service authorities but he is to provide you, and where
concerned, the Air Officer Commanding B.C.A.I.R., with two
copies of such reports. You are then to pass one copy, with any
comments you may wish to make, to the national representative
concerned on Joint Chiefs of Staff in Australia.

14, The officer nominated as the representative of a
national contingent has the right to communicate with his national
authorities, when he considers it necessary in the discharge of his
responsibilities, on matters which affect either the general weli
being of personnel in his contingent or the interests of his Govern-
ment. In the case of the United Kingdom and India contingents
he will communicate through the representative or representatives
of his nation on Joint Chiefs of Staff in Australia. Such communica-
tion may be made only after prior consultation with you. He is
to provide you immediately with two copies. You will at once
send to Joint Chiefs of Staff in Australia a copy together with any
observations on it which you may wish to make.

CONTROL AND ADMINISTRATION OF BRITISH COMMONWEALTH OCCUPA-
TION FORCE

15. The broad policy for the organisation for the control
and administration of British Commonwealth Occupation Force in
Japan and for channels of communication in respect of both you
and your subordinate commanders in relation thereto is set out

282 POST-WAR OCCUPATOIN FORCES: JAPAN AND 5.-E. ASIA

in Appendix 1, “ The Organization for the control and adminis-
tration of British Commonwealth Occupation Force in Тарап ".

16. In carrying out the command and administration of
British Commonwealth Occupation Force you are to be guided
by the principles and policy set forth in the “ Plan for a British
Commonwealth Force to participate in the Occupation of Japan ”.
copies of which are being issued to you and to all concerned.

17. Personnel and units from Service components of national
contingents forming part of Headquarters British Commonwealth
Occupation Force, or B.C.O.F. Force and Base Units are to be
regarded as transferred for functional control and general adminis-
tration. The commanders of Service components of national
contingents remain responsible both to you and their national
Service authorities for the domestic administration, including disci-
plinary action and well being of these personnel and units. In the
case of the officer nominated as the representative of the Indian
Contingent, he, jointly with you, is responsible for ensuring that
Indian personnel are not employed on any task or in such manner
as to conflict with religious or caste susceptibilities.

MILITARY GOVERNMENT

18. Military Government of the area allotted to British
Commonwealth Occupation Force will continue to be conducted
by the United States agencies. You have been provided with
officers both in your Headquarters and those of subordinate forma-
tions for purpose of liaison with the United States military govern-
ment agencies and, with the sanction of those agencies, for liaison
with the Japanese authorities in the British Commonwealth
Occupation Force area.

PUBLICITY POLICY AND PUBLIC RELATIONS ORGANISATION

19. You are to be guided in Public Relations matters by
the following definitions of the objects of publicity in connection
with British Commonwealth Occupation Force and joint Chiefs
of Staff in Australia, which are to be read in conjunction with
paragraphs 4 and 5 above: —

(a) Long Term:
To further British Commonwealth co-operation and co-
ordination.

(b) Short Term:
(i) To ensure adequate and co-ordinated publicity on
a British Commonwealth basis simultaneously in all
the British Commonwealth countries concerned.

APPENDIX С 283

(i) To stimulate voluntary recruitment for the Australian
and New Zealand contingents of British Common-
wealth Occupation Force and to maintain public
interest in the Force throughout the British
Commonwealth.

20. You are to afford the Press every facility within such
limits as are imposed by Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers
or as may be necessary to facilitate the policy set out in paragraphs
4 and 5 above.

21. You are to afford the Public Relations detachments with
each national contingent full facilities for dealing direct with the
Public Relations organisation of their respective countries in
accordance with the latter's domestic Public Relations policy. You
are to ensure that the activities of these detachments are coordina-
ted in the light of the publicity policy for British Commonwealth
Occupation Force set out in paragraph 19 above.

DISCIPLINARY POWERS

29. You are to exercise disciplinary powers in accordance
with the warrants that have been issued to you in respect of
personnel of each national contingent and Service therein.

FINANCIAL POWERS

23. You are authorised on bchalf of the British Common-
wealth Governments concerned to exercise financial powers in
accordance with the limits and provisions set out in Appendix 2
to this directive. Appendix 2 will be issued later.

PROMOTIONS AND APPOINTMENTS

24. All promotions and appointments and recommendations
for promotions and appointments will be made in accordance with
existing instructions issued by national authorities, You may,
however, direct that certain proposed promotions and appoint-
ments, and recommendations for promotions and appointments,
be submitted to you for comment before being authorized or
forwarded to the national authority concerned.

ALTERATIONS TO ORDER OF BATTLE AND WAR ESTABLISHMENTS

95, You are to refer all proposals for changes in the order
of battle or in war establishments (except those of integrated units)

984 POST-WAR OCCUPATION FORCES: JAPAN AND S.-E. ASIA

to the appropriate Australian Service Headquarters for clearance
in accordance with current instructions.

26. In the case of integrated units and headquarters, in
order to facilitate the rotation of staff appointments, you are
authorised to vary the nationality of appointments and postings
below the rank of colonel or equivalent up to a limit of ten per
cent increase or decrease in the numbers of the respective ranks
provided initially by each nationality. Where numbers are too
small to admit of this percentage being observed, the limit is to be
two individuals. Any changes which you make in the terms of
this paragraph are to be reported to Joint Chiefs of Staff in
Australia without delay. Proposals beyond the above limits are
to be referred, in the case of purely air establishments, to В.А.А.Е.
H.Q., and in all other cases to Army Headquarters Melbourne, for
clearance in accordance with current instructions.

27. With the object of conserving British Commonwealth
manpower, you should explore the possibility of replacing Service
personnel by locally engaged persons to an extent that will not
materially impair the fitness of the Force for its tasks. Notwith-
standing paragraphs 25 and 26 you may, at your discretion,
employ in accordance with this paragraph locally engaged persons
to replace Service personnel within your authorised war establish-
ment. Such replacement of Service personnel will be regarded as
constituting a reduction in the total strength of Service personnel
to be posted against the war establishment which itself remains
unaltered.

ALTERATIONS TO WAR EQUIPMENT TABLES

28. Any proposed changes to war equipment tables should
be referred to the appropriate Australian Service Headquarters.
You are, however, authorised to approve local scales and issues
in excess of authorised scales provided these do not result in any
substantial increase in provision and do not introduce new types
of equipment.

Acting Minister for Defence;
Commonwealth Government of Australia,
For and on behalf of his Majesty’s Governments, in the
United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand and India.

APPENDIX D

Directive to the Commander of the Army
Component of the Indian Contingent of
the British Commonwealth Occupation

Forces in Japan

15 October 1946.
APPOINTMENT AND COMMAND

1. This directive is issued to you as the Commander of
the Army component of the Indian Contingent of the British
Commonwealth Occupation Force in JAPAN (BCOF) on behalf
of and with the approval of His Majesty’s Government in India
hereinafter referred to as “ the Government ".
2. This directive is to be read in the light of the “ Plan for
a British Commonwealth Force to participate in the Occupation
of JAPAN ", and in conjunction with the directive issued to the
Nominated Representative of the Indian Contingent and with
any directive which the Commander-in-Chief B.C.O.F. may issue
to you.
3. You are responsible to the Commander-in-Chief B.C.O.F.
for the command, employment, administration and training of the
Indian element of the British-Indian Division and such formations
and units as may be allotted to it from time to time. You will
receive from the Commander-in-Chief B.C.O.F. any directives
necessary in respect of this task.
4. You are at all times to ensure that those under your
command :—
(a) represent India worthily in the occupation of Japan;
(b) maintain and enhance British Commonwealth prestige
and influence in the eyes of the Japanese and of our
Allies; and

(c) illustrate to, and impress on, the Japanese people, as
far as may be possible, the democratic way and purpose
in life.

SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR DOMESTIC ADMINISTRATION
5. You are responsible to the Commander-in-Chief B.C.O.F.

and to G.H.Q. India for matters of domestic administration in-
cluding disciplinary action in respect of all tbe personnel of the

286 POST-WAR OCGUPATION FORCES: JAPAN AND S.-E. ASIA

Indian Army wherever serving in B.C.O.F., and that arrange-
ments for their welfare are satisfactory.

6. You may communicate direct with G.H.Q. India on such
matters, subject to any special instructions which the Commander-
in-Chief B.C.O.F. may issue. In addition, you may make periodical
reports on the activities and general welfare of your command
direct to G.H.O. India but you are to provide the Commander-
in-Chief B.C.O.F. with two copies of such reports.

SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITIES FOR GENERAL WELL BEING OF YOUR
COMPONENT AND FOR SAFEGUARDING THE INTERESTS OF THE
GOVERNMENT

7. You are to bring to the notice of the officer nominated
as the representative of the Indian Contingent any matters which
affect either the general well being of the personnel for whom
you are responsible under this directive, or any matter affecting
the interests of the Government, which you have not been able to
resolve through normal channels in B.C.O.F. and which you
considered sufficiently important to be brought to the notice of the
Government.

DISCIPLINARY POWERS

8. Your disciplinary powers will be in accordance with the
warrants or other forms of delegation that may be issued to you
and with any other powers that may be authorised.

PUBLIC RELATIONS

9. You are to ensure that those under your command
understand the policy governing public relations, which is explained
in the “ Plan for a British Commonwealth Force to participate in
the Occupation of Japan ”,

10. You are to ensure that any Public Relations personnel
attached to your component conform with the requirements of
the Directorate of Public Relations in India with those of the
Headquarters B.C.O.F., Public Relations Directorate; also that
the Commander-in-Chief B.C.O.F.'s directions for the co-ordina-
tion of all public relations activities in B.C.O.F. as a whole are
implemented.

FINANCIAL POWERS

11. You are to exercise such financial powers as may be
delegated to you by the Commander-in-Ghief B.C.O.F., to whom

APPENDIX D 287
the British Commonwealth Governments concerned have delegated
responsibility for the Administration of B.C.O.F. as a whole,
including certain financial powers.

W. J. CAwrHORN,

Major-General,
On behalf of the Representative of the C-in-C India,
Commander-in-Chief in India. on the Joint Chiefs of Staff in

Australia.

APPENDIX E

Directive to the Nominated Representative
of the Indian Contingent of the British
Commonwealth Occupation Force
in Japan

15 October 1946

1. This directive is issued to you as the Nominated Re-
presentative of the Indian Contingent of the British Commonwealth
Occupation Force in JAPAN (B.C.O.F.) on behalf of and with the
approval of His Majesty's Government in India hereinafter referred
to as “ the Government ”,

2. This directive is to be read in the light of the “ Plan for
a British Commonwealth Force to participate in the Occupation of
Japan ", and in conjunction with the relevant paragraphs of the
Directive issued to the commanders of the components of the
Indian Contingent of B.C.O.F. and with any directive which the
Commander-in-Chief B.C.O.F. may issue to you.

3. As the Nominated Representative of the Indian Contin-
gent, you are responsible, in respect of all personnel of all Services
in the Indian Contingent, for bringing to the notice of the Govern-
ment, through the channels prescribed below, any matter which
affects either the general well being of personnel in the contingent
or the interests of the Government, which you have not been able
to resolve in consultation with the Commander-in-Chief B.C.O.F.
and which you consider sufficiently important to be brought to
the notice of the Government.

4. In particular, you are responsible jointly with the
Commander-in-Chief B.C.O.F, for ensuring that Indian personnel
are not employed in any task or in such manner as to conflict with
religious or cast susceptibilities,

5. Before consulting the Commander-in-Chief B.C.O.F.,
< you аге to consult with the senior officer of each of the other
Services in the Indian Contingent. Further, in all such cases,
you are to communicate to the Government only after full con-
sultation with the Commander-in-Chief B.C.O.F., to whom you
are to endorse immediately two copies of your communication.

6. In cases where air questions or matters affecting air force
personnel are involved, you are also to consult with the Air Officer

APPENDIX E 289

Commanding B.C. AIR and similarly provide him with three copies
of your communication.

7. You are to address communications on matters referred
to in paragraph 3 to the Commander-in-Chief in India through
his representative on J.C.O.S.A. Should you be addressed direct
by the Government on any matter, you are to reply through the
channel defined above.

On behalf of the W. J. Cawrnorn,
Commander-in-Chief in India. -© Major-General,
Representative of the C-in-C India,
on the Joint Chiefs of Staff in
Australia.

JAPAN AND S.-E. ASIA

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APPENDIX G

268 Ind Inf Bde Gp Occupation
Instruction No. 1

DISASTER PLAN
13 May 1947
HQ 268 Ind. Inf. Bde. GP.

Ref Map: CENTRAL JAPAN 1/50,000 4451-II, 4551-IV,
4753-YV, 4952-11.

GEN

1. The land areas of JAPAN are particularly liable to
disasters in the form of earthquake, flood, tidal wave, typhoon,
fire or volcanic eruption.

2. Such occurrences present problems which are generally
similar to those presented by air raids and in.framing plans to
meet such emergencies, the principles involved in the now familiar
procedure for ARP should be applied.

3. Preparations may be broadly divided into:—

(a) Action to be taken during precautionary period when

some warning of an impending disaster is available.

(b) Action to be taken during and after a disaster.

4. It may frequently be impossible to implement previously
prepared plans owing to the violence or unexpectedness of the
occurrence. "Therefore all plans must be highly flexible and
considerable improvisation may be required.

SCOPE OF THIS INSTR

5. The objects of this instr. are:

(a) To provide plans for the emp. of 268 Ind. Inf. Bde. Gp.
in the event of a disaster.

(b) To define principles on which comds of sub areas, units
and dets will base their own disaster plans and on which
co-ord action will be taken in the event of inability of
fully implementing the Bde Disaster plan.

TASKS OF THE OCCUPATION FORCE
6. (a) Primary task:

The protection of the lives and property of Allied
Nationals.

APPENDIX G 295

(b) Secondary task:
Emergency relief to Non-Allied Nationals will be given
where it is necessary :—
(i) To alleviate human suffering.
(ii) To preserve peaceful and orderly conditions.
(iii) To prevent chaos.

RELIEF MEASURES TO NON-ALLIED NATIONALS

7. (a) Relief will NOT be given to Non-Allied Nationals at
the expense of the well being of Allied Nationals or their property.

(b) Alirelief to Non-Allied Nationals will be effected through
US Mil Govt. and JAPANESE Govt. agencies in accordance with
Appendix “А” attached.

CIV DISASTER PLAN

8. The Prefectural Government of OKAYAMA, SHIMANE
and TOTTORI have prepared their own Disaster Plan for the
civ population and have now been instr to revise them.

AREAS AND SUB-AREAS

9. (a) Area .. Prefectures of OKAYAMA, SHIMANE
AND TOTTORI.
(b) Sub-Area (1) OKAYAMA SECTOR ABLE

OKAYAMA SOUTH
SECTOR BAKER
OKAYAMA NORTH
SECTOR CHARLIE
KURASHIKI

(ii) SHIMANE

(іі) TOTTORI

GROUPING OF UNITS
10. See Appendix “В” attached.
RESPONSIBILITIES
11. (a) 268 Ind Inf Bde Gp is responsible for initiating,

reparations and measures of relief or any general disaster occurring
in the prefectures of OKAYAMA, SHIMANE and TOTTORI.

296 POST-WAR OCCUPATION FORCES: JAPAN AND S.-E. ASIA

(b) Sub-Areasresponsibilities will be limited to area allotted
as regards planning, preparation and immediate action. In case
of a localized disaster, or one affecting Sub-Areas to a different
extent, co-ord of effort will be directed by HO 268 Ind Inf Bde Gp.

(c) Units are primarily responsible for own camp area and
immediate vicinity but may be allotted additional responsibilities.

COMD AND CONTROL

12. (a) In a disaster emergency COMD 268 Ind Inf Bde
is assuming op control of all army units located in the AREA
and under comd for local adm.

(b) Сота Sub Areas/Sectors will assume op control of
all army units located in sub areas/sectors at the time.

(c) Sub-Areas will Haise with their respective Mil Govt
team and Air Force Ímns.

SUB AREA AND UNIT DISASTER PLAN

13. (a) Sub-Area Plans

Comds Sub-Areas will prepare Disaster Plan for precautionary
measures and immediate action within sub-Areas. Plans of units
under comd will be co-ord by Sub-Area Comd.

(b) Unit Plans

Unit plans for precautionary measures and immediate action
in event of disaster will be prepared and co-ord with Sub-Area
plan.

(c) Sub-Area and unit disaster exercises will be held
periodically.

(d) Disaster Plans will be maint up to date and will be
handed over to incoming fomns or units on relief.

(e) Three copies of Sub-Area plans of units directly under
comd will be submitted to reach this HQ by 1 JUN 47. Units
under comd of Sub-Areas will submit three copies of their Disaster
Plans to Sub-Areas concerned.

BASIS OF DISASTER PLANS

,1*. Plans will be based on a system of seven phases as set
out in paras 23-29. "These states of readiness are based on the

degree of WARNING which experience has shown may be
expected.

APPENDIX G 297

15. The degree of WARNING may vary from several days
e.g. in the case of a typhoon to NO warning at alle.g. in the case of
an.earthquake. Therefore :—
{a) Any alert may NOT necessarily begin with PHASE 2
and in extreme cases it may be necessary to implement
PHASE 6 without previous warning.
(b) Sub-Areas may frequently be standing to at different
states of readiness, since conditions may vary from one
locality to another.

EQUIPTS FOR INCL IN DISASTER PLANS

16. Fire-Fighting
(a) Any kind of disaster is almost certain to be accom-
panied by an outbreak of fire which may assume maj proportions.
(b) Therefore, normal resources in both equipment and
personnel must be augmented as .much as possible and extra
precautions put into force to check and extinguish outbreaks of fire.

17. Med

(a) Hy calls may be made on med resources, which may
themselves be affeced by the disaster. Alternative aid posts will
therefore be held available.

(b) Extra stretchersbearers and vehs for use as amb will
be earmarked to stand by when required.

18. Rescue Squad
Rescue squad will be detailed and appropriate tools ¢qpt
and tpt made available for their use.

19. Sups and Clothing

Seven days res ration will be held by units. Stocks of water
and clothing will also be held by units ready for use. These will
be so located that they have max protection against the effects of
any disaster-and are readily available when required. Under
typhoon conditions dumps should be decentralized into shelter
areas (sec para 26(b) (iii)).

20. Mutual Assistance between Sub-Areas and Units .

(a) Incases where the area affected by a disaster is localized,
Sub-Areas/Units will be prepared to render mutual assistance as
required. |

(b) Such assistance may incl:—

(i) The despatch of tps, sups and eqpt.

208 POST-WAR OCCUPATION FORCES: JAPAN AND 8.-Е. ASIA

(ii) The provision of max engr assistance.
(iii) The housing and rehabilitation of personnel evac from
the affected area. V.
(iv) Civ population—See Appendix ‘ A’ attached.
(v) Med. . |
(c) Tps moving to the disaster area will be armed and will
carry two days sup of rations and water.

21. Looting, Sabotage ete.

Vigorous action will be necessary to prevent looting, sabo-
tage or other hostile acts both during and after a disaster. They
may incl action by subversive elements, under cover of a confused
situation, therefore counter measures will be prepared by ай
units.

EMP OF AC

22. BCAIR is prepared in the event of a disasterto provide AC for
the following tasks:—
(i) Recce of affected area
(ii) Dropping of relief sups
(ій) Evac of cas, where feasible
(iv) Courier and intercomn service

STATES OF READINESS

23. PHASE 1 Normal Conditions
Aciion (i) Prepare and maint up to date Sub-Area/Unit
Disaster Plans.

(ii) Where practicable secure roofs of service type
buildings of a temporary nature (e.g. Nis en hut)
by means of a steel cable picketed in the ground,
as a protection against typhoon.

(iii) Special Earthquake Precautions—See Appendix
“С” attached.

24. PHASE 2— Code Word— Pretoria
(a) Situation
. Warning of a typhoon or tidal wave expected to
strike area within 24 hrs. but NOT before 12 hrs. See
Appendix ‘D’ attached para 4(c).
(b) Action :
Isue WARNING ORDER to all tps.

APPENDIX G 299

25. PHASE 3—Code Word—Ottawa
(a) Situation
| Warning of typhoon or tidal wave expected to strike
within 12 hrs but NOT before 6 hrs.

(b) Action
Issue WARNING ORDER to all tps.

26. PHASE 4--Сойе Word—London
(a) Situation
Warning of typhoon or tidal wave expected to strik
area within 6 hrs but NOT before 3 hrs. ~

(b) Action
(i) Issue WARNING ORDER TO all tps.
(ii) Confine tps to Unit areas, except those on duty.
(iii) Earmark slit trenches or similar shelters above water
level for all personnel as a protection against typhoon
and flood.
(iv) The following will stand to at three hrs notice:
Firefighting squads
Med Units
Rescue Squads.
(v) In case of a typhoon warning:
(a) lash down stocks of rations, water, and clothing
in vehs, f
(b) lash down dumps of loose timber, corrugated
iron or any other material that can be blown
away,
(c) strike tents.

27. PHASE 5—Code Word —Canberra
(a) Situation
(i) Imminent typhoon or tidal wave about to strike
the area within 3 hrs (See Appendix ‘D’ para 5(b).
(ii) Flood, fire or volcanic eruption NOT as yet consti-
tuting a disaster, but capable of developing into one
within a short period.
(b) Action
(i) Implement PHASE 4, if NOT already in force.
(ii) Place TOPSEC, SECRET or CONFD documents
in safes or protected buildings.
(iii) Extinguish all oil stores, braziers or other naked
flames.

300 POST-WAR OCCUPATION FORCES: JAPAN AND S.-E. ASIA

(iv) Open wrls comn if NOT already opened.

(v) In case of fire take normal action to control and
extinguish. | ‚

(vi) In case of flood or volcanic eruption prepare for
evac and implement if necessary.

(vit) In case of typhoon, evac to stronger structures ali
personnel housed in buildings NOT capable of
withstanding winds of high velocity. If such
stronger buildings do NOT exist move personnel to
slit trenches etc. earmarked beforehand.

28. PHASE 6—Code Word—Napier

(a) Situation
(3) Typhoon or tidal wave actually striking the sea.
(0) Flood, fire or volcanic eruption of sufficient intensity
or size as to constitute a disaster.

(iii) Earthquake.

(b) Action
_ (i) Implement PHASE 5, if NOT already in force
as far as conditions permit,
(ii) In the case of an earth tremor or earthquake take
the special precaution detailed in Appendix “С”?
attached.
(iii) Thereafter as ordered by the local unit or Sub-
Area Comd in the It of the circumstances prevailing.

29. PHASE 7—After-Math-Code Word —Delhi

(a) Situation
Disaster passed (See Appendix ‘ D ' para 4(d)) or effects
under control.

(b) Action

(3) Report to HQ 268 Ind Inf Bde Gp by the most
expeditious means :—

(a) The location and magnitude of any damage.
(b) Requirements for assistance.

(c) Cas.

(d) Action of tps.

(e) Any other pertinent infm.

(ii) Survey comn to determine which rds, rlys and
airfds are usable for mov of personnel and sups to
and from the affected areas. Report this infm
to this HO.

APPENDIX G 301

(iii) Restorg, rehabilitate or construct emergency facili-
ties in the following order of priority:
(a) Water sup.
(b) Emergency hospital facilities.
(c) Emergency repair of rds, brs and rlys.
(d) Provision of emergency lighting and heating
facilities.
(e) Civ population.

TYPHOON WARNING

30. Appx C' att gives details of the typhoon warning system
op by BCAIR. This system will be regarded as the official
authority within BCOF area for issue of warnings regarding states
of readiness. Units may however obtain useful corroborative infm
from local JAPANESE Weather Bureaux.

31. Warning msgs will be received by this HQ and it will
be passed to Sub-Areas/Units concerned by. the fastest means.

32. Visual Sig System
The following system will be instituted within sub-areas/
units wherever practicable in order to provide a visual means of
notifying all ranks of the existing state of readiness.
(a) A flag pole will be erected on the most conspicuous pt
within unit areas.
(b) Flags will be displayed to denote the state of readiness
in force as follows :—

PHASE 2 PRETORIA .. ONE flag
PHASE 3 OTTAWA .. TWO flags
PHASE 4 LONDON .. THREE flags
PHASE 5 CANBERRA .. FOUR flags

(c) Flags may be of any convenient colour, size or shape.
INTERCOMN

33, Code Words
(a) Notification of an impending or actual disaster will be
passed by the most expeditious means available using the appro-
priate code word and detail as follows:—
(i) Nature of disaster (eg.—typhoon/fire/earthquake).
(ii) ETA (if applicable) and place.
(iij) Code Word to implement required state of readiness:—
PHASE 2 R PRETORIA
PHASE 3 ses OTTAWA

302 POST-WAR OCCUPATION FORCES: JAPAN AND S.-E. ASIA

PHASE 4 .. LONDON
PHASE 5 .. | CANBERRA
PHASE 6 .. NAPIER

(b) Examfles
* TYPHOON WARNING ETA ... (place)

0223001 LONDON ”
“FIRE... ds (place) CANBERRA ”.

34. Sitreps

(a) Sitreps from Sub-Areas/units will reach this HQ by
0900 hrs and 1800 hrs during WARNING and Disaster
Emergency Period.

(b) This HQ will fwd sitreps to HO BCOF by 0930 hrs.
and 1830 hrs daily.

35. ACK.

В. S. NORONHA,
Bde Major,
HQ 268 Ind Inf Bde Gp. Ext 92.

Okayama

Appendix ‘A’ io HQ 268 Ind. Inf. Bde. Gp. Occupation Instr

1.

No. 1 Disaster Plan of 13 Мау 47.

ASSISTANCE TO CiviL POPULATION

GEN

Att at Annx I is a brief outline of the arrangements

made by the Japanese Prefectural authorities for publishing warnings
and for communicating with the Occupation Forces.

2. The Japanese civil authorities are responsible for all
measures taken for their own security before, during and after a

Disaster.

They may, however, receive assistance from the Occupa-

tion Forces in the circumstances and under the conditions stated
in para 7 of the body of this Instr, subject to the following:

(a)

(b)

(c)

3.
(a)

Relief sups

Mil sups and eqpt will NOT be made available to
the civil population as relief sups, except under the
gravest circumstances.

The Japanese maint stocks of relief sups of all natures
at UJINA, which are available for despatch to afflicted
areas. Mil assistance may however be given to tpt
these stores.

Med

Japanese civilians will NOT be cared for in
Military Hospitals nor will med attention be given
them until Allied Nationals have received adequate care.

In circumstances where medical resources of the
Occupation Forces are NOT fully emp in caring for
Allied Nationals, however, medical personnel may be
made available to advise and assist the Japanese as
required.
Other assistance А

Other specialist personnel, such as engrs, sigs, etc.
may similarly be made available to assist the Japanese if
they are NOT required for the assistance of the Occupa-
tion Forces or of Allied Nationals.

RESPONSIBILITIES OF US MIL GOVT

US Mil Govt units are responsible for:;— | .
Warning local Japanese authorities of an impending

disaster.

304 POST-WAR OCCUPATION FORCES: JAPAN AND S.-E. ASIA

(b) Ensuring by supervision and advice that adequate
measures are taken by the Japanese local authorities
when a disaster occurs.

(c) Requesting military aid from BCOF for the assistance of
the Japanese when required, and for the co-ord and
allocation of all such assistance given.

RESPONSIBILITIES OF BCOF

4. General
Military assistance will only be rendered to the Japanese
by BCOF at the request and through the medium of US Mil Govt.

5. Assistance available

(a) Provision of engrs with their eqpt if required to assist
or supervise Japanese civil engrs im the restoration of rds, ryls,
sea walls etc. etc.

(b) Provision of sig personnel and eqpt to assist the Japanese
in the restoration of comns, or to est comn with isolated areas.

(c) Provision of med personnel.

(d) Provision of MT to set up an emergency tpt system.

(e) Provision of land, air or sea tpt for the mov of relief
sups from Japanese sources. Provision of personnel to supervise
the distribution of relief sups.

6. Procedure
When a disaster occurs within a sub-area of responsibility
Mil assistance so given will be rendered in three stages as follows :—
(a) Stage 1 (i) Sub-areas will immediately despatch reps
by the fastest means to report to the appro-
priate Mil Govt unit to ascertain their
requirements as foliows:—
One LO to ascertain requirements of relief
sups and tpt, and in the absence of a BCOF
Mil Govt LO, to act in his stead.
One Med rep.
One Engr. rep.
One Sig rep.
(н) НО BCOF may similarly despatch one
Liaison Officer and where possible one
Naval Liaison Officer.
(b) Stage 2 (2) Based on the requests of US Mil Govt and
on the advice of the technical reps, the LO
will inform the Sub-area concerned what

APPENDIX G 305

assistance is required. This will include
requests for naval or air assistance.

(ii) Sub-areas will render the max assistance
possible from within their own resources,
keeping this HQ infm.

(ii) Assistance required beyond the resources of
Sub-Area, incl requests for naval or air
assistance, will be referred to HQ 268 Ind
Inf Bde Gp.

(c) Stage 3 This HO will request HQ BCOF to allocate
such extra resources as are available.

7. Allocation of naval or air assistance

(a) When naval or air assistance is required in more than
one Sub-area of responsibility, its allotment will be co-ordinated
by this HQ.

8. Refugees

(a) Should the evac of refugees be necessary, Sub-areas
will be prepared, in conjunc with US Mil Govt, to enforce the use
of selected routes, in order that the mov of important mil and civ
sups and equpt is NOT impeded.

(b) Inexceptional circumstances, Sub-areas will be prepared
to est camps for refugees.

Appendix *B' to Hg. 268 Ind. Inf. Bde. Gf. Occupation Instr,
No. 1 of 13 May 47

GRouPING ов UNrrs

1. OKAYAMA SUB-AREA

COMD:—C.O. 2/5 RGR (FF)
(a) Sector ABLE
(i) Tps:—
2/5 RGR (FF)
350 Fd Pk Sqn RE
21 Fd Pk LAD REME
Water Tpt Pi
80 BGH
(ü) Сота: С.О. 2/5 RGR (FF)
(b) Sector BAKER

(i) Tps:—

268 Ind Inf Bde Sig Sec. 1164 Ind. Tps Wksp sec

30 Fd. Bty RA 111 Ind Wksp Coy

HQ RE 204 Brit Pro Coy

429 Ind Fd Coy RIE 268 Ind Inf Bde Pro. Unit

907 Ind Wks Sec. 152 SIB Sec

227 Ind Div Tpt Coy
RIASC. 551 Ind FS Sec

59 Ind Sup Coy 27 Staff Paymaster
—38 Ind RHSD

21 Ind Comp РІ Det YWCA

591 Ind Sup Рі 60 Ind Reception

9 Ind Fd Bky Sec Camp

861 Ind Pet PI Bde MT РІ

33 Fd Hyg Sec SSO

43 AMU MOV AREA

OKAYAMA
14 Ind MLBU

114 Ind Ord Offrs Shop
208 Ind Ord Fd Pk
9 Kinema Sec.

(ii) Сота Bde Fire Offr

(c) Sector CHARLIE
Tps:—
(i) Pre Release and Resettlement Unit
(i) Rear details 7 Lt Cav
Соша:--О.С. Pre Release and Resettlement Unit

APPENDIX G 307

2. SHIMANE Sub-Area
`1 MAHRATTA
Det Sigs (MATSUE)
9 Lt Fd Amb
Indep Sec 152 Ind Mob Wksp Coy
Comd:—C.O. 1 MAHRATTA

3. TOTTORI Sub-Area
5/1 PUNJAB
56 Ind Comp Pl
112 Postal Unit
Comd:—C.O. 5/1 Punjab.

APPENDIX “С? TO НО 268 IND INF BDE GP OCCUPATION
INSTR No. 1 DISASTER PLAN OF 13 MAY, 1947

SPECIAL PRECAUTIONS TO BE TAKEN IN THE EVENT
OF EARTHQUAKES

1. During Normal State (Phase 1) Е
(a) Ensure that all ranks аге conversant with the provisions

of para 2 below.

(b) Ensure that orders are issued to, and are understood
by all Service or Japanese personnelin charge of Electricity Supply,
Gas and Steam Heating installations which sup the Occupation
Forces, in accordance with the provisions of para 3 below. Where
such installations are Japanese controlled, Sub-areas will request
US Military Government to issue the appropriate instrs.

2. Actions of tps during an earthquake

(a) Evac buildings and move rapidly to areas where there
is NO danger from falling objects.

(b) Iftime allows, extinguish all oilstoves, braziers, electric
fires or naked flames.

(c) When the earthquake is over, inspect buildings for
possible damage that might render them unsafe.

3. Action to be taken by personnel in charge of Power etc. Installations
during an earthquake

(a) Electricity Sup
(i) All Sub-stas sup electrical energy to Occupation
Force Installations will be immediately disconnected
from those installations.
(ii) At local Military Power Stations, switches will be
withdrawn to disconnect the Power Stas from their
respective loads, and the stas closed down.

(b) Gas Sup
As in sub para (a)(i) above.

(c) Steam Heating
(i) Steam will be turned off at the boiler house either
by closing the main boiler steam valves or by
closing the valves on the stam leader.
(ii) Where liquid fuel firing is emp, the fuel sup will
be turned off.

APPENDIX G 309

(iii) Where coal firing is emp dampers will be closed and
firing doors opened. It is emphasized that SAFETY
VALVES must be maint in first class condition to
enable surplus steam to blow off, and for this reason,
must be checked periodically.

(d) Water Sup
It is essential that water sup remains turned ON
to deal with possible fires. In cases where the supply of
water is dependent of the sup of electricity, therefore,
the sup of electricity to pumping stations must be turned
on again as soon as it is safe to do so.

It must be impréssed on all ops that the initiative for taking
action rests with them, since there will be NO time for the issue of
specific orders.

Installations, incl water sup installations, will NOT be put
back into op until the Іосаі Сота is satisfied that there is no likli-
hood of danger to life and property by so doing.

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310 POST-WAR OCCUPATION FORCES: JAPAN AND S.-E. ASIA

Н XIGNdddV

APPENDIX « J”

Split by arms—Indian Army Units]Formations — Japan

IACG

Air Liaison
Welfare
Chaplains

Public Relations |

Graves Regn ..
Canteens

` Totals

PART “А "—

FLAT WE
BORs | VCOs
51 | al
3 | 657 |
206 |
18 1,515
118 323 |
3,061
1,104
H
58 743 |
i
42 796
94 561
12 18
55 87
is 52
10 97
408
з | 3
68 78
|
|
п
m
29 | 60
497 | 10,192

110

152

Officers

10

{

BORs

16

USSR ARMS BASIS

39, RETS |

УСОз
IORs

12

24
17

NCsE

20 -

GRAND TOTAL

О FLAT WE | 3% RETS
| E И VCOs VOCs | | | voc
‘otal | Officers | BROs [AOR Total | Officers] ВОВ; | ORs Total ч mos BORs | IORSs
B | | Ё oes | ЕЗ
619! 5 | ай 5%* 23 7 | 28)| зи ae И, 8
21 Í 36 з | 67, 716: 34 1 657; 690, 1 | 20
6| m | 2121 222! 13 2 206) 221, | 6
4 | 6 | 19 1,560 | 1,622) 43 21 1520| 15984; 1 | 1 46
15 | 8 | 122 333] 473; 16 | 112 3233] 451; 1 | 3 | 10
9 | 5 | | 3158 | $204 | 47 306: | 3,108) 1 | 92 |
“jaz E II a | 1 11741 1,198] 1 5 |
25 1 49 | 60 | 765 8% | 56 56 744 856 | 2 2 | 22 |
| | ss | 2 2 4| 1 | |
1 37 > 37| 86 36 0» |
2 | 9 | 4 | s| в € | e az} вз| 1 | 2 | ж!
18 15 | % | 58) өз | 4 а 573 | 628 [4 | 17
| i
ij 2] B | s: 331 3 12 19 34 | а |
5 | 2 |57 | 90 149] 3 55 87 145 | 2 | 3
2/1 | 5| 5t 2 | 34] 56 | j E
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1 5 | e| | | |
| | |
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| 5 6 | 2 | 13 | | | |
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3 1 | 30 | 62 өй 1 | 29 | 60 9| .. | 1: 2
332 | 403 | 513 | 10,98 | 11,414] 393 2 497 | 10,192 | 11,082 | 10 | [ 36

i
!

NOTES

1. The Indian Army Manpower Ceiling comprises the WE and Rfts of all ТА Units in British Commonwealth Occupation Force (Including Brindiv).
Replacements will be demanded from General Headquarters (India).

(a) Officers (b) Вова of the RE and IACC attached to Indian Units (c) VCOs, IORs and NCsE (d) Members of WVS (I).
BORs other than RE and IACC attached IA Units from part of the British Army Ceiling. Replacements will be demanded from United Kingdom direct.
In the case of the commitment for arms marked* in Part B-Parent Arms basis, no parent arms is specified.

оз

PART “B”—PARENT ARM BASIS
EMEND IECUR GRE

| VOCs |
Total | Officers; BORs| IORs , Total
| NGE |
| 9 | ж | 7 | 289 30
| А [
22: 35 | 1 | 67) ms
6 5 1 : з | 218. 27
i i {
48 | 44 | 22 ; 1566! 1632
Mo] NU | Hào. 333, 455
S | 4 1. | $153 3,201
36 25 | 1 | 1,209; 1,235
:% 58 | 58 | 6| 882
2 | 4
1 37 ae ae 00837
27 | 35 49 | 86 920
юм 43 | 590) 647
1 3 э ә 35
5 3 57 90| 150
2 214. 50 58
H
p dox | 1
: p |
00 5 | | 0
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Booaj|.g ej e
BUR Е 2) B
i i i i
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ee
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| 3% | юз | 513 | ба! 11,398
H

INDEX

Agansing Rai, Naik, V, C.: 84

Allied Control Council: 26-7

Anson Н. M. S.: 122

Atlantic Charter: 1-2

Auchinleck, General Sir Claude: becomes
Commander-inChief, India, 4; visits
Brinjap, 83; his views on employing
Indian troops in Burma and South-
East Asia, 231

Australian Commonwealth Navy Board: 37

Australian Defence Department: 41

Bandoeng: 37th Indian Infantry Brigade in,
228; Headquarters 23rd Indian Division
and 49th Indian Infantry Brigade move
to, 236

Bangka Island: Netherlands East Indies
forces occupy, 245

Bangkok: 218

Barfleur, Н. M. S.: 122

Batavia: re-named Djakarta, 222; British
forces occupy, 226; 23rd Indian Divi-
sion in, 227

Bevin, Mr. Earnest: statement in the House
of Commons about British intentions
in Java, 229

Bladin, Air Commodore F. M.: appointed
Chief of Staff to Lieut.-General
Northcott, 44; see also 118

Brain, Mr. H. N. (Political adviser to
Major-General Gracey): 201

Brinjap (Brindiv): principles for the selec-
tion of, 77; Major-General D. T.
Cowan as Commander of, 78; assem-
bling of, 79; selection of units for,
79-80; Commander-in-Chief, India,
visits and his message to, 83-4; Lieut.-
General Northcott inspects and his
message to, 86; objects of, 86; moves
to Japan and debarkation at Kure,
90-1; designation changed to Brindiv,
94; location of Brindiv, 98; move to
Okayama, 100; communications and
transport for, 107-9; operational
duties of, 110; security in the area
allotted to, 111; occupational duties of,
114-18; general duties of, 119-21;
supervises Japanese general elections,
120-1; liaison with Allied troops,
121-2; liaison with the Japanese, 122;
intelligence activities of, 126; training in
the units of, 127; manpower problems
for, 127-8; armour for, 129-30;
Artillery support for, 130; engineers
and their task in, 130-3; signal commu-
nications in, 134-7; supply and trans-
port for, 137-9; Ordnance stores
distribution to, 130-40; Electrical and
Mechanical Engineers in, 141-2;
education branch in, 142; morale of
Indians in, 143; medical facilities for,

144-5; health of the troops in, 145;
welfare and other recreational facilities
for, 146-50; pay organisation for, 151-
2; Public Relations Detachment ín,
152-3; British and American corres-
pondents visit, 153; radio programmes
and film shows to, 153-5

British Army:
2nd British Division, 230
5th British Brigade, 104, 156
2 Dorset, 153
30th Field Battery, 130

British Borneo: Australian forces re-occupy,
246; Lord Mountbatten visits Australian
forces in, 246; Military administration
in, 246; 20th Indian Division in, 246

British Commonwealth Occupation Force
(BCOF): 16-18; selection of area for,
18-20; strategic, political and economic
considerations of the occupation of
Japan by, 30-1; objects of occupation
of Japan by, 32-4; Joint Chiefs of
Staff, Australia vested with the right to
control and administer, 35; organisation
and arrangements for the control of,
44-7; area allotted to, 45-6; respon-
sibility of, 46; shipping arrangements
for, 50; difficulty in getting more Indian
officers for, 53; channels of communica-
tion for, 55-6; organisation of, 56;
Order of Battle of, 57; administration
of, 60; dependents’ families іп, 62-3;
amenities and welfare for, 63; main-
tenance of, 64; suppliesand accommoda-
tion for, 64-6; movement and trans-
portation for, 66; postal, currency and
financial arrangements for, 67-74;
lessons from the experience of postal
services in, 69; long-term maintenance
for, 74; lessons from 79; relationship
with National Contingents, 94-5;
relief works by, 103-4; re-organisation
of, 104-5; recreational facilities for,
147-50; decision to reduce the streng
of, 158; plan to withdraw Indian
troops from, 158-62; final departure of
Indian troops from, 162-4

Budhi Bahadur Thapa, Rifleman: 116

wthorn, Major-General: 41, 72; repre-
e sents Commander-in-Chief, India on Jo-
int Chiefs of Staff, Australia, 86; visits 4
Royal Indian Air Force Squadron in
Japan, 126
Cedille, Colonel (French): 201
Chiang Kai-shek: 1, 193 _ -
Chifley, Mr. (Australian Prime Minister):
14, 2

4,
istison Lieut-.General Sir Philip: as
Ch ied Force Commander in Netherlands
East Indies, 221; see also 223, 225,
227, 232, 254

3i4-

k Kerz, Sir A. (Special Ambassador of
Clark Korn A Kingdom in Java): 233, 236
Clarkol (Special Column): 206
Combined Chiefs of Staff: 4 —
Combined Chiefs of Staff Committee: 2
Cowan, Major-General, D. 1. : аз Com-

manier British Indian Division of

BCOF, 44; selected as Commander
Brinjap, 78; issues message оп assuming
command, 79; inspects troops at

Mashrul Camp and raises * Force 152”,

82; leaves Japan and bis message to
troops, 105; meets Pressmen in the
ship Dunera, 153; sec alse 85, 95, 116, 150
Cripps, Sir Stafford: 3 с .
Curtin, Mr. John (Australian Prime
Minister}: 3
d’Argeniieu, Vice-Admiral (French): 205,
208

Derevyanko, General (Russian representa-
tive on the Allied Control Council): 27

Devonshire (Ship): 163

Dilwara (Ship): 162

Dunera (Ship): 91-2, 153

Eichelberger, General (О. S. Eighth Army
--- Gommander): 9

Etajima: 118

Evatt, Rt. Hon, H. V. (Australian Minister
for External Affairs): 15, 156-7; meets
General Cawthorn and Indian High
Commissioner, 157; writes to Mr. Nehru
тета of Indian troops in Japan,

Festing, Major-General Frank: 9)

French Indo-China: 192-3; political
developments in, 193-4; British forces
in, 196; occupation of, 197-8; Lady
Mountbatten in, 200; Military position
in, 201-2; developments in Saigon,
202; 32 Indian Infantry Brigade in,
202; developments in other parts of,
203-8; the French take over responsi-
bility for, 208-13; withdrawal of Indian
troops from, 214-15; Royal Air Force
leaves, 215; Franco-Viet Namese
agreement in, 236; evacuation of
Japanese from, 248-50

Fourteenth Army; 170

Gairdner, General: 28
Gaje Ghale, Jemadar, V. C.: 84, 118
Gascoigne, Mr. (United Kingdom Ambas-
sador to Japan): 28
any: 5

y:
Godavari, H. M. I. S.: 124-5

Gracey, Major-General D. D.: 1
201, 212, 249 ere

Hamada: 67
Hatta, Dr.: 220
awthorn, Major-General (Command
23rd Indiam Division). 226 d
Helfrich, Admiral: 224, 229, 232

POST-WAR OCCUPATION FORCES: JAPAN AND S.-E. ASIA

Hiro: 138-9, 141

Hirohito, Emperor: 8

Hiroshima: 5, 47-8

Hong Kong: 1, 153

Hugh Hoffman, Brigadier-General: 116

India: proposes integration of Indian
Administrative Units for functional
control only, 53; agrees to meet the
cost of Indian Component in BCOF,
72; share of Pool Account in BCOF, 73

Indian Army:

7 Cavalry: provides the armour for
Brindiv, 129; main role during stay in
Japan, 129; returns to India for
reorganisation, 129

16 Light Cavalry: 213

4th Indian Infantry Brigade: 241-3

20th Indian Infantry Brigade: 199 .

32nd Indian Infantry Brigade: 210-11

33rd Indian Infantry Brigade: 217

80th Indian Infantry Brigade: 211-13

100th Indian Infantry Brigade: 211, 214

268th Indian Infantry Brigade: 80;
Brigadier K. S. Thimayya as Com-
mander of, 81; Brigadier Shrinagesh
as Commander of, 105; returns to
India as the last undivided contin-
gent of the Indian Army, 144; made
responsible for withdrawal of the
whole of Indian Contingent from
Japan, 158-9; breaks into four
echelons, 158; leaves Japan, 165

7th Indian Division: 172, 216-18

17th Indian Division: 79

20th Indian Division: 172, 201, 209,
213, 214

26th Indian Division: 172, 216

ki nm Company Indian Engineers:

1 Mahratta; 117

114 Field Regiment: 212

14/13 Frontier Force Rifles: 205, 211,
213-14

1/1 Gurkha Rifles: 198, 205, 212, 214

2/5 Royal Gurkha Rifles: known as the
famous “ Triple V. C." Battalion,
80; see also 115, 117-18, 162

4/2 Gurkha Rifles: 210

4/10 Gurkha Rifles: 205, 212-14

16 Indian Field Battery: 130

26 Indian Field Battery: returns to
India: 130

111 Indian Infantry Workshop: 142

23 Mountain Regiment: 212

I Punjab: 116,118

9/14 Punjab: 210 КҮРЕ

Indian Air Force Signals: 134; arrives in
Japan, 136; important lessons during
the stay in Japan, 137

Indian Contingent: tasks of, 96; means of
achieving, 97-8; withdrawal from
Japan, 106, 156; negotiations for
withdrawal of, 156; warning order and
plan of withdrawal, 158.60

Indian Troops: land in Kure, 91-2; take

INDEX

part in Empire Day celebrations, 102;
move to Shikoku Island, 104; haison
with the Japanese, 122-3; morale of,
143; final withdrawal from Japan, 162

Indian Prisoners of War: recovery of, 186-91

Indonesa: declaration of Independence
and efforts to defend it, 222-3; mass
violence against the British forces in,
226-7; Brush build up military
strength іп, 226; negotiations for settle-
ment with the Dutch, 235-5, celebrates
first anniversary of the Republic, 238;
truce with the Dutch and Linggajati
Agreement, 238; clashes with the British
patrols, 242

Itagaki, General (Commander, Imperial
Japanese 7th Army): 9

Iwakun:: Air port of entry for BCOF: 49;
capacity of air port at, 49; air-booking
centre at, 66; Indian Air Formation
Signals at, 134

Jain, Dr. L. С: as Economic Adviser to
the Commonwealth Representative,
27; promoted as the head of the Indian
Laaison Mission in Tokyo, 29

Japan: 1; surrenders and terms of the
surrender, 6-8; American troops land
in, 9; aims of the Allied occupation of,
10; military objects of the occupation
of, 13, 32; Alhed troops for, 14; as an
American base, 25; Laision Mission in,
28-9: British Commonwealth policy
regarding occupation of, 30; strategic,
political and economic considerations of
BCOF іп, 30.1; service families of
BCOF move to, 62; concentration and
move of Brinjap to, 77-93; severe
earthquake in, 103; cyclones in, 110;
problem of Korcans in, 111-12; Royal
Indian Navy and Air Force in, 124-6;
Indian Air Force Signals in. 134-7;
Indian families in, 143

Java: Japanesc landing in, 2; British and
Indian Forces in, 226; revolts against
Dutch, 228; British intentions in, 229;
events in, 230-8; terror and extremism
in, 236-7, evacuation of Japanese
prisoners from, 253-5, strength of
Japanese Army 1n, 254

Joint Chiefs of Staff, Australia: 33, 35;
vested to control and administer British
Commonwealth Occupation Force, 35.
composition and responsibility of, 35-6;
friction with Australtan Defence Depart-
ment by the overseas members of, 36;
Chairman defines the functions of the
members of. 38-9; dissolved, 41;
functions and achievements of. 41-3;
comprised of, 45; directive to C-in-C,
BCOF for the mounting of the Force, 51

Jones, Mi. Frederick (New Zealand De-
fence Minister): 117. Ж

Kandy: Siamese delegation at, 217

Katayama Tetsu: becomes Prime Minister
of Japan, 121

315

Killearn, Lord (Controller of i
Affairs in SEAG), 237 ар

Kochi; 67

Korea- 112

Kumaon Band: 163

Kure: base port for BCOF, 46; capacity
of the port at, 49; ге, ес storage facilities
at, 61, integrated Base Post Office at,
67; advance base fachtes at the port
of, 85, debarkation of Brinjap at, 91;
Н. M. S. Anson and Barfluer visit, 122;
Indian Aw Formation Signals (IAFS)
arnves at, 134; BCOF sports and
amusements at, 150

Lawson, Rt. Hon. J. ].: 224

Leclerc, General (French): 200, 201, 212

Linggajati Agreement: 238

Lockhari, Lieut -General В. M.: 82-3

Longemann, Dr. (Minister of Holland for
Overseas Territories): 230

MacArthur, General Douglas: arrives in
Australia, 3, +, enters Tokvo, 9; agree-
ment with Northcott, 15-16; President
Truman’s directive to, 25; BCOF forms
part of occupation Гогсе under, 45;
Operation Instruction No. 3 and gives
practical shape to MacArthur—North-
cott agreement, 51

MacArthur—Northcott Agreement: 15, 16-

17, 51, 156
MacMahon Ball. 27
Mallaby, Brigadier (Commander, 49th

Indian Infantry Bngade): 227

Mansergh, Major-General E. C.: 230; takes
ВЕ as Allied Commander in Java,

Mashrul Camp: Indian camp at, 81-2;
Indian units concentrate at, 82; * Force
152” raised at, 82

Matsue: 141, 147

Matsuyama: 67

McLachlan, Air Commodore I. D.: 136

Medan: 26th Indian Division concentrates
in, 240; Indian troops in, 241-3;
Netherlands troops relieves SEAC
troops from, 243

Meiji Shrine. 116

Melbourne Army Headquarters: respon-
sibility of: 64-6 А

Missouri (U.S. Ship): Japanese envovs sign
the unconditional surrender on board
the, 7

Miyajima Island; 150

Molotov, Mr. (Soviet Foreign Minister): 6

Mountbatten, Admural Lord Louis
(Supreme Alhed Commander, SEAC):
4; accepts surrender of all Japanese
forces in. South-East Asia, 8; accepts
personal suiiender of Ficld-Marshal
‘ount Terauchi's family swords, 206,
inspects Brnjap, 91; rehnquishes res-
ponsibility, 215: invites Siamese
Military Mission to his headquarters at
Kandy, 216: policy in Netherlands

316

East Indies and Dutch reaction to,
224; sends his Director of Intelligence
to London and Holland, 229; raises the
question of British policy in Indonesia,
231; visits Java, 237; see also. 153, 200-1,
209, 211-12, 217, 221, 226, 236, 253

Nagasaki: 6

Namdeo Jadhao, Sepoy, У. С.: 84 —

Nehru, Pandit Jawaharlal (Prime Minister
of India): presses for the withdrawal of
Indian troops from Japan, 156-7

Netherlands East Indies: 220; South-East
Asia Command takes the responsibilty
to maintain peace in, 221; General
Chnsüson as Allied Force Commander
in, 221; Brush landings іп, 222;
situation in, 224; the Dutch take over
civil authority іп, 237-8; rchef of
from Japanese occupation, 246 у

Nimmo, Brigadier (Commander Australian
Infantry Brigade Group): 45

Noel Baker, Mr.: 229

Northcott, Lieut.-General J.: 15; agree-
ment with General MacArthur (Mac-
Arthur-Northcott Agreement), 15-17;
returns to Austraha, 21; resumes dis-
cussions with MacArthur, 22; as
Commander of British Gommon-
wealth Occupation Force, 44-5; visits
India, 51; lays down policy regarding
fraternisation, 60-1; inspects Brinjap
before its departure to Japan, 86; visits
General Headquarters, (India), New
Dethi and appoints an Indian Officer
as his A.D.C., 87; see also 102

Okayama: 67, 140-1, 150

Pacific War Council: 3

Padang: Indian troops in, 243-4; dis-
turbances in, 244

Palembang: Ist Burma Regiment іп, 244;
disturbances in, 245; 71 Indian Infantry
and 1 Lincolns m, 245; Netherlands
troops take over the control of, 245

Paranjpye, Dr. (Indian High Commissioner
in Australia): 157

Patterson, Rear Admiral: 225

Pearl Harbour: 1

Pickard, Lieut.-Col. E. С.:205

Rajendra Singh, Lieut.-Col.: 165

Ranch; (Ship): 105

RAPWI: 174-5; plans for, 175-6; initial
operations to contact, 176-8; care of
рог to evacuation, 179; movement of,
181-4; see also 221

Red Cross; 185-6

RIASC: Organiauon of units in, 139

Richelieu (French Battleship), 207

Robertson, General: 105

Roya! Indian Navy: in Japan, 124

Royal Indian Air Force: 4 Squadron
arrives іп Japan, 93; activities in
Japan, 125-6; leaves Saigon, 215

Rydr, Major-General Chase W (U, S. IX
Corps Commander): 117

POST-WAR OCCUPATION FORCES: JAPAN AND S.-E. ASIA

Saigon: military position in, 201; develop-
ments in, 202; Vice-Admiral d'Argenheu
arrives in, 205; fighting in, 206-7;
French 9th Colonial Infantry Division
arrives in, 209; 32nd Indian Infantry
Brigade moves from, 211

Sanganaya: 140

Semarang: 233

Seni Pramoj: becomes Prime Minister of
Siam, 217

Scott, General: 147

Sharifuddin, Dr. (Head of the Indonesian
National Army): 234

Shikoku: 49, 67

Shimane: 49

Shrinagesh, Brigadier S. M.: selected as
Commander of 268th Indian Infantry
Brigade, 105; message to Major-
General Cowan by, 105; ensures no
discrimination or communal propa-
ganda in the Units, 144; message from
Head of the Allied Government Team
at Okayama to, 163; goes io Australia
as Indian representative on Japanese
Peace Conference, 164

Siam: see under Thailand

Singapore: 2 д

Sjahrir, Dr.: forms his cabinet and expresses
willingness to co-operate with foreign
powers, 229; visits important centres in
East Java, 232

Soekarno, Dr.: organises the country
against Colonialism, 221; chooses his
cabinet, 223; appeals to President
Truman and Premier Attlee for inter-
vention and Marshal Stalin for moral
support in the struggle for freedom, 229;
Netherlands Government's refusal tone-
gotiate with, 229; moves to Jogjakarta,
234; assumes supreme power among
extremists, 238

Soerio, R. M. D. (Indonesian Governor in
East Java): 230

Sourabaya: flare up and adverse Anglo-
Indonesian relations in, 227; Dr.
Soekarno and Commander 23rd Indian
Division arrive in, 227; stiff resistance
by Indonesians in, 235

South-East Asia Command: 4; issues direc-
uons to local Commanders for occupa-
tion, 171-3; plans for restoration of law
and order in French Indo-China, 195-
6; transfers Field-Marshal Terauchi
to Singapore, 214; transfers duties to
French Miltary Commander, 215;
task of in the occupation of Siam, 217;
responsibility of to maintain peace in
Netherlands East Indies, 221

Stewart, Brigadier, K. L.: 45

Sumatra: 2; occupation of by BCOF,
180; situation in, 238-9; геосси-
pation by BCOF and its objects
for, 239; 26th Indian Division in, 239;
Dutch troops take over control of, 243;
Баа of Japanese prisoners from,

INDEX 317
Takamatsu: 67, 139 Truman. President: issues directive to
Takuma: 67 MacArthur regarding aims in the

Terauchi, Count (Japanese over-all Com-
mander in South-East Asia): 8, 172-3;
surrenders family swords to Lord
Mountbatten, 206; transferred to
Singapore, 214

Vhailand: geographical position of, 215;
climate, 216; Allied occupation of, 216;
treaty with United Kingdom, Australia
and China, 218; elections in, 218;
normal conditions re-established 1n and
occupation forces move from, 218;
evacuation of Japanese prisoners from,
250-2

Thimayya, Brigadier К. S. (now General):
9; as Commander 268th Indian Infantry
Brigade, 81; leaves Japan and his
messages to BCOF, 102-3

Tokushima: 67

Tokyo: 19; British Commonwealth sub-
area at, 21; Gurkhas in, 115-17; Brindiv
guard duties in, 115; 1 Punjab in, 116;
Mahrattas in, 117

“Tottori: 49, 67, 102

occupation of Japan, 10
Twelfth Army: 170

United Kingdom Indian Element (UKIN-
DEL): functions of, 41
United States Eighth Army: 18, 131; Fifth
Air Force, 18
Uno: 67

Van Mook, Dr.: 224; confers with Dr.
Soekarno, 229

Van O Yen, General: 225

Venus, Н. М. 5 : 241

Viwatcha Chaiyant (Siamese Prince): 218

Wadashima: 16; Indian troops at, 130, 139
Wavell, General Sir Archibald P.: 1, 4
Weir, Major-General: 117

Yama, Colonel: arrest of, 124
Yamaguchi: 49

Yoshida, Premier (Japan): 121

Zahir Ahmad, Mr.: 75